M.Y. Eqbal, J.
1. In this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ in the nature of mandamus directing respondent No. 1, the High Court of Judicature at Patna, through its Registrar, to exercise its power on its administrative side and transfer all pending matters relating to references under Section 256 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act' for short), and/or under Section 27 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, arising out of the orders passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in respect of assessment and other orders of the Income-tax-cum-Wealth-tax Officers or other officers of the Income-tax Department having their respective offices within the jurisdiction of the districts of Hazaribagh, Giridih, Dhanbad, Ranchi, Palamau and Singhbhum and pending before the High Court at Patna, to the permanent Bench of the Patna High Court at Ranchi. Besides the above relief, the petitioner further seeks a direction to the Commissioner of Income-tax to henceforth file all reference cases under Section 256(1) of the Act at the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court arising out of the orders of the officers of the Income-tax Department who are having their respective offices within the territorial jurisdiction of the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court and in the case of any refusal by the said Tribunal under Section 256(1) of the Act, the Commissioner should refer it to the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court under Section 256(2) of the Act.
We have heard Mr. Ajit Moitra, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. K. K. Vidyarthi, learned counsel for the Revenue.
2. According to Mr. Moitra after the establishment of a permanent Bench of the Patna High Court at Ranchi, under the provisions of the High Court at Patna (Establishment of a Permanent Bench at Ranchi) Act, 1976 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act of 1976'), and in view of the territorial jurisdiction having been carved out under the Act, the reference under Section 256 of the Act and/or under Section 27 of the Wealth-tax Act, should be made only to the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court. However, Mr. Moitra submitted that the Chief Justice may send any reference case to Patna for hearing either at his own instance or on the prayer made by the parties. Learned counsel further submitted that the matter arising out of the districts of Hazaribagh, Giridih, Dhanbad, Ranchi, Palamau and Singhbhum falls within the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court and, therefore, respondent No. 1 has statutory obligation to pass an order in its administrative side to the effect that all cases arising out of the aforesaid districts shall be transmitted or transferred to the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court for hearing. Learned counsel then submitted that objections have always been taken by the assessees before the Tribunal and before the Commissioner that the cases arising out of the aforesaid places should be referred to the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court, but the Tribunal and the Commissioner have not taken any interest in this regard. Learned counsel in support of his contentions relied upon a Full Bench decision of this court in the case of Syed Zafrul Hassan v. State, AIR 1986 Patna 194. Learned counsel has also relied upon the decisions in the cases of CIT v. Madanlal and Co. : [1993]202ITR360(KAR) and H. K. Melinkeri v. Appropriate Authority : [1996]218ITR348(Guj) .
3. Mr. K. K. Vidyarthi, submitted that under the Act, the Tribunal all over India holds concurrent jurisdiction and the question of jurisdiction of the High Court does not depend upon the sitting of the Tribunal. Learned counsel further submitted that in all income-tax references the Patna High Court has got jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the matter since the cause of action arises from the order of the Appellate Tribunal at Patna. Learned counsel further submitted that this question of territorial jurisdiction of this court was raised in the case of CIT v. Mohammed Quddus and Sons (Tax Case No. 52 of 1979) and the Division Bench of the Patna High Court has held that the Patna High Court has got the jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the reference cases.
4. Before appreciating the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties, it would be useful to look into the provisions of Section 256 of the Act, which reads as follows :
'256. Statement of case to the High Court.--(1) The assessee or the Commissioner may, within sixty days of the date upon which he is served with notice of an order under Section 254, by application in the prescribed form, accompanied where the application is made by the assessee by a fee of two hundred rupees, require the Appellate Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law arising out of such order and, subject to the other provisions contained in this Section, the Appellate Tribunal shall, within one hundred and twenty days of the receipt of such application, draw up a statement of the case and refer it to the High Court :
Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the application within the period hereinbefore specified, allow it to be presented within a further period not exceeding thirty days.
(2) If, on an application made under Sub-section (1), the Appellate Tribunal refuses to state the case on the ground that no question of law arises, the assessee or the Commissioner, as the case may be, may, within six months from the date on which he is served with notice of such refusal, apply to the High Court, and the High Court may, if it is not satisfied with the correctness of the decision of the Appellate Tribunal, require the Appellate Tribunal to state the case and to refer it, and on receipt of any such requisition, the Appellate Tribunal shall state the case and refer it accordingly.
