S.K. Homchaudhuri, J.
1. In both the appeals, the orders of the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for payment of interim compensation under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter mentioned as 'the Act of 1988') have been impugned. According to the appellants, accident in both the cases having taken place prior to coming into force of the Act of 1988, appellants' liability to pay compensation, if any, is governed by the provisions of law in force on the date of accident, i.e., by provisions of Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 and the fixed amount of compensation on the principle of no fault liability should have been Rs. 15,000/- in each as provided under Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 and not Rs. 25,000/- as provided under Section 140 of Act of 1988. Reliance has been placed in the decision of a single Bench of this court in M.A. (F) No. 2 of 1990 and M.A. (F) No. 4 of 1990.
2. On the question as to whether the provision of Section 140 of Act of 1988 shall have retrospective operation in respect of pending claims or not, a single Bench of this court presided by Hon'ble Sangma, J. by the judgment passed in M.A. (F) No. 2 (SH) of 1990 and M.A. (F) No. 4 (SH) of 1990, has held that the provisions of Section 140 of Act of 1988 do not apply retrospectively in respect of pending claims arising out of an accident taking place prior to the date of coming into operation of Act of 1988 (i.e., 1.7.1989). However, another single Bench of this court presided by Hon'ble Srivastava, J. by the judgment passed in M.A. (F) No. 133 of 1987 reported in (1988) (I) GLR NOC 13, held that identical provision under Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which came into force on and from 1.10.1982 would apply retrospectively in respect of pending claims. In view of the difference of opinion the question has been referred to the Division Bench.
3. By Act 59 of 1988, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was enacted and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 has been repealed. The Act of 1988 came into force with effect from 1.7.1989.
4. By Act 47 of 1982, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter mentioned as 'the Act of 1939') was amended and Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act was inserted which provides as follows:
92-A. Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault.—
(1) Where the death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under Sub-section (1) in respect of the death of any person shall be a fixed sum of fifteen thousand rupees and the amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect of the permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of seven thousand five hundred rupees.
(3) In any claim for compensation under Sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.
(4) A claim for compensation under Sub-section (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement.
5. The provision of Section 92-A of the Act of 1939 came into force with effect from 1.10.1982. After insertion of Section 92-A in the Act of 1939 by the Act 47 of 1982 with effect from 1.10.1982, a question arose whether the provision of Section 92-A of the Act of 1939 would be applicable in respect of pending claims arising out of an accident taking place on a date prior to the coming into force of Section 92-A. As already stated above, a single Bench of this court presided by Hon'ble Srivastava, J., in M.A. (F) No. 133 of 1987 by the judgment delivered on 29.7.1988 held that the provision of Section 92-A of the Act of 1939 would apply retrospectively to pending claims arising out of the accidents taking place prior to coming into force of Section 92-A. While repealing the Act of 1939 by the Act of 1988, an identical provision of Section 92-A of the repealed Act (Act of 1939) has been incorporated in Section 140 of the Act of 1988 save and except enhancement of the quantum of the fixed amount of compensation. Section 140 of the Act of 1988 provides as follows:
140. (1) Where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under Sub-section (1) in respect of the death of any person shall be a fixed sum of twenty-five thousand rupees and the amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect of the permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of twelve thousand rupees.
(3) In any claim for compensation under Sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.
(4) A claim for compensation under Sub-section (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement.
It is apparent that the provisions of Section 92-A of Act of 1939 and of Section 140 of Act of 1988 are identical, save and except the quantum of ad interim compensation which have been enhanced from Rs. 15,000 to Rs. 25,000/- in case of death and from Rs. 7,500/- to Rs. 12,000/- in case of permanent disablement.
6. We heard Mr. V.K. Jindal and Mr. B. Endow, the learned counsel for the appellants and Mrs. R.A. Begum for the respondent No. 1 in M.A. (F) No. 1 (SH) of 1990. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that it is well settled that the retrospective operation of a statute cannot be given so as to impair the existing vested right and obligation. Presumption is against the retrospective operation prejudicially affecting the right or obligation in respect of past transaction. The learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that it is also well settled by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Padma Srinivasan v. Premier Insurance Co. Ltd. 1982 ACJ 191 (SC), that right or obligation as regards compensation payable in case of death or bodily injury, resulted from an accident arising out of use of the motor vehicle or vehicles, is to be governed by provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act which was in force on the date of accident. Besides the case of Padma Srinivasan (supra), Mr. Jindal, learned counsel for the appellant, has also placed reliance on the following decisions:
(1) Decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Punjab Tin Supply v. Central Government AIR 1984 SC 871;
(2) Decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Dhanram Singh 1990 ACJ 41 (Allahabad); and
(3) Decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Jaswant Rao v. Kamlabai 1991 ACJ 344 (MP).
