B.K. Sharma, J.
1. This contempt petition has been filed alleging wilful and deliberate disobedience of the order dated 25.07.2006 passed in W.P. (C) No. 4909/2005.
2. The writ petition was filed praying for a direction to the respondents to release the vehicle of the petitioner, a Tata Sumo, bearing registration No. AS 01/L-7753 with the requisition compensation w.e.f. 21.02.05. Further prayer made in the writ petition was to assess the damage caused to the vehicle during requisition and to pay the amount thereof.
3.The writ petition was entertained byway of issuance of notice on 29.07.05. By order dated 31.08.05, this Court upon hearing the learned Counsel for the parties including the State counsel passed the following order:
31.08.05
Heard Mr. Borbhuyan, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. H.K. Barman learned State counsel for the official respondents.
On a consideration of the rival stands taken in the pleadings of the parties, this Court fells that before taking up the issue for final adjudication, a report on the present condition of the vehicle be obtained from the appropriate authorities. Mr. Barman has produced a communication dated 30.08.2005 issued by the Sub-divisional Officer (Sadar), Kamrup Metropolitan District, Guwahati, indicating that a committee has been constituted headed by the District Transport Officer, Kamrup, to assess the quantum of damage, if any, caused to the vehicle and the extent of repairs necessary. In the above premises, it is directed that the Divisional Officer (Sadar), Kamrup Metropolitan District, Guwahati, would cause the petitioner's vehicle to be immediately examined by the appropriate authorities and submit a report before this Court on or before 16.09.2005. The report should indicate the present condition of the vehicle, the extent of damage, if any, caused to it in detail and the consequential repairs that would be necessary therefore.
The prayer for release of the vehicle would be considered on the next date.
4.Pursuant to the aforesaid order dated 31.08.05, a report relating to the condition of the vehicle was submitted on 15.09.05. As per the said report various repairing works in respect of the vehicle were to be done andthe estimate cost of such repairing had been stated to be Rs. 25,000/-. Be stated here that the vehicle all along remained with the respondents.
5. By the time the writ petition was taken up for hearing on 25.07.06, naturally the vehicle got further damaged. The vehicle was requisitioned on 21.02.05. Be it stated here that the vehicle was purchased by the petitioner at the cost of Rs. 2,25,000/- through Finance Company, namely M/S. Tata Finance Ltd. and the same was utilized as a Tourist Taxi from Guwahati to Shillong and back.
6. It is on record that the vehicle was requisitioned by the District Administration for use of the Army and was released by the Army on 19.04.05 and handed over to the district administration. Although the vehicle was released by the Army on 19.04.05, the petitioner was asked only on 02.05.05 to receive the vehicle. In the writ proceeding, the respondents had contended that the vehicle was examined on 18.04.05. To that effect a report dated 18.04.05 furnished by the Motor Vehicle Inspector (MVT) was annexed to the counter affidavit. As per the report there was some damage to the body of the vehicle, but was mechanically workable.
7. The vehicle having remained with the Army for their operation till 19.04.05, same could not have been examined on 18.04.05 by the MVI which was stated to have been done as per the letter of the district administration of the same date, i.e. 18.04.05. This aspect of the matter has been discussed in the judgment. The question has also been raised in this proceeding to which there is no answer from the alleged contemners. Thus, it can safely be concluded that the letter dated 18.04.05 is a manufactured one to suit the purpose of the respondents both in the writ proceeding as well as in this proceeding.
8. To quell any doubt, I have verified the records produced by the learned Counsel for the respondents and as contained in the file No. KN7-65/03. The file contains the letter dated 19.04.05 issued by one Shri Rajnish Sharma, Major. DAA& QMG for Col. Tac, C/o. H.Q.51 Sub Area, C/o. 99 APO by which the vehicle was released in favour of the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup, Guwahati clearly certifying that the vehicle carried out in C.I. OPS with Army w.e.f. 21.02.05 to 19.04.05. Thus in no circumstances the vehicle could have been examined on 18.04.05 as was stated in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents in writ proceeding.