(3) Where in the exercise of its powers under Sub-section (2), the Appellate Tribunal refuses to state a case which it has been required by the assessee to state, the assessee may, within thirty days from the date on which he receives notice of such refusal, withdraw his application, and, if he does so, the fee paid shall be refunded.'
5. From a bare perusal of Section 256(1) of the Act, it is manifest that if the assessee or the Commissioner upon service of notice of an order under Section 254 makes an application requiring the Appellate Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law arising out of such order, the Appellate Tribunal shall draw up the statement of the case and refer it to the High Court. In case the Appellate Tribunal refuses to state the case and refer it to the High Court on the ground that no question of law arises then the assessee or the Commissioner may apply to the High Court
under Section 256(2) of the Act requiring the Appellate Tribunal to state the case and to refer it to the High Court. This section does not specify as to the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, where the reference shall be made. By reading Section 256 in isolation it is manifest that reference under the aforesaid section to the Patna High Court cannot be said to be invalid or irregular.
6. Now, the question that falls for consideration is whether in view of the establishment of the permanent Bench of the Patna High Court at Ranchi under the aforesaid Act of 1976, it is obligatory on the part of the respondents to make reference under Section 256 of the Act to the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court in respect of those matters arising within the territorial jurisdiction of the districts of Hazaribagh, Giridih, Dhanbad, Ranchi, Palamau and Singhbhum.
7. It would be rather appropriate to consider some other relevant provisions of the Act for coming to the right decision on the question involved in this writ petition.
8. Chapter XIII of the Act makes provision for appointment and control of income-tax authorities. Section 116 prescribes different classes of income-tax authorities for the purposes of the Act. Under section 117, the Central Government may appoint such persons as it thinks fit to be income-tax authorities. The Board has been empowered under Section 118 of the Act to issue directions to the income-tax authorities by notification. Section 120 of the Act prescribes the jurisdiction of the income-tax authorities. Sub-section (1) of Section 120 says that the income-tax authorities shall exercise all or any of the powers and perform all or any of the functions conferred on, or, as the case may be, assigned to such authorities by or under the Act in accordance with such directions as the Board may issue for the exercise of the powers. Sub-section (3) of that section says that the Board while issuing the directions may give due regard to the territorial area, persons or classes of persons, incomes or classes of income, and cases or classes of cases. Section 124 of the Act prescribes the jurisdiction of Assessing Officers. According to Sub-section (1) of that section, where the Assessing Officer has been vested with jurisdiction over any area, within the limits of such area, he shall have jurisdiction-
(a) in respect of any person carrying on a business or profession, if the place at which he carries on his business or profession is situate within the area, or where his business or profession is carried on in more places than one, if the principal place of his business or profession is situate within the area, and
(b) in respect of any other person residing within the area. Subsection (2) provides that if a question arises as to whether an Assessing Officer has jurisdiction to assess any person, the question shall be determined by the Director-General or the Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner or the different authorities under certain circumstances.
9. Chapter XX lays down the provisions regarding appeals and revision. Under section 246 of the Act, the assessee aggrieved by the assessment order of an Assessing Officer, other than the, Deputy Commissioner, may appeal to the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) against such order. Under Section 252 of the Act, the Central Government shall constitute an Appellate Tribunal consisting of as many judicial and accountant members as it thinks fit to exercise the powers and discharge the functions conferred on the Appellate Tribunal by the Act. Under Sub-section (3) of that section, the Central Government shall ordinarily appoint a judicial member of the Appellate Tribunal to be the President thereof and may appoint one or more members of the Appellate Tribunal to be the Vice-President or, as the case may be, Vice-Presidents thereof. The Central Government may also appoint one of the Vice-Presidents of the Appellate Tribunal to be the Senior Vice-President thereof. Section 253 of the Act provides that any assessee aggrieved by the orders mentioned in that section may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against such orders. Section 255 prescribes the procedure for exercise of the powers and functions of the Appellate Tribunal. Sub-section (5) of Section 255 empowers the Appellate Tribunal to regulate its own procedure and the procedure of Benches thereof in all matters arising out of the exercise of its powers or of the discharge of its functions, including the places at which the Benches shall hold their sittings. Section 256, as noticed above, makes provision for reference to the High Court. Section 259 says that when any case has been referred to the High Court under Section 256, it shall be heard by a Bench of not less than two judges of the High Court.
