T. Vaiphei, J.
1. These two writ petitions, being interrelated, were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. Heard Mr. A. K. Bhowmik, the learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. S.R. Dey, the learned Counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. T. D. Majurnder, the Additional Government Advocate for the State respondents and Mr. P. K. Biswas, the learned Assistant S. G. For the respondent-Union of India.
3. At the outset, for proper adjudication, it will be necessary to set out the facts of the two cases in seriatim as follows :
W.P. (C) No. 285 of 2001
4. In this case the material facts of the case are that the petitioners Nos. 1 to 9 are occupying different plots of land in R.S. Plot No. 592 under Khatian No. 4/2 of Briddhyanagar Mouja in West Tripura District while the petitioner No. 10 is occupying a plot under R.S. Plot No. 594 under the same Khatian. The petitioner No. 11 is also occupying a plot under R.S. Plot No. 595 under the same Khatian. There is no dispute that all the aforesaid plots are forming parts of the National Highway, which is maintained by the Boarder Road Organization on behalf of the Central Government. The petitioners are occupying these plots for running different types of businesses. In the year 1998, the respondent No. 1 Initiated eviction proceedings against them under Section 11(1) of the Tripura Public Premises (Eviction and Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to 'the TPP Act' for short) for evicting them from the aforesaid plots. The petitioners challenged the eviction proceedings before this Court in Civil Rule Nos. 449, 429, 432, 431, 444, 440, 443, 442 and 430 of 1998 on the ground that the premises belonged to the Central Government and that the State Government has no authority to draw up such proceedings against them. This Court by a common order dated 3-11-1998 disposed of all the writ petitions by directing the petitioners to prefer appeal against the eviction orders before the respondent No. 2. In pursuance of this order, the petitioner Nos. 1 to 5, 10 and other aggrieved persons filed appeals before the respondent No. 2. The respondent No. 2 by identical orders dated 25-2-1999 in T. P. P. Appeal Nos. 2/99, 4/99, 6/99, 9/99, 10/99 and 7/99 held that the said premises were recorded in the name of the Central Government (Boarder Road Organisation) and that the respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to evict the petitioner Nos. 1 to 5 and 10 under the TPP Act and, consequently, set aside the impugned eviction orders. Following these orders of the appellate authority, the petitioners have been occupying the said premises by running their businesses till date.
5. It would appear that the respondent No. 1 again drew up eviction proceedings under Section 11(2) of the Act on 25-4-2001 against the petitioner No. 1 in TPP Case No. 50 of 2001, against the petitioner No. 2 in TPP Case No. 11 of 2001, against the petitioner No. 3 in TPP Case No. 12 of 2001, against the petitioner No. 4 in TPP Case No. 49 of 2001, against the petitioner No. 5 in TPP Case No. 7 of 2001, against the petitioner No. 10 in TPP Case No. 3 of 2001, against the petitioner No. 6 in TPP Case No. 6 of 2001, against the petitioner No. 7 in TPP Case No. 5 of 2001 and against the petitioner No. 11 in TPP Case No. 18 of 2001 and accordingly, issued eviction notices to them requiring them to show cause against the proposed eviction on 2-5-2001. The petitioner Nos. 1 to 7, 10 and 11 appeared before the respondent No. 1 on 2-5-2001 and applied for time to reply the show cause notices and at the same time pointed put to him that he had no jurisdiction to draw up the eviction proceedings against them under the Act inasmuch as the lands belonged to the Central Government and not to the State Government and further that the eviction proceedings were barred by the principles of res judicata. The respondent No. 1 refused to drop the eviction proceedings and issued two notices to the petitioner Nos. 8 and 9 on 11-5-2001 directing them to remove their structures from R.S. Plot No. 592 of Khatian No. 4/2 of Briddhyanagar Mouja. The petitioner Nos. 8 and 9 are the tenants of the petitioner No. 1. The petitioner No. 1 filed his written objection against the said notices dated 11-5-2001 on behalf of the petitioner Nos. 8 and 9. Despite this, the respondent No. 1 proceeded to evict the petitioner from the said premises by 22-5-2001. Though the remaining petitioners have not yet been required to vacate the premises occupied by them, apprehending that the respondent No. 1 would require them to do so in due course, they joined the petitioner Nos. 1, 8 and 9 in filing this writ petition. It may be noted that by the interim order dated 22-5-2001 passed by this Court, the respondents have been restrained from evicting the petitioners from the said premises.
