T. NK. Singh, J.
1. Heard Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. Santa Khaidem, learned Counsel for the respondent.
2. By this petition under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. the petitioner is praying for quashing the entire proceedings of the Criminal (C) Case No. 25 of 2005 pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Imphal.
3. The fact, stated in short, which would suffice for deciding the present criminal petition is that the petitioner-Smt. Elangbam Ongbi R. K. Jibanlata Devi, according to her, is the legally married wife of late Elangbam Santakumar Singh of Bamon Kampu and of their marriage one son, namely; Master Elangbam Pinky alias Winky was born. It is also the case of the petitioner that the petitioner married Elangbam Santakumar Singh on 8-4-1994 according to the customary Hindu law prevailing amongst the Manipuri Hindu in the State of Manipur.
4. To the contra, according to the respondent, one Swapna Sinha is the legally married wife of Elangbam Santakumar Singh of Bamon Kampu and of their marriage two sons, namely; (1) Sunny Singh and (2) Vicky Singh were born.
5. Elangbam Santakumar Singh was serving as Section Officer in the Town Planning Department, Government of Manipur during his lifetime and he died on 14-10-1995 due to illness.
6. According to the petitioner, after the death of Shri Elangbam Santakumar Singh, petitioner collected the certain amount of money which was lying at the time in the name of late Sahtakumar Singh in the Town Planning Department, Government of Manipur for rendering his services as SO. As, there is a dispute as to whether the present petitioner or one Swapna Sinha is the legally married wife of Elangham Santakumar Singh, Nrs. Swapna Sinha and her two sons namely Sunny Singh and Vicky Singh filed an Original (Declaration) Suit being O.S. No. 90 of 2000 before the learned Family Court, Manipur through their power of attorney-holder namely, RK. Mangisana Singh of Keishamthong Elangbam Leikai, against the petitioner and her son claiming themselves to be the wife and the sons of late Elangbam Santakumar Singh.
7. The petitioner also filed written statement in the said Original (Declaratory) Suit No. 90 of 2000 before the learned Family Court, Manipur claiming that the petitioner and her son are the legally married wife and son respectively of late Elangbam Santakumar Singh.
8. It is said that later on Mrs. Swapna Sinha and her two sons filed Matrimonial (Declaration) Suit No. 29 of 2004, before the learned Family Court. In the written statement-cum-counter claim of the petitioner, filed in the Matrimonial (Declaration) Suit, the petitioner and her son had taken further plea that though Smt. Swapna Sinha is the wife of later Elangbam Santakumar Singh, she cannot claim the benefit from the authority concerned on the death of late Elangbam Santakumar Singh since the day she has been living with one Shri Somendro alias Shyamanda Sharma (the present respondent) at the rented house of one Shri Adhikari of Nepali Basti, near Puja Mandir, Koirengei.
9. Admittedly, the said Matrimonial (Declaration) Suit No. 29 of 2004 is still pending. Shri Bramacharimayum Shyamananda Sharma (the present respondent) filed a complaint against the present petitioner alleging that the statement of the present petitioner in the written statement-cum-counter-affidavit filed in Matrimonial (Declaration) Suit No. 29 of 2004 had lowered down his reputation and also that the said statements are defamatory before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Imphal.... The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Imphal registered the said Criminal Complaint case as Criminal (C) Case No. 25 of 2005 and under his order dated 8-4-2005 took the cognizance for the offence under 500 of the I.P.C. against the present petitioner (RK Jibanlata Devi).
10. Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the matter as to whether the present petitioner, Smt. E(O) RK Jibanlata Devi or Smt. Swapna Sinha is the legally married wife of late Elangbam Santakumar Singh is the matter in issue in the said Matrimonial (Declaration) Suit No. 29 of 2004. He also further submits that the statement of the present petitioner in her written statement-cum-counter claim in the said Matrimonial (Declaration) Suit No. 29 of 2004 comes within the exceptions mentioned in Section 499 of the I.P.C.
11. The stage of the Criminal (C) Case No. 25 of 2004 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Imphal is the examination of P.Ws.
12. The power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. is summarised by the Apex Court in R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab : 1960CriLJ1239 . The Apex Court in R. P. Kanpur v. State of Punjab (supra) had summarised some category of cases where inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 can or should be exercised to quash the proceedings;
(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of the offence alleged for want of the sanction.
