T. Vaiphei, J.
1. This batch of 27 writ petitions, which are inter-linked and virtually involving the same parties, were heard together and are being disposed of by this common Judgment.
2. WP (C) Nos. 94 (SH) and 95 (SH) of 2005 were filed by 27 writ petitioners challenging the legality of the notice dated 7.3.2005 issued to each of them by the Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hills, Shillong (the respondent No. 2) Under Section 8 of the Meghalaya Transfer of Land (Regulations) Act, 1971 ('the Regulations' for short) requiring them to show cause within 15 days as to why action should not be taken against them for possessing the lands described in the schedule therein without obtaining necessary permission under the provisions of the Regulations and the rules made there under.
3. For proper appreciation of the controversies involved in all the writ petitions, the undisputed facts on record may be noticed at the very outset. The petitioner No. 1 in WP (C) No. 94 (SH) 2005 inherited with his brothers jointly the plot of land measuring 5008 square metres situate at Burnside, Kench's Trace, Rilbong, Shillong, from their deceased father, namely, Raisaheb Shivnath Dutta, who had obtained lease agreement from the Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hills, Shillong (the respondent No. 2) in that behalf on 29.8.1931 in accordance with the Assam Land Revenue Regulations, 1881. Upon the death of their father, a fresh lease agreement was executed by the respondent No. 2 on 1.7.1999 for a period of 30 years in their favour. Subsequently, when his two brothers died, the said plot came to be recorded only in the name of the petitioner No. 1. All the remaining 26 petitioners in WP (C) No. 94 (SH) and 95 (SH) of 2005 are admittedly the tenants of the petitioner No. 1. These tenant-petitioners were apparently given Municipal Holdings for enabling them to pay taxes in respect of the plots occupied by each of them. It would appear that in the month of October, 2004, the Shillong Municipal Board cancelled their respective holdings whereupon they instituted civil suits being Title Suit Nos. 115(T), 43(T), 56(T), 39(T), 53(T), 51(T), 37(T), 46(T), 34(T) and 36(T) of 2004 before the learned Assistant to Deputy Commissioner, Shillong challenging the cancellations and managed to obtain interim injunction orders on 18.10.2004 staying the cancellations in the miscellaneous cases filed by them in connection therewith. The said suits are still now pending for adjudication in the trial court. This was followed by the impugned notices (dated 7.3.2005) issued by the Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hills, Shillong Under Section 8 of the Meghalaya Transfer of Land (Regulations) Act, 1971 ('the Act of 1971' for short) to all the writ petitioners except the petitioner No. 1 in WP (C) No. 94 (SH) of 2005 i.e. Subrata Dutta, requiring each of them to show cause within 15 days as to why action should not be taken against them for possessing the said holdings without obtaining necessary permission under the provisions of the Act of 1971 and the rules made thereunder. The said petitioners filed their respective show causes by stating that they had no intention of giving up their tenancy rights over such holdings, which they and their respective families had been occupying for years together and contended therein that such occupation of the holdings by them as the tenants there of under their landlord could not be construed as transfer within the meaning of the provisions of the Act of 1971. In addition to these contentions, the writ petitioners in WP (C) No. 95 (SH) of 2005 also asserted that they inherited their respective holdings from the said Satyabrata Dutta by virtue of the Will dated 26.8.1999 executed by him in their favour. This Court, while issuing notice of motion on 19.4.2005, ordered that the prayer for interim order should be considered on the next date and at the sometime directed that the status quo as on that day be maintained till the next returnable dates.
4. Again, during the pendency of WP (C) Nos. 94 (SH) and 95 (SH) of 2005, the Secretary, Meghalaya Urban Development Authority, Shillong, issued the letters dated 24.10.2005 to all the petitioners except the landlord (Subrata Dutta) charging them of constructing the buildings in their said respective holdings without obtaining valid permission from the competent authority and directed them Under Section A Clause 11 (ii) of the Meghalaya Building Bye-Laws 2001 to dismantle such buildings within 7 days, failing which necessary action would be taken against them under the provisions of the Meghalaya Building Bye-Laws and the Town Planning Act. These letters are under challenge in the next batch of writ petitions filed by them being WP (C) Nos. 363 to 371 (SH) 2005, Nos. 373 and 374 (SH) 2005, Nos. 377 (SH) to 383 (SH) of 2005 and Nos. 385 (SH) to 390 (SH) of 2005. The petitioner in WP (C) No. 363 (SH) 2005 further claimed, and not disputed by the respondents, that he was granted building permission on 11.9.2001 by the Chief Executive Officer of the Municipal Board to construct a house on his holding. As for the remaining petitioners therein in the above noted writ petitions, no such building permissions were granted to them. In so far as the petitioners in WP (C) Nos. 371, 378, 377 to 383 and from Nos. 385 to 390 of 2005, are concerned, their case, as in the previous writ petitions filed by them, is that they are the tenants of the deceased Satyabrata Dutta and then, on his death, of the said Subrata Dutta, who is the son of Satyabrata Dutta and that they constructed those buildings long before the coming into force of the Meghalaya Building Bye Laws, 2001. Thus, according to these tenant-petitioners, the question of violation of such building laws cannot arise.