9. On perusal of the records what has transpired is that the vehicle was examined on 20.05.05 and the MVI submitted his report on the same date, i.e. 20.05.05. This report is the replica of the purported report dated 18.04.05. As per the report there was damage to the running board of the vehicle, but was mechanically workable. Thus it is not understood as to what was the necessity to get of the vehicle examined on 20.05.05 in view of the rigid stand of the respondents that the same was released from requisition w.e.f 02.05.05. There is also no explanation as to why the vehicle was retained from 19.04.2005 to 02.05.2005 instead of handing over to the petitioner in being released by the Army on 19.04.2005.
10. The writ petition was disposed of noticing the aforesaid facts as well as the report furnished pursuant to the above quoted order dated 31.08.05 by which direction was issued to assess the damage caused to the vehicle. It was noticed that although the petitioner was asked to take back the vehicle upon purported release of the same w.e.f. 02.05.05, the petitioner could not take delivery of the same as the vehicle was in a damaged condition. Having regard to such a situation, in the judgment, it was observed thus:
6. ... Nothing has been stated in the counter-affidavit as to under whom and as to in what condition, the vehicle remained during the period from 19.04.05 to 02.05.05. If the vehicle was damaged while in custody of the respondents and was not in running condition then naturally, the petitioner could not have taken delivery of the same. As per the order passed by this Court on 31.08.05, a report regarding the condition of the vehicle has been furnished. The report is dated 15.09.05. As per the said report also, various repairing works in respect of the vehicle are to be done and the estimated cost of such repairing has been stated to be Rs. 25,000/-. However, Mr. Borbhuyan, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that in the meantime, the vehicle has been further damaged and repairing cost will be much more than it was assessed by the said report dated 15.09.05. In this connection, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has also referred to the communication dated 30.08.05 made by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Sadar), Kamrup Metropolitan District, Guwahati addressed to the learned State counsel suggesting examination of the vehicle by a Committee headed by the District Transport Officer to assess the quantum of damage, if any, in order to undertake the repairing works by the requisitioning authority. In the suggestion so made, it was indicated that the petitioner would be entitled to get compensation of requisition till the date of release of the vehicle.
11. Having regard to the aforesaid position, it was observed in the judgment that the respondents did not act due diligence in the matter and in the process the petitioner was made to suffer. The writ petition was disposed of with the following directions:
1) The requisition compensation in respect of the vehicle (Tata Sumo) bearing Registration No. AS-01/L-7753, during such period that it remained under requisition till the actual release of the vehicle under good and running condition shall be paid to the petitioner within one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
2) The District Transport Officer, Kamrup, Guwahati shall cause an inspection of the vehicle in question to be made by the competent person in order to assess the damage caused to the vehicle and such assessment shall be computed in terms of the money that would be required to put the vehicle back on the road. Towards assessing the damage caused to the vehicle, a copy of the assessment report shall be furnished to the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup (Metro), Guwahati. Assessment shall be made and the report shall be submitted within one month.
3) The Deputy Commissioner shall within a period of 6 (six) weeks from the date of the report from the District Transport Officer, Kamrup, Guwahati pay to the petitioner the compensation for damage as may be assessed.
12. As per the aforesaid direction the respondents were to assess the damage caused to the vehicle. Such assessment was to be computed in terms of money which would be required to put the vehicle back on the road. The report was to be submitted within one month and thereafter the Deputy Commissioner was to pay the compensation for damage to the petitioner within six weeks. As regards the requisition compensation, same was to be paid to the petitioner within one month for the period in which the vehicle remained under requisition, till the actual release of the vehicle under good and running condition.
13. When the aforesaid directions were not complied with even after expiry of the stipulated period of time, the petitioner filed this contempt petition on 29.11.06. The respondents have filed a number of affidavits justifying their action in the matter. According to them since the vehicle remained under requisition for the period from 21.02.05 to 02.05.05, the petitioner is entitled to requisition compensation only for that period. As regards the assessment of damage caused to the vehicle, it has been stated that same has been estimated at Rs. 1,97,171/-.
14.Therequisitioncompensationhasbeen assessed at Rs. 67,450/- for the period from 21.02.05 to 02.05.05. Strangely enough, as per the affidavit in opposition filed by the respondent No. 2 on 29.01.07,12% VAT and 2.2% income tax were deducted from the damage compensation and 8.8% AGST, 2.2% income tax were deducted from the requisition compensation.
