A.K. Ganguly, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner for quashing the advertisement published in the second week of June 1997, and also the selection procedure initiated thereunder, and also for issuance of mandamus and necessary direction commanding the respondents to appoint the petitioner to the post of Director of State Institute of Educational and Technical, Bihar, Patna (hereinafter referred to as the SIET).
2. Before going into controversial facts, this Court notices certain facts which are not in dispute.
3. Pursuant to the advertisement for selection and appointment to the post of Director, SIET, the petitioner applied, and the Selection Committee in the its meeting held on 21.5.1996 recommended the name of the petitioner for appointment to the post of Director, SIET as early as possible having regard to the urgent need for a full-time Director of SIET. The recommendation of the Selection Committee is annexed to the writ petition as Annexure-4.
4. It appears that the petitioner fulfilled all the qualification and criteria. The Committee found that there are 22 candidates, but only one candidate, who is the petitioner, is eligible for the post, and as such having regard to the urgency for a full-time Director of SIET, the Committee recommended the name of the petitioner for appointment on deputation terms.
5. It is not in dispute that pursuant to the recommendation of the Selection Committee, the petitioner was not appointed as Director. As such the petitioner filed a writ petition before this Hon'ble High Court being C.W.J.C. No. 8279 of 1996. The said writ petition was heard by a learned Judge of this Court and disposed of on 8.4.1997. In the said judgment, the learned Judge has recorded that the Selection Committee was not fully satisfied with the situation and so it decided to have a fresh selection.
6. However, the learned Judge noted that having regard to the requirement of a full-time Director for the Institute, the Selection Committee recommended that the petitioner should be considered for appointment on deputation terms. As such, the Court Directed the issuance of fresh advertisement and the State Government was directed to appoint a full-time Director of SIET on the recommendation made by the Selection Committee, and the petitioner was given opportunity to apply for the post of Director when selection proceedings will be initiated next time. In the meantime, the State Government was also directed to consider the petitioner's appointment on the post of Director of the Institute on deputation terms on the basis of the recommendation made earlier by the Selection Committee.
7. Now what is very much in dispute leading to the grievances of the petitioner is that the criteria on the basis of which previous selection was made, was altered, and by such alteration, the respondent authorities, according to the assertion made by the petitioner in the writ petition, played a fraud, and the said alteration in the required qualification was made by the respondents in order to eliminate the petitioner. The petitioner, however, applied pursuant to the said advertisement, but the petitioner was not appointed and one R.M. Jhaveri was appointed as regular Director of SIET. But during pendency of this writ petition, the said gentleman has tendered his resignation. Therefore, so far as the post is concerned, there is no valid appointment of Director now.
8. Now the questions before this Court are:
(i) Whether the criteria for selection of Director, SIET were altered?
(ii) Whether the conditions could be altered?
(iii) Whether the conditions were altered to eliminate the petitioner?
(iv) Connected with this question emerges another issue, whether the respondents by filing an affidavit enclosing in a manipulative manner the altered criteria as the required and essential criteria has given false evidence and committed an offence against public justice?
9. Since the aforesaid question Nos. (i), (ii) and (iii) are connected, they are, for the sake of convenience, discussed together.
In the writ petition, the petitioner has asserted that the required qualification for appointment to the post of Director, SIET (hereinafter referred to as the said post), has been laid down in the letter dated 13th January, 1992 issued by the Ministry of Human Resources, New Delhi.
10. In the counter-affidavit filed by the Jagdish Das, also the same stand is taken that the criteria laid down in letter dated 13th January, 1992 issued by the Ministry of Human Resources and Development Department, Mew Delhi have been followed.
But the dispute is over the contents of the said letter dated 13.1.1992. From the writ petition which has been filed by the petitioner, it appears that along with the said letter dated 13.1.1992, there are certain enclosures, and from the enclosures, it appears that the qualification for the post of Director, SIET is:
A Master's Degree is any discipline with Administrative Experience of at least 10 years in any executive position
or,
A Degree in any discipline with five years' appropriate experience at a recognized media centre.
But, in the counter-affidavit which has been filed by respondent No. 7 in this proceeding, relevant portion of the enclosures to the said letter dated 13.1.1992 seems to be different. In the enclosures to the letter Dated 13.1.1992 as disclosed in the said affidavit, filed by respondent No. 7, the relevant portion is as follows:
A Master's Degree in any discipline with 8 years' experience in planning, designing, training and administration in an international media institute,
or
A degree in any discipline with 10 years experience from a recognized educational media centre.
