U.B. Saha, J.
1. By this writ petition, the petitioners have assailed the 3 (three) orders of termination dated 05.08.98 (to the writ petition) wherein and whereunder the service of the petitioners were terminated from the posts of Revenue Assistants, Fish Farm Assistant and Gear Assistant respectively.
2. Heard Mr. Ch. Nikel, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Nepolean, learned GA appearing for the respondents.
3. The facts, in a nutshell, require to be adjudicated upon in this writ petition are that: the petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were initially appointed to officiate against the post of Revenue Assistant, Fish Farm Assistant and Gear Assistant in the scale of Rs. 520-20-660-EB-25-860-30-1010/- p.m. with usual allowances lying vacant in Fisheries Department, Manipur w.e.f the date of joining duty until further orders vide orders dated 24.04.1986, 03.03.1986 and 15.02.1986 (Annexures- A/1, A/2 and A/3 to the writ petition) respectively, after they rendered continuous service for a period of three years, their services were terminated on 20th July, 1989 w.e.f. 21.07.1989 by a single common order on the ground that the posts against which the petitioners were appointed, either not existed or ceased to have existed. Admittedly, before issuance of the aforesaid termination order dated 20.07.1989, no notice to show cause was issued to the petitioners. The aforesaid termination orders were issued in respect of so many persons similarly appointed on officiating basis including the petitioners. On earlier occasion, petitioner No. 1 filed writ petition being C.R. No. 452 of 1993 challenging the aforesaid order of termination dated 20.07.1989 and similarly petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 also challenged the aforesaid termination order by filing another writ petition being CR No. 1031 of 1992. This Court in both the writ petitions relying the common judgment and order, passed in CR No. 811 of 1989 and batches, disposed of, the aforesaid two Civil Rules of the petitioners, setting aside the termination order and, directing the respondents therein to take back the petitioners, and also allowed the respondents to proceed with the matter after issuing proper show cause notice and affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. But no back wages were allowed, so far, as the present petitioners are concerned, by this Court in its order dated 25.05.1993 in CR No. 452 of 1993 and order dated 26.08.1992 CR No. 1031 of 1992. The petitioners were taken back to their services and thereafter the respondents issued show cause notices to petitioner No. 1 on 11.06.1993, and to petitioner Nos. 2 and3 on 16.09.1992 allowing 30 (thirty) days time to submit their replies. The petitioners also, accordingly, replied to the show cause notices in time. The Director, Fisheries, Manipur considered the replies submitted by the petitioners and disposed the said replies by passing necessary orders on 30.07.1994 vide Annexures- A/7, A/8 and A/9 to the writ petition respectively, wherein their prayer for regular appointments were rejected and thereafter on 05.08.1994 vide Annexures A/10, A/11 and A/12 to the writ petition, the service of the petitioners were terminated retaining some of the similarly situated persons. As aggrieved by the aforesaid termination orders dated 05.08.1994, the petitioners submitted representations before the Director, Fisheries, Manipur on 08.12.1997 and 22.08.1994 with a prayer for setting aside the orders of termination and to reinstate them in service. But getting no response from the Director, Fisheries, Manipur, the writ petitioners filed the present writ petition for quashing the orders of termination dated 05.08.1994 and also for a direction to reinstate them in their services to the posts of Revenue Assistant, Fish Farm Assistant and Gear Assistants in the Fisheries Department, Government of Manipur.
4. The respondents also filed their counter affidavit contending, interalia, that the writ petitioners appeared before the DPC held from 22.05.1985 to 02.08.1985 for recruitment to the posts of Fish Farm Assistant, Revenue Assistant and Gear Assistant, though not selected for the aforesaid posts but their names have been kept in the waiting list for appointment against the future vacancies. They were appointed purely on officiating basis against the so called short term vacancies like, leave vacancy, training vacancy etc. Before issuance of the termination orders, the authority, in compliance of the order of this Court, issued show cause notices to the petitioners providing 30 (thirty) days time to submit their replies to the show cause notices. The petitioners were terminated as because there was no existing vacancy for their appointment and also they were not selected for the posts which they claimed. The respondents also contended in their counter, in para 11 that the petitioners were appointed against the short term vacancies without the concurrence/approval of the government for which the then Director was placed under suspension and a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him and at the same time, the government took a policy decision not to appoint those candidates who were in the select list/waiting list. The respondents also denied in their counter the other contentions made by the writ petitioners in their writ petition.
