Gurusharan Sharma, J.
1. The defendant is the appellate. He has lost the case in the two courts below.
2. The plaintiff, Swaminath Singh, a lunatic, under the guardianship of his mother, appointed by Court vide Lunacy Case No. 392 of 1974 filed Title Suit No. 247 of 1981 against the defendant, Ramnandan Singh, in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Patna for a decree of eviction from the premises described in Schedule-1 to the plaint as also for arrears of rent as well as damages and mesne profits, past and future.
3. The suit was decreed and the appeal (Title Appeal No. 61 of 1993) filed against the said eviction decree by the defendant was dismissed and the Trial Courts decree was affirmed. Hence this Second Appeal has been preferred by the defendant.
4. Although the parties in the pleadings have given history of their relationship and happening right from the year 1961 onwards but in my opinion those matters are not necessary to be enumerated or gone into in detail for the purpose of the present second appeal.
5. The admitted position was that the suit premises belonged exclusively to the plaintiff, who became lunatic in the year 1974 and his mother was appointed his guardian under the orders of the competent court in accordance with law. The plaintiff had executed a registered lease dated 24.12.1973 (Ext. 2) and inducted the defendant as tenant at monthly rental of Rs. 175/- for the suit premises detailed in Schedule-1 to the plaint. The tenancy according to the lease deed commenced from 1.4.1974 for seven years and was to expire on 31.12.1980.
6. Under Clause 7 of the lease the lessee-defendant was permitted to make temporary constructions over vacant portion of the premises at his own costs, which was to be removed at the time of vacating the premises or to be left, if the value thereof was paid by the lessor-plaintiff. Under Clause 8, on failure to pay rental for two consecutive months the lease was to be terminated and the arrears of rent was to be realised from the defendant. In Clause 9, it was further clarified that on termination of the period of lease the lessee-defendant shall vacate the premises removing all his goods and articles and structures constructed by him without any objection and deliver vacant possession of the premises to the lessor-plaintiff, in the same good condition as it was on the date of the lease, unless the lessor retained the construction for value paid to the lessee, failing which the lessee shall be liable to pay damages. Clause 11 provided that in case the lessee intended to extend the lease on its expiry, he was to inform the lessor through registered notice his intention to do so one month in advance, and in case of approval by the lessor, as agreed, the period of lease could have been extended.
7. Before expiry of the period of the said lease (Ext. 2) on 1.8.1980, according to defendant, the mother of the plaintiff took a sum of Rs. 11,000/-from him and executed an unregistered agreement (Ext G) for extention of the lease after expiry of the deed (Ext. 2) for a further period of five years i.e., from 1.1.1981 to 31.12.1985. According to plaintiff, it was neither genuine nor legal document.
8. The present suit was filed on 26.6.1981, wherein relief was sought for eviction of the defendant, on the expiry of the fixed term of lease on 31.12.1980. Since 1.1.1981 possession of the defendant over the suit premises was of a trespasser. The mother of the plaintiff had no right to enter into any agreement for extention of the period of lease without sanction of the District Judge. The alleged agreement dated 1.8.1980 (Exct. G) was created to enjoy the plaintiff's property unauthorisedly. The mother of the plaintiff did not receive Rs. 11,000/- or any sum towards the alleged agreement. The suit premises was also required for personal necessity i.e. for the benefit of the estate of the lunetic. The rent of the leasehold premises was due from 1.1.1980 to 31.12.1980 at the rate of Rs. 175/- per month. The plaintiff was entitled to receive the said arrears of rent and the damages at the rate of Rs. 175/- per month from 1.1.1981 upto the date of filing of the suit and future mesne profits.
9. During the pendency of the suit the defendant filed Title Suit No. 1 of 1988 for specific performance of the agreement (Ext. G) against the plaintiff. The said suit was decreed on 13.7.1988 and Title Appeal No. 144 of 1988 was filed by the plaintiff of the present suit against the said decree.
10. In view of the decree of the suit for specific performance of contract, the defendant asked the Trial Court to frame an issue in the present suit that the aforesaid decree shall operate as res-judicata for the purpose of this suit, which was refused. However, this Court on 1.11.1990 Vide C.R. No. 824 of 1988 directed the Trial Court to frame an additional issue of res-judicata.
11. While being examined as D.W. 13 in the suit, the defendant in paragraph 94 of his deposition admitted that he was ready to vacate the suit premises, if the value of construction of filling the ditch over the suit land was paid back to him by the plaintiff and he had nothing to prove payment of rent from January to December, 1980.
12. He further admitted that except the recital in Ext. G. he had no proof that payment of a sum of Rs. 11000/- was made to the plaintiff's mother and the said amount was given by way of advance to be adjusted towards rent.
13. Ext. 8 was deposition of the defendant in Lunacy Case No. 392 of 1974/6 of 1976 in the court of 7th Additional District Judge, Patna. In paragraph 7 thereof the defendant admitted that after purchasing the present suit land by registered sale deed dated 15.2.1968, he had invested Rs. 26000/- towards filling the ditch over the land. Thereafter by registered deed of exchange dated 18.12.1969, exchanged the present suit land with 11 bighas 7 kathas 9 dhurs land at Dovi Road, Budh Gaya and relieved the suit land purchased on 15.2.1968. From this, it is clear that the defendant did not invest anything towards filling of the ditch after he took it on lease subsequently with effect from 1.4.1974.
