I.A. Ansari, J.
1. The petitioner, which is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for issuance of appropriate writ(s) directing the respondents herein not to realize and/or deduct tax, at source, under the Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003, from the bills of the petitioner for the works, which the petitioner has carried out on the basis of the verbal agreement entered into with the respondents herein.
2. It is the pleaded case of the petitioner that the petitioner had given, from time to time, various types of vehicles, on hire, at different hire-charges, to the respondent-corporation, on the basis of verbal agreement, which the petitioner had entered into with the respondent-corporation, and that although the petitioner had never given the said vehicles by way of lease, the respondent-corporation has been threatening to deduct tax under the Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003, treating the transactions, in question, as lease.
3. I have heard Mr. T. Baidya, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, and Mr. D. Saikia, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of State respondent No. 4, namely, the State of Assam.
4. There is no dispute that the power of the State Legislature to impose tax on sale and purchase of goods emanates from entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India nor is there any dispute that 46th Amendment of the Constitution, which inserted Clause (29A) in Article 366 of the Constitution of India, has expanded the definition of 'tax on sale or purchase of goods' inasmuch as it has included, within the definition of 'sale', the transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose, whether or not for a specified period, for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration. There is also no dispute that pursuant to the changes so introduced, amendments have been made by the Legislature, in the State of Assam, in the provisions of the Act, particularly, Section 2(33) and 2(19) thereof, which embody the definition of 'sale' and 'lease' respectively.
5. In order to correctly appreciate the development of law relating to the expansion of the State's power to impose sales tax, by bringing 46th Amendment, imperative it is that the material facts, which led to the bringing of the changes in the definition of 'sale' for the purpose of enabling the States to impose sales tax, are taken note of.
6. Before introduction of the 46th Amendment of the Constitution of India, composite contracts, such as, works contract, hire-purchase contract, catering contracts, etc., were not assessable as contracts for sale of goods inasmuch as the contracts, which were indivisible, could not have become subject to sales tax.
7. Before the Constitution (46th Amendment) Act, 1982, the word 'sale', which occurred in the expression 'sale', in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, had carried the same meaning as a 'sale' defined in Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. Hence, prior to the 46th Amendment, sales tax could be imposed only upon transfer of property in goods from one person to another. Consequently, sales tax could not be imposed upon transactions, which might have resembled sale, but did not involve transfer of property in goods. Because of this judicial interpretation, States were losing revenue on account of sales tax in respect of transactions like transfer of the right to use goods, transfer of property in goods involved in execution of works contract, supply of food by a hotelier, etc.
8. With regard to the above, it may be pointed out that as far as back as in the year 1967, the Madras High Court, in A.V. Meiyappan v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes reported in [1967] 20 STC 115, was confronted with the question as to whether a given transaction of 'lease' can ever amount to 'sale'. In A.V. Meiyappan [1967] 20 STC 115 (Mad), the court was examining an agreement entered into by an assessee, called lessor, with a limited company, called lessee, whereunder the assessee had made over to the lessee the outright lease of the world negative rights of the film, for a period of 49 years, for a consideration. The sales tax authorities were of the view that though the transaction was termed as 'lease' for 49 years, the assessee had actually effected a 'sale' of the negative print of the picture for a consideration and, therefore, the transaction was liable to sales tax under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The Madras High Court, however, turned down the imposition of the sales tax by holding that even if a copyright is regarded as species of movable property, the transaction did not connote a 'sale' at all inasmuch as there was no transfer of property in the goods in such a case and the transaction was, therefore, not liable to payment of sales tax.