5. The pleadings on record suggest that the following three questions have to be determined to decide the fate of the writ petition;
(a) whether a person engaged on officiating basis against temporary or leave vacancy or non existent post has created any right to be continued in service or not?
(b) whether the orders of termination of the services of the writ petitioners issued by the Director, Fisheries, Government of Manipur dated 05.08.1994 (Annexures- A/10,11 and 12) respectively are stigmatic or punitive and/or bad in law or not?
(c) whether non mentioning of relevant provisions of rule in the orders of termination would vitiate the impugned orders or not?
6. In support of the writ petition, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Nikel submits that the entire action of the respondents are unfair, unreasonable and perverse as the petitioners were terminated even when they were selected by a proper DPC and their names were in the waiting list, and, they were appointed against the respective posts of Revenue Assistant, Fish Farm Assistant and Gear Assistant on officiating basis and their services cannot be terminated, retaining the other persons appointed on officiating basis, as well as on regular basis, particularly, K. Sarangthem Bimoti Devi, Thaoroijam Bishambhor Singh and Km. Tourangbam Sushila Devi, to the posts of LDC, Fish Farm Assistant and Revenue Assistant (Annexures-A/4, A/5 and A/6). Mr. Nikel, learned Counsel for the petitioners further submits that the aforesaid three persons were also in the waiting list like the petitioners, which will be evident from the counter affidavit filed by the State respondents, hence, the aforesaid fact proves that the orders of termination are manifestly unfair, unreasonable, illegal, incorrect, against the record and a discriminatory one and, liable to be set aside on that count alone. It is also contended by Mr. Nikel that respondents are guilty of, unfair practice of engaging the employees on officiating basis and, continuing them for years together without regularizing their services, either on this ground or that and lastly terminated with a plea of non availability of vacant post, even when they were validly selected by the DPC. He also placed reliance on the provisions of Rule 2 of the Temporary Service Rules, 1965, wherein the meaning of temporary service is discussed and according to him, the petitioners are also covered by the said provisions of temporary service Rules, but the authority in the orders of termination did not mention anything regarding the provisions under which their services were terminated, for which itself, the orders of termination are vitiated and bad in law. His another contention is that after the termination orders, the petitioners submitted two representations, which are not disposed of by the authority till today. To support his contention, he relied the paragraph 4 and 6 in the case of Madan Singh and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors. reported in (2006) 1 SCC 693.
7. In response to the submission of learned Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Nepolean, learned GA appearing for the respondents submits that the petitioners were appointed on officiating basis against non existent posts by the authority without the approval of the government, which is a sine qua non for filling up those posts. He also submitted that the candidates like the petitioners, whose names have been included in the select list, does not have any right, for appointment, but the petitioners were appointed against non existent posts on the basis of their purported selection, which is not permissible under law, hence such appointment itself is nullity, if not, then also the order of appointment does not confer any right to them for continuance in service and in support of his contention he submits that order itself is clear, so far the status of the petitioners are concerned, their services were required till the next order is passed and not for ever, and, the petitioners accepted the said terms and conditions. Mr. Nepolean, learned GA again submits that mere inclusion of their names in the waiting list does not confer any right for appointment in the posts of Revenue Assistant, Fish Farm Assistant and Gear Assistant. He further contended that when the government has the power to appoint, then the Government has also the power to terminate and mere non mentioning of the provisions in the termination order itself would not vitiate or invalidate the said order, if the source of termination is exist in the law and, in that situation, the order is valid one. In support of his aforementioned contention he relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Khazan Singh reported in (1993) 1 SCC 583. And, according to him, the present termination orders are also termination simplicitor and not stigmatic one, hence, the orders of termination are valid and not required to be interfered with by this Court on the question of alleged non-mentioning of provision of Rules and discrimination. He again submitted that it would be evident from the impugned orders that the petitioners were allowed to draw one month's salary i.e., up to September, when their services were terminated w.e.f. 08.08.1994, not only that petitioners were also allowed one month's salary extra, even after issuance of notice as per Court's order, the authority complied, the provisions of Rule 5 of Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965.