5. The case of the respondents in WP (C) Nos. 94 and 95 of 2005, as indicated in their affidavit-in-opposition is that the petitioners are the tenants of Shri Subrata Dutta, the petitioner No. 1, in WP (C) No. 94 (SH) of 2005, who does not have any right of ownership as he was granted merely leasehold right by the Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hills District under certain terms and conditions vide the lease agreement dated 1.7.99 and that no right of ownership over the said holdings could be conferred upon the petitioners by him without the permission of the Government. As for the Will dated 26.8.99 purported to have been executed by the late Satyabrata Dutta, father of the said Subrata Dutta, in favour of the petitioners in WP (C) No. 95 (SH) of 2005, it is pointed out by the respondents that in terms of the Circular dated 13.6.1978 issued by the Revenue Department, Govt. of Meghalaya, making of a Will is permitted only to one's family members but not to other relatives or friends and, as such, the Will in question, which was executed in favour of the petitioners, who are not the family members of the propounded testator, and, that too, at Kolkata, amounts to transfer of property from a non-tribal to other non-tribals in contravention of the provisions of the Meghalaya Transfer of Land (Regulations) Act, 1971 and is, accordingly, void and cannot be acted upon. It is the contention of the respondents that the so-called Will is merely a device created by the deceased to circumvent the restrictive law of transfer. According to the respondents, the impugned notices are issued by a competent authority, and do not suffer from any infirmity.
6. The case of the respondents in WP (C) Nos. 363 (SH) to 371 (SH), Nos. WP (C) Nos. 373 (SH) and Nos. 374 (SH) of 2005, from Nos. 377 (SH) to 383 (SH) and from Nos. 385 (SH) to 390 (SH) is that it is for the petitioners therein to show how they got the Municipal holding numbers prior to execution of the so-called Will at Kolkata. They maintain that no valid permission for construction of such houses have been obtained by them. The respondents categorically deny that those houses were constructed by the petitioner’s long back and assert that those constructions are very recent, that too, without obtaining any building permissions. It is stated by the respondents that on site inspection by the officials of the respondent No. 2, the petitioners could not produce valid permission from the competent authority granting them permission for construction of their buildings, which prompted them to issue the impugned notices. It is the contention of the respondents that when the petitioners could not produce valid permissions for construction of their buildings, the question of providing opportunity of hearing to them cannot arise. It is pointed out by the respondents that the Meghalaya Urban Development Authority is not a party to WP (C) No. 94 (SH) of 2005 and that there is no question of their attempting to circumvent either the process of law or of the order dated 19.4.2005. It is also asserted by the respondents that the Revenue Department, Govt. of Meghalaya vide the letter dated 22.9.2003 (Annexure-1 to the affidavit-in-opposition) requested the Meghalaya Urban Development Authority not to grant any building permission to the petitioners whose names were listed therein. Contending that the writ petitions being devoid of merits, the respondents pray for their dismissal with compensatory costs.
