Judgment:
Sheema Ali Khan, J.
1. This First Appeal arises out of partition suit. The admitted genealogical table which is admitted is as follows:
Kalapnath Rai
|
_______|_______
Bataso Kuer (Wife)
|
_______________________|____________________________________
| | |
(1) Baikunth Rai (2) Kaushalya Devi (3) Ram Nami Devi
(Son) (daughter) (daughter)
| (Appellant No. 1) (Appellant No. 2)
__________|________ (Since dead) (Since dead)
Mostt. Lagana Kuer
Wife (Respondent)
(Since dead)
2. The plaintiffs who are the daughters of Kalapnath Rai have filed a suit for partition claiming 1/3rd share in the suit properties measuring 12.26 Acres situated at Gori, P.S. Kargahar, District - Rohtas.
3. The plaintiffs' case is that Kalapnath Rai had one son who died in the year 1938 leaving behind his widow Bataso Kuar defendant No. 1 and his son Baikunth Rai and also two daughters who are the plaintiffs in this case. Baikunth Rai had also died in 1942-43 leaving behind his widow Lagana Kuar. Later the appellants have accepted that Lagana Kuer had a daughter, namely, Talukraj. It is, therefore, claimed that when Kalapnath Rai died in 1938 his widow Bataso Kuar came in joint possession in the properties with her son Baikunth Rai. After the death of Baikunth Rai she was in joint possession with Lagana widow of Baikunth. Bataso Kuar died after passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It is, therefore, claimed by the plaintiffs that their mother Bataso Kuer acquired absolute right and title in the properties with respect to 1/2 shares of the land and thus after the death of their mother, they are entitled to a share in the mother's property.
4. The alternative case of the plaintiffs is that if the story of inheritance by Bataso Kuar is not accepted then Bataso Kuar would be entitled to maintenance and it was in recognition of her right to be maintained that she was allowed to come in joint possession of the suit properties after the death of her husband alongwith her son Baikunth Rai and after the death of her son she was in joint possession with his widow Lagana Kuar. It is further stated in the plaint that Bataso Kuar continued to be in possession in the properties and she acquired absolute right and title to 1/2 share of the properties under the Hindu Succession Act.
The defendant's case in the written statement is that the plaintiffs have no right to sue for partition. According to them Kalapnath Rai died more than 50-51 years ago in the year 1921 and his son Baikunth Rai was a minor at the time of death of his father, and as such, his mother Bataso Kuar was the guardian of the properties till Baikunth Rai attained majority. The defendants claim that Bataso Kuar had only right to be maintained out of the family properties and that she never came to possession of the suit property and thus acquired no right or title in the suit properties. It is also said that Bataso Kuar and the defendant were on good terms and had a good relationship with each other, and as such, out of reverence, the name of Bataso Kuar was entered in the 'Jamabandi'. The defendants claim that in spite of the fact that the name of Bataso Kuar was entered the 'Jamabandi', the rent were paid by Lagana Kuar. The defendants specifically assert that entry of the name of Bataso Kuar in the Jamabandi was only as the matter of courtesy, and as such, the plaintiffs cannot claim partition over the suit premises on the basis of these documents.
5. The trial court has framed eight issues in this case and dismissed the suit. This Court agrees with the findings of Trial Court that the plaintiffs have not been able to prove by oral or documentary evidence that the plaintiffs have title and possession of the suit lands by virtue of their contention that Basato Kuer came into possession of the lands belonging to her husband by virtue of his death in 1938 in lieu of maintenance under the Hindu Succession Act. The main issues before the Court are as follows:
i) Whether Bataso Kuer had acquired any interest in the suit land ?
ii) Whether Bataso Kuer acquired the right and title over the share in lieu of her right to maintenance?
iii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to share in the suit property ?
The trial court has dealt in detail with the oral evidence adduced by the plaintiffs and the defendants to show and prove their respective cases which is that Kalapnath Rai died in the year 1938 (plaintiffs' case) and/or 1921 (defendants' case). Before this Court the appellants have virtually given up their case that Kalapnath Rai died in 1938, perhaps because the evidence on this issue is unreliable and unbelievable. Therefore, the only question before this Court is refer to the oral evidence to see whether the plaintiff appellants can show to this Court that Bataso Kuar came into possession of suit property, in exercise of her right of maintenance.
Ten witnesses on behalf of the plaintiffs and twenty witnesses on behalf of the defendants have been examined in order to prove their case.