15. By order dated 08.04.08 while nothing that even after expiry of 1 1/2 year, the damage compensation had not been paid to the petitioner, it was also noted that the respondents decided to make deduction under the aforesaid heads even from the amount of damage compensation of Rs. 1,97,171/-. When satisfactory reply was not furnished, personal appearance of the alleged contemners was ordered and it was only after such personal appearance and direction of this Court vide order dated 28.02.08, the aforesaid amount of Rs. 1,97,171/- was paid to the petitioner.
16. The respondents in their further affidavits have stuck to their stand that since the vehicle remained under requisition only for the period from 21.02.05 to 02.05.05, the petitioner is entitled to requisition compensation only for that period and not for the period beyond 02.05.05 to actual release of the vehicle on good and running condition.
17. I have heard Mr. M.K. Choudhury, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Mr. J.I. Borbhuyan, learned Counsel for the petitioner. I Have also heard Mr. N. Dutta, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Mr. J. Roy, learned Counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 3 as well as Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Ms. R. Chakraborty, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2.
18. While Mr. Choudhury, learned Sr. counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that nothing else could be glaring example of wilful and deliberate violation of the aforesaid order of this Court, both Mr. N. Dutta and Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned Sr. Counsel for the respondents submitted that there is no wilful and deliberate violation of the order of this Court and at best it can be said to be a case of wrong understanding of the order and/or wrong interpretation of the directions contained in the order. Mr. Dutta also submitted that the respondent No. 1 has been unnecessarily dragged on to this contempt proceeding as he was not the authority which requisitioned the vehicle. Referring to the stand in the affidavit filed by the respondent No. 1, Mr. Dutta submitted that the respondent No. 1 acted in the matter as per intimation received from the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. It was pointed out from the affidavits filed that there was no delay on the part of the respondent No. 1 and he immediately released the fund as per the requisition placed by the respondent No. 2 on receipt of the clearance from the Finance Department. As regards the respondent No. 3, it was submitted by Mr. Dutta that he only acted as per the direction of the respondent No. 2 and that there was no independent exercise of any discretion in the matter on point.
19. Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 while adhering to the stand that the petitioner is not entitled to any requisition compensation except for the period from 21.02.05 to 02.05.05, submitted that since the vehicle was released at least on 02.05.05 with due intimation to the petitioner, it was incumbent on her part to receive the vehicle. According to him even in case of any damage to the vehicle, the petitioner could have raised the issue after taking back the vehicle. He also submitted that even if there is wrong and/or misinterpretation of the directions contained in the order of this Court, same will not amount to wilful and deliberate violation of the order of this Court. He placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court reported in : 1992CriLJ284 Ashok Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar and : 1999CriLJ1332 Indian Airports Employees Union v. Ranjan Chatterjee.
20. I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and the materials on record. I have also gone through the records produced by Ms. R. Chakraborty, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2. The directions contained in the order dated 25.07.06 passed in W.P.(C) No. 4909/05 have been quoted above. As per the said direction, the damage caused to the vehicle was to be assessed in terms of money and the amount was to the paid to the petitioner. Further direction was to pay the requisition compensation till the actual release of the vehicle under good and running condition. On a conjoint reading of both the directions coupled with the direction to pay the requisition compensation till the actual release of the vehicle under good and running condition leaves no manner of doubt that the petitioner would be entitled to requisition compensation from 02.05.05 till actual release of the same under good and running condition.
21. As per the additional affidavit filed by the petitioner, she having received the damage compensation of Rs. 1,97,171/- on 10.03.08 with request of the respondents to take the vehicle back from the office premises of the respondent No. 2, the vehicle should be deemed to be released on 10.03.08 and thus, she is entitled to requisition compensation for the period from 21.02.05 to 10.03.08.
22. Although as per the direction of this Court, the petitioner would be entitled to receive requisition compensation till the actual release of the vehicle under good and running condition and on 10.03.08 the vehicle was not released under good and running condition, but only the damage compensation was paid, it cannot be said that there was compliance of the direction of this Court on 10.03.08. But in view acceptance of the petitioner the said date as the date of the release of the vehicle. I am not inclined to go into that issue.