7. After hearing Mr. A.S. Siddique, the learned Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. S.P. Mahanta, the learned Counsel for the respondents and Mr. N.D. Chullai, the learned State Counsel, and after going through the materials on record, I am of the view that the first point for consideration is whether the handing over of possession of those holdings by the petitioner No. 1 (Subrata Dutta) in favour of the remaining petitioners in WP (C) Nos. 94 (SH) and 95 (SH) of 2005, whether by the Will dated 26.8.99 or otherwise, can be said to contravene the provisions of the Act of 1971. It is strenuously argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that since the petitioners are occupying the holdings in question either as tenants of the said Subrata Dutta or as successors-in-interest of the late Satyabrata Dutta, who had executed the Will dated 26.8.99, the question of transfer contemplated by Section 3 of the Act of 1971 does not arise. According to the learned Counsel, to attract the provisions of Section 8 of the Act of 1971, it must be shown by the respondents that a transfer in the nature of gift, sale, exchange, mortgage, lease, surrender or any other mode of transfer has taken place between the said Subrata Dutta and the petitioners or between the deceased Satyabrata Dutta and the petitioners in terms of the Will dated 26.8.99. It is thus his contention that the possession of the holdings in question by the petitioners as tenants of the said Subrata Dutta does not involve an element of transfer. The second limb of his contention is that testamentary disposition in the form of the Will dated 26.8.99 executed by the said Satyabrata Dutta cannot corne within the meaning of transfer of property inasmuch as such transaction is not a transfer between living persons. In that view of the matter, submits the learned Counsel, there is no contravention of Section 8 of the Act of 1971 warranting the issuance of the impugned notices by the respondents. Per contra, Mr. N.D. Chullai, the learned Senior Government Advocate, submits that once it is found that the said Subrata Dutta has parted with possession of the said holdings in favour of the petitioners, as in the case here, the former clearly violated Clause 16 of the lease Agreement dated at Annexure-1 to the affidavit-in-opposition, the penalty whereof is the determination of the lease by the Government, which can re-enter such leaseholds. According to the learned State Counsel, neither the said Subrata Dutta nor the petitioners have any right to retain possession of such holdings; they are thus liable to eviction forthwith. He further contends that the Will in question, assuming without admitting the genuineness or validity thereof, has also the effect of transferring the said holdings in favour of the petitioners, or, at any rate, of parting with possession thereof in favour of some of the petitioners, which is hit by Section 8 of the Act of 1971. According to the learned State Counsel, definition of the word 'transfer' appearing in Section 2(d) of the Act of 1971 is inclusive of any mode of transfer including transfer by testamentary disposition. It is thus submitted by the learned Counsel for the State that the impugned notices are perfectly in order and do not call for the interference of this Court.
8. To understand the rival contentions of the parties, it may at this stage be appropriate to refer to Section 3 of the Act of 1971, which is as under:
3. Transfer of land. (1) No land in Meghalaya shall be transferred by a tribal to a non-tribal or by a non-tribal to another non-tribal except with the previous sanction of the competent authority:
Provided that the Government of Meghalaya, if satisfied, may from time to time by notification, prohibiting such transfer of land within such area or areas as may be specified in the notification and thereupon the competent authority shall not sanction any such transfer of land under the provisions of this Act, within such area or areas.
(2) Every notification issued under the proviso to Sub-section (1) of this Section shall-
(i) Have effect on the date of its first publication in the official Gazette of Meghalaya;
(ii) Be laid, as soon as may be after its publication in the official Gazette, before the house of the Legislative Assembly of the State.
(3) Any transfer of land made in contravention of the provisions of this section shall be void and shall not be enforceable in any Court.
Section 2(d) defines the term 'transfer' to mean the conveyance of land of one person to another and includes gift, sale, exchange, mortgage, lease, surrender or any other mode of transfer.
9. From the provisions extracted above, it is obvious that the transfer of land from a tribal to a non-tribal or from a non-tribal to a non-tribal can be affected only after obtaining the previous sanction of the competent authority and any transfer made without such sanction shall be void and cannot be enforceable in any court. The undisputable fact on record is that the petitioners are either occupying the said holdings as tenants or as successors-in-interest of the deceased Satyabrata Dutta by virtue of the Will dated 26.8.99 executed by the former. The term 'transfer' as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act of 1971 plainly gives an extended meaning to it by including within its sweep 'any other mode of transfer' apart from the normal means of transfer such as gift, sale, exchange, mortgage, lease and surrender. As noted earlier, some of the petitioners, who are not covered by the alleged Will, were inducted into their respective holdings by the deceased Satyabrata Dutta as his tenants. This necessarily involved parting with possession of the leasehold premises by the deceased in favour of these petitioners. As noted earlier, some of the petitioners, who are not otherwise covered by the alleged Will, were apparently inducted into the leasehold premises first by the deceased Satyabrata Dutta and thence permitted by the said Subrata Dutta, son of the deceased, to remain there. This necessarily involved parting with possession of the tenancy premises both by these petitioners. At this stage, we may incidentally note that Clause 16 of the lease agreement executed by and between the Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hills, Shillong and the said Subrata Dutta, provides that without previous consent and approval in writing of the Deputy Commissioner granted with the concurrence of the Government, the lessee shall not transfer, assign, sublet or part with possession of the land leased or any portion thereof. Clause 20 of the lease agreement further says that in case of breach of any condition of this lease by the lessee or any person claiming through him, the lease shall be determined and the Government shall have the right to re-enter the property. This much is clear even at this stage. The act of the said Subrata Dutta in parting with his possession of the tenancy premises in favour of the said petitioners is in breach of the lease agreement in question, which warrants the determination of the very lease agreement thereof. The occupants like the said petitioners are therefore, unauthorized occupants and are not having even a semblance of right whatsoever to such holdings.