6. P.Ws. 1, 2, 5 and 6 are formal witnesses whereas P.Ws. 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 10 are witnesses on the factum of year of death of Kalapnath Rai, these witnesses have also tried to depose that Bataso Kuer was in joint possession of the suit premises.
7. On going through the evidence of witnesses, it appears that the plaintiffs' witnesses have strenuously tried to show that Kalpnath Rai died in 1938. PW 3 has stated that Bataso Devi was in joint possession of the suit property. He claims that he has his lands just next to the lands of the family. This witness is on the point of joint possession of Bataso Kuer and Lagana Kuar. However, this witness could not give plot numbers of the land. Moreover, according to this witness the daughters came in possession after the death of Bataso Kuar. In the cross-examination he discloses facts contrary to the statements made in the chief, inasmuch, he has stated that the Bataso's daughters live in their 'Sasural'.
PW 4 has stated that Kalapnath Rai died before he attained 'Hosh'. This witness is fifty years old and claims that he attained 'Hosh' at the age of ten. As such according to this witness Kalapnath Rai died in the year 1934. Therefore, he does not support the case of the plaintiffs. PW 7 is not reliable as after stating the year of death of Kalapnath Rai, he has not been able to give the year of death of his own brother. In fact he has not been able to state the year of death of any of his family member. With respect to joint possession this witness claims that the plaintiffs used to cultivate the lands after the death of Bataso Kuer, thereby demolishing the plaintiffs' case. According to this witness Bataso Kuer and Lagana were living in one house. In the same breath this witness claims that he does not remember when Bataso Kuer died. Obviously the court cannot rely on the evidence of such a witness.
8. PW 8 is a witness only on the point of possession and is aged 35 years and has not contributed in any way to the case of the plaintiffs, as he says he attained 'hosh' at the age of 14/15 years and also says in his enthusiasm to support the plaintiff's case that he saw Kaushaliya and Ram Nami in possession of the suit premises since he attained 'hosh' i.e., sometime in 1954 which was even before the death of Bataso. His evidence has to be rejected on the point of possession as it beyond the pleadings of the plaintiffs.
9. PW 9 is husband of plaintiff No. 1. This witness is not trust worthy in view of the fact that he has not been able to give any details as to payment of Lagan, Chaukidari tax, the names of the 'Baniyar,' and as such, no reliance can be placed on his evidence.
10. Kaushalya Devi was one of the plaintiffs and she too has not been able to give details regarding the lands which she dealt with after the death of Kalapnath Rai.
11. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has criticized the evidence led by the defendants and has stated that the defendants' witnesses support the plaintiffs' case, rather, than the case of the defendants. On going through the evidence of defendants, I find that these witnesses have stated that Baikunth Rai was the only person who dealt with the property when he was alive. Further DW 1 and 4 also state that Bataso Kuer used to look after the property on behalf of Baikunth till he was a minor. Much emphasis has been placed on this aspect that D.Ws. 5 and 6 stated that the name of Bataso Kuer was also mutated during survey. These witnesses have also stated that they have full knowledge and details of the lands and they cannot give the boundary etc. of the lands.
12. Learned Counsel for the appellants also submits on the basis of the evidence led by the defendants' witnesses that Bataso Kuer and Lagana Devi used to live together and on the basis of such statement by the witnesses, it has been argued that this fact leads to the conclusion that both of them were in joint possession of the suit premises. This Court cannot place much reliance on the fact that the daughter-in-law and the mother-in-law lived in the same house as Bataso Kuer never made claim with respect to any share in lieu of maintenance of the property in question.
13. On consideration of the submissions of the parties, this Court finds that the evidence led by the parties is an attempt to prove their respective cases. With respect to death of Kalapnath Rai, the evidence in fact which emerges is that Kalapnath Rai died in 1921 or before 1937. The evidence with respect to joint possession of land by Bataso and Lagna Kuer is very weak and in fact I would rather rely on the documentary evidence vis-a-vis oral evidence, as there are too many loop holes in the oral evidence.
14. From perusal of the evidence it also appears that there was no dispute between the parties as when Bataso Kuer was alive. She lived with her son and daughter-in-law and was being looked after by them. There is not an iota evidence to show that Bataso was separate in mess or that she lived in a separate 'Kitta' of the house and had her own establishment or was managing or dealing with the properties separately.
On the basis of the evidence, I find and hold that the plaintiffs have not been able to show by oral evidence that Bataso came in possession of any part of the suit properties in exercise of her right to maintenance.