10. The Appellate Tribunal in exercise of power conferred by sub-section (5) of Section 255 have made rules, namely, the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Rules' for short). According to Rule 3 of the Rules, a Bench shall hold its sittings at its headquarters or at such other place or places as may be authorised by the President. Rule 4 provides that a Bench shall hear and determine such appeals and applications made under the Act as the President may by general or special order direct. Rule 20 of the Rules provides that a place of hearing of appeals shall be fixed with reference to the current
business of the Tribunal and the time necessary for the service of the notice of appeal, so that the parties should get sufficient time to appear and put their cases before the appellate authority. According to Rule 37 of the Rules for the purpose of an application under Section 256(1) the procedure provided under Rules 6, 7, 12, 19, 20, 21, 23, 26 and 34 shall apply mutatis mutandis. As per Rule 40 the Bench which heard the appeal giving rise to the application shall hear it unless the President, the Senior Vice-President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, directs otherwise. As per Rule 47 where a requisition is received from the High Court under Sub-section (2) of Section 256, or where the case is referred back under Section 258, it shall be dealt with by the Bench referred to in Rule 40 unless otherwise directed by the President or the Senior Vice-President or the Vice-President, as the case may be.
11. From a reading of the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules, referred to herein above, it is manifest that the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer to assess an assessee is to be determined by the place of business, profession or vocation or by location of the residence of the assessee, as the case may be. The jurisdiction to hear an appeal against the assessment order -of the Income-tax Officer would be with that Appellate Assistant Commissioner or other officer who has been given such jurisdiction by the directions issued by the Central Board of Revenue in that regard. The rules further lay down the procedure and manner of disposal of appeals against the appellate order by the Appellate Tribunal.
12. As noticed above, the assessee or the Commissioner may require the Appellate Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law arising out of the order under Section 254 and the Appellate Tribunal shall within the time prescribed draw up the statement of case and refer the question to the High Court. However, it appears that the aforesaid provision does not clearly provide as to to which particular High Court the Appellate Tribunal has to make the reference under Section 256(1) and which High Court can call for a reference under Section 256(2) in a case where a Bench of the Appellate Tribunal has jurisdiction over more than one State. The provision also does not indicate as to what would be the position if the High Court of a State has its permanent Bench giving exclusive territorial jurisdiction to that Bench, as it appears from the Act and the Rules that in some places the Appellate Tribunal has jurisdiction over more than one State having separate High Courts.
13. For the aforesaid reasons, in some cases the question arose as to to which High Court reference has to be made in such circumstances. In the
case of Seth Banarsi Dass Gupta v. CIT : [1978]113ITR817(Delhi) , the assessment order was passed by the Income-tax Officer, Meerut in U. P. and the assessee went in appeal which was decided by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Meerut. Thereafter further appeal was heard by the Appellate Tribunal (Delhi Bench). On the application filed by the assessee a reference was made to the Delhi High Court under Section 256(1) of the Act, In the said reference case an objection was raised that it was the Allahabad High Court where the reference should have been made. The Delhi High Court in the said reference case considered the various provisions of the Act and the Rules and held as under (page 827):
'It seems to us that, when there is no direct statutory provision governing the matter, the proper course would be to apply the same basis that has been adopted already with regard to the jurisdiction of a Bench of the Appellate Tribunal for the following reasons :
Firstly, as already noticed, the jurisdiction of an Income-tax Officer, i.e., the place of assessment, has been required under Section 64 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, to be determined on the basis of the place where the assessee carries on a business or profession or vocation and, in other cases, the area in which the assessee resides. This basis, however, has not been adopted in providing the basis for the determination of the jurisdiction of a Bench of the Appellate Tribunal. Under the Explanation to Standing Order No. 1 of 1954, as well as to Standing Order No. 1 of 1967, the aforesaid basis under Section 64 was expressly given a goby, and the basis of the location of the office of the Assessing Officer has been adopted. Therefore, in considering the question as to the High Court to which a Bench having jurisdiction over more than one State has to make reference, the basis adopted for determining the jurisdiction of the Bench would be more appropriate than the basis adopted for determining the jurisdiction of an Income-tax Officer.