9. The decision of the Madras High Court, in A.V. Meiyappan [1967] 20 STC 115, created immense difficulty for the States for quite a long time, because novel device of leasing of films resulted into avoidance of huge amounts of sales tax. This apart, in State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. reported in [1958] 9 STC 353, the Supreme Court gave a new approach to the definition of 'sale' by prohibiting States from taxing transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of indivisible works contract. This decision also affected the revenue of the States. The State's revenue was further reduced to a great extent in view of the decision in K.L. Johar & Co. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer reported in [1965] 16 STC 213, wherein the apex court decided that the State can tax only the depreciated value of the goods. Yet another decision of the apex court, in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Associated Hotels of India Ltd. reported in [1972] 29 STC 474, closed the door of a big revenue earning area by the States, when the apex court held that supply of food by a hotelier was essentially one of services by the hotelier and that it is, as a part of the amenities, incidental to the service, that a hotelier serves meals at specified hours.
10. Because of the traditional concept of 'sale', which the courts adhered to, while interpreting as to whether a given transaction amounts, or does not amount, to 'sale', the 46th Amendment Act of the Constitution brought changes in the definition of the word 'sale' as given in Article 366 inasmuch as it widened, by inserting Clause (29A) to Article 366, the definition of 'sale' by incorporating those transactions, which might have resembled 'sale', but did not fall, within the traditional concept of 'sale', and were judicially held not to be exigible to sales tax. The idea behind this amendment was to create a concept of deemed sale by treating, with the help of a legal fiction, such a transaction as a 'sale' even if the same did not fall within the ambit of the definition of 'sale' as defined in the Sale of Goods Act. In other words, by bringing various transactions within the purview of the definition of 'sale', a transaction, which was, otherwise, not a 'sale', has been deemed to be a 'sale'. This Clause (29A) of Article 366 states as under:
(29A) 'tax on the sale or purchase of goods' includes:
(a) a tax on the transfer, otherwise than in pursuance of a contract, of property in any goods for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration;
(b) a tax on the transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract ;
(e) a tax on the delivery of goods on hire-purchase or any system of payment by instalments ;
(d) a tax on the transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose (whether or not for a specified period) for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration ;
(e) a tax on the supply of goods by any unincorporated association or body of persons to a member thereof for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration ;
(f) a tax on the supply, by way of or as part of any service or in any other manner whatsoever, of goods, being food or any other article for human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating), where such supply or service, is for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration, and such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods shall be deemed to be a sale of those goods by the person making the transfer, delivery or supply and a purchase of those goods by the person to whom such transfer, delivery or supply is made;
11. The effect of the amendment, which has been introduced to Article 366, by inserting Clause (29A), is that a State Legislature has become competent to impose sales tax, amongst others, on the transfer of the right to use any goods, which, before the amendment, so made, the State Legislature was not competent to do. What the insertion of Clause (29A) has done is that various transactions, enumerated therein, which were, otherwise, not sales, have to be deemed, by a legal fiction, as sales. Such sales are commonly called deemed sales. Under Clause (29A)(d), a 'transfer of the right to use any goods' for any purpose and for any period, for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration, shall be deemed to be a sale of goods by the person making the transfer, delivery or supply, and a purchase of those goods by the person to whom transfer, delivery or supply is made.
12. Consequent upon the above amendments of the Constitution, almost all the States have amended their respective definitions of the word 'sale', in the sales tax statutes, by incorporating identical language used by the Constitution. Indisputably, the expression 'transfer of the right to use any goods' cannot be equated with the expression 'transfer of property in goods', because the transfer of the 'right to use any goods' is not the same as the 'transfer of the goods' itself ; but when the definition of 'sale' is amended in consonance with the change introduced in the definition of 'sale' by the 46th Amendment, a transfer of the right to use any goods would amount to sale within the meaning of the sales tax laws empowering thereby the State Legislature to impose tax, on such a transaction, as 'sale'.
13. In Assam too, under the Act, tax became exigible, by Section 8(1)(f), on 'operating lease' as mentioned in Schedule VII at the rate(s) specified in the Schedule. Section 2(33) of the Act provides that 'sale' shall include 'any transfer of the use of any goods' under an 'operating lease'. Section 2(33) reads as under:
2(33) : 'Sale', with all the grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means any transfer of property in goods by any person for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration, and includes:
(iv) any transfer of the use of any goods under an operating lease..