6. The respondent Nos. 1 to 3 contested the writ petition and filed their counter-affidavit as well as supplementary counter-affidavit. The principal stand taken by the State-respondents in their counter-affidavits is that the aforesaid lands are recorded in the name of GREF on behalf of the Central Government even though the lands really belong to the State Government. According to the respondents, the said lands vested in the Central Government for maintaining the National Highway and no transfer of the lands in favour of the Central Government ever took place. The vesting of the lands happened by the operation of law, i.e. Section 4 of the National Highways Act, 1956. It is, therefore, contended by the State-respondents that the vesting of the lands with the Union of India for the purpose of maintaining National Highway does not in any manner affect the title and ownership of the State of Tripura over the same and that, in fact, the vesting of the lands with the Union of India is brought about only for the purpose of its maintenance and proper upkeep. The State-respondents also point out that the eviction proceedings were undertaken by the respondent No. 1 on the basis of the complaint lodged by 78, Road Construction Coy.' (GREF), C/O. 99 APO on November, 2000, for removal of unauthorized occupants of the lands on both sides of 44 National Highways starting from Chandrapur K.M. 2,600 to 13,700 (upto Mohanpur). The eviction notices were issued by the respondent No. 1 to keep the road free from traffic or obstruction and the same is done in accordance with law, for which no interference of this Court is called for. In the supplementary affidavit of the State-respondents, it is clarified that the recording of the Central Government (BRTF) as the owner of the lands in question in the record of rights was made erroneously and that on detection of this wrong entry, correction of the record of rights was effected on 11-8-2003 under the provision of Section 95 of the Tripura Lands Revenue & Lands Reforms Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to 'the TLR & LR Act' for short) vide case No. 33 of 2003 and that the said lands is now recorded in the name of the Public Works Department, Government of Tripura in place of BRTF of the Central Government. It is, therefore, contended by the State-respondents that the petitioners have no case and their writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
W.P. (C) No. 143 of 2004
7. This writ petition is the offshoot of the aforesaid writ petition and the relief claimed in this writ petition is to quash the said order dated 11-8-2003 passed by the District Collector, West Tripura District correcting the record of rights in respect of the aforesaid lands in the name of the P.W.D., Government of Tripura. This order was passed by the District Collector upon his findings that the lands never belonged to the Central Government. The contention of the writ petitioners is that the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 in collusion got the aforesaid order dated 11-8-2003 passed by the District Collector, when the matter is pending before this Court arid is, therefore, sub-judice, and is illegal. Their writ petition is contested by the respondents on the grounds already mentioned hereinabove.
8. Mr. A. K. Bhowmik, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners strenuously urges that when the premises stood vested in the Central Government by the operation of Section 4 of the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short), all the ownerships, rights and interest thereto stood transferred to the Central Government and, therefore, the State-respondents or the Estate Officer have no authority or jurisdiction to evict the petitioners from the aforesaid premises. According to the learned senior counsel, the term 'vest' must be given the literal meaning and should be read literally and etymologically and so read it can mean and only mean transfer of ownership of the said premises in favour of the Central Government. Once the ownership of the said lands have been transferred to the Central Government, according to the learned senior counsel, it is only the Central Government and not the State Government which can evict the petitioners from the said premises. On the other hand, Mr. T.D. Majumder, the learned Additional Government Advocate submits with equal vehemence that the term 'vest' cannot be read literally or in Isolation, but must be read in the context in which it is used. Elaborating his submission, the learned Additional Government Advocate contends that for the purpose of proper construction of Section 4 of the Act, regard must be had to the object of the legislation and the provision should be read along with the other provisions of the Act. It is further contended by him that the vesting of the premises in question in the Central Government is limited for the purpose of enabling the Central Government to develop and maintain the National Highway, i.e. 44, National Highway, starting from Chandrapur to Mohanpur and, as such, the ownership of the said premises, except for the purposes already mentioned, continues to remain with the State Government. In support of his contention, he strongly relies on the decision of the Full Bench of the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in Girdharilal Anand Saraf v. State of Jammu and Kashmir AIR 1969 J and K 113.