(ii) Where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) Where the allegations made against the accused person constitute an offence but there is either no legal evidence or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
The Apex Court again considered the scope of the power under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. and category of the cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice in some detail in the State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 Cri LJ 527. The Apex Court, thus, summarised the scope of exercise of the power under Section 482 of the Code in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. (supra) as follows (para 108):
102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise, of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Art (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
13. The Apex Court again followed the ratio laid down in the R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab 1960 Cri LJ 1239 (supra) and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Cri LJ 527 (supra) in State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta : 2004CriLJ598 . The Apex Court in State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta and Ors. (supra) held that even if the charge is framed at that stage. High Court cannot appreciate the evidence, but can evaluate material and documents on records to the extent of its prima facie satisfaction about the existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The Apex Court further held that the documents annexed to the petition under Section 482, Cr. P.C. cannot be termed as evidence without being tested and proved. The ratio laid down by the Apex Court in State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta and Ors. (supra) regarding the scope of the exercise and inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. in para Nos. 8 and 11 of the SCC read as follows:
8. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is an exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of Court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All Courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any express provisions, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a Court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist. Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complainant, the Court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complaint has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.
Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, moreso, when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. (See Janata Dal v. H. S. Choudhary 1993 Cri LJ 600 and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar 1964 (1) Cri LJ 1.) It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceedings instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or its frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. It the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in the Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings. (Shri Dhana-lakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar 1990 Cri LJ 320 (SC); State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma 1991 Cri LJ 1438 (SC); Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill 1996 Cri LJ 381 (SC); State of Kerala v. O. C. Kuttan 1999 Cri LJ 1623 (SC), State of U.P. v. O. P. Sharma 1996 Cri LJ 1878 (SC); Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhade, Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 1999 Cri LJ 4566 and Rajesh Bajaj v. State of NCT of Delhi 1999 Cri LJ 1833 (SC)).
14. The Apex Court discussed the power and jurisdiction Of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. in Mohanan v. Prabhya V. Nair : AIR2004SC1719 . The fact in that case is that the appellant filed a criminal complaint before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Cherthala alleging that the respondent who is a Gynaecologist attached to a private hospital had shown medical negligence of such a degree and thereby the appellant's-wife died on 8-12-1995. In the said criminal complaint the appellant alleged that in spite of repeated request to take his wife to Medical College Hospital, the respondent told him that the patient has no problem and everything would be alright within a short time. The appellant filed a complaint before the police and after investigation the police filed a report. Thereafter, the appellant filed a criminal complaint before the Magistrate. The Magistrate took cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 304-A, I.P.C. Thereafter, the first respondent filed a criminal misc. application before the High Court to quash the criminal proceeding alleging that the allegations made in the complaint along with the sworn statement and other materials before the Court, did not make out an offence and the complaint and other proceedings were liable to be quashed. The learned single Judge held that (para 1):
The mere fact that a patient dies in a hospital does not lead to the presumption that the death occurred due to the negligence of the doctor and in order to make a doctor criminally responsible for death of his patient, it must be established that there was negligence or incompetence on his part which went beyond a mere matter of compensation on the basis of some civil liability and that he did something in disregard for the life and safety of the patient.
In that case, the Apex Court held that the learned single Judge was not justified in quashing the complaint at the threshold, especially in a case where the culpability could be established only on proper analysis of the expert evidence that may be adduced by the complainant.
15. In the present case also the stage of the case of the Criminal (C) Case No. 25 of 2005 is at the stage of examination of the P.Ws. From the perusal of the complaint case which has been registered as Criminal (C) Case No. 25 of 2005 and annexed at Annexure-A/3 to the present criminal petition, this Court, at this stage, cannot come to a finding that the material for committing offence under Section 500, I.P.C. is not made out in the complaint. Over and above, the present petitioner shall have all the opportunity to lead evidence that her said statement in the written statement or/counter claim in the Matrimonial (Declaration) Suit No. 29 of 2004 would come under the exceptions mentioned in Section 499 of the I.P.C. and also that the said statement is not known to the public as a result thereof there is no question of lowering down the reputation of the present respondent in the eyes of the public.
16. Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned Counsel for the petitioner also strenuously submits that the Criminal (C) Case No. 25 of 2005 is barred by limitation inasmuch as no Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term of one year but not exceeding three years after expiry of three years. In this point, we may refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Harnam Singh v. Everest Construction Co. : 2004CriLJ4178 , wherein the Apex Court held that the fact of delay, if any, in instituting the complaint was necessary to be determined for considering the merits of the charge, that could only be done at the stage of trial on the basis of the evidence on record.
Such being the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Harnam Singh v. Everest Construction Co. and Ors. (supra) the present petitioner would have ample opportunity to lead evidence to show that the respondent/ complainant of the Criminal (C) Case No. 25 of 2005 had the knowledge of the said statement in her counter claim as early as 2000 inasmuch as the petitioner had taken similar plea in her written statement in the earlier Matrimonial (Declaration) Suit No. 90 of 2000.
17. Having regard to the above discussions and ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the cases mentioned above, this Court is of the considered view that this criminal petition is not the right case where this Court shall exercise the power under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. for quashing the Criminal (C) Case No. 25 of 2005. Accordingly, this criminal petition is devoid of merit and stands dismissed.
However, it is made clear that any observation made in the present judgment and order, shall not cause any prejudice to either of the parties while deciding their cases by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in the Criminal (C) Case No. 25 of 2005.