14. The expression 'operating lease' has been defined, by Section 2(25), to mean a lease other than a financial lease. Thus, any lease, other than a financial lease, is an 'operating lease' within the sales tax laws in Assam. The term 'lease' has been defined under Section 2(19) of the Act as follows:
2(19) 'lease' means any agreement or arrangement whereby the right to use any goods for any purpose is transferred by one person to another whether or not for a specified purpose, for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration without the transfer of ownership and includes a sub-lease but does not include any transfer on hire purchase or any system of payment by instalments.
15. Section 2(20) of the Act defines 'lessee' to mean a person to whom the right to use any goods for any purpose is transferred under a lease.
16. Section 2(21) of the Act defines 'lessor' to mean a person by whom any right to use any goods for any purpose is transferred under a lease.
17. From a combined reading of the various provisions of law, which have been pointed out above, what clearly transpires is that there must be 'a transfer of the right to use any goods' in order to attract levy of 'sales tax'. In other words, transfer of the right to use any goods, for any purpose, is a condition precedent for imposition of sales tax. This tax is not a tax on the right to use any goods or on the use of any goods ; it is, rather, a tax on the 'transfer' of the 'right' to 'use' any 'goods'. Thus, unless and until the incidence of 'transfer' of the right to use goods, in a given case, is present, a transaction would not become a 'sale' even under the expanded definition of 'sale'. Similarly, a transaction would not attract 'sales tax' merely because of the fact that the goods have been hired and the hiring charges have been paid to the person, who gives, on hire, the goods unless one can show that the transaction is not confined to 'use' of the goods, but it is, in substance, a 'transfer' of the 'right' to 'use' the 'goods'.
18. I may pause here to point out that in 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra reported in : AIR2000SC2436 , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, speaking through Bharucha, J. (as his Lordship, then, was), pointed out, while interpreting Article 366(29A)(d), that levy of tax is not on use of goods, but on the transfer of the right to use goods and that the right to use goods accrues only on account of the transfer of right. In other words, explains the Supreme Court, in 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. : AIR2000SC2436 , that in order to attract sales tax, the right to use arises only on the transfer of such a right and unless there is transfer of such a right, the question of the transfer of the right to use does not arise. Having held that it is the transfer of the right to use any goods, which is exigible to sales tax, and that without such transfer, no sales tax can be imposed, the Supreme Court goes on to observe, in 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. : AIR2000SC2436 , that if the goods are available, then, the transfer of the right to use goods takes place, when the contract, in respect thereof, is executed, for, the right to use goods would stand transferred to the lessee, no sooner the contract is executed. The Supreme Court further observed, in 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. : AIR2000SC2436 , that if the goods are available, irrespective of the fact where the goods are located, and a written contract is entered into between the parties, the taxable event on such a 'deemed sale' would be the execution of the contract ; but in the case of an oral or implied transfer of the right to use goods, such transfer may be effected by the delivery of the goods. Having so observed, the Supreme Court, in 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. : AIR2000SC2436 , pointed out that no authority could be shown to support the view that there would be no completed transfer of right to use goods unless the goods are delivered. The Supreme Court, therefore, concluded, in 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. : AIR2000SC2436 , that delivery of goods cannot constitute a basis for levy of tax on the transfer of the right to use any goods.