23. The matter will also have to be considered in terms of the proceeding dated 17.06.08. On that date also Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned Counsel representing the respondent No. 2 reiterated the stand that the vehicle was released from requisition on 02.05.05, but on being personally asked, all the contemners present in the Court stated in unequivocal terms that the vehicle was in a damaged condition on 02.05.05 and that the vehicle being in damaged condition, the refusal on the part of the petitioner to take back the vehicle was not unjustified. Thus, apparently there is inherent contradiction between their such stand and the stand in the counter affidavit. The order passed on 17.06.08 is reproduced below:
17.06.08
In terms of the earlier orders of this Court, the alleged contemners are personally present. Although, it is submitted by Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned Sr. counsel representing the respondent No. 2 that the vehicle in question was released with effect from 02.05.05, but on being asked personally, all the respondents have submitted that on the date of derequisitioning the vehicle i.e. on 02,05.05, the vehicle was in a damaged condition. They also submit that the vehicle being in a damaged condition, refusal on the part of the petitioner to take back the vehicle cannot be said to be unjustified.
In view of the above personal submission on the part of the respondents, who are personally present, there is inherent contradiction in their stand in the affidavits filed by them. Due to paucity of time the matter could not be heard conclusively.
Further hearing on 26.06.08 as the 1st and fixed item. The matter shall be listed alongwith WP(C) No. 4909/2005 disposed of on 25.07.2006. Personal appearance of the alleged contemners stands dispensed with for today.
24. From the aforesaid stand of the respondents upon their personal appearance, it cannot be said to be a case of wrong and/or misinterpretation of the terms and conditions in the order alleging violation of which this contempt petition has been filed.
25. In the case Ashok Kumar Singh (supra), the Apex Court having found that there was misrepresentation of the executive directions and the order of the Court, held that there was no wilfiil and deliberate violation of the Court's order. Similarly in Indian Airports' Employees opinion between the rival parties as to whether the workmen for whom the appellant/Union of India was representing, were covered by the relief granted by the Court held that non-implementation of the Court's order in the case those workmen did not amount to contempt.
26. These two decisions are of no help to the case of the respondents. It is not the case of wrong and/or misinterpretation of the directions of this Court. The respondents, even after apprising them of the correct position of the order of this Court, stuck to their stand that the requisition compensation was to be paid only for the period from 21.02.05 to 02.05.05. However, as against such stand in their affidavits in the proceeding held on 17.06.08 in their presence, they admitted that the vehicle was in a damaged condition on 02.05.05 and the refusal on the part of the petitioner to accept the vehicle in such condition was not unjustified.
27. When there is clear understanding of the terms as contained in the order in question, any attempt to dilute the same, on the basis of the same very stand in the writ proceeding which did not find favour of this Court is nothing but an attempt to mislead the Court. It is unfortunate that the responsible officers of the State tried to create confusion and chaos in the matter. On the face of the order and the direction contained therein, there cannot be any wrong and misrepresentation of the same. As per the directions, the damaged compensation was to be assessed in terms of money and the vehicle was to be released under good and running condition. The direction was issued in view of the fact that the vehicle was in custody of the respondents. The damage caused to the vehicle was to assess in terms of money and thereafter on repairing etc. of the vehicle, same was to be released under good and running condition. Thus naturally, the vehicle having remained in the custody of the respondents till its deemed release on 10.03.2008 which was to be in good and running condition, she would be entitled to requisition compensation. After all, the vehicle was not being used by her for luxury, but for commercial purpose. There is no scope for any other interpretation of the order.