15. Having dealt with the evidence regarding possession of Bataso Kuer over the suit lands, I shall now examine the documentary evidence on this point to indicate whether in fact Bataso was in possession of any part of the land in lieu of her rights to maintenance. The only document which has been produced on behalf of the plaintiff was the counter foils of rent receipts of the ex-landlord marked as Ext. '6' series to show that the receipts were granted in the joint names of defendant Lagana Kuer and Bataso Kuer. The other documents is Ext. '5' which has been prepared during the last survey operations, which also records the name of both the aforesaid ladies in respect of the suit lands.
16. It has been argued on behalf of the plaintiff that these two documents prove that Bataso had acquired right and title over half of the suit properties. This contention of the plaintiff has been challenged on behalf of the defendant by submitting that Baikunth was minor at the time of death of his father and, therefore, receipts by the ex-landlord were granted in the joint names of minor son and the mother. The grant of receipt by itself cannot indicate that Bataso was in exclusive possession of any portion of the land. It has been next submitted that during the survey the name of Bataso Kuer was recorded as a matter of courtesy by Lagana which she has stated in paragraphs 27, 29 and 30 of her deposition. Moreover, the grant of receipt or the entry of the name in the records has to be backed by actual evidence of physical possession. There is absolutely no evidence to show that Bataso was managing the property or that she came in possession over any specific portion of the suit land.
17. On the other hand, the defendant has produced several documents to show that Baikunth or after him his wife, Lagana were managing the properties. Ext. 'H' is the Zamindari register of 1923 wherein Baikunth's name has been recorded and after his death, the name of his wife Lagana was recorded. Ext. 'I' series would show that notice had been issued in the year, 1921 in a suit instituted in Banaras showing Baikunth as a minor under the guardianship of his mother. Ext. 'J' is an order of attachment of the year 1933 against Baikunth Rai. Ext. 'K' series are sale proclamation against Baikunth in the years 1933 and 1934. Ext. 'M' series are the money orders coupons issued by the Government in the years 1933 and 1944. Ext. 'A' series are 39 irrigation Parchas which are either in the name of Baikunth or his wife Lagana Kuer. Ext. 'E' series which are 98 in number are water receipts also either in the name of Baikunth or Lagna Kuer. Ext. 'D' series, 13 in number, are Chowkidari receipts only in the name of Lagana Kuer. Apart from this, Ext. 'F' series are mortgage deeds by Baikunth which have been redeemed by Ext. 'X' and Ext. 'B' by Lagana Kuer.
18. On the basis of those documents the submission is that Baikunth Rai and after his death his wife Lagana were managing and dealing with the properties and in fact Bataso being the mother of Baikunth was treated with courtesy, love and respect and was looked after by her daughter-in-law Lagana. The evidence would also show that the lands belonging to Kalapnath Rai were dealt with by the manager on behalf of Kalapnath Rai and after his death, Baikunt and thereafter on behalf of Lagana. I, therefore, find that there is sufficient evidence both oral and documentary to hold that Bataso did not acquire any right, title or possession over the suit properties in lieu of her right to maintenance.
19. Learned Counsel for the appellants has referred to a judgment of the Supreme court in the case of Tulasamma V. v. Sesha Reddi AIR 1977 SC 1944 to say that the right of maintenance of a Hindu widow is a pre existing right and recognized by Shastric Hindu Law and the right has merely been codified by the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, and as such, the widow would get an absolute right in the property after the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by virtue of Section 14(1) of the 1956 Act. Learned Counsel has particularly referred to propositions (1) and (2) wherein it has been held that a Hindu women's right to maintenance is a personal obligation as far as husband is concerned even if he has no property. If the husband has property, then the right of the widow becomes an equitable right on his property and any person who succeeds the property, carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow. Proposition (2) states that the right to maintenance is not a right to property but it a pre existing right in property.
20. I see no difficulty in interpreting this proposition and for this purpose I shall discuss the facts of Tulasamma's case before dealing with legal aspect. Tulasamma died in 1931 in a state of jointness with his step brother leaving behind his widow Tulasamma. The widow filed a petition for maintenance and the respondents in the suit filed an application for recording a compromise between Tulasamma and the defendant. Tulasamma opposed the application which was ultimately dismissed. Sesha Reddi filed an appeal before the District Judge, Nellore. During the execution proceeding there was a compromise between Tulasamma and Sesha Reddi. Under the compromise Tulasamma was allotted the scheduled properties, but was to enjoy only a limited interest therein with no power of alienation. According to the terms of the compromise, the property was to revert back to the plaintiff after the death of Tulasamma. Tulasamma continued to be in possession of the property even after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and as such, the Supreme court held that Tulasamma had acquired absolute right in the property under Section 14(1) of the 1956 Act.
