Syed Md. Mahfooz Alam, J.
1. This second appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 8.7.1988 passed by Sri Arun Chandra Das, 2nd Additional District Judge. Vaishali at Hajipur in Title Appeal No. 12 of 1985 affirming the judgment and decree dated 14.2.1985 and 26.2.1985, respectively, passed by Sri Uma Shankar Prasad, Munsif Ist. Hajipur in Title Suit No. 123 of 1974 and decreed the suit of the plaintiffs respondents.
2. The brief fact of the case is as follows:
Plaintiff Rajendra Jha and others filed, a title suit, before the Munsif Ist, Hajipur which was numbered as Title Suit No. 123 of 1974. The said title suit was filed for declaration of plaintiffs' title and for recovery of possession of the suit land appertaining to old khata No. 31 Khesra No. 29 measuring an area of 2 kathas 10 dhurs situated in village Balatar P.S. Hajipur District Vaishali.
The plaintiffs' case, in short, is that one Damari Jha had two sons, namely, Brahmdeo Jha and Sukhdeo Jha. The said Damari Jha died in the state of jointness with his two sons, as such, after the death of Damari Jha both the brothers, namely, Brahmdeo Jha and Sukhdeo Jha jointly inherited the suit properties along with other properties. Brahmdeo Jha was elder to Sukhdeo Jha and as such, he became karta of the joint family. In the year, 1926, 5 kathas of land appertaining to C.S. plot No. 29 under Khata No. 31 of Mauza Balatar was acquired by the income of the joint family but the sale deed was executed in the name of Brahmdeo Jha as he was Karta of the joint family. In 1940 both the brothers separated and they divided all the properties half and half. Accordingly, 2 kathas 10 dhurs of plot No. 29 from the north was alloted to Sukhdeo Jha whereas 2 kathas 10 dhurs of the said plot from the south was alloted to Brahmdeo Jha. Just after partition Brahmdeo Jha died in or about 1940 leaving behind him his widow Kaushalya Devi and a daughter Baban Devi. On 30.12.1946 Sukhdeo Jha executed a sale deed in favour of Udit Jha with respect to 2 kathas 10 dhurs of plot No. 29. After the said sale Udit Jha, came in possession of the purchased land. On 19.5.1948 the said Udit Jha sold the said 2 kathas 10 dhurs land to Maharakhi Devi. The said Maharakhi Devi was the wife of Damari Jha and the mother of Brahmdeo Jha and Sukhdeo Jha. On 10.8.1950 Mahrakhi Devi executed a deed of gift with respect to the said 2 kathas 10 dhurs of land besides other lands in favour of Baleshwar Thakur who accepted the gift and came in possession of the said lands. On 2.4.1971 the said Baleshwar Thakur sold the said land to plaintiff No. 1 Rajendra Jha. Further case of the plaintiffs is that by virtue of the said sale deed the plaintiffs acquired right, title and interest in the said 2 kathas 10 dhurs land from north which was allotted to Sukhdeo Jha and came in possession thereof. It is said that the defendants were desirous of purchasing the aforementioned land from Maharakhi Devi but she refused to sell the land to the defendants due to which the defendants were very much aggrieved and when they (defendants) came to know about the execution of gift deed by Maharakhi Devi in favour Baleshwar Thakur they brought Kaushalya Kuer in their favour and got a mortgage deed executed from Kaushalya Kuer with respect to the suit land on 21.8.1950 in favour of Ram Padarath Thakur, although Kaushalya Devi had already sold her share in the disputed Khersa to her daughter Baban Devi by virtue of the sale deed dated 27.6.1945 and as a matter of fact, the said mortgage deed was never acted upon. Further case is that when the defendants did riot get any benefit from the abovementioned mortgage they again brought a farzi document in existence and got executed a gift, deed by Kaushalya Kuer in favour of Bechan Jha with respect to her half share in the disputed plot although the said Kaushalya Devi had already sold her share to her daughter. However, the said Bechan Jha never came in possession of the land by virtue of the gift deed. It is further said that the defendants have also fabricated some other documents in their favour. Further case is that on 28.4.1971 the said Kaushalya Devi and Bechan Jha executed two sale deeds - one in favour of defendant Nos. 1 and 6 and another in favour of defendant Nos. 3 to 5 with respect to the entire 5 kathas of land appertaining to plot No. 29 under Khata No. 31 including the northern half allotted to Sukhdeo Jha and then on the strength of the said sale deeds, the defendants started interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land as a result of which 144 and 145 Cr.P.C. proceedings were stared between the plaintiffs and the defendants which were decided in favour of the defendants vide order dated 26.7.1973. Thereafter on the strength of the order passed, in 145 Cr.P.C. proceeding the defendants dispossessed the plaintiffs from the suit land on 27.7.1973 and hence, the necessity of filing of the suit arose.