9. From the pleadings and submissions of the rival parties, the sole question, which falls for consideration, is whether the term 'vest' used in Section 4 of the Act will have the effect of transfer of ownership of the premises in question from the State Government to the Central Government. At this stage, it may be noticed that it is a common ground of the parties that the petitioners are not the owners of the premises in question and that the said premises form a part of and lie within 44, National Highway, At the outset, it will be appropriate to reproduce below the provision of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act :
4. National Highways to vest in the Union.-- all National Highways shall vest in the Union and for the purposes of this Act 'highways' include-
(i) all lands appurtenant thereto, whether demarcated or not;
(ii) all bridges, culverts, tunnels, causeways, carriageways and other structures constructed on or across such highways; and
(iii) all fences, trees posts and boundary, furlong and mile stones of such highways or any land appurtenant to such highways.
5. Responsibility for development and maintenance of National Highways.- It shall be the responsibility of the Central Government to develop and maintain in proper repair all National Highways; but the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that any function In relation to the development or maintenance of any National Highway shall, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the notification, also be exercisable by the Government of the State within which the National Highway is situated or by any officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government or to the State Government.
10. Under Section 4 of the Act, all National Highways are vested in the Union of India and the term 'Highways' for the purpose of the Act, Includes among other, all lands appurtenant thereto whether demarcated or not. Section 5 of the Act explains that the responsibility for developing and maintaining in proper repair all National Highways is given to the Central Government, A comparative reading of these two Sections will show that the vesting of the aforesaid lands in the Central Government is to enable the Central Government to develop, maintain and proper repair of all National Highways. In my judgment, the duty and responsibility imposed upon the Central Government by the Act for the development and maintenance of the National Highways will not necessarily require the transfer of ownership of the premises to it. It must, however, be noted that the submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners assumes that the word 'vest' necessarily signifies that ownership of the premises passes upon the Central Government. But the word 'vest' has several meanings with reference to the context in which it is used as can be seen from the following observation of Lord Cranworth in Richardson v. Robertson (1862) 6 LT 75 :.The word 'vest' la a word, at least of ambiguous import. Prima facie 'vesting' in possession is the more natural meaning. The expressions 'investiture' - 'Clothing' - and whatever else be the explanation as to the origin of the word, point prima facie rather to the enjoyment than to the obtaining of a right. But I am willing to accede to the argument that was pressed at the bar, that by long usage Vesting' ordinarily means the having obtained an absolute and indefeasible right, as contra-distinguished from the not having so obtained it, But it cannot be disputed that the word 'vesting' may mean, and often does mean, that which is its primary etymological signification, namely, vesting in possession.
11. It will also be instructive to note the following words of Wiles, J. in Hinde v. Charlton (1866-67) G.P. Cases 104 :.there is a whole series of authorities in which words, which in terms vested the freehold in persons appointed to perform some public duties, such as canal companies and boards of health, have been held satisfied by giving to such persons the control over the soil which was necessary to the carrying out the objects of the Act without giving them the freehold.
12. The learned Judge, therefore, held that the word 'vest' did not convey a free hold title but only a right in the nature of an easement. The following observations in the case of Coverdale v. Charlton 1878 (4) QBD 104 made in connection with the provisions of the Public Health Act, 1875 are illuminating :
What then is the meaning of the word 'vest' in this section The legislature might have used the expression 'transferred' or 'conveyed', but they have used the word Vest'. The meaning I should like to put upon it is, that the street vests in the local board qua street; not that, any soil or any right to the soil or surface vests, but that it vests qua street.
