U.L. Bhat, CJ.
1. These appeals are filed against the judgment and award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Dibrugarh, in M.A.C. Case No. 6 of 1978. M.A. (F) 3 of 1986 is filed by the owner of the vehicle involved in the occurrence and M.A. (F) 15 of 1986 is filed by the claimants.
2. Claimants are the heirs of Nandalal Kedia, who died in the accident which took place at 11.30 p.m. on 15.9.1977 at Lahoal when he was traveiling in car No. ASA 5171 from Dibrugarh to Tinsukia. Alleging that the accident took place on account of rash and negligent driving of the car, a sum of Rs. 22,00,000/- was claimed as compensation. The owner of the car filed a written statement stating that the car was in a mechanically sound condition and it was driven by duly licensed driver, that the car was given for the personal use of his friend Nandalal Kedia on that day and he himself came to know about the accident the next morning. According to him the accident was not the result of rash and negligent driving. It took place when the driver, to avoid a major accident with a truck coming from the opposite side, swerved the car and applied brakes. But the car skidded and turned 180 and Nandalal Kedia jumped out through the door and fell down on the iron railings sustaining fatal injuries. He denied his liability for compensation. The insurer filed written statement contending, inter alia, that compensation claim is excessive. The insurer did not admit that all the terms and conditions of the policy had been complied with and put the claimants to strict proof thereof. The insurer also put the claimants to strict proof of other averments in the claim petition, including the averments of negligence of the driver. The insurer took the plea that according to the terms of the policy, the risk relating to life or injury of the occupants is not covered.
3. The Tribunal held that the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving of the car, fixed the compensation payable to claimant Nos. 2 to 6 (first claimant having died) at Rs. 3,50,000/- and held the owner and driver of the car liable for the amount and directed them to pay the same within one month and aw aided interest at 12 1/2 per cent per annum from the end of the period of one month. Insurer was exonerated on the ground of violation of a condition of a policy.
4. Learned counsel for the owner contended that the compensation awarded is illegal and excessive and that the insurer is liable. Learned counsel for the claimants contended that the insurer is liable. According to him, though compensation awarded under some heads is unsustainable, total amount awarded could be sustained under certain other heads. Learned counsel for the insurer contended that the policy does not cover the risk of a gratuitous passenger like Nandalal Kedia and, therefore, the insurer is not liable and that the compensation awarded is absurd, excessive and unreasonable. According to him there was violation of one of the conditions of the policy since the driver of the car had not taken necessary precautions to prevent the accident.
5. It is not argued before us that the finding of the Tribunal that the accident was the consequence of rash and negligent driving of the car is unsustainable. The Tribunal considered the evidence in this behalf and arrived at an appropriate conclusion which does not call for interference. PW 3, one of the occupants of the car, deposed that the accident took place at 11 p.m. when it was raining, though he asked the driver to drive slowly the car was proceeding at great speed and then the car moved towards the railway line and the driver tried to turn the car and then the accident took place. The road was sufficiently wide to enable two vehicles to pass and the road was straight. There was no other vehicle on the road at that time. Nandalal Kedia and the driver were thrown out of the car and injured. Sometime thereafter a car came and the injured were taken to Medical College but Nandalal Kedia did not survive. The witness is definite that the accident took place due to excessive speed of the car. He denied that a vehicle was coming from opposite side and the driver applied the brakes and the car turned to the opposite direction. Similar is the evidence given by another passenger, PW 4. The driver of the car was examined as OPW 2. He deposed that a truck was coming from opposite side at high speed and being afraid he swerved the car to the left side, the truck passed the car and the car turned to opposite direction and he fell down from the car. He was injured and was hospitalised for two days. He has a valid licence. There was moderate rain and the car was moving at 35 to 40 miles per hour speed. He denied driving the car at a high speed. According to him when he applied the brakes the car skidded. The car was driven on a drizzly night. The driver had a duty to drive the car with care and caution. Even assuming that a lorry came from opposite side and the driver applied the brakes, the car would not skid unless it would have been driven at a high speed. The finding of the Tribunal that the accident took place on account of negligent driving of the car does not call for interference. The driver is liable to pay compensation.