28. As noted above, the respondents, even after their stand that the vehicle was released on 02.05.05, got the vehicle examined on 20.05.05. At that point of time, there was no direction of this Court to assess the damage caused to the vehicle. The respondents did it of their own. Thus the plea of the respondents that the vehicle was released on 02.05.05 is nothing but misrepresentation of fact. As noted above, there is also no question of examining the vehicle on 18.04.05 when admittedly the vehicle was engaged in Army operation from which it was released on 19.04.05. Thus the vehicle was shown examined co-insiding the release of the vehicle by the Army to the District Administration on 19.04.05. Although the vehicle was handed over on 19.04.05, it was under the respondents till 02.05.05 for no reason whatsoever, when the same was shown released. As admitted by the respondents themselves in this proceeding held on 17.06.08, the petitioner rightly did not accept the vehicle same having been in damaged condition. It does not lie on the mouth of the respondents to say that since the vehicle was released on 02.05.05, the petitioner was duty bound to accept the same, no matter what was the condition of the vehicle. Had the vehicle been accepted by the petitioner, the respondents would have refused to entertain her further claim in respect of the damage caused to the vehicle. The respondents were under obligation to hand over the vehicle to the petitioner in the same condition in which the vehicle was requisitioned on 21.02.05.
29. The respondents have assessed the damage compensation of the vehicle after the order of this Court. If the vehicle stood actually released on 02.05.05, there was no question of assessing the damage caused to the vehicle thereafter. The respondents clearly understood the direction of this Court in respect of assessing the damage caused to the vehicle, but refused to understand the direction relating to payment of requisition compensation till such time the vehicle was released under good and running condition. Release of the vehicle under good and running condition would necessarily mean repairing of the same for which the damage was to be assessed in terms of money. The petitioner has been paid damage compensation only on 10.03.08 and that too as per the interim direction of this Court. The petitioner has claimed requisition compensation only upto 10.03.08, although as per the direction of this Court she is entitled to receive compensation till such time the vehicle was released under good and running condition.
30. Now coming to the respective plea in the counter affidavits filed by the alleged con-temners, it is seen that the direction of this Court was basically to the respondent No. 2. The respondent Nos. 1 and 3 acted on the basis of the request and information furnished by the respondent No. 2, but it was incumbent on their part to follow and comply with the directions of this Court and in case of any misgivings to get it verified. Even during the proceeding of the contempt proceeding, when the correct position of the case was discussed, they did not mend themselves and rather stuck to the stand in the affidavits. However, good sense prevailed over them, when they admitted that the vehicle was in a damaged condition on 02.05.05 and consequently the petitioner was not obliged to take the vehicle back. Unfortunately, even after such stand made known to the Court by making oral statement before this Court, the respondents did not translate it into action.
31. The respondent No. 1 in his further affidavit filed on 24.04.08 inter alia has made the following statements:
11. That the deponent respectfully states that the deponent has performed his part and therefore no wilful disobedience can be attributed to the deponent in respect of alleged non-compliance of the order passed by this Hon'ble Court. The deponent upon receipt of the requisitions has taken up the matter with the finance department and upon receipt of the FOC released the Ceiling and thereafter no further requisition or correspondence was received by him. The deponent personally is not concerned with the custody, requisition, de-reuisition or handing over the vehicle in question.
12. That the deponent states that the order passed by this Hon'ble Court on 08.04.08 was received by the deponent only on 22.04.08. The deponent after receipt of the order made an enquiry and found that the vehicle is kept at the premises of the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup (M) officer alongwith other official cars. The said vehicle is lying without use.
13. That the deponent states that this Hon'ble Court vide order dated 28.02.08. directed the respondent to pay the amount of Rs. 1,97,171/- which has been assessed by the District Transport Officer on account of repair by way of cheque and to furnish the particulars of such payment on the next date fixed. It may be mentioned here that in terms of the aforesaid direction the Deputy Commissioner Kamrup Metropolitan District vide letter dated 10.03.08 forwarded two cheques of Rs. 1,97,171/-and Rs. 72,760/-. It may be mentioned here that the petitioner received the cheque of Rs. 1,97,171/-on 10.03.08 however, she declined to receive the cheque of Rs. 72,760/-. It is pertinent to mention here that the payment of the said amount was informed by the Deputy Commissioner vide its letter No. KNZ 65/2003/250 dated 19.04.08.
14. That the deponent states that under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is humbly submitted that there is no wilful and deliberate violation of this Hon'ble High Court's order dated 25.07.06 on the part of the answering deponent. The deponent bears great respect and regard towards this Hon'ble Court, in fact he is duty bound to carry out the order of this Hon'ble High Court. However, the deponent tenders an unconditional and unqualified apology for any action on the part of the deponent by which he may have committed an honest and genuine mistake or for any error of involvement on his part in dealing with the matter. The deponent most humbly submits that there was no wilful violation of any order passed by this Hon'ble Court on the part of the deponent.
