J.N. Bhatt, CJ. and Shashank Kr. Singh, J.
1. In this letters patent appeal, the challenge is against the judgment rendered in First Appeal No. 222 of 1980, dated 11th December, 1987, whereby the appeal has been allowed and the judgment and decree, dated 22.12.1979, passed by the trial Court in Title Suit No. 43 of 1973/1 of 1979 came to be set aside.
2. The limited question, which requires to be considered in this appeal, is as to whether the views and the ultimate conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge is, in any way, erroneous, unjustified or perverse, requiring our interference in exercise of the appellate powers under Clause 10 of the letters patent of the Patna High Court Rules.
3. The factual profile is elaborately articulated in the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge, therefore, it may not be necessary for us to reiterate the same. However, be it mentioned that the suit came to be filed for declaration, by the original plaintiff, who was 'shebait' in respect of the endowed property mentioned in the Schedules of the plaint. It was also for a direction to hand over the charge and possession of the property along with accounts, including the deposits.
4. Upon appreciation of the facts and circumstances, the trial Court passed the judgment on 22nd December, 1979 dismissing the suit. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the original plaintiff 'shebait' filed the First Appeal. He succeeded in the appeal. That is how the original defendants have now come up in this letters patent appeal assailing the validity and legality of the judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge.
5. It may be highlighted at this stage that there is no dispute about the fact that the deed of endowment, which is eloquent and explicit, making a scheme for running of the trust, by the original settler of the endowment, is to be examined for the purpose of the mode of management and the right of the manager of the endowed property. Any person claiming right of a 'shebait of such endowment, on the oral version, cannot succeed for the simple reason that no oral evidence can be received as admissible against the writings or recitals in the deed. In this context it may be highlighted that there is specific provision provided in Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. From a plain perusal of the said, it is evident that when the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property have been proved according to the provisions of Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its written terms.
6. The learned Single Judge upon correct assessment and true appraisal of the factual, as well as, legal provisions, has reached to the conclusion which is quite weighty and supportable. We also upon examination, find that there is no any material worth the name on the record which would support the claim of the appellants. Therefore, we are left with no option but to dismiss this letters patent appeal while affirming the view and the ultimate conclusion r1ecorded by the learned Single Judge in the First Appeal. We, therefore, dismiss this letters patent appeal with costs.