6. Before considering the liability of the insurer, it is necessary to consider if the insured in this case has liability in regard to the death or injuries suffered by the gratuitous passenger in his car. The question of liability of the insurer would arise only if the insured is found liable. The insured permitted the deceased to travel in the car. Deceased was neither a trespasser nor a volunteer. The driver, while driving the car with the deceased as one of the passengers, was acting in the course of his employment. The driver was doing that which the owner of the car had employed him to do. Hence for the negligent act of the driver, his employer is vicariously liable.
7. The Tribunal held that the insurer is not liable on the ground that there was violation of a condition of the policy which stipulated that the driver should take reasonable precautions to avoid an accident. Undoubtedly, the driver did not take reasonable precautions to avoid an accident. That may be a violation of the policy stipulation. However, it cannot be said that there was violation of a condition of the policy so as to exonerate the insurer. Violation of any or every condition of policy will not exonerate the insurer. Defences which are available to an insurer are those specified in Sub-section (2) of Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 (for short 'the Act'). Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) enables an insurer to defend an action on the ground that there has been a breach of specified condition of policy being one of the conditions enumerated in sub-Clauses (i), (ii) or (iii). The failure of the driver to take reasonable precautions to avoid an accident is not one of the conditions enumerated in Clause (b). Therefore, violation of this condition cannot exonerate the insurer.
8. The car involved in the accident is a private car. The owner of the car allowed his friend, Nandalal Kedia, to use the car at the time of accident. Nandalal Kedia was a gratuitous passenger in the car. Section 95 does not require 'Act only policy' to cover the risk in respect of death or bodily injury of the gratuitous passenger in a vehicle, which is not a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire and reward. Admittedly, the policy taken out in the present case is not an 'Act only policy', but a 'comprehensive policy'. It is the contention of the insurer that the comprehensive policy issued in this case does not cover risk to a gratuitous passenger since premium in that behalf was not paid. Learned counsel for the claimants and the owner of the car, on the other hand, contend that the policy covers risk to gratuitous passengers also.
9. In case of a private car, it is not the mandatory requirement of Section 95 of the Act that risk to passengers, that is, gratuitous passengers should be covered by a valid insurance policy. However, the owner of the car can obtain a policy to cover any risk not required to be covered under Section 95 of the Act. It is open to him to obtain a policy covering higher risk or risk beyond what is required by the Act. [See Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. Pvt. Ltd. 1977 ACJ 343 (SC) and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jugal Kishore 1988 ACJ 270 (SC)]. In other words, it is open to an insured to take what is called a comprehensive policy to cover risk higher than or beyond the requirements of law. The use of the word 'comprehensive' in a policy cannot mean that the policy covers all risks. Cover of any particular risk is determined by the contract between the owner of the car, that is, the insured and the insurer and payment of premium.
10. The decision in Pushpabai's case 1977 ACJ 343 (SC), which was pronounced on 25.3.1977, that Section 95 (1) (b) (i) of the Act does not require that a policy of insurance should cover risk to the passengers who are not earned for hire or reward had a significant sequel. The Tariff Advisory Committee by instruction dated 13.3.1978 required insurance companies to incoiporate in appropriate policies a clause covering risk:
Death or bodily injury to any person including occupants carried in the motor car provided that such occupants are not carried for hire or reward.
The committee further directed that all existing policies should be deemed to incorporate this amendment automatically and that the instrument would take effect from 25.3.1977. The intention of the committee was to encourage wider policy coverage, i.e., to cover risk in respect of gratuitous passengers also. The instruction regarding deemed retrospective incorporation with effect from 25.3.1977 was intended to cover existing policies and claims pending on that day, even though extra premium had not been paid in that behalf. The effect of the instruction cannot be incorporation of the clause in future policies without payment of requisite additional premium for that purpose. Future policies could cover such a risk only if the insured pays the appropriate premium. If extra premium has not been paid for a policy obtained after 25.3.1977, the risk in respect of gratuitous passengers cannot be taken to have been covered; this is so even if language of wider import is used in the printed form. Additional or wider coverage is introduced by what is called 'I.M.T.' endorsement attached to the policy. If additional premium is not paid for a particular risk coverage, the appropriate I.M.T. endorsement will not be attached to the policy and such coverage will be absent.