17. That under these circumstances the deponent humbly tenders an unconditional and unqualified apology for any action on the part of the deponent by which he may have committed an honest and genuine mistake or for any error of involvement on his part in dealing with the matter. The deponent also most humbly submits that there was no wilful violation of any order passed by this Hon'ble Court on the part of the deponent.
32. Similarly the respondent No. 3 in his further affidavit filed on 16.06.08 inter aliahas made the following statements:
5. That the answering deponent at the outset states that the answering deponent is not the sanctioning authority. He is a mere official under the Deputy Commissioner. His action is subject to approval of the Deputy Commissioner. In the instant case the deponent has acted as per the direction/order of the Deputy Commissioner from time to time and therefore there is no wilful or deliberate violation of the order passed by this Hon'ble Court.
12. That the deponent respectfully states that the deponent has performed his part and therefore no wilful disobedience can be attributed to the deponent in respect of alleged noncompliance of the order passed by this Hon'ble Court. The deponent while serving as Additional Deputy Commissioner has taken steps till left the said post on 19th November, 2007. The deponent has prepared the cheques on 20.11.2006 with the approval of the Deputy Commissioner. 15. That the deponent states that under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is humbly submitted that there is no wilful and deliberate violation of this Hon'ble High Court's order dated 25.07.06 on the part of the answering deponent. The deponent ears great respect and regard towards this Hon'ble Court, in fact he is duty bound to carry out the order of this Hon'ble High Court. However, the deponent tenders an unconditional and unqualified apology for any action on the part of the deponent by which he may have committed an honest and genuine mistake or for any error of involvement on his part in dealing with the matter. The deponent most humbly submits that there was no wilful violation of any order passed by this Hon'ble Court on the part of the deponent.
17. That it is stated with respect that there is no oblique motive on the part of the deponent to frustrate the order of the court or lower down majesty of the court. Further there is no ill motive on the part of the deponent. The deponent is duty bound to comply the order of this Hon'ble Court. The deponent respectfully states that the deponent has cited sufficient reasons which is not within his control for any delay in the compliance of the order of this Hon'ble Court. Besides that the deponent is presently posted at Dispur as Deputy Secretary, Agriculture Department.
18. That under these circumstances the deponent humbly tenders any unconditional and unqualified apology for any action on the part of the deponent by which he may have committed an honest and genuine mistake or for any error of involvement on his part in dealing with the matter. The deponent also most humbly submits that there was no wilful violation of any order passed by this Hon'ble Court on the part of the deponent.
33. In the further affidavit filed by the respondent No. 3, he has enclosed Annexure-B letter dated 03.08.06 furnishing the details of the assessment in terms of money. The amount indicated is Rs. 1,97,171/- which was paid to the petitioner at the intervention of this Court. The letter giving the details of the repairing jobs under different heads was addressed to the District Transport Officer, by the Motor Vehicle Inspector. The respondents at the first instance wanted to deduct the aforementioned taxes even from that amount. The letter certified the following:
The above mentioned repairing works to be done for the road worthiness as well as fit to ply the vehicle back on road. The rates of replaceable parts are compared with the present market price. The total amount of the parts & work charge are assessed at Rs. 1,97,171.00 (One Lakh Ninety Seven Thousand One Hundred Seventy One Only).
34. As against the above, the respondent No. 2 in his further affidavit filed on 17.06.08 has tried to justify the contention that the petitioner is entitled to requisition compensation only for the period from 19.04.05 to 02.05.05. In his affidavit there is no reflection of any true remorse for what has been done in the matter dragging the petitioner, a poor lady, to unnecessary litigations. All through the affidavit, he has justified his action. It is not his plea that his action is the reflection of the true and correct interpretation of the direction of this Court and that in case of any wrong and/or misinterpretation of the same, his action will not amount to willful and deliberate violation of the order of this Court. However, he has stated the following:
4. That the deponent submits that the deponent has the highest regard for the orders of this Hon'ble Court and would never willfully or internationally violate the orders of this Hon'ble Court and it has always been the endeavour of the deponent to obey and affect full implementation of the orders of this Hon'ble Court. All throughout his service career he has unfailingly shown deep and sincere regard for the authority and orders of the Court and it has been the Deponent's persistent endeavour to effect full implementation of the orders of the Court.
