Manisana, J.
1. In this petition, two questions have been raised --
(i) Whether Paresh Kalita was a juvenile delinquent under the Juvenile Justice Act at the time of commission of the alleged offences or at the time of arrest?
(ii) If Paresh was a juvenile delinquent, whether his case would be governed by the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 or the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987?
2. Paresh Kalita was apprehended by the members of the Border Security Force and he was made over to the civil police of Udalguri Police Station on 6-11-91. The civil police arrested Paresh Kalita on accusation of having committed offences under Sections 3 and 4 of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (for short 'TADA (P) Act'), Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code etc., under Udalguri Police Station Case No. 126 of 1991. Paresh is still in jail.
3. Section 2(h) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 defines 'juvenile' to mean a boy who has not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who has not attained the age of eighteen years. Paresh is a boy. Considering his birth certificate issued by the Municipality, the College Certificate showing his date of birth and opinion of the Board of Doctors, we hold that at the time of occurrence or at the time of arrest Paresh did not complete 16 years of age. Therefore, Paresh was a juvenile delinquent under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986.
4. The next question which arises for our consideration is whether the case of Paresh shall be governed by the TADA (P) Act or the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 as Paresh was arrested on an accusation of having committed offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the TADA (P) Act as well.
5. Mr. Laskar, learned Additional Advocate General, has contended that in view of the provisions under Section 25 of the TADA (P) Act, the TADA (P) Act shall override the Juvenile Justice Act. Mr. G. Uzir, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has contended that Section 25 of the TADA (P) Act cannot override the Juvenile Justice Act in case of conflict between the provisions of the two Acts for the Juvenile Justice Act has been enacted in view of Article 15 of the Constitution. Mr. Uzir has also drawn our attention to 'Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 1959'.
6. Section 25 of the TADA (P) Act runs:
OVERRIDING EFFECT-- The provisions of this Act or any rule made thereunder or any order made under such rule shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act or in any innstrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Act.
(Emphasis added)
Although, both the Juvenile Justice Act and TADA (P) Act are special Acts, Section 25 of the TADA (P) Act contains a non obstante clause with a view to give TADA (P) Act in case of conflict an overriding effect over the provisions in any enactment or instrument mentioned in the non obstante clause.
It is true that Article 15(3) is a special provision which can be applied in favour of women and children but not against them. It is also true that the child by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguard and care, including appropriate legal protection. But, under the TADA (P) Act the terrorism has been treated as a special criminal problem. The Act creates a new class of offences called 'Terrorist Act' and 'Disruptive activity' which are to be tried exclusively by a special Court called Designated Court by providing special procedure for trial of such offences. It may be noted that under Section 12 of the TADA (P) Act, the Designated Court also may try any other offence under any law while trying any offence under the TADA (P) Act. When the language of Section 25 of the TADA (P) Act is so clear, we are unable to entertain the contentions of Mr. Uzir that TADA (P) Act cannot override the Juvenile Justice Act.
7. In the result, the petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations. No costs.