Judgment:
Navin Sinha, J.
1. Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and the Respondents.
2. The petitioner was suspended. Six charges were framed against him. He filed his reply. The enquiry report was submitted.
A second show cause notice was issued to him with regard to charges 1, 2 & 3. He filed his reply when final orders have been passed for 5% deduction of his pension consequent to his retirement on 31.12.1997 and that nothing beyond subsistence allowance was payable for the period of suspension.
3. In context of charge No. 1 the submission is that the Inquiry Officer has himself noted that as an auditor the petitioner had raised objections with regard to certain financial matters in his audit report. However, the Inquiry Officer has observed that the petitioner as the auditor should have been more vociferous and dogged in pursuing his audit objections. In absence of having done so he had indirectly aided in the commission of the irregularities. This was not a finding of guilt but a finding based on surmises and conjectures. No punishment could be imposed without a finding of guilt. With regard to charge No. 2, learned Counsel submitted that the Inquiry Officer arrived at a finding that on the basis of the materials it appears that the petitioner was
subsequently authorized to carry on the audit of the Societies in question for which he was not originally authorized. The findings were therefore, one of exoneration. For charge No. 3, the Inquiry Officer arrived at the conclusion that the cause of delay in audit of 17 Societies was that the petitioner was involved in the audit of other Banks. This was also an order of exoneration. On a finding based on surmises and conjectures and two findings of exoneration, a second show cause notice was issued. This did not set out the materials on which the disciplinary authority was satisfied of a finding of guilt or brief reasons for differing with the report of exoneration of two charges. In absence of the same the orders of punishment are vitiated.
4. Learned Counsel for the Respondents urged that there has been full compliance of the procedures inasmuch as after the enquiry report was submitted proper opportunity by a second show cause notice was given and only whereafter the order of punishment was passed.
5. The law stands well settled by now that in a departmental enquiry there has to be a finding of guilt before an order of punishment is passed. That surmises and conjectures cannot supplant a finding of guilt. In the present case, the findings with regard to charge No. 1 was that though the petitioner as an Auditor made objection but he was not vociferous and strenuous in pursuing the same. The Inquiry Officer himself left the matter inconclusive. This Court has no hesitation in holding that this finding can clearly be classified as based on surmises and conjectures and not a finding of guilt.
6. With regard to charges Nos. 2 & 3, in view of exoneration by the Inquiry Officer, absence of any reasons in the second show cause notice with regard to the reasons for differing with the same. this Court finds it difficult to sustain the order of punishment.
7. In normal circumstances, the matter would have been remanded to the authority to proceed afresh from the stage that irregularity in procedure has occurred, but, for the reason that the petitioner has retired on 31.12.1997 and that there are no direct allegations against him of financial defalcation or siphoning of funds, this Court is not persuaded to expose him in the evening of his life to a fresh proceedings.
8. Relying upon : (2005)IILLJ690SC (Ram Dayal Rai v. Jharkhand State Electricity Board and Ors.) this Court holds that even 5% reduction of pension will cause an irreparable loss and injury to the petitioner as after his retirement, the pensionary benefit is the only amount available to him as a retired employee to eke out a livelihood.
9. In the result, the impugned order dated 13.1.1999 is hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to full pension and the arrears of pension shall be paid to him within a maximum period of three months from the date of receipt and/or production of a copy of this order. The writ application stands allowed.