3. The case of the contesting defendants is that Brahmdeo Jha and Sukhdeo Jha were sons of Damari Jha but they were separate since 1926. After separation Brahmdeo Jha purchased the suit plot in his own name and as such the suit plot was the self-acquired property of Brahmdeo Jha and after death of Brahmdeo Jha his wife Kaushalya Devi came in possession of the disputed plot and sold half of the disputed plot to her daughter by virtue of the sale deed dated 27.6.1945 but later on, by a registered document dated 27.2.1946 she cancelled the said sale deed and remained in possession of the disputed plot, and exercised her title and possession by executing several Sudbharana deeds to different persons including the plaintiff, Rajendra Jha. It is further said that Sukhdeo Jha, Udit Jha, Mostt. Maharakhi Devi, Baleshwar Thakur or the plaintiffs never came in possession of the suit plot and did not acquire any right, title and interest in the disputed plot, Plaintiff No.1 Rajendra Jha himself took suit plot in mortgage admitting the title of Kauyshalya Kuer. The defendants are bonafide purchasers of the suit land from Kaushalya Kuer and Bechan Jha by virtue of the two sale deeds executed on 28.4.1971. After the said purchase, the defendants came in possession of the disputed plot and got their names mutated. They were paying rent of the suit land to the State of Bihar and were getting rent receipts. The khatians have also been prepared in the names of the defendants. A proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. was also started between the plaintiffs and the defendants and the plaintiffs lost the case and the proceeding was decided in favour of the defendants. It has been asserted that the plaintiffs have got no title to the suit land and they are not entitled for recovery of possession. The prayer has been made to dismiss the suit of the plaintiffs.
4. From perusal of the judgment of the trial court it appears that on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, altogether nine issues were framed which are as follows:
(I) Is the suit as framed maintainable?
(II) Have the plaintiffs got any cause of action or right to sue?
(III) Is the suit barred by law of limitation, estoppel, waiver and acquiescence?
(IV) Does the suit suffer from defect of parties?
(V) Whether the suit plot was purchased by Brahmdeo Jha and Sukhdeo Jha in state of jointness or it was purchased by Brahmdeo Jha out of his own income?
(VI) Whether the plaintiffs have got title to the land in suit?
(VII) Whether the story of possession and dispossession as alleged by the plaintiff is correct or as alleged by the defendants is correct?
(VIII) Are the plaintiffs entitled to the relief asked for or to any other relief or reliefs?
5. From the perusal of the judgment of the trial court, it appears that the learned trial Court after making elaborate discussion on all the above mentioned issues decreed the suit of the plaintiffs by judgment dated 14.2.1985. It further transpires that against the said judgment and decree the defendants preferred appeal which was disposed of on 8.7.1988 by IInd Additional District Judge, Vaishali, who dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court.
6. During the course of argument, on 9.5.2006, following substantial question of law were formulated on re-cast for determination:
I. Whether the findings of the First Appellate Court are perverse due to non-consideration of oral as well as documentary evidence adduced by the partis?
II. Whether in the absence of any evidence on record regarding the sufficient nucleous in the family of Brahmdeo Jha and sukhdeo Jha, the findings of the court below that the suit property was joint acquisition of two brothers, namely, Brahmdeo Jha & Sukhdeo Jha is correct or not?
III. Whether in view of the fact that the possession of the defendants-appellants was found by the court of executive as well as by the consolidation authorities, the finding of the court below for recovery of possession in favour of plaintiff-respondent is perverse?