Secondly, according to the said basis provided in the Explanation to the standing order for determining the jurisdiction of a Bench, the Bench deals with appeals and applications arising out of the orders of the assessing Income-tax Officers in the various States mentioned as against the Bench in column 2 of the tabular form in Clause 1 of the standing order. In other words, the Bench hears appeals and applications in the cases coming from the States over which it has been given jurisdiction. Therefore, when it hears and determines an appeal as an appeal from a particular State, it would be quite appropriate for the Bench to refer a
question of law arising out of its order in that appeal to the High Court of the State from which the appeal had come.
Thirdly, this view, in our opinion, would also be in accord with and give a meaning and effect to the words 'in relation to any State, the High Court of that State in Section 66(8) of the Act.
Fourthly, Section 33(6) of the Act provides that 'save as provided in Section 66, orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal on appeal shall be final', and Section 66(5) provides that the High Court upon the hearing of any such case shall decide the questions of law raised thereby and shall deliver its judgment thereon containing the grounds on which such decision is founded and shall send a copy of such judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar to the Appellate Tribunal which shall pass such orders as are necessary to dispose of the case conformably to such judgment'. The said provisions show that in a case where a reference is made to a High Court by a Bench of the Appellate Tribunal under Section 66 of the Act, the reference is just an intermediate stage, and the case (appeal before the Bench) would be finally disposed of by the Bench after receiving the judgment of the High Court in the reference. So, instead of adopting a different basis for that intermediate stage, it would be quite appropriate to adopt the same basis as the one adopted for determining the jurisdiction of the Bench.'
14. In the case of CIT v. S. Sivaramakrishna Iyer [1968] 70 ITR 860, a similar question of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 256 of the Act arose before the Madras High Court and it was held as under (headnote) :
'As there are no statutory provisions for determining the proper High Court to which reference under Section 66(2) should be made where the Tribunal has jurisdiction over more than one State, the principles which apply to a determination of the jurisdiction of a court should be applied, and in this view, where a Tribunal has jurisdiction over more States than one, and it has to make a choice, it must be guided by the principles of Section 64, and make the reference to the High Court which has jurisdiction over the place where the assessee carries on business, profession or vocation or resides.'
15. In the case of CIT v. Madanlal and Co. : [1993]202ITR360(KAR) , the assessee was carrying on business in Bombay and the order of assessment was passed by the Income-tax Officer, Bombay. The appeal preferred to the first appellate authority was transferred to Bangalore. The assessee
thereafter filed the further appeal before the Appellate Tribunal at Bangalore. The reference was made under Section 256(1) of the Act to the Karnataka High Court. An objection was raised with regard to the jurisdiction of the Karnataka High Court. In that reference case, their Lordships took the view that reference made to the Karnataka High Court was not valid. Following the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Seth Banarsi Dass Gupta : [1978]113ITR817(Delhi) it was held as under :
'The lis or the cause for further proceedings arises out of the order of the Income-tax Officer. It is this order that is sought to be reversed or modified. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that the said order should be juridically considered only by the High Court having jurisdiction over the particular Income-tax Officer. An assessee may shift his place of business or residence and it will not be practical to locate such place of residence or business always, to determine the High Court's jurisdiction. Law should be clear, certain and simple. The location of the assessing authority is easily identifiable. We are in respectful agreement with the test formulated by the Delhi High Court to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a reference under Section 256 of the Act.'
16. In the case of Birla Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. v. CIT [1980] 123 ITR 353 a similar question arose before the Delhi High Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the reference, and it was held as under (page 362) :
'In this case, the assessment orders were passed by the Income-tax Officer at Jaipur and the appeals were also disposed of by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner at Jaipur. The mere accident that when the matters came before the Tribunal the appeals had to be heard by the Delhi Bench of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal because at that time there was no Bench of the Tribunal at Jaipur, cannot vest this court with jurisdiction to hear references in the matters coming from the State of Rajasthan. Section 66(8) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, as well as Section 269 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, define the jurisdiction of the High Court in relation to the State to which the matters pertain and as interpreted by this court in the earlier decision above referred to, the Rajasthan High Court is the appropriate High Court to which the reference in this case should have been made. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the reference to this court has to be returned unanswered to the Tribunal.'
17. Having regard to the various provisions of the Act read with the relevant rules of the Rules, and the principles of law enunciated by the
various High Courts, I have no hesitation in holding that for the purpose of reference under Section 256 of the Act, the jurisdiction of the High Court should be determined on the basis of the place where the assessee carries on business or profession or vocation and in other cases the area in which the assessee resides, as under the law the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer and the place of assessment has to be determined on the basis of the place where the assessee carries on business or profession and/or the area in which the assessee resides.
