Navaniti Prasad Singh, J.
1. The present revision application is against the Judgment and decree passed in Title Suit No. 13 of 1995/10 of 1999 of the Subordinate Judge IV, Patna where under the learned Judge has decreed the suit in terms of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') and directed the petitioners, who are defendants in the Court below, to hand over the suit land to the opposite first party, who are plaintiffs in the Court below, as also for removing the blockade created by them as well as the hut over the suit land and on failure of the defendants to so hand over, the plaintiffs were entitled to get the possession through process of Court.
2. The petitioners and opposite first party being defendants first party and plaintiffs respectively have appeared and have been heard.
3. On 24-1-1995, the plaintiffs instituted the above suit purporting to be a suit in terms of Section 6 of the Act, inter alia, alleging that one Ram Prakash Singh and others held a piece of land measuring about thirteen and half kathas. On 3rd June, 1993 one Smt. Kamleshwari Devi, the late grandmother of the plaintiffs purchased an area of about ten kathas of the said land from Ram Prakash Singh and others for valuable consideration by registered sale deed but as the vendor was in possession of slightly larger area, the said Smt Kamleshwari Devi was given possession of the entire thirteen and half kathas of land. She came in possession of the said entire land. Since 1953, she continued in possession openly and adversely to all and that being so also acquired title by law of adverse possession and ouster. She constructed a house over her ten kathas of land as purchased and the rest of the land including the land on which possession was with her though not purchased was used for growing for gardening and vegetable garden. The said plot which was in excess of the sale deed but in possession of the late grandmother of the plaintiffs was landlocked and she had constructed a boundary wall separating it from the land of the defendant first party (petitioners before this Court). The defendant first party repeatedly approached the plaintiffs to sell part of the said landlocked land which was evidenced by his letter dated 19-10-1991 (Exhibit-A) and letter dated 29-11 -1991 (Exhibit-1/1) to sell. Having failed to get the plaintiffs to sell the landlocked land to the defendants, the defendant first party then sought to create a sale deed in their favour on 16-2-1993 (Exhibit -2/a) in respect of four kathas of land and tried to dispossess the petitioners. By then Kamleshwari Devi had died on 31-3-1987 and the plaintiffs being her grandsons were in possession of the said land on which they have built the house known as 'Kamla Niwas' and they were also the legatees under her will dated 22-8-1986. The plaintiffs having come in possession, tried to resist dispossession which gave rise to initiation of a proceeding under Section 144 of Cr. P.C. on basis of an application by opposite party No. 2 (plaintiff No. 2) dated 4-3-1993 (Exhibit-C/a). The report of the Executive Magistrate dated 23-3-1993 (Annexure-5) was submitted on 7-4-1993 in the proceedings under Section 144 of Cr. P.C. supporting the possession of the plaintiffs over the entire schedule land. These proceedings under Section 144 of Cr. P.C. were later converted into proceedings under Section 145 of Cr. P.C. and ultimately the proceedings were dropped. The defendants, taking advantage of the termination of proceedings under Section 145 of Cr. P.C. then blocked the passage from Kamla Niwas to the land behind and constructed a Phoos Jhopri (thatched hut) on 27-11-1994, thus, effectively dispossessing the plaintiffs and, therefore, the suit was filed for restoration of possession on 24-1-1995.
4. The suit was resisted by the petitioners, defendant first party on the grounds that it was barred by limitation, the plaintiffs were never in possession. The plaintiffs had no title to a land, the defendants had acquired title by purchase of the said land and the defendants had been in exclusive possession of the said land since the defendants' purchase that is 16-2-1993 and had got their names mutated and were paying rent to the State of Bihar, the defendants, after purchase of the said land, had erected a thatched hut on their land.
5. The trial Court initially dismissed the suit holding that the suit, as framed, was not maintainable as disputed questions of title had been raised. This led to the plaintiffs filing a civil revision before this Court being civil revision No 567 of 2000 against the order dated 31-1 -2000 of the trial Court dismissing the suit. The said civil revision was allowed on contest by order dated 2-2-2001 holding that the suit was maintainable and the case was remanded for fresh decision in terms of Section 6 of the Act. I may mention here that apparently nobody challenged this order holding the suit to be maintainable in terms of Section 6 of the Act. It is, thereafter, that the suit was heard and allowed by the order impugned dated 25-6-2003 and decree dated 8-7-2003 with a direction to the defendants (petitioners before this Court) to hand over possession of the suit land to the plaintiffs after removing the blockade as well as the hut.
