S.K. Katriar, J.
1. This writ petition has been preferred for the reliefs (i) to quash the sale notice dated 31-1-2002 (Annexure-4), and the sale notice dated 26-3-2002 (Annexure-5), issued by respondent No. 2 (the Bihar State Credit and Investment Corporation Limited) (hereinafter referred to as 'the BICICO'), whereby Hotel Ambassador located at Buxar was notified for auction sale in terms of Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as, 'the Act'), (ii) to quash the notice dated 14-3-2002 (Annexure 5/A), calling upon the petitioner to deposit Rs. 182,85 lacs towards repayment of the loan amount which it owes to BICICO, (iii) to quash the notice dated 31-3-2002 (Annexure-6), and (iv) to quash the notice bearing legal notice No. Legal/3516 dated 31-3-2002 (Annexure-7) that a sum of Rs. 191.30 lacs were due against him as on 31-3-2002, informing the petitioner that the unit in question had been auction sold in favour of respondent No. 6 for a sum of rupees one crore, and making an offer to the petitioner to retain the assets on matching terms and conditions, for restoration of possession of the unit, and lastly not to take any coercive action including the proposed action to sell the assets.
2. The facts are not in dispute. The petitioner is a private limited company and is, inter alia, engaged in the hotel business. It owns Hotel Ambassador at Buxar. 1 he petitioner had applied for financial term loan of Rs. 81.2 lacs for the hotel project costing Rs. 123.32 lacs. BICICO sanctioned Rs. 70 lacs for the above project subject to certain conditions. The petitioner availed of the total loan amount of Rs. 44.57 lacs between 20-10-1993 to 30-6-1994. The petitioner has so far deposited the following amounts with respondent No. 2 :
Year
Amount (Rs. in Lakh)
1993-940.25 (By adjustment)
1994-95
1.48 (-do-)
1995-96
nil
1996-97
nil
1997-98
nil
1998-99
nil
1999-2000
1.50
2000-2001
nil
2001-2002
11.00
2002-2003 (20-4-2002)
10.00
Total Rs.
24.23
It is relevant to State that in pursuance of the order of this Court on 9-4-2002, the petitioner had deposited the said sum of Rs. 10 lacs on 20-4-2002. It is further stated in the writ petition that it defaulted in repayment of the loan amount and interest which led to the impugned sale notices dated 31-1-2002 (Annexure-4), and dated 26-3-2002 (Annexure-5), issued in terms of Section 29 of the Act, putting the unit on auction sale in an effort to recover the maximum possible amount against the loan amount payable by the petitioner. Respondent No. 2 offered to purchase the unit in question for a sum of Rs. 95.50 lacs. It further appears that after a negotiation between respondent No. 2 and respondent No. 6, the amount was negotiated and raised to rupees one crore, vide letter No. Legal/SFC Sale/HA/3484 dated 31-3-2002 (Annexure 'C' to the supplementary affidavit of respondent No. 6). Respondent No. 6 accepted the offer and admittedly deposited the entire sum of rupees one crore between 26-3-2002 to 30-3-2002.
3. The petitioner company instituted Title Suit No. 143 of 2002 in the Court of learned Subordinate Judge, 1st Court, Patna, on 4-4-2002, seeking the following reliefs :
(i) That upon adjudication it be held and declared the notice dated 31-1-2002, 14-3-2002, 26-3-2002 contained at Annexures 4 to 5 and proposed action and threat to put the plaintiff's assets on auction sale or otherwise to deal with and the threat to take over and finalise the sale of the said unit either under S.F.C. Act or under P.D.R. Act or otherwise are illegal, void, arbitrary, malicious, inoperative, unauthorised, without jurisdiction, vindictive, unenforceable in law and on facts as well as in violation of the agreement unilaterally and hence not empowered to sell them out in pursuant thereto.
(ii) That it be further held and declared that the defendants are bound by the agreement entered into by and between plaintiff and the defendants and not free to repudiate the same unilaterally at their whims and fancies.
(iii) That by grant of ad interim injunction the defendants be restrained from taking any proposed step pursuant to the said notices for selling out the plaintiffs Hotel unit till the disposal of the suit.
(iv) That the cost of the suit be also awarded to the plaintiff against defendants.