18. Now the main point in issue before us is ; Whether this court (a permanent Bench of the Patna High Court at Ranchi) has jurisdiction to call for a reference under Section 256(2) of the Act and also whether the reference as contemplated under Section 256(1) of the Act has to be made before this court. As noticed above, the permanent Bench of the Patna High Court at Ranchi has been established by an Act of Parliament, namely, the High Court at Patna (Establishment of a Permanent Bench at Ranchi) Act, 1976, Section 2 of that Act reads as under :
'There shall be established a Permanent Bench of the High Court of Patna at Ranchi, and such judges of the High Court at Patna, being not less than three in number, as the Chief Justice of that High Court may, from time to time, nominate, shall sit at Ranchi in order to exercise that jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in that High Court in respect of cases arising in the districts of Hazaribagh, Giridih, Dhanbad, Ranchi, Palamau and Singhbhum :
Provided that the Chief Justice of that High Court may, in his discretion, order that any cases or class of cases arising in any such district shall be heard at Patna.'
19. After the establishment of a permanent Bench at Ranchi new rules were framed by the Patna High Court in respect of filing and hearing of cases relating to the districts within the jurisdiction of the Ranchi Bench. Rule 3 is worth to be quoted hereinbelow :
'All cases arising in the districts of Hazaribagh, Giridih, Dhanbad, Ranchi, Palamau and Singhbhum will be filed and heard at Ranchi :
Provided that the Chief Justice of the High Court may in his discretion, order that any case arising in such district shall be heard at Patna.'
20. From a bare reading of Section 2 of the said Act and Rule 3 above, it is manifest that after establishment of a permanent Bench of the Patna High Court at Ranchi, the power and jurisdiction has been vested in the
Ranchi Bench to decide the cases arising in the districts of Hazaribagh, Giridih, Dhanbad, Ranchi, Palamau and Singhbhum. It is further clear that by virtue of the aforesaid Act the jurisdiction of this court has been carved out and all cases arising in the aforesaid districts have to be filed and heard by this court. The only rider provided is that the Chief Justice may in his discretion order that any case arising in the aforesaid districts shall be heard at Patna.
21. The Full Bench of this court in the case of Syed Zafrul Hassan : AIR1986Pat194 have considered the scope and effect of the aforesaid Act of 1976 and the rule while deciding the objection raised by the State with regard to the maintainability of an application for anticipatory bail filed in the Patna High Court in respect of commission of an offence within the territorial jurisdiction of District Singhbhum, where a case was registered. Their Lordships after considering the aforesaid Act of 1976 have held as under (page 205) :
'It necessarily follows from the aforesaid Section 2 of the Ranchi Bench Act and Rule 3 of the Rules of the Patna High Court that after the establishment of a permanent Bench at Ranchi, that Bench alone has now to exercise jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the Patna High Court arising out of cases in the districts of Hazaribagh, Giridih, Dhanbad, Ranchi, Palamau and Singhbhum. Learned counsel for the State had rightly contended that if the parties were allowed to whimsically select the jurisdiction from which Bench of the High Court they would seek redress, it would violate both the letter and spirit of the statutory provisions. Further, it would render the proviso to Section 2 of the Ranchi Bench Act as also the proviso to Rule 3 wholly nugatory.'
22. In the case of Dr. Sanjay Kumar Sinha v. State of Bihar : AIR1989Pat241 , a controversy arose when contrary orders were passed by the two courts, one at Patna and another at the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court. The case related to admission in postgraduate medical courses. The Supreme Court issued certain directions for starting post-graduate courses in medical science from a particular date and not to extend the eligibility date for completion of twelve months house job/housemanship. It appears that different orders were passed by the High Court at Patna and by this Bench. The Division Bench of the High Court ordered for listing of the case at Patna for hearing. A question arose as to whether the cases filed in the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court can be sent to Patna and under what circumstances. The Division
Bench of this court after referring Section 2 of the Act of 1976 has held as under (page 248) :
'It will be noticed that power has been given to the Chief Justice to order any case arising within the jurisdiction of this Bench for hearing at Patna. Hearing of a case can be only after it is admitted for hearing. This case was admitted for hearing on March 29, 1989. Further, no Bench at Patna could pass judicial order as done on March 13, 1989, calling for the records of this case for hearing at Patna. The order could have been passed by the Acting Chief Justice on the administrative side and that only after an order admitting the case for hearing was passed at Ranchi.'