10. That apart, the parting with possession of the tenancy premises by the said Subrata Dutta in favour of the said petitioner falls within the mischief of Section 3 of the Act of 1971. The provision is certainly beneficial and the legislative intention is to discourage in any manner the transfer of land in the State of Meghalaya from a tribal to a non-tribal or from a non-tribal to another non-tribal as indicated by the Preamble to the Act, that is to say, 'to regulate transfer of land in Meghalaya for the protection of the interests of the Scheduled Tribes therein'. Where Section 2(d) of the Act of 1971 gives an extended meaning to the term 'transfer' by including within if the expression 'any other mode of transfer', it would not be proper to confine the meaning of transfer to transfer under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or a situation where the transfer has a statutory definition. In my opinion, the lease agreement protects the said Subrata Dutta so long as he may himself use the leasehold premises but not the transferees like the petitioners inducted by him to posses the premises in breach of the contract, which act is often done with the object of illegitimate profiteering or rack renting. What exactly is contemplated by the lease agreement and the Act of 1971 is where possession has passed from one tribal to a non-tribal or from a non-tribal to another tribal without the previous sanction of the competent authority, a situation of that type would come within the meaning of the expressions 'any other mode of transfer', and, therefore, would be amenable to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Deputy Commissioner or the competent authority within the ambit of Section 8 of the Act of 1971.
11. Coming now to the question as to whether the word 'transfer' includes testamentary disposition, in my Judgment, the answer must be in the affirmative. To recapitulate the case of the petitioners in WP (C) No. 95 (SH) of 2005, they claim that the said Salyabrata Dutta, out of love and affection, executed the Will dated 26.8.99 at Kolkata in their favour and got the same registered in the Office of the Additional Registrar of Assurance, Kolkata, where by he bequeathed their respective holdings to them. The application for probate of the said Will is still pending before the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner, Shillong in Probate Misc. Case No. 8 to 20(T) of 2004. It is the contention of the petitioners therein that the testator of the said Will had a permanent, heritable and transferable right to the premises bequeathed by him and that the passing of property from one testator to a legatee as in this case does not constitute transfer. In other words, according to the petitioners, the word 'transfer' does not and cannot cover any testamentary disposition and, therefore, the pass of the premises to them is not hit by Section 3 of the Act of 1971.
12. It is true that the word 'transfer' ordinarily is not understood to cover any testamentary disposition. Rather, it is understood to convey transfer inter vivos, i.e. as an act by which a living person gives away property in present or future to one or more other living persons. It is also equally true that the bequest becomes effective only after the death of the testator and is liable to be revoked at any time. However, keeping in mind the legislative intent in enacting the law, there does not appear to be any reason why such a restrictive conception of the word 'transfer' under the Transfer of Property, 1882 should be imported in the Act of 1971, in the absence of any indication to that effect. The use of the expression 'any other mode of transfer' in Section 2(d) of the Act of 1971 plainly militates against legislature having intended to import such a restricted concept of the word 'transfer'. It is difficult to comprehend why the legislature could have intended to exclude such bequests from the sweep of the prohibited transfers Under Section 3 of the Act of 1971, when the concept of bequest is pregnant with the same evils as other transfers. As noted earlier, the words 'any other mode of transfer' in this context only go to signify inclusion of 'bequest' also therein. Even the restricted concept of 'transfer' inter vivos in Section 5 of the TP Act contemplates its becoming effective at some future date in a given case. Testamentary disposition does result in the passing of the property from the testator to the legatee, though it is different in nature from the concepts of gift, sale, exchange, mortgage, lease or surrender. Nonetheless, in my opinion, testamentary disposition is a transfer in its generic sense. In the view that I have taken, I hold that testamentary disposition like the Will in question comes within the ambit of transfer and within the mischief of Section 3 of the Act of 1971. Resultantly, the Will dated 26.8.99 has the effect of transferring the demised premises from the said Satyabrata Dutta to the petitioners in WP (C) No. 95 (SH) of 2005 and such transfer made without the previous sanction of the competent authority are void and are not enforceable in any Court including this Court.