7. Another leg of submission of Mr. Jindal is that as per provision of Sub-section 2 (b) (ii) of Section 95 of the Act of 1939, in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger carried for hire or reward etc., insurer's liability is limited to Rs. 15,000/- (Rupees fifteen thousand) for each individual passenger. Now, if the provision of Section 140 of the Act of 1988 is given retrospective operation in respect of pending claims, in case of death of a passenger carried for hire or reward etc., resulted from an accident that took place prior to coming into force of Act of 1988, insurer would be made to pay Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees twenty-five thousand) on the principle of no fault liability on account of interim compensation which would exceed the maximum liability of the insurer limited to Rs. 15,000/- (Rupees fifteen thousand) by Rs. 10,000/-. While adapting the submission made by Mr. Jindal, Mr. B. Endow, learned counsel, has fairly drawn our attention to the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of T. Srinivasulu Reddy v. C. Govardhana Naidu 1990 ACJ 66 (AP). In the said case, a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that provision of Section 92-A of the Act of 1939 would operate retrospectively in respect of pending claims.
8. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants. In Padma Srinivasan's case 1982 ACJ 191 (SC), the question arose as to whether the provision of enhancement of the maximum compensation from Rs. 20,000/- to Rs. 50,000/- would apply to the insurance policy taken prior to coming into force of the amended provision of the Act of 1939, by which enhancement was made or not. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the law which would apply for determining the quantum of damages was the one which has been in force on the date of accident, when the breach of contract was committed inasmuch as the cause of action arose on the date of accident and not the law that was in force on the date on which contract was made.
9. In the case of Punjab Tin Supply, AIR 1984 SC 871, in para 17 of the decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held:
All laws which affect substantive rights generally operate prospectively and there is a presumption against their retro-spectivity if they affect vested rights and obligations unless the legislative effect may be given where there are express words giving retrospective effect or where the language used necessarily implies that such retrospective operation is intended. Hence the question whether a statutory provision has retrospective effect or not depends primarily on the language in which it is couched. If the language is clear and unambiguous effect will have to be given to the provision in question in accordance with its tenor. If the language is not clear then the court has to decide whether in the light of the surrounding circumstances retrospective effect should be given to it or not.
The ratio of the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. 1990 ACJ 41 (Allahabad) and that of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Jaswant Rao 1991 ACJ 344 (MP), has no application on the question involved in these appeals.
10. It is well settled that the change in the law during the pendency of a case and/ or appeal has to be taken into account In para 10 of the decision in the case of Dayawati v. Inderjit, AIR 1966 SC 1423, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
If the new law speaks in language which expressly or by clear intendment takes in even pending matters, the court of trial as well as the court of appeal must have regard to an intention so expressed, and the court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the judgment of the court of first instance.
In para 9 of the decision in the case of Rafiquennessa v. Lal Bahadur Chetri, AIR 1964 SC 1511, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
In order to make the statement of the law relating to the relevant rule of construction which has to be adopted in dealing with the effect of statutory provisions in this connection, we ought to add that retrospective operation of a statutory provision can be inferred even in case where such retrospective operation appears to be clearly implicit in the provision construed in the context where it occurs. In other words, a statutory provision is held to be retrospective either when it is so declared by express terms, or the intention to make it retrospective clearly follows from the relevant words and the context in which they occur.
In para 21 of the decision in the case of Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare, AIR 1989 SC 1253, the Hon'ble Supreme Court amongst others held:
The presumption against retrospective operation is strong in cases in which the statute, if operated retrospectively, would prejudicially affect vested rights or the illegality of the past transactions, or impair contracts, or impose new duty or attach new disability in respect of past transactions or consideration already passed. However, a statute is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. We must look at the general scope and purview of the statute and at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what was the former state of law and what the legislation contemplated. Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested agreeably to existing laws is retrospective and is generally unjust and may be oppressive. But laws made justly and for the benefit of individuals and the community as a whole, as in this case, may relate to a time antecedent to their commencement. The presumption against retrospectivity may in such cases be rebutted by necessary implications from the language employed in the statute. It cannot be said to. be an invariable rule that a statute could not be retrospective unless so expressed in the very terms of the section which had to be construed.