7. Before making discussion on the substantial question of law as formulated above, I would like to point out that this appeal has been preferred against the concurrent findings of the two courts below whereby both the courts below have decreed the suit of the plaintiffs. It is settled principle of law that in Second Appeal where there is concurrent finding of the courts below, the power of this Court to interfere with the judgment of the courts below is very limited and as per the provision of Section 100 C.P.C. this Court is not empowered to re-appreicate the evidence of the parties without framing substantial question of law. In this regard, I place reliance upon the following decisions: (i) A.I.R. 1959 SC 57 Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanymayya and Ors., (ii) : [1963]3SCR604 V. Ramachandra Ayyar and Anr. v. Ramalingam Chettiar and Anr., (iii) : [1999]2SCR728 Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and Ors. and 2005 (2) B.B.C.J.-IV- page. 420. In the case of Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanymayya and Ors. A.I.R. 1959 SC 57 following observation has been made by the Apex Court regarding the provision of Section 100 C.P.C.
The provision of Section 100 are clear and unambiguous. There is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross the error may seem to be. Nor does the fact, that the finding of the First Appellate Court is baaed upon some documentary evidence make it any the less a finding of fact. A Judge, of the High Court has, therefore, no jurisdiction to interfere in second appeal with the findings of fact given by the first appellate court based upon an appreciation of the relevant evidence. (The practice of some Judges of the High Court disposing second appeal as if they were first appeal deprecated).
8. In the. case of V. Ramachandra Ayyar and Anr. v. Ramalingam Chettiar and Anr. : [1963]3SCR604 following observation, has been made by the Apex Court, on the provision of Section 100 C.P.C.
If a finding of fact has been recorded by the first appellate court without any evidence, that finding can be successfully challenged in second appeal, because a finding of fact which is not supported by any evidence can be questioned under Section 100; and in that connection, it may be said that the decree proceeding on such a finding discloses a substantial defect or error in procedure. This, however, does not mean that wherever the High Court thinks that the evidence accepted by the lower appellate court could not have been reasonably accepted, the High Court would be justified in interfering with the decision of the lower appellate court. All that it means is that it should be a case where the evidence, which is accepted by the lower appellate court no, reasonable person could have accepted and that really amounts to saying that there is no evidence at all.... The High Court was not justified in interfering with the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court merely because the judgment of the lower appellate court was not as elaborate as that of the trial Judge, or because some of the reasons given by the trial Judge had not been expressly reversed by the lower appellate court. The finding of the lower appellate court could not be said to be perverse or not supported by any evidence.
9. In the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and Ors. : [1999]2SCR728 following observation has been made by the Apex Court:
The right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in the section must be strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and no court has the power to add to or enlarge those grounds. The Second Appeal can not be decided on merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of fact howsoever erroneous can not be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this section. The substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of fact.
10. In 2005 (21) B.B.C.J.-IV- Page 421 Manicka Poosa1i (D) by Lrs . and Ors. appellants v. Anjalai Ammal and Anr. respondents while making discussion on the scope of Section-100 C.P.C. the Apex Court made following observations:
In second appeal existence of substantial question of law is the sine quo non for the exercise of jurisdiction and the High Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without formulating the substantia1 questions of law.
Para-17 of the decision runs as follows:
This judgment was followed by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 2292 of 1999 Govindaraju v. Marriamman : AIR2005SC1008 . In Govindaraju's case (supra) it has been held that the High Court while exercising its power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure on re-appreciation of the evidence cannot set aside the, findings of the fact recorded by the first appellate court unless the High Court comes to the, conclusion that the findings recorded by the first appellate court were perserve i.e. based on misreading of evidence or based on no evidence.
11. Thus, from the decision cited above, it is clear that this Court while exercising the power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not empowered to set aside the findings of fact recorded by the courts below on re-appreciation of the evidence unless this Court finds that the findings recorded by the learned lower courts are perverse i.e. based on misreading of evidence or based on no evidence. Therefore, in the light of the guidelines enunciated by the High Courts and the Apex Court. I would like to give my findings on the substantial questions of law formulated in this appeal in order to come to the conclusion that whether the findings recorded by the courts below are perverse.
