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Bal Govind Mistry Vs. Mahabeer Prasad Tiberewal and anr. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citation
Subject;Motor Vehicles
CourtPatna High Court
Decided On
Case NumberM.A. No. 181 of 1994 (R)
Judge
AppellantBal Govind Mistry
RespondentMahabeer Prasad Tiberewal and anr.
Appellant AdvocateManjul Prasad, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateEqbal, Adv.
DispositionAppeal allowed
Excerpt:
- - manjul prasad submits that the learned court below has committed an error of record as well as law by not taking into consideration the fact that the accident had taken place on 6.4.1987 and the claim petition was filed on 2.3.1989. the appeal was admitted after condoning the delay on 22.6.1989 whereas the motor vehicles act, 1988, came into force from 1.7.1989. on these backdrops it is urged that the court below has wrongly placed reliance on the aforesaid decisions of the supreme court. provided that the claims tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time......disposed of at this stage itself on a very simple point.3. it appears that the appellant-claimant filed a claim petition being compensation case nos. 32 of 1989 and 28 of 1989 before the addl. judicial commissioner, lohardaga, on 2.3.1989. admittedly, the accident took place on 6.4.1987. there was some delay in filing of the said claim case and, as such, a petition under section 5 of the limitation act accompanied the memo of claim petition. by order dated 22.6.1989 the learned court below, after hearing the counsel of the appellant and condoning the delay, admitted the case. notices were issued to the opposite parties.4. when the case was being heard by the court below, the insurance company raised a point that the said claim case was barred by law of limitation. in support of this.....
Judgment:

S.K. Chattopadhyaya, J.

1. Heard Mr. Manjul Prasad for the appellant and Mr. Eqbal for respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 1 has not appeared in spite of valid service of notice.

2. With the consent of the parties, this miscellaneous appeal is being disposed of at this stage itself on a very simple point.

3. It appears that the appellant-claimant filed a claim petition being compensation Case Nos. 32 of 1989 and 28 of 1989 before the Addl. Judicial Commissioner, Lohardaga, on 2.3.1989. Admittedly, the accident took place on 6.4.1987. There was some delay in filing of the said claim case and, as such, a petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act accompanied the memo of claim petition. By order dated 22.6.1989 the learned court below, after hearing the Counsel of the appellant and condoning the delay, admitted the case. Notices were issued to the opposite parties.

4. When the case was being heard by the court below, the insurance company raised a point that the said claim case was barred by law of limitation. In support of this contention reliance was placed in the case of Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 1991 ACJ 1060 (SC) and in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaranlata Das 1993 ACJ 748 (SC). It appears that the learned court below, relying on the aforesaid decisions, held that the claim case filed by the appellant was barred by limitation and, as such, he dismissed the same. Against that order dated 31.5.1994 the appellant has preferred this appeal.

5. Mr. Manjul Prasad submits that the learned court below has committed an error of record as well as law by not taking into consideration the fact that the accident had taken place on 6.4.1987 and the claim petition was filed on 2.3.1989. The appeal was admitted after condoning the delay on 22.6.1989 whereas the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, came into force from 1.7.1989. On these backdrops it is urged that the court below has wrongly placed reliance on the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court.

6. Mr. Eqbal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the insurance company, however, submits that the court below has dismissed the claim case correctly on the consideration that the provisions of Section 16(1)(3) of the new Act were retrospective in operation.

7. Section 16(1)3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, reads as follows:

No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident:

Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time.

8. In the case of Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 1991 ACJ 1060 (SC), the Apex Court after considering the provisions of Section 16(1)3) of the Motor Vehicles Act has observed as follows:

If in a given case the accident had taken place more than a year before the new Act coming in force and the claimant had actually filed his petition while the old Act was in force, but after a period of one year, the position could be different. Having actually initiated the proceeding when the old Act covered the field, the claimant could say that his right which had accrued on filing of the petition could not be taken away.

9. In the instant case as I have discussed above, the accident took place when the old Act was in operation. The claim case was filed on 2.3.1989 which was admitted on 22.6.1989. In such view of the matter, the right of the claimant to claim compensation was not affected at all by the substitution of one Act by another. In my opinion, the learned court below has committed not only error of record by not considering the relevant dates but also a grave error of law by not giving proper interpretation to the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court.

10. It would not be out of place to refer another observation of the Supreme Court in considering the question of limitation. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353, their Lordships have observed as follows:

A stronger warning is to be kept in mind by the courts that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so as could be possible in each matter. The approach has to be justice-oriented.

11. In the result this appeal is allowed. The order dated 31.5.1994 and the award dated 7.6.1994 are set aside and the matter is remanded to the court below with a direction to restore the said case in its original records and after giving full opportunities to the parties, dispose of the matter expeditiously in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.


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