I.A. Ansari, J.
1. The moot question, raised in this Criminal Petition, is this: Whether it is permissible, under the law, for a Magistrate, specified in Section 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short, 'the Code'), to direct production before him of a male muslim child, aged about two years, if such a child is as alleged by the mother of the child to have been forcibly removed from her custody by her husband and kept confined against her will? Yet another important question, which this Criminal Petition raises, is this: Is forcible removal of a male muslim child, aged about two years, by his father from the custody of his mother amounts to an offence of wrongful confinement within the meaning of Section 340 IPC?
2. Before I enter into the merit of the present petition, the material facts, leading to this petition, may be noted as follows:
(i) A complaint was made to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kokrajhar, by the opposite party herein, her grievances being, in brief, thus: The accused No. 1 (i.e., the petitioner No. 1 herein) is her husband, their marriage having been solemnized about 11 years ago and after their marriage, they lived together as husband and wife till the last part of the month of April, 2005, at the residence of the accused at village Kaithpara Part-II under Abhayapuri Police Station, in the district of Bongaigaon. The male child, born in their wedlock, is presently aged about two years seven months. In the last part of April, 2007, the accused-petitioner No. 1 quarreled with the complainant and drove her out of her matrimonial house with her said minor child and dropped them at the residence of the complainant's elder brother, at Boro Bhadeyaguri, under Kokrajhar Police Station and since then, the complainant has been residing with her said minor child at her said elder brother's residence and it is her elder brother, who has been supporting and maintaining her and her child. On 31.05.2007, accused No. 1, accompanied by the accused No. 2 (who is cousin of the accused No. 1) appeared, suddenly, at the residence of the complainant's said brother and forcibly took away the said suckling baby from the custody of the complainant. On his return home, the complainant's elder brother searched for the accused at Kokrajhar town and other places, but came to learn that the accused had left Boro Bhadeyaguri by bus and had gone to his house at Kaithpara Part-II. On 01.06.2007 and 02.06.2007, the complainant with her elder brother and others went to the house of the accused No. 1 to bring her minor child, but the two accused persons did not allow her to bring her child; rather, the two accused threatened the complainant and her companion with assault and asked them not to come, again, to the house of the accused, though the said minor child, on seeing his mother, was eager and crying to come to the lap of his mother. As the said child is a suckling baby and has been suffering from serious illness and yet he has been kept confined forcibly against the consent of his mother in whose custody the child was, the custody of the child is wrongful and the accused have thereby committed offences under Sections 365/343/506/34 IPC. The complainant accordingly prayed for taking penal action against the two accused aforementioned and also issue a search warrant in exercise of powers under Section 97 of the Code and give custody of the child to her.
(ii) Upon, however, examining the complainant under Section 200 of the Code and holding an enquiry under Section 202 thereof, the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kokrajhar, held that no case of comission of any offence can be said to have been made out against the two accused inasmuch as both father and mother are natural guardians of the said child and taking away of the said child by her father, who is a guardian, does not amount to an offence of wrongful confinement. On the conclusion so reached, the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate passed, on 07.06.2007, an order declining to issue search warrant as had been sought for by the complainant and dismissed the complaint.