Regarding the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioners relating to retention of 3(three) other employees while the petitioners were terminated Mr. Nepolean, learned GA submits that the persons appointed on officiating basis, even if retained, they were retained on the strength of an interim order of this Court and not by the wisdom of the government. So far K. Sarangthem Bimoti Devi, Thaoroijam Bishambhor Singh and Km. Tourangbam Sushila Devi, were appointed/engaged vide Annexures-A/4, A/5 and A/6 to the posts of LDC, Fish Farm Assistant and Revenue Assistant are concerned, they were appointed on regular basis, their cases cannot be compared with the present writ petitioners, not only that, the aforesaid three persons were also not in the same panel, they were in the panel of general candidates at the time of their appointments and petitioners were in the panel of ST candidates, hence, the doctrine of equality is in no way applicable, as the petitioners and the persons retained are different in class and status. Mr. Nepolean, further contended that the appointments, have been made, against non existent posts on officiating basis and the petitioners were also aware about that fact. He again contended that engagement of petitioners were wrong and nullity in the eye of law, as the same were against non existing posts and a wrong order does not confer any right to the petitioners. He again contended that for arguments sake, even if it is admitted that the retention of other persons are wrong then also the petitioners have no right to approach this Court to direct the authorities to do another wrong, to justify the wrong/mistake committed earlier by the authority. In support of his contention, Mr. Nepolean, relied para Nos. 14 and 15 in the case of State of U.P. and Ors. v. Rajkumar Shurma and Ors. reported in . Relevant portion of para 11 of the counter, referred by Mr. Nepolean, is reproduced hereunder:
11. That, with reference to para No. 14 of the writ petition, it is submitted that the petitioners were appointed against the short term vacancies as stated in para 7 of this counter affidavit by the then Director of Fisheries without the concurrence/approval of the Government for which he was placed under suspension and initiated departmental disciplinary proceedings against him. At the same time the Government took policy decision not to appoint those candidates who were in the Select list/wait listed candidates.
8. In order to appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the parties, it would be better, to quote herein below, one of the appointment letters and one of the impugned orders of termination, respectively, as all the three orders of appointment and terminations are similar in nature.
(i) Government of Manipur Department of Fisheries Manipur
ORDERImphal, 24th March, 1986.
No. FD/190/Estt/86(i): On the recommendation of the DPC Shri Golmei Dishinang, S/o Dingnang Golmei of Sangrempang, Tamenglong District is hereby appointed to officiate against the post of Revenue Assistant in the scale of Rs. 520-20-660-EB-25-860-30-1010/- pm with usual allowances lying vacant in the Fisheries Department, Manipur w.e.f. the date of joining duty until further orders.
Sd/-(A. Iboongohal Singh) Director of Fisheries, Manipur.
(ii) Government of Manipur Directorate of Fisheries
Imphal, the 5th August, 1994.
No. FD/45/Estt/88 (Pt) Vol-I/931: Whereas, Shri Dishinang Golmei, S/o Dinganang Golmei of Sangrempang Village, Tamenglong District was appointed to the post of Revenue Assistant in the Fishery Department, Manipur on officiating basis against the so called short term vacancies like leave vacancy, training vacancy etc.
2. And whereas, it has been found that the alleged short-term vacancies had never existed or created to exist.
3. And whereas, in pursuance of the directives of the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in its judgment and orders passed on 25.05.93 in Civil Rule No. 452/93, the said directives had been complied with the reasonable opportunity etc. had been afforded to Shri Dishinang Golmei.
4. And whereas, the show cause statements/reply submitted by Shri Dinganang Golmei had been disposed of after due and careful consideration by the Department, under letter No. FD/45/Estt/88(Pt) Vol-I dt. 30.07.94.
5. Now, therefore, the services of Shri Dinganang Golmei is hereby terminated with effect from 08.08.94 (afternoon).
6. Further, Shri Singanang Golmei is allowed to draw his/pay and allowances upto 07.09.94.
Sd/-05.08.94 (M. Dineshchandra Singh) Director of Fisheries, Manipur.