13. In view of my findings in the foregoing, the impugned notices under challenge in WP (C) Nos. 94 (SH) and 95 (SH) and 95 (SH) of 2005 do not suffer from any infirmity calling for the interference of this Court. This then takes me to the controversies involved in the next batch of writ petitions i.e. WP (C) Nos. 363 to 371 and 374, Nos. 377 to 383 and Nos. 385 to 390 of 2005. These writ petitions are virtually the offshoots of WP (C) Nos. 94 (SH) and 95(SH) of 2005. To shorten this Judgment, suffice it to refer merely to one of such cases, as illustrative of the nature of the remaining cases, which is that after staying the impugned notices in WP (C) Nos. 94 (SH) and 95 (SH) of 2005 by this Court by its order dated 19.4.2005, the Meghalaya Urban Development Authority ('respondent-authority' for short) issued the notice dated 24.10.2005 upon the petitioner in the following terms:
No. MUDA 188/38/2005-06/39
Dated Shillong, the 24.10.2005
ToShri Ratan PradhanKench's Trace,Shillong
Sub: UNAUTHORISED CONSTRUCTION
On site inspection by this office, it was detected that you have constructed the building in your compound at Kench's Trace (Plot No. 47) without obtaining any valid permission from the competent Authority. In this regard you are directed Under Section 'A', Clause 11 (ii) of the Meghalaya Building Bye-Laws 2001 to dismantle immediately within 7 (seven) days time, falling which necessary action will be taken against you as per Rules of the Meghalaya Building Bye-Laws 2001 and Town Planning act.
SecretaryMeghalaya Urban DevelopmentAuthority, Shillong
No. MUDA 188/38/2005-06/39
Dated Shillong, the 24.10.2005
Copy to: 1. The Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hills District, Shillong for favour of information.
SecretaryMeghalaya Urban DevelopmentAuthority, Shillong
14. The case of the petitioners is that the buildings constructed by them on the premises in question were constructed by them long before the coming into force of the Meghalaya Building Bye Laws 2001 and the Town Planning Act and the question of violating such laws, ipso facto, does not arise. Drawing my attention to Section 'A', Clause 11(ii) of the Building Bye Laws, Mr. A.S. Siddique, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that the penalty of demolition of unauthorized building can be attracted only in respect of the buildings constructed after the commencement of the Bye Laws and not the buildings like the ones constructed by the petitioners prior to that. Similarly, submits the learned Counsel, the power of demolition of building conferred by Section 30-B of the Meghalaya Town and Country Planning Act, 2004, can be exercised only in respect of these build-which are constructed after the coming into force of such Act and not before. Simply put, the contention of the learned Counsel is that the respondent-authority has no jurisdiction to issue the impugned letters requiring the petitioners to dismantle their buildings. On the other hand, Mr. S.P. Mahanta, the learned Counsel for the respondent-authority supports the impugned letters and submits that the directions are perfectly in order on the facts and circumstances of the case.
15. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions of the Counsel appearing for the rival parties. Even assuming that the structures/buildings standing on the leasehold premises were constructed by the petitioners prior to the coming into force of the Meghalaya Building Bye Laws, 2001, which is seriously disputed by the respondent-authority, and that the respondent-authority is, therefore, without jurisdiction to issue the impugned letters, the undisputed fact remains that the petitioners have no semblance of right or interest in the respective holdings occupied by them. Their arguments sound like this, 'Yes, we have no legal right to occupy the premises in question, but then the respondent-authority also has no power to evict us there from! Therefore, this Court should restrain the respondent-authority from dismantling our buildings!' I am afraid; this type of submissions cannot be countenanced by this court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction. Issuance of a writ of certiorari is a discretionary remedy. The law is now well-settled that the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not strike down an illegal order although it may be lawful to do so. In a given case, the High Court may not extend the benefit of a discretionary relief to the petitioner. Such a relief can be denied, inter alia, when it would be opposed to public policy or in a case where quashing of an illegal order would revive another illegal order or would perpetuate an illegality or where the effect of allowing a writ petition would be to give unfair advantage to a party. In M.P. Mittal v. State of Haryana (1984) 4 SCC 577; a company entered into a contract with the State Industrial Development Corporation, where by the Corporation underwrote preference shares of the company on which dividend was payable. The appellant, who was then the Managing Director of the Company, executed an agreement under which he guaranteed in his personal capacity the payment of the dividend income due. The guarantee agreement, inter alia, stipulated that the dues on account of agreement would be recoverable in the manner in which land revenue is collected by the Government. The company defaulted in paying the dividend to the Corporation and the Corporation applied to the Assistant Collector for instituting recovery proceedings. When the Collector, after giving opportunity to the appellant to pay up the dues, commenced coercive measures including the issue of warrant for the arrest of the appellant, the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court but a Division Bench of the High Court passed an order on August 2, 1978 summarily dismissing the writ petition. Dismissing the appeal, the Apex Court held:
5. Now there is no dispute that the appellant knowingly and deliberately entered into the Guarantee agreement, and is liable as Guarantor to make payment of the dividend due from Messrs Deport Foods Limited. Nor is it disputed that the amount due, with interest, stands at Rs. 2,02,166/- in respect of the period ending with the year 1977. It was not contended that the appellant in fact does not possess sufficient funds or cannot avail of sufficient personal property for the purpose of discharging the liability. The record also shows that before instituting coercive proceedings, the Assistant Collector provided the appellant made no attempt to discharge the liability. When that is so, we are of opinion that he is not entitled to relief in these proceedings. The appeal arises out of a writ petition, and it is well settled that when a petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is open to the High Court to consider whether, in the exercise of its undoubted discretionary jurisdiction, it should decline relief to such petitioner if the grant of relief would defeat the interests of justice. The Court always has power to refuse relief where the petitioner seeks to invoke its writ jurisdiction in order to secure a dishonest advantage or perpetuate an unjust gain. This is a case where the High Court was fully justified in refusing relief. On that ground alone, the appeal must fail.
16. It is next contended by Mr. A.S. Siddique, the learned Counsel for the petitioners that both the impugned notices/letters is sued under the provisions of the Meghalaya Transfer of Land (Regulations) Act, 1971 and the Meghalaya Building Bye Laws, 2001 violate the principles of natural justice as no effective opportunity of hearing was given to all the petitioners. The question whether violation of the principles of natural justice per se would entail quashing of an order or a proceeding came up for consideration before the Apex Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India : AIR2000SC2783 . The Apex Court observed therein that at one time, it was held in Ridge v. Baldwin, (1963) 2 All ER 66 (HL) that breach of principles of natural justice was in itself treated as prejudice and that no other 'de facto' prejudice needed to be proved. But, since then the rig our of the Rule has been relaxed not only in England but also in our country. According to Apex Court, Schnapps Reddy, J. in S.L. Kapoor case, : [1981]1SCR746 , laid down two exceptions, namely, if upon admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion was possible, then in such a case, the principle that breach of natural justice was in itself prejudice, would not apply. In other words, if no other conclusion was possible on admitted or indisputable facts, it is not necessary to quash the order which was passed in violation of natural justice. The Apex Court, however, cautions therein that the 'useless finality' theory is an exception and that in the ultimate analysis; it may depend on the facts of a particular case. In my Judgment, the aforesaid observations of the Apex Court completely answer the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. After all, in the words of the Apex Court in Managing Director, ECIL, B. Karunakar, : (1994)4SCC727 , the theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether, in fact, prejudice has been caused to the petitioner or not to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. On the facts established in these writ petitions, no prejudice could be caused to the petitioners by denial of effective opportunity of hearing when they could not show any semblance of right to the buildings held by them or to their holdings; this is the only conclusion possible which can be drawn even by this Court, not to speak of the respondent-authority.
17. The offshoot of the foregoing discussions is that these writ petitions are bereft of merits and fail. Consequently, the writ petitions are dismissed, but, on the facts of the case, without costs.
18. However, considering the hardships and inconvenience to be faced by the petitioners and their family members in requiring them to leave their hearth and homes unceremoniously and abruptly, the ends of justice will be served if the respondents give them a period of three months to find alternative arrangements. Order accordingly.
.