13. Connotation of the word 'vest' in the context of Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, Section 3(a), U.P. Town Improvement Act, 1919 as extended to Delhi, came up for consideration before the Apex Court in 1956 in the case of Fruit and Vegetable Marchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust : [1957]1SCR1 on the following facts and circumstances :
Under an agreement the Government placed certain lands belonging to it at the disposal of the Improvement Trust for the construction of a market. The Trust constructed the market with funds advanced by the Government by way of loan at interest. Under the agreement the Trust had to pay a certain fixed sum by way of revenue on the property; the income from the market had to be applied to the payment of interest on the money advanced by Government, and to the payment of expenses for the management of the market and the surplus had to be placed at the disposal of Government to be spent according to its directions. The lessee of the market from the Trust filed a suit for a declaration that it was protected from ejectment by the provisions of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act. It was contended by the lessee that the market was the property of the Trust to which the Act applied. It was further contended by the lessee relying upon the language of Section 54A(2) of the U.P. Town Improvement Act, that the market vested in the Trust for otherwise it could not upon transfer by the Trust vest in the Chief Commissioner as provided by this section.
This is what the Apex Court says :
That the word 'vest' is a word of variable import is shown by provisions of Indian statutes also. For example, Section 56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (V of 1920) empowers the Court at the time of the making of the order of adjudication or thereafter to appoint a receiver for the property of the insolvent and further provides that 'such property shall thereupon vest in the receiver.' The property vests in the receiver for the purpose of administering the estate of the insolvent for the payment of his debts after realizing his assets. The property of the insolvent vests in the receiver not for all purposes but only for the purpose of the Insolvency Act and the receiver has no interest of his own in the property. On the other hand, Sections 16 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act (Act I of 1894), provide that the property so acquired, upon the happening of certain events, shall 'vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances'. In the cases contemplated by Sections 16 and 17 the property acquired becomes the property of Government without any conditions or limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration. It would thus appear that the word 'vest' has not got a fixed connotation, meaning in all cases that the property is owned by the person or the authority in whom it vests. It may vest in title, or it may vest in possession, or it may vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it may have been used in a particular piece of legislation. The provisions of the Improvement Act, particularly Sections 45 to 49 and 54 and 54A when they speak of a certain building or street or square or other land vesting in a municipality or other local body or in a trust, do not necessarily mean that ownership has passed to any of them.
14. From the aforesaid decision, it is obvious that the word 'vest' has not got a fixed connotation, meaning in all cases that the property is owned by the person or the authority in whom it vests and that it may vest in title, or it may vest in possession, or it may vest in a limited sense. In the instant case, from the undisputed facts of the case, it is clear that the said premises forming parts of the 44, National Highway have been vested in the Central Government for the purpose of development and proper maintenance of the National Highway and that the highway vests in the Central Government qua highway; not that any soil or any right to the soil or surface vests, but that it vests qua National Highway. The Central Government has been vested with the said lands to perform an important national duty of maintaining National Highway thereon only for the purpose of carrying out the object of the Act. It cannot by any stretch of imagination be held that this arrangement has stripped or has effect of stripping the State Government of its title over the said premises. In that view of the matter, I hold that the premises in question do not belong to the Central Government but they belong to the State Government, In view of this finding, I am of the view that the respondent No. 1, which is an officer of the State Government, has the authority or jurisdiction to proceed against the petitioners under the provisions of the TPP Act for evicting them from the premises in question. The impugned eviction notices issued by the respondent No. 1 do not suffer from any infirmity warranting the interference of this Court.
15. Following my finding that the ownership of the said premises does not vest in the Central Government and that the State of Tripura is the owner thereof, I do not find any illegality or impropriety in the order dated 11 -8-2003 passed by the District Collector, West Tripura, Agartala in Case No. 33 of 2003 under Section 95 of the TLR and LR Act in correcting the relevant record of rights in the name of the Public Works Department, Government of Tripura in place of BRTF on behalf of the Central Government.
16. In the light of the foregoing, both the writ petitions are devoid of merits and are liable to be dismissed, which I hereby do. However, considering the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs. The interim order dated 22-5-2001 and 6-5-2004 passed by this Court stand vacated.