9. It is also necessary, to appreciate the submission of learned Counsel for the petitioners to quote relevant portion of Rule 2 of CCS (Temporary) Service Rule.
In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) 'Appointment Authority' means, in relation to a specified post, the authority declared as such under the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965;
(b)....
(c)....
(d) 'Temporary Service' means the service of a temporary Government servant in a temporary post or officiating service in a permanent post, under the Government of India; and
(e)Defence Services...
10. In Madan Singh (supra) the Apex Court stated as under:
4. It is contended that termination of their services under executive instructions was not justifiable, particularly when they had put in such a long period of service and while persons junior to them in service have been retained. It has further been contended that while the services of all these appellants have been terminated, fresh recruitment has been made almost simultaneously, which goes to show that there was need for such services and there was, therefore, no justification for termination of services of the appellants.'
6. These appeals had been heard finally on 09.12.1987 and had been adjourned to enable counsel for the appellants to place fresh written submissions. Such submissions have been made today. We have taken into consideration the submissions made earlier and those in the written note now placed before under Section 279/338/427/304-A IPC. We are of the view that in the circumstances, appearing in these cases, there was no justification for termination of the services of the appellants and the petitioners in the respective proceedings before under Section 279/338/427/304-A IPC. The State Government had come forward with orders from time to time for absorption of persons like the parties before under Section 279/338/427/304-A IPC. Taking into consideration their continuous service, the benefit conferred under those government orders is available to the appellants and, therefore, they are entitled to continue in service. Reliance has been placed on Dharwal Distt. v. State of Karnataka.
11. Paragraph Nos. 14 and 15 of Rajkumar Sharma (supra), which are relied by Mr. Nepolean, are reproduced below:
14. Selectees cannot claim the appointment as a matter of right. Mere inclusion of candidate's name in the list does not confer any right to be selected, even if some of the vacancies remained unfilled and the candidates concerned cannot claim that they have been given a hostile discrimination.
15. Even, if in some cases appointments have been made by mistake or wrongly that does not confer any right on another person. Article
14 of the Constitution does not envisage negative, equality, and if the State committed the mistake it cannot be forced to perpetuate the same mistake.
12. In Khazan Singh (supra) the Apex Court held that it is settled proposition of law that when the exercise of power can be justified under any provisions of law then non mention of the said provision in the order cannot invalidate the same. The Apex Court also in High Court of Gujarat and Anr. v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat and Ors. (2003) 4 SCC 712 held that 'it is further trite that non-mentioning or wrong mentioning of a provision of law would not invalidate an order if a source therefore can be found out either under general law or a statute law. And in M.I. Khan and Ors. v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. 2004 AIR SCW504 relying on the principle laid down in Khazan Singh (supra) held that 'it is now well settled principles of law that non-mentioning or wrong mentioning of a provisions of law does not invalidate an order in the event it is found that a power therefore exists.'
13. It is an admitted position that the petitioners were appointed on officiating basis against the posts of Revenue Assistant, Fish Farm Assistant and Gear Assistant lying vacant temporarily in the Fishery Department, Manipur with effect from their joining until further order and they were never appointed substantively against any permanent vacancy after following the necessary procedures as envisaged in the constitutional scheme. There is a distinction between officiating service and substantive service. A person appointed on officiating basis has no right to the post as he rendered service as non permanent holder of the post. On the other hand, a person appointed on substantive post has a right to the post in which he was appointed and rendered service as permanent holder of the post. In support of the aforesaid observation, this Court considered the case of P.C. Kunhikrishnan Nambiar and Anr. v. State of Kerala and Ors. reported in and in the case of Arun Kumar Chatterjee v. South Eastern Railway and Ors. reported in .