6. I may also notice at this stage that in view of the remand order passed by this Court in civil revision No. 567 of 2000 on 2-2-2001, the defendants (petitioners before this Court) filed a Title Suit No. 153 of 2001 against the opposite parties (plaintiffs of the earlier suit) for a declaration of their title which is still pending. I may also note that the will of late Kamleshwari Devi in favour of the plaintiffs which was pending at that time was probated by this Court in Testamentary Suit No. 3 of 1996 which arose out of Testamentary Case No. 3 of 1991 on 5-2-2001 that is before the impugned judgment and decree and letter of administration of the will of Smt. Kamleshwari Devi dated 22-8-1986 was granted in favour of the plaintiffs.
7. In support of the revision application challenging the impugned judgment and decree, it was submitted (i) the suit could not have been filed pending grant of letter of administration and should not have been decreed in absence of letter of administration as till then, the plaintiffs were merely legatees. Only an order could be made but no judgment and decree could be issued, (ii) there was no proof of possession of the plaintiffs. Possession was of late grandmother, (iii) the suit was barred by limitation in terms of Section 6(2)(a) of the Act. There was no proof of dispossession by the defendants. The plaintiffs have, admittedly, not purchased the said land as the said land was, admittedly, not mentioned in their sale deed whereas the defendants had purchased the said land and had title to it and in the end that the trial Court erred in directing removal of thatched hut which, by now, had been made into a pucca house as in terms of Section 6 of the Act, the only decree that could be passed was restoration of possession and nothing more. On the other hand, Shri Sidheshwar Prasad Singh appearing for the plaintiffs-opposite parties has submitted that in terms of Section 6 of the Act, the question of right, title or interest in the property in dispute is foreign to the scope of the said provisions. It only deals with possession and unlawful dispossession irrespective of right, title or interest. Secondly, there was ample evidence of plaintiffs' possession which was tacitly admitted by the defendants first party (petitioners) by their letters which in fact acknowledged the right of the plaintiffs by adverse possession and the request of the defendants to sell a part thereof to them. It was further submitted that the suit was not barred by limitation under Section 6 (2) of the Act as the actual dispossession took place on 27-11-1994 when the defendant first party blocked the passage of the plaintiffs to the said land and put up their thatched hut. It was then submitted that the decree of the trial Court was in accordance with law inasmuch as the Court, while directing restoration of peaceful possession, had to direct removal of obstacles to possession and, therefore, the defendants were obliged to open the passage which they had blocked and remove the hutment which were forcibly and illegally erected to restore possession to the plaintiff. Alternatively In this regard, it was submitted that the defendants would be obliged to vacate the premises which they had illegally, constructed and handed over in entirety to the plaintiffs as its construction by the defendants was in course of illegal occupation. Lastly, it was submitted that as in terms of Section 6(3) of the Act, the remedy by way of appeal or review having been barred and by virtue of Section 6(4) of the Act, the Act permitted filing of suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession based thereon. It must be held that the revision itself was not maintainable.
8. Having heard the matter at length and given my anxious consideration, I am of the considered opinion that the petitioners (defendant first parly) are not entitled to any relief from this Court in this revision application. Coming to the first issue with regard to the question of the plaintiff being legatees at the time when suit was instituted, suffice to say that it is well settled that pending grant of letter of administration in respect of a will, a legatee has a right to sue. This cannot be disputed. Similarly, it cannot be disputed that the Courts pending grant of letter of administration can make an order in favour of the legatee but base no judgment or decree till letter of administration is granted. In the present case, it is now not disputed that testamentary case being testamentary case No. 3 of 1991 was filedlong before the institution of the present suit. The said testamentary case was converted into a suit and registered as testamentary suit No. 3 of 1996. The plaintiffs (opposite first party) were the petitioners in the said testamentary suit. In the said testamentary suit, letter of administration was granted by this Court on 5-2-2001 that is before the impugned judgment dated 25-6-2003. In view of the aforesaid facts, the submission on behalf of petitioners (defendant first party) is misconceived. The legatees' right had crystallised before the judgment by grant of letter of administration in their favour.
9. Now coming to the question of possession, the Court by the impugned judgment has in detail discussed the facts. There is letter of defendant first party (petitioners before this Court) seeking to purchase part Of the said land from the plaintiffs which would not have been there if the plaintiffs were not in possession as according to the plaintiffs themselves, they had not purchased the property but were put in possession of the property since 1953 by their vendor-who owned the property as well. Secondly, there were inspection reports of the Executive Magistrate and other evidences. This being a finding of fact and there being no perversity in this regard committed by the trial Court, I do not think it would be proper for this Court to interfere in those findings of fact.