11. The Delhi High Court in Sugar Chand Phool Chand Jain v. Santosh Gupta 1985 ACJ 585 (Delhi), held that the policy in that case which was in force on 25.3.1977 is deemed to incorporate the clause covering risk in respect of gratuitous passengers. The same view was adopted by the Orissa High Court in Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sanatan Pradhan 1988 ACJ 792 (Orissa), in regard to an accident which took place in 1982, without considering if additional premium had been paid. The policy involved in Assam Corporation v. Binu Rani Ao 1974 ACJ 381 (Assam & Nagaland), was stated to have specifically covered risk for death or injury to 'any person' out of the use of the vehicle in Section II, Clause (1) (a) under the heading 'Third party risks'. A Division Bench of this court held that gratuitous passenger in the jeep involved in the accident was a third party and his injury was covered by the policy. There was no contention in that case that additional premium had not been paid and, therefore, the printed term of the policy was not part of the contract. A Full Bench of three Judges of this court in Him Devi v. Bhaha Kami Das 1977 ACJ 293 (Assam), considered a policy which contained a printed clause that the company will indemnify the insured in the event of accident against all sums which he shall become legally liable to pay in respect of death or bodily injury to any person, but except so far as is necessary to meet the requirements of Section 95 of the Act, the company shall not be liable when such death or injury arises out of and in the course of the employment of such person by insured. The court held that the words 'any person' would not exclude a gratuitous passenger travelling in the car. It was not clear to the court under what circumstances the passenger happened to travel in the car, or if the car was hired or lent gratuitously by the insured. It was held that hence the insured was not liable for the driver's negligence and, therefore, the insurer was not liable.
12. A Full Bench of five Judges of this court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satyanath Hazarika 1989 ACJ 685 (Gauhati), adverted to the decisions of the Supreme Court and this court had observed:
After the decision in Pushpabai's case 1977 ACJ 343 (SC), there is no scope to argue that under an 'Act only' policy the insurer is liable to indemnify the insured for the compensation payable by the latter in case of death or bodily injury to the passenger who is not carried for hire or reward. Of course, a particular policy may travel beyond the limit of Section 95 and cover cases of gratuitous passengers also.
The court recorded the submission that:.in recent private car comprehensive policies a provision has been made for compensation arising out of accidents to unnamed passengers other than the insured and his paid driver or cleaner for which some additional premium is charged.
The court held:.an insurer would be liable to indemnify the insured in respect of compensation awarded against him for the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger in all those cases which are pending before the Claims Tribunal or appellate authorities since 25th March, 1977. In other cases, the insurer would be liable in cases of the present nature if the particular policy covered the risk, and it shall be the burden of the insurer to satisfy by producing the policy that such a risk was not covered by the policy, if that was its case before the Claims Tribunal.
The accident in Jugal Kishore's case 1988 ACJ 270 (SC), took place in 1969 and the appellate court disposed of the appeal in 1984, i.e., after 25.3.1977. The policy in that case was 'Commercial Vehicle Comprehensive'. The Supreme Court observed:
Comprehensive insurance of the vehicle and payment of higher premium on this score, however, do not mean that the limit of the liability with regard to third party risk becomes unlimited or higher than the statutory liability fixed under Sub-section (2) of Section 95 of the Act. For this purpose a specific agreement has to be arrived at between the owner and the insurance company and separate premium has to be paid on the amount of liability undertaken by the insurance company in this behalf. Likewise, if risk of any other nature, for instance, with regard to the driver or passengers, etc., in excess of statutory liability, if any, is sought to be covered it has to be clearly specified in the policy and separate premium paid there for.
The court noticed that no additional premium had been paid for covering risk in excess of Rs. 20,000/- per person and, therefore, insurer is not liable beyond the statutory limit even though the policy is a 'comprehensive' policy.