21. The facts reveal that Tulasamma came in possession of specific portion of the property and that her right became absolute after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and as such, the challenge made by Sesha Reddi with respect to her title was rejected by the Supreme court. While dealing with this aspect of the matter, therefore, the Supreme court has held that the Hindu women's right to maintenance was recognized even before any law was enacted on this issue. Finally, it has been said that where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband, she is entitled to retain possession in lieu of her maintenance unless the person who succeeds the property or purchases the same is in a position to make arrangement for her maintenance. Therefore, the Supreme court has specifically laid down the law and recognized the right of maintenance of a Hindu widow even before 1937. It was further held that she would be entitled to maintenance by the successor of her husband.
22. The facts of the present case are different inasmuch as after the death of Kalapnath Rai in 1921, his son Baikunth came in possession of the entire properties of his father and Bataso could have only had a right of maintenance. On the other hand, if Bataso had come in possession of a specific portion of the land in lieu of her maintenance which was separate and defined vis-a-vis other successors, i.e. Baikunth, she would be entitled to become the absolute owner of the lands, which were in her possession after the 1956 Act. As stated earlier the evidence in fact does not support the plaintiff's contention that she was in possession of the lands as a co-owner, rather, the evidence is that she continued to live with Lagana Kuer and was looked after by her and that she never raised any question or issue with respect to her share in the property.
23. Similarly in the case of Raghubar Singh v. Gulab Singh : [1998]3SCR555 the Supreme Court has also relied on Tulasamma's case. The facts of the case is that Manraj Singh executed a Will in favour of his grandson Raghubar Singh and Janak Dular, his wife by which he had created a life time interest in favour of his wife. After the death of Raghubar Singh, the other co-sharers filed a suit. The suit ended in a compromise. In the said compromise the widow Janak Dulari was also given a life time interest. In the mean time, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force. There was a contest with respect to right of Janak Dulari and the Supreme court held that the High court has erred in holding that Smt. Janak Dulari was covered by Section 14(2) of the Act. The Supreme Court had held that Janak Dulari came into possession by way of compromise decree which recognized the right of Smt. Janak Dulari as owner in possession of the suit property with all the rightsand control over it and as such her case was to be covered by Section 14(1) of the 1956 Act. In this case also the widow came in possession of the lands which were recognized by a Will and a compromise decree of the court.
24. In both the aforesaid cases referred to by learned Counsel for the appellants the right of the widow has been recognized either by a written instrument or in a proceeding before the court and as such the Supreme court held that the widow had come into possession and her rights became absolute after the enactment 1956 Act. Therefore, the cases referred to aforesaid do not help the appellants and this Court cannot hold that Bataso Kuer had become the absolute owner of the property of her husband and after her death her daughter would be entitled to a share in the mother's property along with Tulakraj, daughter of Baikunth and Lagna Kuer.
25. Defendant No. 1 has raised the issue that in any event the daughter would not be entitled to half of the share of Bataso Kuer in view of Section 16 of the Hindu Succession Act. There is no need to answer this issue in view of the fact that this Court has come to a finding that Bataso never came in possession of any part of the suit property in lieu of her right to maintenance.
26. A question was raised by defendant No. 1 that the appeal would abate in view of notification issued under Sections 3 and 4 of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act (hereinafter referred to 'the Consolidation Act'). An interlocutory application being I.A. No. 5086 of 2008 has been filed which was pressed on 26.8.2008. Thereafter, several supplementary affidavits and counter affidavits have been filed.
A notification was issued under Section 4A of the Bihar Consolidation Act, 1956. This notification was withdrawn and the consolidation proceedings were again declared to be valid by notification No. 186, dated 15.3.2004. The third supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the appellants shows that although the notification was made under Section 10(1) of the Consolidation Act on 29.10.1974, no further action or steps has been taken in the consolidation proceeding and the notification has not been acted upon.
27. Having raised this issue, learned Counsel for defendant No. 1 has not seriously pressed this issue and prayed that the matter may be decided by this Court on its merits. In any event I find that the appeal was filed on 27.11.1974 and after more than thirty years, defendant No. 1 has filed the interlocutory application stating that the appeal has abated because of the notification under Section 4A of Consolidation Act. It is admitted by both the parties that in fact no follow up action has been taken in this regard.
In view of the findings aforesaid, this appeal is dismissed but with no order as to costs.