10. Next coming to the question of limitation, the dates with regard to initiation of Section 144 Cr. P.C. proceedings up to the time Section 145 Cr. P.C. proceedings were terminated with regard to possession, it was only a case of a threat of dispossession but the actual dispossession came to be done by blocking the passage of the plaintiffs to the said land and construction of thatched hut on the said land on 27-11-1994 by the defendant first party. The suit then having been filed on 24-1-1995 was well within the period prescribed under Section 6(2)(a) of the Act which provides a period of six months from the date of dispossession. As such, I hold that the suit is not barred by limitation.
11. The next ground taken is that the defendant first party (petitioners before this Court) had acquired right, title or interest over the land by virtue of registered sale deed dated 16-2-1993 and mutations thereafter whereas the plaintiffs had, admittedly, no title as they had not purchased the said land. The answer to this is that Section 6 of the Act provides a special and speedy remedy for a particular type of grievance that is to replace in possession of a person who had been vacated, from immovable property on which he had been in possession, otherwise than by process of law. In other words, it is a similar suit for possession of immovable property and the question of title is wholly outside its scope. It is well established by series of Judgment that under this Section, a person who has no title including a trespasser who has provoked his possession cannot be vacated by force even by one who has a right, title authorising him to keep the same. Under this provision, possession is sufficient evidence already. The idea is not to settle disputes of title but to safeguard against illegal or unlawful dispossession of possession except by procedure established by law. Simply put, it is against action of a person who takes law into his own hand to dispossess a person in possession irrespective of the title of the two parties. It is not a question of lawful possession. It is a question of unlawful dispossession. To my mind, it is for these reasons that Section 6(4) of the Act provides that an order/judgment under Section 6 of the Act would not disentitle a person from filing a separate suit and proving his title and then claiming possession but that does not mean that he can exercise his right to get possession in a manner not sanctioned by law.
12. In the present case, it is established that the petitioners (defendant first party) first sought to purchase the land from the plaintiffs. Having failed to do so, they got a sale deed in their favour but having failed to get possession, they forcibly took possession divesting plaintiffs of their possession which they apparently enjoyed since 1953 that is for almost four decades. Now coming to the question of illegality in that part of the decree by which the defendants have been directed to remove the thatched hut, no doubt, in a suit under Section 6 of the Act, the only decree that can be passed is that of restoration of possession. Restoration of possession must necessarily mean removal of obstruction on the enjoyment of possession by the plaintiff, removal of obstruction to the possession by the defendants and restoring the full enjoyment of possession to the plaintiffs. If the defendants has obstructed the passage to the land by constructing a boundary wall then a decree of restoration of possession must necessarily direct removal of that boundary wall as without removal thereof possession cannot be restored. In the present case in view of the findings recorded, it is found that the defendants (petitioners herein) had created obstacles and prevented the plaintiffs from enjoying and exercising their possession thereby ousting them. This could only be restored by ordering removal of obstacles which was rightly done. So far as removal of hutment is concerned as hutment was erected to disturb the possession of the plaintiffs and it was an unlawful manner of act either the defendants had to remove the same to restore the possession or abandon the same. Even if subsequently during the pendency of the suit and apparently within the time when the suit stood dismissed till its restoration and remand by this Court, a pucca structure was constructed after the construction of hutment. The defendants would be obliged to vacate the said structure and hand over the entire land back to the possession of the plaintiffs. To my mind, the defendants cannot be heard to say that they had illegally or unlawfully occupied the land and having constructed thereon, other cannot be asked to vacate the land because if a decree for vacating the land and handing over possession has to be granted and has to be meaningful, it goes without saying that they have to vacate and hand over any construction made by them as well subject to their getting back possession by virtue of the title suit which they have filed for declaring their title over the said land.
13. Therefore, in my view, the revision application is misconceived and merits no relief.
14. In regard to the submission of the plaintiffs opposite first party to the maintainability of revision application itself on the ground that when the statute in specific terms permits appeal, review and permits an independent suit then by implication, revision against the order should be excluded. To this in fairness to the learned Counsel, I may state that revision is not expressly barred by Section 6 but generally the view has been that High Court would not interfere in revision where other remedies are open to the parties, the party has a proper; specific remedy by virtue of Section 6(4) of the Act to institute a regular suit for declaration of title and for possession but in extreme cases where grave injustice has been done or where the trial is no trial at all or where the decision is vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record or where the petitioner is left with no other remedy and such like extreme cases, the High Court does interfere but this question need not be finally decided as even otherwise I have found that the issues raised are misconceived and the revision application merits no consideration and in the revision application, no relief can be granted on the basis of what has been urged by the petitioners.
15. No other ground having been argued, in my view, the revision application is fit to be dismissed and is dismissed as such.