23. As stated above, Mr. K. K. Vidyarthi placed heavy reliance on the order of the Division Bench passed in Tax Case No. 52 of 1979, wherein this court held that in all income-tax references the Patna Bench has got the jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the matter, since the cause of action arises from the order of the Appellate Tribunal at Patna. In that case it appears that the assessment proceeding originated from the order of the Income-tax Officer of an area which fell within the territorial jurisdiction of the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court. Ultimately, a second appeal was filed by the assessee before the Appellate Tribunal at Patna. Thereafter, the matter came before the Patna High Court under Section 256(2) of the Act. The assessee raised an objection by filing an application regarding maintainability of the reference case before the Patna High Court. According to the assessee, since the case relates to the area falling within the territorial jurisdiction of the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court, the reference ought to have been made before this court. The said objection was disposed of by the Division Bench in terms of the order dated July 30, 1984, passed in Tax Case No. 52 of 1979. For better appreciation the said order dated July 30, 1984, of the Division Bench is reproduced hereinbelow :
'15. July 30, 1984. By order dated December 4, 1979, it was directed that the petition at Flag-M be disposed of at the time of hearing of this taxation case. Unfortunately, no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee to raise any objection with regard to the jurisdiction of the Patna Bench in cases arising out of references made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna. Even so, we have considered the matter and in our view in all income-tax references the Patna Bench has got the jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the matter since the lis and the cause of action arises from the order of the Appellate Tribunal at Patna. It is a different matter that camps of the Tribunal are held sometimes at Ranchi. That, however,
shall not make any difference because in all such cases the lis and the cause of action arises out of the order of the Tribunal at Patna, only more so, in view of the fact that all such appeals are filed at Patna. As to what will be the position in regard to the writ cases is a matter which needs no consideration in this case. Perhaps, it may have to be decided when an objection in a writ case is taken on behalf of either party, the assessee or the Revenue.
We, therefore, proceed to hear this case on merits.'
24. From a perusal of the aforesaid order of the Division Bench, it appears that by the said order the objection petition was disposed of by the court simply holding that in all tax reference cases the Patna Bench has got jurisdiction, without considering the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules. Moreover, subsequent to that order the Full Bench of this court has clarified the power and jurisdiction of the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court.
25. With due respect, in view of the relevant provisions of the Act and the rules and the law discussed hereinabove vis-a-vis the principles laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Syed Zafrul Hassan : AIR1986Pat194 , the aforesaid order of the Division Bench in Tax Case No. 52 of 1979 does not hold good
26. In the light of the foregoing discussions, I am of the definite view that in all reference cases under Section 256 of the Act and Section 27 of the Wealth-tax Act arising out of assessment orders passed by the Income-tax Officers of the places falling within the districts of Hazaribagh, Giridih, Dhanbad, Ranchi, Palamau and Singhbhum, the permanent Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and dispose of those reference cases unless the Chief Justice in his discretion orders that any cases or classes of cases arising in any such district shall be heard at Patna. I am further of the opinion that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has no option but to make reference under the aforesaid provisions of law to the permanent Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court in all the cases which have arisen or originated from the assessment orders of the assessing authorities of areas falling within the districts of Hazaribagh, Giridih, Dhanbad, Ranchi, Palamau and Singhbhum.
27. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part and respondent Nos. 2 and 3, namely, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna Bench, and the Commissioner of Income-tax, Ranchi, are directed to henceforth file and/ or refer all reference applications to the permanent Bench of the Patna
High Court at Ranchi under Section 256 of the Act and Section 27 of the Wealth-tax Act in respect of cases arising out of assessment and other orders of the Income-tax-cum-Wealth-tax Officer or other officers of the Income-tax Department having their respective offices within the territorial jurisdiction of the districts of Hazaribagh, Giridih, Dhanbad, Palamau, Ranchi and Singhbhum. The prayer of the writ petitioner for issuance of writ to respondent No. 1, the High Court of Judicature at Patna, to transfer all pending cases from Patna to Ranchi is hereby refused, and it is directed that all reference cases pending in the High Court at Patna shall be heard and disposed of by the High Court of Judicature at Patna. However, there shall be no order as to costs.