(v) That any other and further relief or reliefs which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice may also be granted to the plaintiff.
4. It appears from the order sheet of the suit that the same was instituted on 4-4-2002, and was admitted on 5-4-2002. It further appears that the prayer for ad interim injunction was not granted on 8-4-2002, and instead notices were directed to be issued to the defendant. The petitioner then instituted the present writ petition on 9-4-2002, and was placed before me the same day under the orders of Hon'ble the Chief Justice. It was, inter alia, ordered that the petitioner shall adhere to the following schedule of repayment as an interim measures subject to the final result of the writ petition :
(i) A sum of Rs. 10 lacs per demand draft shall be handed over to respondent No. 2 during the current month on the receipt of which the respondent Corporation shall hand over possession of the unit in question to the petitioner forthwith.
(ii) The petitioner shall hand over Rs. 10 lacs per demand drafts to the respondent Corporation every month until further orders of the Court,
(iii) It was further ordered that it will be open to respondent No. 2 to proceed with the auction, but agreement shall not be concluded with the third party without prior permission of this Court.
It further appears that the petitioner deposited a sum of Rs. 10 lacs with respondent No. 2 on 20-4-2002, but possession of the unit, which had already been taken over by respondent No. 2 earlier, was not restored to the petitioner.
5. While assailing the validity of the impugned action, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that respondent Nos. 2 and 5 had agreed for the sale on 31-3-2002, whereas respondent No. 2 had made offer to the petitioner to retain the assets of the unit in question on matching terms and conditions belatedly by communication dated 27-7-2002 (Annexure 'A' to the supplementary counter-affidavit of respondent No. 2). He, therefore, submits that the petitioner is prepared to retain the assets on payment of rupees one crore after adjusting the sum of Rs. 24,93,136/- paid to respondent No. 2 under orders of this Court. He further submits in the same vein as supplemental to the dominant submission that he cannot be asked to pay interest. He next submits that his application for the benefits under the OTS scheme may be considered, vide notice published in the legal dailies on 15-7-2002 (Annexure-12 to the supplementary affidavit of the petitioner). Learned Counsel for the petitioner relies on the following reported judgments:
(1) (1983)3 SCC 379, Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Lotus Hotel.
(2) ( 1992) 2 BLJR 827 : (1992)1 PLJR 700, Om Flour Mills v. The State of Bihar.
(3) (2002)3 SCC 496, Haryana State Financial Corporation v. Jagdamba Oils Ltd..
6. Mr. R.K. Dutta, appearing for respondent No. 2 and its functionaries, has supported the impugned action. He submits that it is manifest from the chart showing the payments that BICICO acted with forbearance and gave far more than adequate time to the petitioner to repay the loan, but it was driven to a point of desperation and had to act in terms of Section 29 of the Act to protect its interest. The petitioner had paid a total sum of Rs. 14.23 lacs till this Court intervened by order dated 9-4-2002. He next submits that the only duty of BICICO in terms of Section 29 of the Act is to get the best possible offer, and secondly to make an offer to the original promoter to retain the assets on matching terms and conditions. On an earlier occasion, respondent No. 2 had got the present offer of Rs. 41 lacs and had declined to sale the same, and ultimately got an offer of rupees one crore from respondent No. 6, the entire amount has been received simultaneously. He next submits that BICICO in its commercial wisdom came to the conclusion that rupees one crore was the highest possible price which could be obtained for the assets coupled with the position that the entire money had simultaneously been paid. It shall strive to recover the rest from the petitioner. He next submits that BICICO had made the offer to the petitioner to retain the assets on matching terms and conditions by the aforesaid notice bearing legal/3516 dated 31-3-2002 (Annexure-7), which it refused or failed to avail. Had the petitioner availed of the same, there would not have been the occasion for the present writ petition. He next submits that the equities of the parties have to be carefully adjudged in view of the rights created in favour of respondent No. 6, particularly in a situation where it has till been deprived of the possession of the unit on account of the pendency of the present writ petition. He lastly submits that the benefit of OTS cannot be claimed as a matter of right and BICICO is entitled to take steps to recover as much as possible after exercising its commercial wisdom and in terms of Section 29 of the Act. He submits in the same vein that BICICO in any event would not like to risk its rupees one crore already received from respondent No. 6.