The intendment of legislature for insertion of Section 92-A in the Act of 1939 can be gathered from the statement of objects and reasons of Amendment Act 47 of 1982, which is as follows:
There has been a rapid development of road transport during the past few years and a large increase in the number of motor vehicles on the road. The incidence of road accidents by motor vehicles has reached serious proportions. During the last three years, the number of road accidents per year on the average has been around 1.45 lakh and of these the number of fatal accidents has been around 20,000 per year. The victims of these accidents are generally pedestrians belonging to the less affluent sections of society. The provisions of the Act as to compensation in respect of accidents can be availed of only in cases of accidents which can be proved to have taken place as a result of wrongful act or negligence on the part of the owners or drivers of the vehicles concerned. Having regard to the nature of circumstances in which road accidents take place, in a number of cases it is difficult to secure adequate evidence to prove negligence. Further, in what are known as 'hit and run' accidents, by reason of the identity of the vehicle involved in the accident not being known, the persons affected cannot prefer any claims for compensation. It is, therefore, considered necessary to amend the Act suitably to secure strict enforcement of road safety measures and also to make, as a measure of social justice, suitable provisions first for compensation without proof of fault or negligence on the part of the owner or driver of the vehicle and, secondly, for compensation by way of solatium in eases in which the identity of the vehicle causing an accident is unknown.
It is apparent from the statement of objects and reasons of Amendment Act 47 of 1982, that Section 92-A of the Act of 1939 was inserted as a measure of social justice and the provision is a beneficial piece of legislation. The provision of Section 140 of the Act of 1988 is identical to the provision of Section 92-A of the Act of 1939, save and except the quantum of compensation. As such, Section 140 of the Act of 1988 is also a beneficial piece of legislation. A piece of beneficial legislation should be construed liberally.
11. The object and reasons of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act 47 of 1982, inserting Section 92-A in the Act of 1939, and the principle enunciated by the Apex Court in the cases of Dayawati v. Inderjit, AIR 1966 SC 1423, Rafiquennessa v. Lal Bahadur Chetri, AIR 1964 SC 1511, and in the case of Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare, AIR 1989 SC 1253, lead to the conclusion that the provision of Section 140 of the Act of 1988, which is identical with the provision of Section 92-A of Act of 1939, shall operate retrospectively in respect of pending claims of fixed amount of compensation on the principle of no fault liability although the accident out of which the claims arose might have taken place prior to date of coming into force of the Act of 1988.
12. Under the provision of Section 140 of the Act of 1988, on the principle of no fault liability, the owner of the vehicle involved in an accident would be liable to pay a fixed sum of Rs. 25,000/- in respect of death of a person and a fixed sum of Rs. 12,000/- in respect of permanent disablement of any person and that for securing this fixed amount of compensation, it will not be necessary to prove any wrongful act or negligence of the driver of the vehicle. It may reasonably be presumed that while incorporating the identical provision of Section 92-A of the Act of 1939 in Section 140 of the Act of 1988, the legislature, after taking into consideration the steady decline of rupee value due to inflation, has increased the quantum of fixed amount of compensation on the principle of no fault liability from Rs. 15,000 to Rs. 25,000/- in case of death of a person and from Rs. 7,500/- to Rs. 12,000/- in case of permanent disablement of a person.
13. Mandate of the provision of Section 140 of the Act of 1988 is to provide immediate interim relief to the victim of an accident and the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident is to pay the fixed amount of compensation soon after the accident without questioning as 'to whether the accident took place due to negligence or wrongful act on the part of the driver of the vehicle or not'. As such, the submission of Mr. Jindal that if the provision of Section 140 of the Act of 1988 is given retrospective operation in respect of pending claims, in certain case the compensation payable by the insurer on the principle of no fault liability would exceed the maximum amount of compensation by Rs. 10,000/- which the insurer would be ultimately liable to pay, is not relevant for deciding whether the provision of Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 shall operate retrospectively in respect of pending claim.
14. For the foregoing reasons, with respect, we differ with the decision of the single Bench of this court in Case No. M.A. (F) 2 (SH) of 1990 holding that provision of Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 shall not operate retrospectively in case of pending claims and we hold the provision of Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 would operate retrospectively in respect of pending claims for compensation under the provision of Section 140 (Sic. Section 92-A) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The decision of the single Bench in M.A. (F) No. 2 (SH) of 1990 and M.A. (F) No. 4 (SH) of 1990 is overruled.
15. The appeals are, therefore, without merit and are dismissed. No costs.