19. The relevant observations made, on the above aspects of the law, by the apex court, in 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. : AIR2000SC2436 , read as under:
27. Article 366(29A)(d) further shows that levy of tax is not on use of goods but on the transfer of the right to use goods. The right to use goods accrues only on account of the transfer of right. In other words, right to use arises only on the transfer of such a right and unless there is transfer of right, the right to use does not arise. Therefore, it is the transfer which is sine qua non for the right to use any goods. If the goods are available, the transfer of the right to use takes place when the contract in respect thereof is executed. As soon as the contract is executed, the right is vested in the lessee. Thus, the situs of taxable event of such a tax would be the transfer which legally transfers the right to use goods. In other words, if the goods are available irrespective of the fact where the goods are located and a written contract is entered into between the parties, the taxable event on such a deemed sale would be the execution of the contract for the transfer of right to use goods. But in case of an oral or implied transfer of the right to use goods it may be effected by the delivery of the goods.
28. No authority of this Court has been shown, on behalf of respondents that there would be no completed transfer of right to use goods unless the goods are delivered. Thus, the delivery of goods cannot constitute a basis for levy of tax on the transfer of right to use any goods. We are, therefore, of the view that where the goods are in existence, the taxable event on the transfer of the right to use goods occurs when a contract is executed between the lessor and the lessee and situs of sale of such a deemed sale would be the place where the contract in respect thereof is executed. Thus, where goods to be transferred are available and a written contract is executed between the parties, it is at that point, situs of taxable event, on the transfer of right to use goods, would occur and situs of sale of such a transaction would be the place, where the contract is executed.
20. Relying upon the decision in 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. : AIR2000SC2436 , the apex court held, in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Union of India reported in : 2004(170)ELT385(SC) , that handing over of possession of the goods is not sine qua non for completing the transfer of the right to use such goods.
21. In Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Union of India reported in : [2006]282ITR273(SC) , a three-judge Bench had the occasion to consider the question as to whether delivery of goods is at all necessary for the purpose of effecting the transfer of the right to use the goods. To the question, so put, the Supreme Court responded by holding that the essence of the right, under Article 366(29A)(d), is that it relates to user of goods and though, in a given case, actual delivery of the goods may not be necessary for effecting transfer of the right to use the goods, yet the goods must be available at the time of the transfer, must be deliverable and delivered at some stage. The apex court pointed out, in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. : [2006]282ITR273(SC) , that the decision, in 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. : AIR2000SC2436 , cannot be cited as an authority for the proposition that delivery of possession of goods is not a necessary concomitant for completing a transaction of sale for the purpose of bringing such a transaction within the ambit of Article 366(29A)(d). The apex court also pointed out, in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. : [2006]282ITR273(SC) that in 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. : AIR2000SC2436 , what the Constitution Bench was required to determine was the situs of the taxable event. In other words, what the Constitution Bench, in 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. : AIR2000SC2436 , was required to determine was as to where the taxable event, for the purpose of sales tax, takes place in the context of Sub-clause (d) of Article 366(29A), because the States had selected three distinct places for imposing sales tax. In other words, in 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. : AIR2000SC2436 , three distinctly separate criteria were found to have been used by the States for the purpose of levying sales tax under Article 366(29A)(d). Some States had levied tax, on the transfer of the right to use goods, on the basis of the location of the goods at the time of their use irrespective of the place, where the agreement for such transfer of the right to use such goods was made; while some States had levied tax upon delivery of the goods, in the State, pursuant to the agreements of transfer. Yet another set of States had levied tax on deemed sale on the premise that the agreement of transfer of the right to use had been executed within the State concerned. It is the third view, which found approval by the Constitution Bench in 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. : AIR2000SC2436 , for, the Constitution Bench took the view that the transfer of the right to use took place, where the agreements were executed, and not at the place, where the goods were used, nor at the place, where the goods (pursuant to the agreement) were delivered.