7. Mr. V.R.P. Singh, learned Counsel for respondent No. 6, submits that the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands. It has suppressed A vital material fact regarding institution of Title Suit No. 143 of 2002 where it had failed to obtain interim order of injunction, on the heels of which the present writ petition was instituted. He submits that had the same been disclosed in the writ petition, this Court may not have passed the order dated 9-4-2002 in favour of the petitioner. Counsel next submits that it is not possible for the petitioner to satisfy this Court that the action of respondent No. 2 was unreasonable. He next submits that respondents Nos. 2 and 6 have entered into a concluded contract which has not been fully carried out only on account of the pendency of this writ petition, He next submits that he is entitled to possession of the unit forthwith failing which the sum of rupees one crore may be refunded to respondent No. 6 with interest. He has advanced similar contentions as learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 with respect to the other issues.
8. I have perused the pleadings on record and considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 6 is pre-eminently right in his submission that the petitioner has not come to this Court with clean hands. The reliefs prayed for in the suit and the present writ petition are same or similar. The suit was instituted on 4-4-2002, was admitted on 5-4-2002, and injunction application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code was moved on 8-4-2002, on which date no interim order was passed in favour of the petitioner; and only notices were issued. The petitioner instituted the present writ petition in this Court on 9-4-2002 on which date it was mentioned before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for the matter to be taken up the same day on account of the urgency involved in the matter, and was accordingly directed to be notified to be taken up before me. The matter was taken up before me on 9-4-2002 and the interim order to the aforesaid effect was passed on the basis of the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Respondent No, 6 was added as a party respondent by order dated 2-5-2002. Respondent No. 2 has rightly stated in its counter-affidavit that its Counsel had appeared without any instructions in the matter because of the very short time available to him to appear in the matter. Secondly, respondent No. 2 may not have been aware of the pendency of the suit because notices had been directed to be issued on 8-4-2002. In this back ground, I have no doubt in my mind that had this Court been informed of the pendency of the suit and the order dated 8-4-2002 passed thereon, I may not have passed the aforesaid order dated 9-4-2002. The writ petition is obviously not maintainable.
9. Law is well-settled that the extra-ordinary prerogative writ jurisdiction cannot normally be permitted to be invoked when the suit for same or similar reliefs is pending, a position accentuated by the fact in the present proceeding that the petitioner did not disclose the same in the writ petition, I am supported by the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court reported, in 1998 (1) PLJR 889, Sachidanand Roy v. State of Bihar, paragraphs 6 to 9 of which are set out herein below :
'(6) Law in this regard is well-settled that the writ Court ordinarily shall not permit its extra-ordinary jurisdiction to be converted into a Civil Court under the ordinary law when the suit is pending and interim order or miscellaneous order passed by the trial Court have not been challenged under the statutory provisions of appeal or revision as the case may be.
(7) Learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, while supporting the judgment impugned contended that when the suit was filed at that time the district authorities were not interfering with the possession of the respondent Shivanand Pandey and others. But interference started during the pendency of the suit and, therefore, the writ petitions were filed. The submissions made in this regard appear to be not judiciously sound inasmuch as the law has taken care of in this regard to meet such eventuality. In such circumstances, the suitors may implead such persons as parties in the suit itself rather than resorting to the extraordinary jurisdiction of a writ Court.
(8) This legal position is not disputed that against the orders whereby the Munsif Court has rejected the occupants, (Shivanand Pandey's and others) injunction application, the remedy of appeal under Order XLIII, Rule 1 CPC was available to them but the same has not been availed of and directly the jurisdiction of writ Court was invoked. In these circumstances, it is not only a case of patent error but the learned writ Court appears to have exceeded in its jurisdiction. Though the writ jurisdiction is not confined to issuing the prerogative writs alone; but there is consensus of judicial opinion that the writ Court will not permit its extraordinary jurisdiction to be converted into a Civil Court under the ordinary law where a suit is pending and interim or miscellaneous orders already passed by the trial Court against which remedy of appeal or revision is available but not availed of. Thus the order impugned is liable to be interfered with by this Court.