Substantial Question of Law No. (I)
12. I have already stated above that under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court is not empowered to re-appreciate the evidence of the parties unless this Court finds that the findings' recorded by the learned lower court are perverse or based on misreading of evidence. It means that in second appeal where there is concurrent findings of the courts below on certain facts, there is no need to evaluate the entire evidence available on record rather this Court has to see that the findings are prima facie correct or not and as such, I would like to scrutinise the evidence available on record only to see - whether the findings of the courts below are correct or the same are perverse. It appears that while coming to the conclusion that the plaintiffs have got title to the suit land appertaining to old khata No. 31 khesra No. 29 measuring an area of 2 kathas and 10 dhurs situated in village Balatand Police Station Hajipur District Vaishali, the court below has placed reliance upon Ext. A/2, the sale deed dated 26.6.1945 executed by Kaushalya Devi, wife of Brahmdeo Jha in favour of her daughter, Babuni Devi, The learned court below has futher placed reliance upon Ext. C which is a deed of cancellation dated 27.2.46 executed by Kaushalya Devi. The learned court below has further placed reliance upon Ext.6 which is sudbharna deed dated 5.4.1949 jointly executed by Brahmdeo Jha and Sukhdeo Jha in favour of Budhan Jha with respect to 7 kathas and 17 dhurs of land situated in Mauza Balatand including 3 kathas 15 dhurs appertaining to Khata No. 31 khesra No. 29. According to the findings of the learned lover court, the abovementioned documents fully establish this fact that 5 kathas of land appertaining to khata No. 31 khesra No. 29 of Mauza Balatand was joint acquisition of two brothers, namely, Brahmadeo Jha and Sukhdeo Jha and on partition, half of the area i.e. 2 kathas 10 dhurs was allotted to Brahmadeo Jha and another half i.e. 2 khatas 10 dhurs was allotted to Sukhdeo Jha. Prima facie, this finding of the learned lower court appears to be correct as Ext. A/2 is the oldest document available on record executed by Kaushalya Kuer from whom the defendants claimed their title. It is a sale deed executed on 27.6.1945 by Kaushalya Devi in favour of her daughter Smt. Babuni Devi. This sale deed shows that Kaushalya Devi had sold her half share i.e. 2 khatas 10 dhurs of land to her own daughter. This document further shows that out 5 kathas of land, half portion belongs to Sukhdeo Jha. The truthfulness of this statement of Kaushalya Devi cannot be doubted because at that time there was no dispute between the parties with regard to the suit land.
13. It has been argued by the learned Advocate of the appellants that the contents of Ext. A/2 cannot be used against the defendants being the statement of Kaushalya, Devi as Kaushilaya Devi herself cancelled the said sale deed by a deed of cancellation executed on 27.2.46 which is Ext. C. I am of the view that this argument of the learned advocate of the appellants is misconceived as the sale deed dated 27.6.1945 executed by Kaushalya Devi in favour of her daughter Babuni Devi was not cancelled because of the fact that some wrong statements were inadvertently made by Kaushalya Devi in the said sale deed but the same was cancelled because of the fact that Smt. Babuni Devi did not pay the consideration money nor she paid the mortgage debt. Another document which proves that the suit plot was jointly acquired by two brothers, namely, Brahmadeo Jha and Sukhdeo Jha is Ext. 6 which is a sudbarana deed dated 5.6.1939 executed by Brahmadeo Jha and Sukhdeo Jha in favour of Budhan Jha. This document shows that both the brothers had jointly dealt with the lands of khata No. 31 khesra No. 29 and by the said document they jointly mortgaged 3 kathas 15 dhurs of the said land in favour of Budhan Jha. Thus, Ext. 6 also establishes that the suit plot was jointly acquired by Brahmadeo Jha and Sukhdeo Jha. Ext. 2/G is the sale deed dated 23.12.46 executed by Sukhdeo Jha in favour of Udit Jha which establishes that the said Sukhdeo Jha sold half portion of the suit plot to Udit Jha as far back as in the year, 1946 but neither Most. Kaushalya Kuer nor her daughter Babuni Devi nor Bechan Jha raised any objection against the said sale. Ext. 2/F shows that in the year 1958 Udit Jha sold the suit land to Maharkhani Devi, wife of Damari Jha, who by virtue of the gift deed dated 10.8.1950, gifted the same to Balesar Thakur. Ext. 4 which is a sale deed dated 2.4.1969 shows that the said Balesar Thakur sold the suit plot to Rajendra Jha. All the abovementioned documents establish that out of 5 kathas of khata No. 31 plot No. 29 half portion of the land i.e. 2 kathas 10 dhurs was always dealt with Sukhdeo Jha and Anr. half portion was dealt with by the widow of Brahmadeo Jha, namely, Kaushalya Devi. Therefore, the above documents which are of unimpeachable character disprove the case of defendant that entire 5 kathas of land appertaining to plot No. 29 khata No. 31 was self-acquired property of Brahmadeo Jha.