(iii) Aggrieved by the order, dated 07.06.2007, aforementioned, the complainant filed a revision, which gave rise to Criminal Motion No. 6(2)/2007. By an order, dated 13.06.2007, passed in the revision, learned Sessions Judge, Kokrajhar, directed, inter alia, issuance of notice to the accused. As the accused did not appear on the date fixed and service report had also not been received by the revisional Court, the learned Sessions Judge passed an order, on 20.06.2007, fixing the case on 28.06.2007 and directing, in the meanwhile, issuance of notice to the complainant's husband, (i.e., the accused petitioner No. 1 herein) to produce the child, in question, in the Court. On the date fixed, (i.e., on 28.06.2007), a petition was filed by the learned Counsel for the accused petitioner praying for time for hearing, but did not produce the child as had been directed by the order, dated 20.06.2007, aforementioned. The learned Sessions Judge, then, passed an order, on 28.06.2007, fixing the case, on 02.07.2007, and also directing, once again, the accused petitioner to produce the child, in the Court, on the date of the hearing. When the matter came up on 02.07.2007, a petition was filed by the accused praying for time to produce the child, in the Court, on the ground that the accused No. 1 (i.e., the father of the said child) had been suffering from diarrhoea Another petition was filed on that very day, whereby time was sought for hearing on the ground that some relevant documents were required to be collected. However, upon hearing the learned Counsel for the petitioner and also the learned Public Prosecutor, learned Sessions Judge fixed the revision, on 07.07.2007, for production of the child and hearing of the revision. On the date so fixed, i.e. on 07.07.2007, yet another petition was filed, on behalf of the accused petitioner, seeking time for hearing on the ground, inter alia, that the accused could not come to the Court due to the sudden bandh call announced by the Adivasi people. The learned Sessions Judge, noted in his order, dated 07.07.2007, to the effect that the bandh call, given by the Adivasi people, had stood withdrawn and this news had already been published in the newspaper, the child was about two years seven months old and is a suckling baby, who is alleged to have been forcibly taken away from the custody of his mother, it is necessary to direct the Officer-in-Charge, Abhayapuri Police Station, to produce the child in the Court, on 07.07.2007, from the custody of the accused. The revision was accordingly fixed, on 10.07.2007, for production of the child and hearing. It is, at this stage, that the present petition, under Section 482 of the Code, has been filed, in this Court, by the accused persons seeking to get set aside and quashed the orders, dated 20.06.2007 and 07.07.2007, aforementioned whereby directions for production of the child and also for issuance of search warrant were passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Kokrajhar.
3. I have heard Mr. A.M. Mazumdar, learned Senior counsel for the petitioners, and Mr. S.C. Biswas, learned Counsel for the complainant opposite party.
4. While considering the present revision, it is pertinent to note, at the very outset, that, however subtle may be, there lies a distinction between a guardian and a custodian. (See Medai Dalavoi T. Kumaraswami Mudaliar v. Medai Dalavoi Rojammal reported in : AIR1957Mad563 ). A person, entitled to the custody of an infant child, may not necessarily be his or her guardian, whether natural, testamentary or otherwise. This apart, an infant child may be in the custody of a person as custodian or as a guardian. Guardianship involves more comprehensive and valuable right than custody. When a woman, as mother of an infant child, has the custody of the child by an order of the Court, removal of such child from the custody of the mother even by the child's father, who may be natural guardian, would be an illegal and wrongful act.
5. What is also important to bear in mind is that wrongful confinement has been defined in Section 340 IPC thus: 'Whoever wrongfully restraints any person in such a manner as to prevent that person from proceeding beyond certain circumscribing limits is said wrongfully to confine that person'. From the definition so given, it is evident that wrongful confinement is a species of wrongful restraint as defined in Section 339 IPC. While, in wrongful restraint, there is only a partial suspension of ones liberty, wrongful confinement reflects total suspension of liberty beyond certain prescribed limits. The period of suspension is immaterial for constituting an offence of wrongful confinement or wrongful restraint. When a person is restrained and is prevented from going, where he has a right to go, the restraint becomes wrongful if such restraint is not in exercise of any right, power or authority under any law.
6. Wrongful confinement is an offence against human body. Thus, when one man compels another to stay in any given place against his will, he imprisons that other person just as much as if he has locked him up in a room. The act of compelling a man to remain within a prescribed limit against his will, and without right, authority or power under the law, amounts to his imprisonment and this imprisonment is nothing, but wrongful confinement. When a minor is kept against the will of the person, who held the custody of such a child and who is entitled to take the custody of the child, such detention would amount to wrongful confinement, for, in such a case, it is the will of the person, who is entitled to have custody of such a child, which will be the will of the child, for, the child's willingness or consent would be immaterial unless unless the welfare of the child, in a given case, demands removal of the child from the custody of the person, who is, otherwise, entitled to keep the custody of the child. Guardian and custodian are not synonyms with each other. Thus, even when a parent; who, with impunity, snatches away a child from the lawful custody of the other parent, who held such custody and who is entitled to have the custody of the child under the law, personal, statutory or otherwise, such snatching away of the child and his detention against the will of the parent in whose custody the child was, would amount to an offence of wrongful confinement.