5. That the Deponent submits that if it appears to this Hon'ble Court that the Deponent has in any manner violated the orders of this Hon'ble Court, the same has been wholly unintentional and the deponent hereby tenders his humble and unconditional apology to this Hon'ble Court.
35. An argument was made that since the present respondent No. 2 was added a party respondent at a later state of the proceeding vide order passed on 04.01.08 in Misc. Case No. 4313/07, the present respondent No. 2 cannot be said to be guilty of wilful and deliberate violation of the aforesaid order of this Court. It is on record that he was made party respondent after apprising him of the order of this Court and the present proceeding. Occupying high position of the office of the Deputy Commissioner, he was clearly responsible alongwith his predecessor towards true and correct implementation of the order of this Court. However, even after impleading him party respondent and apprising of direction of this Court, he stuck to his stand reflected in the affidavits, although as per his opinion personally expressed before this Court on 17.06.08, the petitioner was not obliged to take the vehicle back in damaged condition.
36. At this stage, it will be appropriate to refer to the stand of the predecessor of the respondent No. 2, namely Mr. Abinash Joshi, who in his affidavit filed on 29.01.07 took the stand that the petitioner was entitled to requisition compensation only for the period of 21.02.05 to 02.05.05. It is in this affidavit, he stated about the deductions on account of VAT, income tax, AGST etc. from the amount of damage compensation. It was only after the direction of this Court, the full amount of damage compensation was paid to the petitioner. I am afraid, if this is not wilful and deliberate violation of the order of this Court, what else would it be. All the respondents understood the directions of this Court and each of them made known the same to the Court in the proceeding held on 17.06.08. But in the affidavits they have stuck to their stand that the petitioner is entitled to requisition compensation only for the period from 21.02.05 to 02.05.05. Such conduct on the part of the respondents is unbecoming of the Govt. servant occupying high positions.
The foundation of the judiciary is the trust and the confidence of the people in its ability to deliver fearless and impartial justice and as such no action can be permitted which may shake the very foundation itself. The purpose of contempt is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts of law.
37. An act constitutes contempt if it is calculated or has the tendency of interfering with the due course of justice. The object of the discipline enforced by the court in the case of contempt of court is not to vindicate the dignity of the person of the Judge but to prevent undue interference with the administration of justice. The confidence in courts of justice which the public possess must in no way be tarnished, diminished or wiped out by contumacious behaviour of any person.
38. The essence of contempt is action or inaction amounting to an interference with or obstruction to or having a tendency to interfere with or to obstruct the due administration of justice. Lowering the dignity of the court or shaking the confidence of the public in its is reprehensible.
39. As has been observed by the Apex Court in Arundhati Roy, in re reported in (2002) 3 SCC 343, there can be no doubt that the purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of law courts and their image in the minds of the public and that this is in no way whittled down. If by contumacious words or writings the common man is led to lose his respect for the Judge acting in the discharge of his judicial duties, then the confidence reposed in courts of justice is rudely shaken and the officer need be punished. In essence the law of contempt is the protector of the seat of justice more than the person of the Judge sitting in that seat. The law of contempt has been enacted to secure Public respect and confidence in the judicial process. If such confidence is shaken or broken, the confidence of the common man in the institution of judiciary and democratic setup is likely to be eroded which, if not checked, is sure to be disastrous for the society itself.
40. The apology to be available to the contemner must be sincere and unconditional. It must be definite and must be made early enough in the proceedings to merit full consideration. To pay 'I am extremely sorry' is a mere expression of regret and is not an apology as contemplated in the Act. A belated apology loses its value. The court has power to reject an apology when it is not satisfactory. If the apology is tendered at a late stage it will be considered as an after-thought and intended merely to avoid punishment.
41. Acceptance of apology is in the discretion of the court which is to be exercised having regard to the circumstances of each case. Apology must be genuine and prompt and should not be an effort to get out of an inconvenient situation to escape punishment.