14. It has been argued by the learned Advocate of the appellants that Ext. D/2 which is a sudbharana deed dated 21.8.50 executed by Kaushalya Kumer in favour of Ram Padarath Thakur shows that Kaushalya Devi mortgaged the entire 5 kathas of land of khata No. 31 khesra No. 29 in favour of Ram Padarath Thakur and the said mortgage was redeemed by the plaintiff Rajendra Jha as per the endorsement of redemption dated. 11.11.1956. The learned Advocate of the appellants submitted that this circumstance establishes beyond doubt that the plaintiff Rajendra Jha has admitted that the entire 5 kathas of land of khata No. 31 khesra No. 29 belonged to Kaushalya Kuer but I am of the view that the learned lower court has rightly not placed reliance upon this document in order to come to the conclusion that the entire 5 kathas of the suit plot belonged to Kaushalya Kuer as Ext. 6 which is a sudbharana deed of the year 1939 shows that the suit plot measuring 5 kathas of land was jointly mortgaged by the two brothers namely, Brahmdeo Jha and Sukhdeo Jha in favour of one Budhan Jha establishing the fact that the property was jointly acquired by the two brothers. Likewise, Ext. D which is also a sudbharana deed dated 2.9.1968 executed by Mostt. Kaushalya Kumer in favour of Jaishree Rai for the entire 5 kathas of land cannot be said to be a documentary proof of the fact that the entire 5 kathas of land of khata No. 31 khesra No. 29 belonged to Kaushalya Devi as Ext. H which is a deed of gift dated 30.12.1950 executed by Kaushalya Devi in favour of Bechan Jha establishes that on 2.9.1968 Kaushalya, Devi had no right to execute mortgage deed with respect to the entire 5 kathas of land of khata No. 31 keshra No. 29 as she had already gifted away 3 kathas 15 dhurs 10 dhuriks of land to Bechan Jha out of total area of katha of land through the deed of gift executed on 30.12.50 and, therefore, I am of the view that this Ext. D is a fabricated document and the learned lower court has rightly rejected this document. Thus, from the scrutiny of the above documentary evidence I have come to the conclusion that the learned trial court as well as the first appellate court have rightly come to the conclusion that 5 kathas of land appertaining to Khata No. 31 plot No. 29 was joint acquisition of the two brothers, namely, Brahmadeo Jha and Sukhdeo Jha and then both the courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs have got right, title and interest with respect to 2 kathas 10 dhurs of land of khata No. 31 khesra No. 29 of Mauza Balatand. Thus, on the basis of the above discussions, I find and hold that the findings of the first appellate court are not perverse due to non-consideration of oral as well as documentary evidence adduced by the parties rather the same are based on correct appreciation and proper consideration of the oral as well as documentary evidence adduced by the parties. Accordingly, this substantial question of law No. (I) is decided against the appellants.