7. What emerges from the above discussion is that it is an incorrect proposition of law that a father would never be held liable for offence of wrongful confinement if he detains the child by having snatched her away from the mother, who was, under some authority of law, had, at the time of so snatching away the child, the custody of the child and is entitled to have custody of the child.
8. In Dushyant Somal v. Sushma Somal : 1981CriLJ719 , Dushyant Somal and Sushma Somal were legally wedded spouses. Because of their estranged relation, their daughter, Sweta, and son, Sandeep, both of whom were minor, lived with the mother, who used to live separately from her husband. The other had obtained an ex parte order of custody by making an application under the Guardian and Wards Act and, with the help of police, recovered the custody of her son, Sandeep, from her husband. The wife alleged that on 27th October, 1980, at about 7 a.m., when Sandeep, escorted by his maternal grand mother, was waiting at the bus stop, his father, Captain Dushyant, accompanied by three or four persons, came in a car and forcibly took away the child. When the child was so taken away, his mother, Sushma, was helping her daughter, Sweta, to board a school bus. The police registered a case under Section 363 IPC against the father of the child. Having failed to trace out the whereabouts of her daughter, Sweta, the mother applied to the Delhi High Court for a writ of habeas corpus directing the husband to produce her son. The husband took the plea that the entire case had been fabricated against him, his case being that as the child had already completed 5 years of age, the child was entitled to be kept in the custody of the father. The High Court chose to record evidence. Sushma examined herself and her mother as witnesses. They were neither cross examined by Captain Dushyant nor did he examine himself as a witness. A writ was accordingly issued by the High Court directing Captain Dushyant to produce the child before the court so that the custody of the child could be entrusted to the mother. Despite such a writ having been issued, when Captain Dushyant failed to produce the child, the contempt proceeding was initiated and having found him guilty, he was detained in civil prison. This order came before the Supreme Court. The relevant observations made by the Supreme Court, in this case, are of some significance. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court was correct in coming to the conclusion that Captain Dushyant had taken away the child unlawfully from the custody of his mother. The Court also observed that though a Court will not be justified in punishing an alleged contemner if it is impossible for the contemner to abide by the order passed by the Court, but this does not mean that a writ of habeas corpus cannot or will not be issued against a parent, who, with impunity, snatches away a child from the lawful custody of the other parent to whom a Court has given such custody nor does it mean that despite the contemptuous conduct of such a parent in not producing the child, even after a direction to do so has been given to him, such a father can still plead justification for the disobedience of the order by merely persisting that he had not taken away the child and/or by contending that it is/was impossible to obey the order. At yet another place, the Supreme Court observed that if after producing the child, Captain Dushyant wanted to retain the custody of the child, he was free to satisfy the Court of the child was lawfully in his custody.
9. From the observations, as made in Dushyant Somal (supra), one aspect of law becomes clear that no parent can, with impunity, take away a minor from the custody of the other parent, who holds the custody of the child by authority of law. Such authority may be derived not necessarily by only orders or directions of the Court, but also from the personal law of the parties, the statutory law, if any, or order of the Court. It would, therefore, be wrong to contend, as has been done in the present, on behalf of the petitioners, that the petitioner No. 1, being the natural guardian of the child, in question, could have never been held responsible for the commission of offence of wrongful confinement even if he had taken away the child from the custody of the child's mother forcibly and detained the child in his custody against the will of the mother.
10. In this revision, I must hasten to point out, I am not concerned with the question as to whether any offence has been committed by the petitioner-father or not. What I am, however, concerned with, in this revision, is a correct statement of law and the correct statement of law is that even a person, who may be guardian, can be held responsible, in a given case, for commission of wrongful confinement if the child is taken away from the custody of the either parent against his or her will if such parent was holding the custody of the child pursuant to any authority of law. It is equally important to note that in matters concerning custody of a minor child, the paramount consideration is the welfare of the minor and not necessarily the legal right to any particular party. [See Veena Kapoor v. Varinder Kumar Kapoor reported in : AIR1982SC792 ).