(9) Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, under the principle of doctrine of election, once a forum is elected by a litigant, without getting that remedy exhausted or withdrawn on a reasonable ground, he cannot switch on at his own sweet-will or whims during the pendency of that proceeding to any other forum, particularly remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be resorted to.
And normally a writ Court will not permit its extraordinary jurisdiction to be converted into a Civil Court under the ordinary law when admittedly a suit is pending and interim orders or miscellaneous orders passed by the trial Court have not been challenged availing of the statutory remedy provided under the Civil Procedure Code. (See the decision in the case of Swetambar Sithanakwasi Jain Samiti and Anr. v. The Alleged Committee of Management Sri R.J.I. College, Agra and Ors., reported in JT 1996 (3) SC 21).'
10. I am also supported by the judgment of this Court reported in 2002 (3) B.B.C.J. 298, Bishundeo Singh v. The State of Biher and Ors., paragraphs 4 and 5 are set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference :
'Law is well-settled that an application for a writ may be refused by the Court upon a consideration of certain circumstances as disentitling the applicant to relief even though he may have a legal right which has been infringed i.e., he has not come with clean hands of has obtained rule of the Court by misleading it or by misrepresentation. Referenced may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1994 SC 579, Para 10 : (1994)1 SCC 1991, Chancellor v. Bijayanand Kar, and the Division Bench judgment of this Court, reported in (1996) 2 PLJR 345, Baidyanath Mahto v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee. It has been held as follows in paragraph 6 of the judgment in Baidyanath Mahto (supra).
'(6) Such conduct on the part of the petitioners disentitled them to any relief under the writ jurisdiction on this Court. This position is well-settled that when an applicant approached the Court for discretionary and equitable relief, he must approach the Court with clear hands and must display utmost candour and clarity. There must not be any misrepresentation of vital facts in the writ petition on the basis of which the jurisdiction of the Court is invoked. This position has been reiterated by the apex Court in the case of Vijay Kumar Kathuria v. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 1983 SC 622 and again in the case of Welcome Hotel v. The State of Andhra Pradesh reported in AIR 1983 SC 1015. In an another recent judgment in the case of T. N. Ranjan and Anr. v. C. Achutta Memon and Ors., reported in AIR 1991 SC 983 the Supreme Court was pleased to observe at page 985 in paragraph 3 as follows :
'Even an assailable cause or illegal and arbitrary order may fail to move the conscience of the Court due to inequitable and unjustifiable behaviour or conduct in equitablejurisdiction.'
5. The following observation of Viscount Reading in the judgment of the King's Bench Division reported in (917)1 KB 486, The Kind v. The General Commissioners for the purposes of the Income Tax Acts for the district of Kensington, is illuminating:
'Where an ex-parte application has been made to this Court for a rule nisi for other process, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the application was not candid and did not fairly sate the facts, but stated them in such a way as to mislead the Court as to the true facts, the Court ought, for its own protection and to prevent an abuse of its process to refuse to proceed any further with the examination of the merits. This is a power inherent in the Court, but one which should only be used in cases which bring conviction to the mind of the Court that it has been deceived. Before coming to this conclusion a careful examination will be made of the facts as they are and as they have been stated in the applicant's affidavit and everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the view of the Court when it reads the affidavit and knows the true facts. But if the result of this examination and hearing it to leave no doubt that the Court has been deceived, then it will refuse to hear anything further from the applicant in a proceeding which has only been set in motion by means of a misleading affidavit,'
11. I am reminded of the observations of Lord Denning in his judgment reported in (1956)1 All ER 341, Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, wherein it has been held that'......No Court in this land will allow a person to keep an advantage which he has obtained by fraud. No judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything. This Court is careful not to find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved it vitiates judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever; see,.............so here I am of the opinion that, if this declaration is proved to have been false and fraudulent, it is a nullity and void and the landlords cannot recover any increase of rent by virtue of it....'
12. The petitioner had thus obtained the rule and the interim order dated 9-4-2002, by suppressing a most vital fact, namely, pendency of the suit and the order dated 8-4-2002 passed thereon. The petitioner's conduct verges on fraud. The petitioner has, therefore, disentitled itself from any relief in the extraordinary prerogative writ jurisdiction.
13. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 is right in his submission that the petitioner has been a chronic defaulter and had paid a mere sum of Rs. 14.23 lacs till the institution of this writ petition, whereafter it deposited on 20-4-2002 a sum of ten lacs under the orders of this Court. Therefore, it has rightly been contended on behalf of respondent No. 2 that it acted with forbearance and gave more than sufficient opportunity to repay the debts. The petitioner owed a sum of Rs. 191.30 lacs as on 31-3-2002, as is manifest from the aforesaid notice dated 31-3-2002 (Annexure-7). This Court has no means to verify whether that sale of the unit for rupees one crore was the best possible offer or not, but a few facts are manifest which establish the bona fides of respondent No. 2. It was sold on the basis of a widely published advertisement. Respondent No. 2 had not sold the unit for Rs. 41 lacs on an earlier occasion, has been sold for rupees one crore on this occasion, and the entire amount was deposited simultaneously, which is in contra-distinction to the track-record of the petitioner to the effect that it had paid a total sum of Rs. 14.23 lacs until the institution of the writ petition. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 has rightly relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Haryana State Financial Corporation v. Jagdamba Oils Mills (supra), wherein it has been observed, quoting from the classic judgment of Lord Greene, M.R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, reported in 1947. Vol. 2, All Eng. L.R. page 680, the Court cannot substitute its judgment for action of the administrative authority unless it is so unfair or unreasonable that no reasonable person would have taken that action. The Supreme Court has observed in paragraph 15 of the judgment that the view expressed in Gem Cap case [(1993)2 SCC 299], appears to be more in line with the legislative intent. Indulgence shown to chronic defaulter would amount to flogging a dead horse without any conceivable result being expected. It is one thing to assist the borrower who has intention to repay, but is prevented by insurmountable difficulties in meeting the commitment. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chandra case [(1993)2 SCC 279] has been expressly over-ruled by this judgment. I am thus of the view that respondent No. 2 acted in a bona fide manner and, in its commercial discretion, rightly decided to sell the unit in favour of respondent No. 6.
14. It has rightly been contended on behalf of the respondents that on the own showing of the petitioner, respondent No. 2 had made the offer to the petitioner to retain the assets of the unit on matching terms and conditions which is manifest from the aforesaid communication dated 31-3-2002 (Annexure-7), from respondent No. 2 to the petitioner, the relevant portion of which is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference :
'The bidders presents and bidding had offered Rs. 95.50 lacs after negotiations and agreed to increase of Rs. 1.00 crore (Rupees One Crore) to be paid in one instalment.
'Further take notice that this offer to purchase the said hotel as received by BICICO is being communicated with an offer to you to accept the same on the same terms and conditions. If this offer is acceptable to you, you are requested to give your acceptance alongwith Demand Drafts/Cheques for the above noted amount within 10 days of issue of this letter.'
Learned Counsel for the petitioner is, therefore, not right in his submission that the offer to retain the assets was made belatedly by letter dated 26-7-2002 (Annexure 'A' to the supplementary counter-affidavit of respondent No. 2). It appears to me on a plain reading of this letter that the same was really with respect to the petitioner's request for one time settlement. In any view of the matter, the officer had been promptly made by the aforesaid letter dated 31-3-2002 (Annexure-7).
15. Learned Counsel for the petitioner next submits that respondent No. 2 is failing in its statutory duty to support the petitioner unit. He relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Lotus Hotel Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and places reliance on the following observations of the judgment:
'How a public sector corporation set up to give impetus to industrial development of the country, a promise of planned economy aimed at job expansion to liquidate the curse of unemployment, and larger production helping price stabilisation acts in a manner contrary to its raison d'etre and becomes counterproductive is aptly illustrated by the facts of this case.'
The reliance has been placed on these observations in a manner Completely torn out of the context. That writ petition was for the arbitrary refusal to release the sanctioned loan amount by the State Financial Corporation to the entrepreneur who had already acted on the basis of the sanction, incurred expenditure and liabilities. Therefore, the Court allowed the writ petition by applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel, The judgment is an authority for application of the principle of promissory estoppel. On the other hand, in the present case, it is a case of recovery in terms of Section 29 of the Act after the borrower had been given sufficient time to repay, and was after auction promptly given the offer to retain the assets on matching terms and conditions. The judgment in Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Lotus Hotel Pvt. Ltd., (supra) is, therefore, wholly irrelevant in the present context. The judgment of this Court in Om Flour Mills v. State of Bihar (supra) is inapplicable for the same reasons.
16. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that those entrepreneurs who are willing to perform their part of the contract and have taken some steps in that direction should be supported. He submits that the petitioner is still prepared to pay the balance sum of the bid amount. In other word, it is still prepared to pay the balance sum of Rs. 76,06,864/- i.e., the bid amount after adjusting the sum of Rs. 24,93,136/- deposited by it under orders of this Court. It must first of all be clarified that the petitioner has deposited a sum of Rs. 10 lacs only (on 20-4-2002) under orders of this Court. Relying on the; judgment of the Court of appeal in England in Associated Provincial Pictures Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation (supra), to the extent adverted to in Haryana State Financial Corporation v. Jagdamba Oil Mills, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that respondent No. 2 should have in the aforesaid back ground exercised its discretion reasonably and in favour of the petitioner. The Court of appeal has observed in the judgment that, with respect to judicial review of exercise of such discretion, the 'Courts must always remember, first, that the Act deals, not with a judicial act, but with an executive act; secondly, that the conditions which, under the exercise of that executive act, may be imposed are in terms put within the discretion of the local authority without limitation; and thirdly, that the statute provides no appeal from the decision of the local authority. What, then, is the power of the Courts?' The Court of appeal then proceeded to observe that the Court is 'only concerned, to see whether the legal authority have contravened the law by acting in excess of the powers which parliament has vested in it. It must always be remembered that the Court is not a Court of appeal. The law recognises certain principles in which the discretion must be exercised, but within the four corners of those principles the discretion is an absolute one and cannot be questioned in any Court of law.' The Court of appeal has in substance held that the powers of the Court to interfere with such executive discretion is extremely limited. The Court of appeal proceeded to illustrate by observing that it would be a bad exercise of discretion if the red-haired teacher were dismissed because she had red hair.
17. In that view of the matter, I have no doubt in my mind that the judgment of the Court of appeal in England completely defeats the petitioner's case. In other words, the exercise of discretion by respondent No. 2 to put the unit on sale, the decision to sell the same in favour of respondent No. 6 for a sum of rupees one crore paid/ deposited simultaneously, are entirely within ,the discretion of BICICO, a statutory authority in whom the Parliament has vested its confidence to decide such questions. This Court is not sitting in appeal. In any view of the matter, I am satisfied that respondent No. 2 in the present case exercised it discretion properly, acted in its best interest and tried to recover the amount as much as possible.
18. I should now deal with the petitioner's contention to avail of the OTS scheme. It must be clearly stated that the agreement between respondents 2 and 6 for sale of the unit in question for a sum of rupees one crore has become final and the latter became entitled to its possession soon after it deposited the entire bid amount and the petitioner failed or refused to retain the assets on matching terms. This Court is in no doubt that respondent No. 6 has so far been kept out of possession because of the misconceived writ petition based as it is on misrepresentation and suppression of material facts verging on fraud. As stated hereinabove, the decision of respondent No. 2 to take action in terms of Section 29 of the Act is an appropriate decision and cannot be faulted. The sale in favour of respondent No. 6 became final but for this writ petition. In this back ground, I wish to state that it may still be open to the petitioner to have his pending application for the benefit of OTS scheme considered for realisation of the balance of the dues of the Corporation after adjustment of the aforesaid sum of rupees one crore, and the amount deposited by the petitioner so far. In case the petitioner expresses its willingness to have its application for OTS considered, then respondent No. 2 shall dispose of the same in accordance with law for realisation of the balance of the dues against the petitioner. It must clearly be stated that this Court has not applied its mind to the scope and content of the OTS scheme.
19. In the result, this writ petition is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 10,000/- to be paid directly to respondent No. 6 within a period of four weeks from today. Respondent No. 2 is hereby directed to hand over possession of the unit in question to respondent No. 6 forthwith. Respondent No. 6 is left to his remedies in accordance with law for the claim of damages and/or any other appropriate relief against the petitioner for being kept out of possession.