13. Printed copy of the policy is part of Exh. 'Ka'. The heading of the policy is 'Private Cars Comprehensive (India)'. The heading of Section II is 'Liability to third parties'. Clause 1 of Section II, which is a printed clause, reads thus:
(1) The company will indemnify the insured in the event of accident caused by or arising out of the use of the motor car against all sums including claimant's costs and expenses which the insured shall become legally liable to pay in respect of—
(a) death or bodily injury to any person but except so far as is necessary to meet the requirement of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the company shall not be liable where such death or injury arises out of and in course of the employment of such person by the insured;
Printed sheets of I.M.T. endorsements are seen attached to the policy. I.M.T. 21 (riot and strike), I.M.T. 16 (legal liability to person employed in connection with the operation, etc.), I.M.T. 23 (replacement parts) and I.M.T. (excess accidental damage) are seen to be part of the policy. I.M.T. 21 and 16 required payment of additional premium—Endorsement shows payment of Rs. 37.50 regarding I.M.T. 21 and Rs. 5/-paid in respect to I.M.T. 16. I.M.T. 5 relating to 'accidents to unnamed passengers other than insured and his paid driver or cleaner' is not attached and no additional premium is seen paid there for. I.M.T. 1 contemplates reduction of premium and such reduction is seen granted. The particulars in the policy show that additional premium has not been paid for coverage of risk to passengers. It must, therefore, be held that the contract of insurance between the insured and the insurer in this case does not cover risk of death or injury to gratuitous passengers travelling in the car. We, therefore, hold that insurer is not liable.
14. The original claimants were the father, widow and the minor children of the deceased. The father died before the disposal of the claim petition.
15. According to the claim petition Rs. 1,50,000/- was claimed for the father, Rs. 5,50,000/- for the widow and a sum of Rs. 22,00,000/- for the four children together. The Claims Tribunal did not award anything on account of the father because he died pending the case and his legal representatives were not impleaded, awarded Rs. 1,50,000/- for the widow and Rs. 2,00,000/- for the four children together. The heads of claim in the claim petition are pecuniary loss, mental shock and agony suffered by the claimants, loss of marital love, care and attention, loss of enjoyment of life, etc., in the case of the widow and loss of love, care, attention, etc., in the case of others, loss of education and marriage in the case of the children, loss of enjoyment, etc., in the case of the children. A sum of Rs. 10,000/- was also claimed for expenses on funeral and religious rites.
16. The Tribunal awarded to the widow Rs. 1,00,000/- for loss of marital love and enjoyment, Rs. 40,000/- for mental shock and agony suffered by her and Rs. 10,000/-for funeral expenses. The children together were awarded Rs. 1,00,000/- for loss of parental love, care, attention, etc. and Rs. 1,00,000/- for mental shock and agony suffered by them.
17. Section 110-B of the Act empowers the Tribunal to determine 'the amount of compensation which appeals to it to be just'. The power given to the Tribunal in the matter of fixing compensation is wide. However, it is not every accident and every injury which gives cause of action to file a claim petition. Liability of the owner or the insurer or for that matter of the driver would arise only on proof of negligence except to the extent that this principle of law of Torts has been statutorily amended, as in the case of partial no fault liability. [See Minu B. Mehta v. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan 1977 ACJ 118 (SC)]. We are referring to this because there is a controversy whether the Tribunal can look into the principles of law of Torts or the provisions of Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, in fixing the quantum of just compensation. High Courts have expressed conflicting views in the matter. One view is that Section 110-B of the Act does not create any new basis or extent of liability and quantum has to be decided in accordance with the substantive law of liability in force, namely, the law of Torts. [See Kamla Devi v. Kishan Chand 1970 ACJ 310 (MP), Dewan Hari Chand v. Municipal Committee of Delhi 1981 ACJ 131 (Delhi) and Mohinder Singh Sohal v. Ramesh Kumar 1981 ACJ 326 (P&H;)]. Another view is that the relevant provisions of the Act are a self-contained code for adjudication of claims of compensation and the Tribunal is not to be guided by any principle of law of Torts. [See Mohammed Habibullah v. K. Seetliammal 1966 ACJ 349 (Madias), Megjiblwi Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai 1977 ACJ 253 (Gujarat) and Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Peerappa Para-sappa 1979 ACJ 229 (Karnataka)]. There is yet another view that the Act does not spell out any clear guidelines or norms for assessment of compensation and, therefore, the Tribunal should look to the principles laid down in the law of Torts for guidance in the matter, though it has wider power than the civil court since Section 110-B empowers the Tribunal to determine 'just compensation'. [See M.A. Rahim v. Sayari Bai 1972 ACJ 470 (Madias), Gulab Devi Sofumey v. Govt. of M.P. 1971 ACJ 214 (MP) and Ishwari Devi v. Union of India 1968 ACJ 141 (Delhi)]. The Supreme Court referred to this controversy in Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transporters Insurance Co. Ltd. 1971 ACJ 206 (SC), but left it unresolved.