11. It is thus clear that there is a difference between the two so far as the requirement of qualification is concerned.
12. The petitioner's case is that the altered requirements were incorporated by way of manipulation and for the purpose of eliminating the petitioner from being selected as Director.
13. Since difference between two requirements in the qualification for appointment to the post of Director is of considerable importance in this case, this Court noticing the same, by an order dated 10.12.1998 directed the Counsel for the Union of India to file an affidavit disclosing therein the original document dated 13th January, 1992 along with enclosure, and the Court also directed respondent No. 3 to keep the original of the said document in his possession. Pursuant thereto, an affidavit was filed by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Union of India and the original of the said document dated 13th January, 1992 including its enclosures were produced before this Court. From the said affidavit, it appears that the description of the qualification which was given by the writ petitioner in the writ petition are correct, and the description which was given by respondent No. 7 in its affidavit are not correct. It appears from the affidavit filed by the respondent and also the stand taken by the State Government in this case that the forwarding letter dated 13th January, 1992 is the same, but there is change in the contents of its enclosures. This is very distressing and the Court records its strong disapproval of the mariner in which such affidavits are filed casually by the respondent No. 7, without disclosing the correct documents as its enclosure.
14. In this context, it is relevant to note here that after the Court by its order dated 8.4.1997 directed fresh selection to be made, a request was made to the Central Government by the then Director SIET to fix qualification for appointment of the said post. The same was done by a communication dated 22nd April, 1997, written by the then Director, SIET. Thereafter, a reply came from the Government of India, Ministry of Human Resources and Development dated 30th April, 1997 reiterating its previous recommendation about qualification for the post of Director, SIET, and this recommendation tallies with the particulars disclosed by the petitioner in the writ petition.
15. Therefore, the attempt on the part of the then Director, SIET, was made to change the qualification and criteria for the aforesaid post of Director. But that was not successful, but even then the advertisement which was inserted on 12th June, 1997 as noted above was not in accordance with the criteria fixed by the Central Government.
In the context of these undisputed documents which are on records, the argument made by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 7 appears to be rather misconceived. Learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 7 submitted that the SIET is an autonomous unit which is entitled to fix its criteria for recruitment to the post of Director on its own. Learned Counsel further submitted that the criteria which has been disclosed in the counter-affidavit of respondent No. 7 is the criteria in accordance with the N.C.E.R.T. guidelines which would appear from their handbook. Further more, the learned Counsel submitted that the criteria which has been disclosed in the counter-affidavit of respondent No. 7 are more acceptable having regard to the requirement of the job for the post of Director, SIET instead of the criteria which has been disclosed by the petitioner in the writ petition.
16. This argument cannot be accepted by this Court inter alia on the ground that when the SIET itself requested the Central Government to fix criteria for such appointment then it is expected that the criteria fixed by the Central Government for recruitment of the said post is binding on SIET. Once the said Institute authorized the Central Government to fix criteria, and thereafter, the Central Government has fixed the same, it is no longer open to them to refuse to follow the said criteria on the basis of its so-called autonomy. In fact, it has not asserted its autonomy in this matter. And it followed the criteria fixed by the Central Government by its letter dated 13.1.92. but in the name of doing so, it has purportedly followed something which is not part of the enclosure to the Central Government's letter dated 13.1.92. This is a very irresponsible stand on the part of the said institute and is condemned by this Court.
Apart from that, the Human Resources Department of the Central Government is authorized, as an Apex Body, to fix necessary criteria, and it has fixed the same pursuant to request of respondent No. 7. Thereafter, it is no longer open to the said institute to differ with the same in a surreptitious manner and hold a selection process on the basis of criteria which is not fixed by the Central Government.
As such this Court is bound to hold that the entire selection process which was conducted after the Court's order dated 8.4.1997 has been made on the basis of the criteria which are not sanctioned by the Central Government, and as such the selection process is obviously bad in law.