22. Thus, in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. : [2006]282ITR273(SC) , the court held that delivery of goods, at some stage, is necessary in order to complete the transfer of the right to use the goods. To put it a little differently, though 'situs' of a 'deemed sale' does not depend on the place of delivery of goods, the taxable event is not complete, in the light of decision in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. : [2006]282ITR273(SC) , until the time the delivery of the goods takes place, for, it is upon delivery of the goods that the transfer of the right to use the goods is completed. This delivery may, however, be actual or constructive. In other words, a 'deemed sale' cannot be treated as complete until the time the contract is executed by delivery of the goods inasmuch as the transfer of the right to use goods does not take place until the time the transferor delivers the goods, which is the subject of contract, though, for the purpose of determining the 'situs' of such a 'deemed sale', it is the place, where the agreement is executed, which will be treated as the place of the 'deemed sale' provided that the agreement is in writing; but in a case of oral agreement, it may be effected by the delivery of the goods.
23. The relevant observations made, in this regard, in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. : [2006]282ITR273(SC) , read as under:
73 [See para 72 of 3 VST]. With respect, the decision in 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra : AIR2000SC2436 cannot be cited as authority for the proposition that delivery of possession of the goods is not a necessary concomitant for completing a transaction of sale for the purposes of Article 366(29A)(d) of the Constitution. In that decision the court had to determine where the taxable event for the purposes of sales tax took place in the context of Sub-clause (d) of Article 366(29A). Some States had levied tax on the transfer of the right to use goods on the location of goods at the time of their use irrespective of the place where the agreement for such transfer of right to use such goods was made. Other States levied tax upon delivery of the goods in the State pursuant to agreements of transfer while some other States levied tax on deemed sales on the premise that the agreement for transfer of the right to use had been executed within that State (vide para 2 of the judgment as reported). This Court upheld the third view, namely, merely that the transfer of the right to use took place where the agreements were executed....
24. Explaining, in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. : [2006]282ITR273(SC) , its earlier decision, in 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. : AIR2000SC2436 , the apex court pointed out that while determining the situs of the transfer of the right to use the goods, the court have not observed, in 20th Century Finance Corporation Ltd. : AIR2000SC2436 , that the delivery of goods was inessential for the purpose of completing the process of transfer of the right to use; rather, the Constitution Bench held, points out the Supreme Court, in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. : [2006]282ITR273(SC) , that the goods must be available, when the transfer of the right to use the goods takes place, and that the Constitution Bench also recognized that for oral contracts, the situs of the transfer may be the place, where the goods are delivered.
25. The apex court further held, in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. : [2006]282ITR273(SC) , that the delivery of the goods may not take place simultaneously with the transfer of the right to use the goods, but the goods must be in existence, deliverable, when the right is sought to be transferred, and must, at some stage, be delivered.
26. It is, therefore, clear that in order to constitute a transfer of right to use goods, there must be parting with the possession of the goods for the limited period of its use in favour of the lessee by the lessor. The effective control of the goods must not remain with the owner, but must stand transferred to the lessee for the use by the latter at his will and it is this transfer of the effective control of the goods, which attracts sales tax (See Alpha Clays v. State of Kerala reported in : 2004(2)KLT235 ).
27. In Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. reported in : AIR2002SC1305 , it was claimed by the sales tax authorities that the transaction, whereby the owner of certain machinery had made available, his machinery to the contractor, amounted to sale. Dealing with this contention of the sales tax authorities, a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the transfer of the right to use goods necessarily involves delivery of possession by the transferor to the transferee; but the delivery of possession must be distinct from its custody and that mere transfer of possession does not amount to delivery in the context of the transfer of the right to use goods. In the facts of the case in Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd., it was held by the Division Bench See that although the possession of the machinery was given to the transferee, yet the effective custody and control of the machinery having remained with the transferor, such transaction would not amount to transfer of the right to use goods. This decision of the Division Bench was upheld by the apex court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. : AIR2002SC1305 .
28. In contrast, Aggarwal Brothers v. State of Haryana reported in : AIR1999SC2868 , was a case, wherein assessee had hired shuttering in favour of the contractor for use of the latter in the course of construction of the building. The apex court opined that the possession of the shuttering materials had been transferred by the assessee to the contractor for their use and, therefore, the transaction was a deemed sale.