18. Motor Vehicles Act does not create a new basis or extent of liability in regard to the claims arising out of death or injury in a motor vehicle accident. The right of the claimant and liability of the driver or the owner arises only if the latter can be held liable under the common law of Torts. Under the common law of Torts, liability arises if the accident is the result of rashness or negligence on the part of the driver. Therefore, the provisions of the Act cannot be regarded as a self-contained code. The common law of Torts is modified, in regard to fatal accidents, by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. The Act has a wider connotation than the expression 'damages' used in the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. The better view is that the Tribunal must be generally guided by the principles of law of Torts in the matter of quantification of compensation. In other words, Tribunal must follow the basic principles of law of Torts, though it must be regarded as having power to make its own assessment of what would be 'just compensation' in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. One fundamental principle of law of Torts that would govern claims under the Act arising in regard to fatal accidents is that what the claimant could obtain is based on pecuniary loss sustained by the claimant.
19. The heirs of the deceased are not entitled to any compensation for pain or mental agony suffered by them on account of the death of their near one. However, if the injured in a fatal accident has survived for some time and had suffered pain and agony, claim could be made in that behalf. [See N. Sivammal v. Pandian Roadways Corporation 1985 ACJ 75 (SC)]. There is neither plea nor evidence in the present case that the deceased survived for any length of time or had undergone any pain or agony. The award of Rs. 40,000/- to the widow and Rs. 1,00,000/- for the children for mental shock and agony suffered by them is unsustainable.
20. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 1,00,000/-to the wife for loss of marital care and enjoyment and Rs. 1,00,000/- to the children for the loss of parental love, care, attention and guidance. We find that in Hardeo Kaur v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation 1992 ACJ 300 (SC), Supreme Court adjusted the multiplier adopted for determining the loss of dependency on a consideration of the fact that no compensation was awarded by the Tribunal for loss of 'consortium' to the wife and the children. It is true that under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, as explained by the Supreme Court in Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. R.M.K. Veluswami 1958-65 ACJ 179 (SC) and C.K. Subramania Iyer v. T. Kunhi Kuttan Nair 1970 ACJ 110 (SC), solatium, damages for injured feelings or sentiments are not admissible under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. As we have indicated earlier, Tribunal has wider power in awarding compensation than an ordinary civil court has in awarding damages under Fatal Accidents Act. In the English common law, loss of consortium has been recognised as an admissible head of claim, though it is based mainly on loss of servitium. This principle is applicable in India also. See the decision of the Kerala High Court in K. Velunni v. Premalatha 1989 ACJ 833 (Kerala), where decisions of various High Courts have been considered and it has been held that compensation can be awarded for loss of consortium though it can be fixed only at a modest amount. By a modest amount it meant conventional amount. See Hare v. British Transport Commission, (1956) 1 All ER 578, where it has been indicated that compensation on this count cannot be generous. Strictly speaking, children also will not be entitled to compensation for loss of love or affection. Children who have lost a parent are entitled to recover for loss of attention and services though the sum to be awarded in this behalf must be kept within modest limits. However, the award of Rs. 1,00,000/- for loss of parental love, care and attention is unsustainable. It is legitimate to award Rs. 5,000/- to the widow for loss of consortium and Rs. 3,000/- to each of the children for loss of attention and services.
21. It is within the power of the appellate court to sustain an award to any extent by granting compensation under heads not considered or allowed by the Tribunal. [See N. Sivammal v. Pandian Roadways Corporation 1985 ACJ 75 (SC)]. It is argued that the claimants were dependants of the deceased and on account of his death they lost his financial help and support and suffered pecuniary loss and compensation should be awarded on the basis of pecuniary loss. The Tribunal did not award any amount under this head on the ground that the claimants did not suffer financial loss on account of premature death of Nandalal Kedia. This finding is challenged by the claimants.