17. Now, the question is whether the criteria was deliberately altered to eliminate the petitioner. Before answering this question, this Court has to consider the various facts which are on records and which are summarized below:
(a) As noted above by its recommendation dated 21st May 1996 the petitioner was selected by the previous Selection Committee for the post of Director on deputation terms till the full-time Director is appointed, but the respondent did not appoint the petitioner to the said post;
(b) Then, the petitioner came to this Court being aggrieved with such action on the part of the respondent, and this Court by its order dated 8.4.1997, after considering the matter finally, directed the respondent to consider the petitioner's case for appointment on deputation terms for the said post of Director on the basis of the recommendation of the selection Committee. Even then, the respondent did not appoint the petitioner to the said post;
(c) As the respondent authority could not fill up the said post within the time frame fixed by the Court, the State come with the prayer for extension of time. Such prayer was disposed of by a learned Judge of this Court by an order Dated 31st July, 1997.
While disposing the said prayer, the learned Judge of this Court held:
It is to be noted that the Selection Committee had found the petitioner (the present petitioner) not only fit for appointment, but in fact, the only candidate eligible for appointment to the post. In my view, the correct interpretation of the order is that if the State Government for any valid reasons fails to make appointment of full-time Director, then the petitioner shall be appointed on the post on deputation terms, and respondent No. 5 shall cease to function.
Thus, the Court refused to extend time and directed that respondent No. 5 shall cease to function as Incharge Director, SIET forthwith. Even then, the petitioner was not appointed.
(d) Thereafter, this writ petition was filed by the petitioner challenging the selection procedure on the basis of altered criteria as noted above and a learned Judge of this Court at an interlocutory stage by the order dated 8.8.97 observed:
Till such regular appointment is made, respondents are duty-bound to appoint the petitioner on deputation terms to the said post of Director, SIET, in terms of the order dated 8th April, 1997 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 8379/96, and the Court directed that the said order should be published by 11th August, 1997.
Even then, the petitioner was not appointed.
18. The aforesaid chain of events amply demonstrates that the respondent No. 7 and the State Government strained their every nerve to deny the appointment to the petitioner to the post of Director, SIET on any conceivable pretext. The learned Counsel for the State submits with reference to the order dated 8.8.1997 that the situation contemplated in the order dated 8.8.1997 does not exist now, inasmuch as, regular selection has taken place, and a gentlemen has been selected. But, this argument loses its force in view of the fact that the person selected has left the job and at the present moment there is no full-time Director of the said Institute. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the respondent authorities to act in terms of the order of this Court dated 8.8.1997. But the authorities have consistently failed to act in terms of Court's order.
19. From the aforesaid narration of the fact, it is clear that the respondent No. 7 and State Government by acting in the manner stated above, has made it clear that they want to act a manner they like and by disregarding the orders passed by this Court, even though such orders have acquired finality and have not been appealed against.
It is at essential requisite of rule of law that the Government authorities obey the Court's order both in letter and spirit. The administration run by the Government must be based on Rule of Law, so they must act in an exemplary fashion in carrying out Court's orders as otherwise the Rule of Law becomes a mockery and a teasing illusion in hands of those who are to uphold it.
20. Sitting in this Court, 1 have the unfortunate experience to find that the order of this Court in most of the cases are not obeyed and com plied with unless it is enforced under the Contempt of Courts Act. This has become the rule and not the exception. So the administration of justice has to falter at every step. This is a very sad commentary on the purity and integrity of the State's administration.
21. In the context of the aforesaid chain of events, the allegation of the petitioner that the criteria was altered in order to eliminate the petitioner acquires some degree of probability. As already noted above, an attempt was made on behalf of the said Institute by writing a letter to the Central Government to alter the qualification/criteria for appointment to the said post. When said attempt failed, then in the name of complying with the qualification fixed by the communication of the Government of India dated 13.1.1992, in a subtle manner, the altered criteria was introduced, and on the basis of the said altered criteria selection was held. Such selection is obviously bad and as such is quashed.
22. Learned Counsel for the said Institute referred to certain decisions in support of his contentions that in a case of selection by experts, Court would be slow the interfere in the absence of any case of positive bias or malice. The learned Counsel placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Km. Neelima Misra v. Dr. Harinder Kaur Paintal and Ors. reported in AIR 1990 Supreme Court page 1402 and in the case of National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences v. K. Kalyana Raman reported in 1992 Supplementary (2) Supreme Court Cases, page 481. The learned Counsel also referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in Tata Cellular reported in (1994) 6 SCC page 651, to point out. the limited scope of judicial review.