29. What is immensely important to note is that in both the cases, namely, in Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. : AIR2002SC1305 as well as in Aggarwal Brothers : AIR1999SC2868 , the goods were in existence and the same were delivered to the contractors for their use. However, while in one case, namely, in Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. : AIR2002SC1305 , the transaction was not treated as sale, because there was no intention to transfer the right to use the goods and the effective custody and control of the machinery remained with the transferor, notwithstanding the delivery thereof, the other case, namely, Aggarwal Brothers : AIR1999SC2868 is one, wherein not only that the delivery of the shuttering materials took place, but even the right to use the shuttering materials, in any manner as the contractor wanted, stood permitted and it was for this reason that this transaction was held to be a transaction, which amounted to 'deemed sale'. The relevant observations made, in this regard, by the apex court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. : [2006]282ITR273(SC) read as under:.when the assessee had hired shuttering in favour of the contractors to use it in the course of construction of the buildings it was found that possession of the shuttering materials was transferred by the assessee to the customers for their use and, therefore, there was deemed sale within the meaning of Sub-clause (d) of Clause (29A) of Article 366. What is noteworthy is that in both the cases there were goods in existence which were delivered to the contractors for their use. In one case there was no intention to transfer the right to use while in the other there was.
30. In Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, Bhopal reported in : [1977]3SCR578 , the apex court has pointed out that mere use of the words such as 'agent' or 'agency' 'buyer' or 'seller' cannot be sufficient to lead to an irresistible inference that the parties concerned did, in fact, intend that the status, so described in an agreement, shall stand conferred on the party concerned. The apex court has further pointed out, in Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. : [1977]3SCR578 , that unless the context shows that the parties to an agreement clearly intended to treat a buyer as buyer and not as an agent, the mere formal description of a person as an agent or buyer is not conclusive. The observations made, in this regard, in Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. : [1977]3SCR578 , read as under : (page 48).While interpreting the terms of the agreement, the court has to look to the substance rather than the form of it. The mere fact that the word 'agent' or 'agency' is used or the words 'buyer' and 'seller' are used to describe the status of the parties concerned is not sufficient to lead to the irresistible inferences that the parties did in fact intend that the said status would be conferred. Thus the mere formal description of a person as an agent or a buyer is not conclusive, unless the context shows that the parties clearly intended to treat a buyer as a buyer and not as an agent....
31. From the above discussion, what also clearly emerges is that the question as to whether, in a given case, there is or there is no transfer of the right to use goods becomes a question of fact and this fact can be determined on the basis of the terms of the contract, which may govern a given transaction. In fact, in North East Gases Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Assam reported in [2004] 134 STC 249, this Court has held that the question relating to transfer of the right to use any goods is essentially a question of fact, which has to be determined, in each case, having regard to the terms of the contract, wherein the transfer is made.
32. In view of the fact that the terms of the contract really determine whether, in a given case, there is or there is no transfer of the right to use any goods, it is necessary to take note of the relevant clauses of the agreement, which govern the transaction, which is sought to be made exigible to sales tax. However, it has, after perusal of the materials, on record, been found that no material has been made available, on record, to prove the terms of the agreement, which the parties had entered into. So long as the terms and conditions of the agreement are not made known to the court, it is not possible to interfere with the matter. At the same time, the respondents have also not placed, on record, anything to indicate that the transactions, in questions, amounted to lease.
33. Considering, therefore, the matter in its entirety and in the interest of justice, this writ petition is disposed of making it clear to the respondents that the respondents shall not make any deduction at source, from the bills of the petitioner, of any amount(s), by way of sales tax or value added tax, until and unless the petitioner is informed as to how the transactions, in connection with giving of the petitioner's vehicle (s), on hire, to the respondent-Corporation, amounted to transfer of the right to use the vehicles from the end of the petitioner to the respondent-Corporation.
34. With the above observations and directions, this writ petition shall stand disposed of.
No order as to cost.