42. Principle governing the acceptance of an apology, as laid down in M.Y. Sareef v. Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of Nagpur reported in : 1955CriLJ133 was reiterated by the Supreme Court in M.B. Sangi v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana reported in : 1991CriLJ2648a and applied by the High Courts in their decisions. The principle, according to M.Y. Shareef, being:.it is well settled that apology is not a weapon of defence to purge the guilty of their offence; nor is it intended to operate as a universal penacea, but it is intended to be real evidence of contriteness....
43. In the 1971 Act Explanation to Section 12 states:
An apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide.
44. The apology tendered by the respondents in their further affidavits have been noted above. During the course of hearing, Mr. Dutta, learned Counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 3 also submitted that if there was any mistake on the part of the respondents in interpreting the direction of this Court, appropriate order be passed towards implementation of the direction accepting the unconditional apology tendered by the respondents. Having regard to the conduct of the respondents throughout the proceeding and the nature of involvement in respect of implementation of the directions of this Court, I am of the considered opinion that there has been wilful and deliberate violation of the order of this Court, more particularly by the respondent No. 2. Mr. Pratik Hazela, Deputy Commissioner, Karnrup, Guwahati and his predecessor Mr. Abinash Joshi.
45. This now leads us to the question as to whether the respondents should be awarded with the punishment as prescribed under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 or should be exonerated upon acceptance of the apology tendered by them in their affidavits. The kind of apology tendered by the respondents have been noted above. The kind of involvement of the respondent No. 1 and 3 in the entire episode is also noted above. Having regard to the unconditional apology tendered by them and the nature of their involvement towards implementation of the directions of this Court, their such apology is accepted with a note of caution that they should be careful in future in dealing with such matters. As regards the respondent No. 2, both Mr. Pratik Hazela and his predecessor Mr. Abinash Joshi, while holding them guilty of contempt of Court for wilful and delibarate violation of the order in question, they are severely reprimanded with the note of caution that they will realize that in the system of Indian democratic governance as contemplated by the Constitution, senior officers like them occupying key positions are not supposed to mortgage their own discretion, volition and decision making authority and be prepared to give way or being pushed back or pressed ahead with action having no sanctity in law.
46. The Conduct Rules of Central Government services command the civil servants to maintain at all times absolute integrity and devotion to duty and do nothing which is unbecoming of a government servant. No government servant shall in the performance of his official duties, or in the exercise of power conferred on him, act otherwise than in his best judgment.
47. The said two officers acted in the matter in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant unmindful of the fact that they are not absolved from their duty to exercise their personal judgment having regard to the clear direction of this Court.
48. The petitioner has given the figure of the requisition compensation of Rs. 11,46,390/- taking the requisition period from 21.02.05 to 10.03.08 (1113 days). Thedaily requisition fee has been shown at Rs. 1030/-per day. While it is true that the vehicle remained in custody of the respondents till 10.03.08, but having regard to the facts and circumstances involved in the case and also in view of the fact that even if the vehicle was not in custody of the respondents, there was no guarantee that the petitioner's vehicle would have earned that much of amount, I am of the considered opinion that ends of justice would met if the requisition compensation is assessed at 50% of the requisition compensation for the period in question calculated on the basis of the prescribed and prevalent daily requisition fee. The amount shall be paid to the petitioner by way of account payee cheque as expeditiously as possible but at any rate not later than 31.10.08. Further, the petitioner will be entitled to the cost of the proceeding to be borne by the predecessor of the incumbent and the present incumbent of the office of the respondent No. 2, i.e. the Deputy Commissioner, namely Shri Abinash Joshi and Shri Pratik Hazela. The amount shall be deposited in equal share of Rs. 5000/- by both the officers with the Registry of the High Court and the petitioner will be entitled to withdraw the same upon furnishing proper identity.
49. With the aforesaid directions and expressing displeasure on the conduct of the respondents with a note of warning to the respondent Nos. 1 and 3 and severe reprimand to both Shri Abinash Joshi and Shri Pratik Hazela, this contempt proceeding is closed.
50. Contempt petition is disposed of in terms of the aforesaid directions.