14. For better appreciation, relevant paragraph of the P.C. Kunhikrishnan (supra) is reproduced hereunder:
6. Whether service rendered in a post is officiating or substantive for the purpose of the regulation will depend on the sense in which the words, 'officiating' and 'substantive' are used in the regulation, not on the labels given (if given at all) to the several kinds of service rendered by members of the Civil services of the several States in the State Service Rules governing them. The words 'officiating' and 'substantive' are not defined in the Regulations, nor in the Indian Administrative Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954 the definitions in which are attracted by reason of regulation 2(2) of the Regulations. Nor have we been referred to any definition that has been made applicable. Hence the words have to be construed in their ordinary sense, and if the State service rules by which a particular candidate is governed uses these words in a different or in a special sense as for example F.R.9(19) of the Madras Fundamental Rules seems to define the word 'officiate' -that would be altogether irrelevant even though the question whether the service rendered by him is officiating or substantive within the meaning of the Regulation must depend on orders made in accordance with the service rules governing him.
In the ordinary sense of the words in the context of service, 'to officiate' is to 'perform the duties of an office.' and 'substantive' means 'permanent'. Substantive service therefore means service as a permanent holder of an office, and, in contradistinction, officiating service means service rendered as a non-permanent holder. In fact, all service which is not substantive is officiating, and it seems clear that the words, 'whether officiating or substantive' are used in the Regulation to mean 'whether substantive or not'. The word 'service' by itself without any qualification would originally comprise all service and the words 'whether officiating or substantive' are put in brackets after the word 'service' only in order to emphasis that all service, of whatever kind, counts. The regulation divides service into two categories, officiating and substantive, and does not contemplate a third, and what it says, is that all service, whether officiating or substantive, counts. It was necessary to clarify that all service, whether officiating or substantive, lest it be thought, in view of the fact that only substantive members of the State Civil Services are eligible, that the eight years of qualifying service should also be substantive. The purpose of the regulation is obviously that a candidate, in order to be eligible, must have a certain status and a certain experience. He must be a substantive member of a State Civil Service that must be his status and he must have eight years experience as a Deputy Collector. And, for the purpose of that experience, it is sufficient that he should have performed the duties of the post it does not matter whether or not he performs them in a substantive capacity.
15. It is also necessary to quote paragraph 11 of the Arun Kumar (supra) wherein the Apex Court dealt with the meaning of word 'officiating' and 'temporary' as under:
11. That apart, the Railway Board's interpretation in the aforesaid Circular dated Dec 31,1966, of the term 'officiating' in R. 312 of the Railway Establishment Manual, as including both officiating as well as temporary staff, was apparently wrong. According to its ordinary connotation, the word 'officiating' is generally used when a servant having held one post permanently or substantively is appointed to a post in a higher rank, but not permanently or substantively, while still retaining his lien on his substantive post i.e., officiating in that post till his confirmation. Such officiating appointment may be made when there is a temporary vacancy in a higher post due to the death or retirement of the incumbent or otherwise. In contrast, the word 'temporary' usually denotes a person appointed in the civil service for the first time and the appointment is not permanent but temporary i.e., for the time being, with no right to the post.
16. The law relating to termination simplicitor has been dealt with by the Apex Court in the cases of Radheshyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation ; Diptiprakash Bannerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and Ors. : V.P. Apuju v. State of Punjab and Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P. and also of this Court in the case of State of Assam v. Smti Pratima Das: 1997 (2) GLT 71 and State of Assam and Ors. v. Margherita Mahakuma Prathamik Brittidhari Shikshak Sanmeloni 1997 (1) GLT 167 : (1998) 1 GLR 89. The aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court and this Court hold the field.
17. Wrong committed purportedly by the authority keeping 3 (three) persons selected with the petitioners as alleged, if admitted then also such wrong action of the authority does not create any right in favour of them for continuation in service, as it is settled principle that one wrong cannot be justified by committing another wrong, hence, this Court is not in a position to accept the submission of Mr. Nikel, learned Counsel for the petitioner. And, basic rule of fairness is that no decision should be taken against a person or persons which will affect the right of person/persons without providing him/them any opportunity to place his/their cases for such decision. In the instant case those 3 (three) persons whose services were retained are not party in the instant proceeding and, fact remains that, their services were retained in compliance of the Court's interim order, not by the government in its wisdom, therefore, the question of discrimination as alleged does not arise at all. Admittedly, as the petitioners were appointed/engaged on officiating basis without following the normal procedures prescribed for public employment and they have no right to the post and it was also known to them at the time of entering service that they were engaged against temporary vacancy/leave vacancy and their services are likely to be terminated without any notice, as they are guided by terms of appointments and temporary service rule, not by the rules framed for the posts under Art. 309 of the Constitution. The action should be impartial and should be free from even appearance of unfairness, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The basic point which has to be seen is whether the person, like the petitioners against whom decisions have already been taken, were allowed the opportunity to place his/their case/cases before the decision making authority and the authority whether after hearing him/them detail fairly, reasonably, impertially or not. In the instant case the State respondents in compliance with the Court's order dated 25.05.1995 passed in CR No. 452 of 1993, issued show cause notices and the petitioners submitted reply to the show cause after they have given personal hearing. Therefore, it cannot be said that no opportunity was provided to the petitioners as required under the law and as such, the action of the authority is not unfair, unreasonable and violative of doctrine of natural justice though in such cases show cause notices for termination, predecisional hearing is not necessary as per the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union Territory of Chandigarh v. Dilbaga Singh and Ors. .