11. What I may also point out is that a person can, indeed, invoke the provisions of Section 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure even if he had the statutory remedy available, under Guardian and Wards Act, to seek appointment as guardian or custody of a child. The Court cannot refuse to act in terms of the provisions of Section 97 if a case of wrongful confinement of a child against one of the child's parents is, otherwise, made out. The Court cannot, in such a case, ask the aggrieved party to go to the civil court for obtaining relief under the Guardian and Wards Act. This becomes clear from the decision in Gohar Begum v. Suggi Alias Nazma Begum and Ors. : 1960CriLJ164 , wherein the Apex Court observed:
We further see no reason why the appellant should have been asked to proceed under the Guardian and Wards Act for recovering the custody of the child. She had of course the right to do so. But she had also a clear right to an order for the custody of the child under Section 491 of the Code. The fact that she had a right under the Guardians and Wards Act is no justification for denying her the right under Section 491. That is well established as will appear from the cases hereinafter cited.
It is further well established in England that in issuing a writ of habeas corpus a court has power in the case of an infant to direct its custody to be placed with a certain person. In The King v. Greenhill (1836) 4 AD & E 624, 640; 111 ER 922,927) Lord Denman, CJ, said:
When an infant is brought before the Court by habeas corpus if he be of an age to exercise a choice, the Court leaves him to elect where he will go. If he be not of that age, and want a direction would only expose him to dangers or seductions, the Court must make an order for his being placed in the proper custody.
See also The Queen v. Clarke (1857) 7 EL & BL 186 : 119 ER 1217).
In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. IX, Article 1201 at page 702 it is said:
Where, as frequently occurs in the case of infants, conflicting claims for the custody of the same individual are raised, such claims may be enquired into on the return to a writ of habeas corpus and the custody awarded to the proper person.
Section 491 is expressly concerned with the directions of the nature of a habeas corpus. The English principles applicable and that of a writ of habeas corpus, therefore, apply here. In fact the our country have always exercised the power to direct under Section 491 in a fit case that the custody of an infant be delivered to the applicant: See Rama Iyer v. Natraja Iyer AIR 1948 Mad 294, Zara Bibi v. Abdul Razzak (1910) XIII Bom. LR 891 and Subbuswami Goundan v. Kamakshi Ammal (1930) ILR 53 Mad 72. If the Courts did not have this power, the remedy under Section 491 would in the case of infants often become in fructuous.
12. From a combined reading of the observations made in Dushyant Somal (supra) and Gohar Begum (supra), what becomes transparent is that in the matter of custody of a child, it is the welfare of the minor, which is of paramount consideration, and, while considering the question of custody of a minor child, under Section 97 of the Code (Section 491 of the old Code), the English principles, applicable to the issue of a writ of habeas corpus, applies and, in an appropriate case, the Court has the power and, in fact, a duty to direct delivery of the custody of the child to that parent, whose custody would best suit the welfare of the child, particularly, when the child has been produced, in the Court, from the custody of a person, who is alleged to have snatched away the child from the custody of the mother even if such snatcher is father of the child.
13. I may pause here to point out that a Division Bench of Madras High Court, in S. Rama Iyer v. K.V. Nataraja Iyer AIR 1948 Madras 294, concluded that an application under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, (i.e., Section 97 of the new Code) by natural guardian of a minor for custody of the minor, who has been illegally detained by another person, i.e. detained against the wishes of the natural guardian, is maintainable and the fact that the guardian could have sought for appropriate orders under the Guardians and Wards Act and has not availed of such remedy is immaterial and inconsequential. The Division Bench, in S. Rama Iyer (supra), further held that in the case of a minor, who is not capable of making up his mind and decide between the right and wrong, his will is not material and what is material is the will of the guardian.
14. In Subbuswami Goundan v. Kamakshi Ammal and Anr. reported in 1930 ILR Mad 72, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court had the occasion to deal with an application made under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, whereby the husband had sought to recover the custody of his minor wife alleged to have been illegally detained by her parents. The Court took the view that if a minor, even though with her consent, remains in the custody of a person, such a person must be held to have illegally detained the minor within the meaning of Section 491 if any other person, who is better entitled in law to have the custody of the minor, desires to have the custody of the minor. The Division Bench, for coming to such a conclusion, relied on Abraham v. Mahtabo (1889) ILR Cal 487.
15. Bearing in mind the broad principles of law governing the application of Section 97 of the Code, let me, now, turn to the Muslim Personal Law of the Sunni Muslims as regards the custody of a child vis-a-vis his or her guardianship, for, the parties, in this revision, are, admittedly, Sunni Muslims.