Substantial Question of Law No. (II)
15. It has been argued on behalf of the appellants that there is absolutely no evidence on record that there was sufficient nucleus in the family of Brahmadeo Jha and Sukhdeo Jha from which the suit property was jointly acquired by the two brothers and as such, the finding of the courts below that the suit property was joint acquisition of the two brothers is incorrect. In this regard, I would like to say that the documents filed by the defendants themselves establish beyond, doubt that there were some other properties in the family of Brahmadeo Jha and Sukhdeo Jha forming nucleus. Ext. 2/G which is a sale deed, dated 23.12.1946 executed by Sukhdeo Jha in favour of Udit Jha establishes that besides plot No. 29 appertaining to khata No. 31 there were some other lands in the family of Sukhdeo Jha appertaining to Khata No. 52 khesra No. 98, khata No. 55 khesra No. 27/2 and khata No. 108 khesra No. 5. This document stands corroborated from Ext. 5, as well as Exts. 2, 2/B, 2/C, 2/D, 2/F and 2/H. Likewise, Ext. A/2 of the defendants's document also establishes that besides the land of plot No. 29 khata No. 31, the widow of Brahmadeo Jha had certain other lands in khata No. 55 plot No. 123/2, khata No. 53 plot No. 98 and khata No. 108 plot No. 5. All these facts establish beyond doubt that there was sufficient evidence on record to come to the conclusion that in the family of Brahmadeo Jha and Sukhdeo Jha there was sufficient nucleus to purchase the suit property and therefore the finding of the courts, below that the suit property was joint acquisition of the two brothers, namely, Brahmdeo Jha and Sukhdeo Jha is correct. Accordingly, this substantial question of law is also decided against the appellants.
Substantial Question of Law No. (III)
16. It has been argued on behalf of the appellants that the defendants were found in possession of the suit land by the executive court as well as by the consolidation authorities and the defendants also adduced documentary evidence in support of their possession over the suit land and as such, the finding of the court below for recovery of possession in favour of the plaintiffs - respondents is perverse. In this regard, I would like to say that the claim of the defendants is based on the basis of the two sale deeds executed on 28.4.1971 jointly by Kaushalya Devi and Bechan Jha in favour of Jageshwar Rai, Jai Kishun Rai, Nagendra Rai and Bhag Narayan Choudhary. These sale deeds are Exts. A and A/1, The record of the lower court shows that three years after the said purchase, the plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession which was numbered as Title Suit No. 123 of 1974. This fact establishes that when the suit was filed by the plaintiff the plea of adverse possession was not available to the defendant and, therefore, the learned courts below were right in arriving at the conclusion that as the plaintiffs - respondents have succeeded in proving their title with respect to the suit plot, as such, they are also entitled for recovery of possession. I am, therefore, of the view that on this score also, the findings of the trial court as well as the appellate court are not perverse. However, before concluding my judgment, I would like to say that the very sale deeds of the defendants i.e. Exts. A and A/1 dated 28.4.1971 do not appear to be valid documents as Ext, H which is the gift deed dated 30.12.50 establishes that Kaushalya Devi had already gifted 3 kathas 15 dhurs 10 dhuriks of land of plot No. 29 khata No. 31 to Bechan Jha meaning thereby that on 28.4.1971 Kaushalya Devi had no right to execute the sale deed with respect to 3 kathas 15 dhurs 10 dhuriks of land which she had already gifted to Bechan Jha. Likewise, Bechan Jha could not have acquired any right, title and interest in the suit property by virtue of the gift deed dated 30.12.1950 executed by Kaushalya Devi in his favour as on that very date i.e. 30.12.1950 Kaushalya Devi was a limited owner and she had no right to alienate the property by executing a sale deed or gift deed. I am, therefore, of the view that by virtue of the gift deed dated 30.12.50, Bechan Jha had also not acquired any right, title and interest in the suit property, and as such, he had no right to sell the suit property to the defendants. In such view of the matter, I hold that by virtue of the sale deed dated 28.4.1971 Exts. A and A/1 jointly executed by Kaushalya Devi and Bechan Jha, the defendants had not acquired any right, title and interest in the suit property and, therefore, the possession of the defendants was of trespassers and under law they were liable to be evicted. I, therefore, hold that the learned courts below have rightly held that the plaintiffs are entitled for recovery of possession and this finding is also not perverse. Accordingly, this substantial question of law is also decided against the appellants.
17. In the result, I do not find any merit in this second appeal and as such, the same is dismissed and the findings of the courts below on all the issues are hereby confirmed. No costs.