18. This Court, after giving thoughtful considerations to the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court and rival submissions of the parties and records available before it, is of the considered view that the petitioners were admittedly engaged/appointed on officiating basis and they had have no right to be continued in service as they were not permanent holders of office in view of the case of P.C. Kunhikrishnan (supra) and Arunkumar (supra) and that the termination orders impugned in this case are termination simplicitor in nature as the authority did not put any stigma and the petitioners have no right to the posts, as they were appointed on officiating basis against the non existing posts and rendered service as non permanent holders, as stated earlier. Officiating means to manage and/or run the office for the time being against which appointed, which does not confer any right to continue in service, as the service is temporary in nature. While learned Counsel for the petitioners admitted that the petitioners were appointed on officiating basis and were temporary employees of the government till the orders of termination, then according to this Court they are governed by the temporary service Rules, 1965 and the appointing authority has the power to terminate the service as per provisions of said Temporary Service Rules and mere non mentioning of the provision of Rule in the termination orders would not vitiate and/or invalidate the same in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Khazan Singh (supra), M.T. Khan (supra) and Gujarat Kishan Mazdur Panchayat (supra) and, therefore, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the orders of termination are termination simplicitor and a valid one in the eye of law, hence, require no interference by this Court.
19. In the backdrop of what have been stated herein above and the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the cases referred above, this Court is in complete agreement with the submission of Mr. Nepolean, that the petitioners were appointed, against the non existent posts without approval of the appropriate authority, have no right to continue in service, as they had have no vested right to the posts, and as also they were not the holders of substantive posts, they were appointed wrongly against non existent posts without approval of the Government by the Director, Fisheries, Manipur, who was subsequently suspended by the authority and a disciplinary proceeding was also initiated against him for his wrong action, which fact is not denied by the petitioners by way of filing affidavit in rejoinder. There is also no quarrel with the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in Rajkumar Sharma (supra) to the effect that selectees cannot claim the appointments as a matter of right and if some appointments have been made by mistake or wrongly that does not confer any right on another person and Article 14 does not envisage negative equality. According to this Court, the case of Madan Singh (supra) has no application in the present case in hand as the said case was decided by the Apex Court on the basis of different fact situation and in the said case the posts were available and, they were appointed following necessary procedures. But, in the instant case, the situation is totally different in nature, as the petitioners were appointed against the non existent posts and that is also on officiating basis until further order. According to this Court, the appointing authority was incompetent to appoint any person including the petitioners without any approval from the Government of Manipur as required, for which itself, the orders of appointments are nullity and the same do not confer any right for continuation in service. In view of the case of Khazan Singh (supra), M.T. Khan (supra) and Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor (supra) mere non mentioning of the provisions of Rule 5 of the Temporary Service Rules, 1965 in the order of termination cannot vitiate and/or invalidate the same for which there is a source in the instant case admittedly, under Rule 5 of the Temporary Service Rule is the source for termination of illegal appointees like the petitioners to modify the wrong action, i.e., illegal appointment orders issued by the authority. Therefore, the service of petitioners, in the non existent posts without approval of the Government, as terminated by the impugned orders of termination, do not require any interference by the Court.
20. For the discussions and reasons stated above, this Court hold that the writ petition is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. And accordingly, the same is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
.