16. According to Muslim Personal Law, the minority of a male or female terminates, when he or she attains puberty. Under the Indian Majority Act, the minority ceases on completion of 18th year, but when a guardian has been appointed by the Court, the age of majority is prolonged until the minor completes the age of 20 years. Ordinarily, in India, even under Mohammedan Law, by virtue of the provisions of Indian Majority Act, even when a minor attains the age of puberty, he cannot act on his own, without his guardian, except in the case of marriage, dower and divorce, for, in other cases, his minority continues until completion of the age of 18th years.
17. Mulla, in Principles of Moham medan Law, para 352 (18th Edition), has observed:
352. Right of mother to custody of infant children--The mother is entitled to the custody (Hizanat) of her male child until he has completed the age of seven years and of her female child until she has attained puberty. The right continues though she is divorced by the father of the child, unless she marries a second husband in which case the custody belongs to the father.
18. From what has been recorded by Mulla, in 'Principles of Mohammedan Law', what becomes clear is that the mother is entitled to the custody (Hizanat) of her male child until he has completed the age of seven years and of her female child until she has attained puberty. To the same effect are the observations made in various other authoritative commentaries of Muslim Law. Let me, therefore, pause and refer to these authorities.
19. Hamilton Hiday (Vol. 1 at page 385) observes, 'If a separation takes place between a husband and wife, who are possessed of infant child, the right of nursing and keeping is vested with the mother, because it is recorded that the woman once applied to the Prophet saying:
O Prophet of God : This is my son, the fruit of my womb cherished in my bosom and suckled at my breast and his father is desirous of taking him away from me in his own 'care' to which the Prophet replied. 'Thou hast a right in the child prior to the husband, so long as thou doth not marry with a 'stranger'; moreover, a mother is not only more tender, but also better qualified to cherish a child during infancy so that committing the care to her is of advantage to the child
20. In Fatwai Alamgiri (Vol. 1 page 728), it has been observed:
The mother is of all the persons best entitled to the custody of her infant children during the concubial relationship as well as after its dissolution.
21. Amir Ali in Mohammedan Law, (Vol. II, at page 304) has observed:
The mother can, on no account, give up her right of 'Hizanat', for, even if she were to obtain a Khula in lieu of her abandonment of her right to her child custody, Khula will be valid and she will retain a right of Hizanat.
22. AHA Fyzee in Book Outline of Mohammedan Law, (IV Edition) has observed:
Mother: Custody of an infant child belong to the mother and this right is known as Hizanat. The mother is entitled, in Muslim Law, to the custody of her male child till the age of 7 years and of her female child till puberty.
23. From what have been recorded in the authoritative commentaries on the Principles of Mohammedan Law with regard to the custody of an infant child, what transpires is that the mother is entitled to have the custody (Hizanat) of her infant child up to a prescribed period. The question, however, which may be asked is as to who is the natural guardian of a muslim child--be the child a male or a female. While considering this aspect of the Muslim Law, it needs to be noted that the Privy Council has clarified, in Imambandi v. Mutsaddi reported in (1918) 45 IA 73, that under the Mohammedan Law, the father is the primary and natural guardian of his minor children and that the right and custody of the mother is subject to the supervision of the father, which the father is entitled to exercise by virtue of his guardianship. Though the mother is not a de jure guardian of her minor children under the Mohammedan Law, the fact remains that she has the right to obtain custody of her male child until he completes the age of seven years and of her female child until she attains puberty. The observations made by the Privy Council, in Imambandi (supra) read thus:
It is perfectly clear that under the Mohammedan law the mother is entitled only to the custody of the person of her minor child up to a certain age according to the sex of the child. But she is not the natural guardian; the father alone, or, if he be dead, his executor (under the Sunni Law) is the legal guardian. The mother has no larger powers to deal with her minor child's property than any outsider or non-relative who happens to have charge for the time being of the infant.
24. In fact, it is also imperative that one also takes note of the fact that the right of a Muslim mother to have the custody (Hizanat) of her male child until he attains the age of seven years and of her female child until she attains her puberty is not absolute and unconditional, for, her right to have such custody, though continues even if she is divorced by the father of the child, such right to have the custody would cease if she marries a second husband inasmuch as the right to have the custody of the child, would, in such a case, belong to the father. Mulla, in Principles of Mohammedan Law, has also recorded some other circumstances, which disqualify a Muslim mother from receiving or holding the custody of the child, male or female.