The principles pointed out in those decisions can hardly be doubted. It is well known that recommendations of expert selection body are entitled to respect and not to be trifled with. In fact, respondent institute itself has not acted in consonance with the recommendation of the Selection Committee by not appointing the petitioner to the post of Director on deputation terms. That was the recommendation of the Selection Committee. They have not even acted in terms of the Court's order when the Court directed them to implement the said recommendation. So, this argument does lie in their mouth, if I may say so.
23. Apart from that, the Court is not quashing on merits the decision of the Selection Committee. The Court is quashing the selection on the ground that the Selection was held on the basis of certain criteria which are not sanctioned by the Central Government even though it is made to appear on the basis of some manipulation that the criteria fixed by the Central Government in its letter dated 1.3th January, 1992 are followed. In a case like this, the Court, has undoubted jurisdiction to set aside such a selection which is vitiated fundamentally for following certain principles which it should not. follow. So the ratio in those decisions are not applicable to the facts of this case.
24. The next question is whether a proceeding should be initiated in this case against the respondents for giving false evidence.
It is well known that a proceeding can be initiated on the complaint of Court either suo motu or on an application made to it. There is no application here. In order to initiate a suo motu proceeding, the Court must be prima facie satisfied at whose instance the contents of the document dated 13th January, 1992, have been manipulated. There may have been some maneuvering at some stage, but the Court cannot pinpoint at whose instance this has been done. It is well known that before setting the Original Law in nation by initiating a proceeding under Section 340, the Court should exercise great care and caution and no prosecution should be directed by the Court unless there is a reasonable probability of conviction. So going by these principles, in the facts of this case, no such prosecution can be initiated by this Court.
25. Now, new selection has to be made and it has to be in accordance with bye-laws of the said institute, especially Bye-laws 22 and by the Selection Committee referred to in bye-laws 22. Such selection should be held on the basis of the criteria which has been disclosed in the affidavit of the Central Government filed before this Court on 21st January, 1999, and according to the said criteria, the qualification for appointment to the post of Director is as follows:
A Master's Degree in any discipline with Administrative Experience of at least 10 years in any executive position,
or,
A degree in any discipline with 5 years' appropriate experience at a recognized media centre.
26. So this Court, issues the following directions:
(I) The respondent Institute is to issue an advertisement in two leading dailies in accordance with the aforesaid criteria, within a period of fortnight from today, for conducting a fresh selection for appointment on the said post;
(II) The selection procedure must be completed within a period of two months from the date of insertion of the advertisement;
(III) In the said selection, the petitioner should be allowed to participate and his candidature should be considered on merits on the basis of the aforesaid criteria, for selection.
27. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged for the appointment of the petitioner on the post of Director of the said Institute on deputation or on ad hoc basis. The same has been resisted by the learned Counsel appearing for the State, as well as learned Counsel appearing for the said Institute.
28. After considering the matter, this Court is of the opinion that the petitioner need not be posted as a Director of the said Institute pending regular selection of a Director in which he will be a candidate. At the same time, this Court is of the view that having regard to the bungling made by the said Institute for selection on the post of Director, and also having regard to the persistent refusal of the authorities of the said Institute in acting in compliance with the Court's orders, the present Director-Incharge should not be allowed to function and should be replaced by a Director, such Director is to be nominated by the Secretary, Ministry of Human Resources Department, Government of India.
29. So the Court issues further directions:
(i) The Secretary, Ministry of Human Resources Department Government of India is requested to appoint on deputation basis any suitable person other than the present incumbent for the post of Incharge Director of the said Institute within a period of fortnight from today;
(ii) The Director to be so appointed should be an independent person with considerable administrative experience, and he will not be an applicant for the post of Director in respect of which selection is going to take place;
(iii) The said Director to be so appointed must ensure that the selection procedure takes place fairly and in accordance with the criteria mentioned above;
(iv) As soon as new Director is selected and appointed, the Director appointed on deputation basis will hand over charge and relinquish his office in favour of the duly selected Director.
Let a copy of this judgment may be transmitted to respondent No. 1 immediately by the Registry of this Court.
With these directions, this writ petition is thus allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to costs.