22. Nandalal Kedia was a businessman and partner of two firms. On his death his legal representatives continued in the partnership. According to the oral evidence of PWs 1 and 2 (sons of deceased) he earned an income of Rs. 3,000/- per month. Some income tax assessment orders have been produced. The documents show income of Rs. 31,260/- for the assessment year 1973-74, Rs. 22,980/- for the assessment year 1975-76, Rs. 8,810/- for the assessment year 1976-77 and Rs. 31,440/'- for the assessment year 1977-78. The documents relate to the period prior to the accident. PW 2, the eldest son of the deceased, deposed that his father was partner of two. firms and on his death they continued to be partners in the two firms and they have started two new firms. He denied that their income has increased. Another son, third claimant, examined as PW 1, deposed that the present income is Rs. 1,500/- per month and they are paying income tax. Records regarding payment of income tax have not been produced. In the light of this evidence, the Tribunal was justified in holding that there was no loss of income sustained by the claimants on account of the death of Nandalal Kedia.
23. Nandalal Kedia was looking after his wife and children. His average income could have been taken to be Rs. 2,000/- per month on the basis of the assessment orders produced. He would have been spending Rs. 1,000/- per month on his wife and children. The age of the widow is not given in the claim petition. Ages of other claimants who were minors at the time of claim petition are not mentioned in the claim petition. Third claimant, when he gave evidence in 1985, was aged 22 years. Claimant Nos. 4 to 6 are younger to him. They would have continued to depend on their father for a period ranging from 10 to 15 years. Nandalal Kedia was aged 45 years at the time of accident. His widow would have been dependent on him for about 20 years. If there is any loss of income or pecuniary loss the claimants would be entitled to compensation on that basis. Since the business has continued and the number of firms has increased, it cannot be assumed that the income has diminished. After the accident the entire income would go to the claimants. It was on this basis that the Tribunal declined to award any compensation for pecuniary loss.
24. Principles on the basis of which pecuniary loss to the dependants is to be determined are well established. The Supreme Court in Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. R.M.K. Veluswami 1958-65 ACJ 179 (SC), stated:
Shortly stated, the general principle is that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on the one hand the loss to the claimants of the future pecuniary benefit and on the other any pecuniary advantage which from whatever source comes to them by reason of the death, that is, the balance of loss and gain to a dependant by the death must be ascertained.
This principle has been followed in Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transporters Ins. Co. Ltd. 1971 ACJ 206 (SC). [See also Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd. 1942 AC 601, Voller v. Dairy Ltd., (1962) 1 WLR 960, Taylor v. O' Connor, (1971) AC 115, Damyanti Devi v. Sita Devi 1972 ACJ 334 (P&H;), Automobile Transport (Rajasthan), Pvt. Ltd. v. Dewalal 1977 ACJ 150 (Rajasthan), Gulab Devi Sohaney v. Government of Madhya Pradesh 1971 ACJ 214 (MP), State of Orissa v. Archana Naik 1975 ACJ 116 (Orissa).
25. We have indicated that the deceased would have been spending and would be expected to spend Rs. 1,000/- per month on the claimants for varying periods. On account of his premature death at the age of 45 years, claimants inherited the business of the deceased who was a partner in two firms and they have joined the partnerships. The inheritance has been accelerated by about 20 years. Even if the firms are dissolved, they can collect their share of the partnership assets. Pecuniary loss has to be arrived at by balancing the loss of future pecuniary benefits and the pecuniary advantages they have derived. In the particular facts of the case, capitalisation method cannot be followed; it would be just to fix a global amount bearing in mind all the relevant circumstances. We award Rs. 25,000/- as compensation for pecuniary loss.
26. Compensation due would be as follows:
Loss of consortium to
the widow ... Rs. 5,000/-
Loss of attention and
services to the four
children ... Rs. 12,000/-
Pecuniary loss ... Rs. 25,000/-
Expenses of funeral
and religious rites ... Rs. 10,000/-
------------
Total ... Rs. 52,000/-
27. The Tribunal awarded interest at 12 1/2 per cent per annum from the expiry of one month from the date of award. The Tribunal did not consider whether the claimants would be entitled to interest from the date of the claim petition. We hold that the claimants are entitled to interest on the amount found due at 10 per cent per annum from the date of claim petition till the date of order and thereafter at the rate of 12 1/2 per cent till payment. This amount shall be paid by the owner of the car.
28. In the result, we reduce the compensation payable to the surviving claimants to Rs. 52,000/- in all. The owner of the car shall pay the amount with interest at 10 per cent per annum from the date of the claim petition to the date of the award by the Tribunal and at 12 1/2 per cent per annum thereafter till payment. Appeals are thus disposed of, but without costs.
W.A. Shishak, J.
1. I agree.