25. The Principles of Mohammedan Law by Mulla, para 354 (Eighteenth Edition) embodies the disqualifications of a Muslim mother from receiving or holding the custody of her child, male or female, as under:
(1) if she marries a person not related to the child within the prohibited degrees' (Sections 260-261) e.g. a stranger, but the right revives on the dissolution of the marriage by death or divorce; or
(2) if she goes and resides, during the subsistence of the marriage, at a distance from the father's place of residence; or
(3) if she is leading an immoral life, as where is a prostitute; or
(4) if she neglects to take proper care of the child.
26. From the authoritative commentaries on the principles of Muslim Personal Law and also the various judicial pronouncements, what becomes clear is that though under the Mohammedan Law, father is the primary and natural guardian of his minor children, both male as well as female, mother is entitled to the custody of her male child until he completes the age of seven years and of her female child until she attains puberty. This right to have the custody of her minor children continues even after the mother is divorced by the father of the child unless she marries a second husband, particularly, a stranger, but the right to receive the custody of her child revives on the dissolution of her marriage with such a stranger by death or divorce. The mother would lose her right to seek custody of such a minor child if she goes and resides, during the subsistence of the marriage, at a distance from the father's place of residence or if she is leading an immoral life or if she neglects to take proper care of the child.
27. In the present case, the opposite party herein, as already indicated above, had lodged a complaint, in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, alleging, inter alia, that her two year old male child had been forcibly snatched away by her husband and some others. The learned Magistrate took the view that a father of Muslim child, being natural guardian, cannot be accused of commission of the offence of wrongful confinement even if the child is taken away from the custody of the mother and detained by the father in his custody against the will of the mother. Whether in the given complaint, sufficient accusations have been made or not disclosing commission of an offence, under Section 340 IPC, is the question, which the learned Sessions Judge would be required to decide in the revision. Suffice it to point out here that the law, in their country, is not that even if one of the parents remove the child from the custody of the other parent, who had, at the relevant time, holding such a custody under some authority of law--be such authority arising from personal law, statutory law or such authority having been derived from the order(s) of the Court.
28. Coupled with the above, it is also worth pointing out that the learned Sessions Judge had the power and authority to direct production of the child in the Court. Such a direction did not decide any of the rights of the parties nor did it decide any given aspect of law. Viewed thus, it is clear that this order was wholly interlocutory in nature. No doubt, it is true that even an interlocutory order can be interfered with by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.PC. The fact, however, remains that in the present case, the learned Sessions Judge's order is not in violation of the law.
29. The narration of facts, as catalogued above, indicates that the petitioner, father herein did not produce the child in the Court on one pretext or another. When a direction given by a Court is according to law, such a direction cannot be evaded by resorting to one excuse or the other. In fact, at the time of hearing of this criminal petition, it was not agitated before this Court that the petitioner had any legal or justifiable cause of not producing the child in the Court. In such circumstances, learned Sessions Judge was competent to enforce the order of production of the child by giving appropriate direction(s) to the police to ensure production of the child in the Court. Considered thus, it is clear that the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity, factual or legal. In the present case, since the child is, admittedly, two years old, though male, the personal law of the parties concerned makes the mother entitled to take such a child into her custody if the child has been forcibly removed from her custody even by his father. These are the aspects, which are to he examined by the learned Sessions Judge.
30. I may, however, hasten to reiterate that a Muslim husband cannot escape the penalty for the offence of wrongful confinement if he takes away the minor child from the custody of the mother, who is entitled to Hizanat, (i.e. custody) of the child.
31. Because of what have discussed and pointed out above, I find absolutely no merit in the presrent criminal petition. This criminal petition, therefore, fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. 32. Considering the matter in its entirety and in the interest of justice, it is hereby directed that the parties to this criminal petition shall appear in the Court of the Sessions Judge, on 06.02.2008, and on that day, the petitioners shall produce the child, in question, in the Court as had been directed and if the petitioners fail or refuse to produce the child, the learned Sessions Judge may pass such further or other order(s) as may be deemed proper in the facts and attending circumstances of the case.