14. Ext. 8/A was deposition of the defendant in Title Suit No. 1 of 1981. In paragraph 1 of his examination-in-chief this defendant admitted that there were two rooms standing over the suit land from before, which were demolished after the lease (Ext. 2) and new constructions were made by him thereon. This act of the defendant was also in violation of Clause 7 of the lease (Ext. 2), wherein it was specifically provided that he was permitted to make temporary constructions only over the vacant portion of the premises. He was, therefore, not authorized to demolish the two rooms, which was already in instance on the plot and made new constructions over the constructed portion. In the said deposition the defendant also admitted that it terms of Clause 11 of the lease (Ext. 2) no notice was given by him to the plaintiff for renewal of the lease.
15. So far as the question as to whether the judgment and decree dated 13.7.1988 was to operate as res-judicata in Title Suit No. 247 of 1981 was concerned, 1 find that the first appellate court by the impugned judgment also came to the same conclusion that the agreement (Ext. G) was a valid document. But since aforesaid decree in Trial Suit No. 1 of 1988 was passed on 13.7.1988 and much earlier to that, on 31.12.1985 itself, the extended period of lease by virtue of the said agreement (Ext. G) had already expired and, as such thereafter the relief prayed for in Title Suit No. 1 of 1988 became infractions and any direction to perform the said agreement to the plaintiff was redundant and ineffective.
16. Under Section 29 of the Indian Lunetic Act, 1912, as held by this Court in Gobardhan Lal and Ors. v. Sheo Narayan Sahu and Ors. AIR 1929 Patna 202 a certified guardian could have entered into a contract subject to sanction being accorded to the proposed transaction and only after the sanction was accorded the contract was to be completed. Completion as such contract depended upon sanction of the competent authority. In the present case no such sanction of the competent authority. In the present case no such sanction was obtained even after execution of Ext. 2.
17. In the aforesaid circumstance, without going into the questions as to whether the agreement (Ext. G) was valid or the decree of Title Suit No. 1 of 1988 was to operate as res-judicata in the present suit for eviction, this appeal has to be disposed of only on the basis of subsequent right and new cause of action accrued in favour of the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit itself.
18. Even if the agreement dated 1.8.1980 (Ext. G) for extension of she lease (Ext. 2) which was to expire on 31.12.1980 is taken to be a valid one and even if pursuant thereto the original lease be taken to have been further extended for five years, from 1.1.1981 to 31.12.1985, the said period already expired during the pendency of Title Suit No. 247 of 1981. However, the suit suit was disposed of on 8.2.1993.
19. In Ranvijaya Shahi v. Bala Prasad Motani : AIR1978Pat91 a Division Bench of this Court held that even subsequent rights or new cause of action could have been taken into consideration at the time of final adjudication provided that there was no valid defence. Learned Judges of the said case found that even if the clause for renewal had been given effect to, the lease would have been extended for a further period of five years only. There was no clause for any further subsequent renewal. That being so, the lease would have again terminated after the renewal on the 1st of September, 1972. The said date also to the misfortune of the appellant had gone by long since. Counsel for the appellant was not able to tell the Bench that there would have been any valid probable defence to adjudicate on the ground of termination of the present lease.
20. It is well settled that supervening and subsequent events may be into consideration only for the purpose of making adjudication final so as to dispose of the dispute between the parties finally and thus to shorter the litigation. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, in the case there could have been no possible defence-justifying any right to the tenant-appellant to continue as a lessee, after termination of the extended period of lease. An order of eviction had to be granted accordingly.
21. In the present case even if the five years' extended period of the lease is counted, the said period culminated on 31.12.1985 and thereafter on behalf of the tenant, no valid and/or probable defence against ejectment, on the ground of termination of the lease in respect of the suit premises, was canvassed.
22. Taking seven years' period of original lease and the extended period of five years, the total period of the lease being for twelve years, in any case terminated itself by efflux of time and the lease came to an end on 1.1.1986. This event having happened during the pendency of the suit, the Court ought to have taken this subsequent event into consideration and granted a decree of eviction on that basis alone.
23. In view of the facts enumerated in paragraphs 13 and 14 above, in my opinion, the defendant was not entitled to claim any amount said to be invested either in filling the ditch of making constructions over the suit land from the plaintiff.
24. The defendant in his deposition as D.W. 13 admitted that he had no proof of payment of rent from January 1980 to December, 1980. The could below, therefore, rightly found the plaintiff entitled to a decree for arrears of rent/damages from January, 1980 onwards to the date of decree at the rate of Rs. 175/- per month.
25. So far as the arrears of rent recoverable by the plaintiff and adjustment of the aforesaid amount of Rs. 11000/- towards rent, which was claimed to have been paid to the plaintiff's mother by the defendant was concerned, modify the imputed judgment and decree to the extent that after deducting a sum of Rs. 11000/- the plaintiff was entitled to recover only the balance amount of arrears of rent/(i) at the rate of Rs. 175/- per month from January, 1980 to December, 1980 and (ii) at the rate of Rs. 300/- per month from 1.1.1981 to 31.12.1985. Besides that the plaintiff was also entitled to recover damages at the rate of Rs. 300/- per month from 1.1.1986 till the date the defendant vacated the premises pursuant to the impugned eviction decree.
26. With the aforesaid modifications the impugned judgment and decree are hereby confirmed.
27. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed, with costs throughout.