Judgment:
Prasun Kumar Deb, J.
1. Both the appeals are taken up together for hearing as the subject matter are some and are being disposed of by this common order.
2. A tenant was invited by the appellant on 10.4.1980 for construction of residential quarter at Jayant Colliery and the respondent submitted his tenant which was accepted after negotiation and work order was issued on 27.9.1980 and the agreement was duty executed between the parties on 29.9.1980. As per the stipulation, the work was required to be completed by the respondent within a period of 24 months from the date of handing over of the site but the work could not be completed within the stipulated time as further specifications and some more extra works were included which were presumably as per the agreement and then the difference arose between the parlies with regard to higner payment for Petrol, Oil and Lubricants (hereinafter to be referred to as 'P.O.L.'); and materials other than steel. As per arbitration clause of the agreement, 'pie. dispute was referred to Shri S.C. Jauhari, Deputy Director, Town and Country Planning, Government of Madhya Pradesh, Singrauli, the sole arbitrator for arbitration, in accordance with arbitration clauses mentioned in the agreement between the parties. The terms of reference was specific in the following manner:
Whether the claimant-contractor is entitled to higher payments for P.O.L. and materials other than steel? and if so, to what amount?
3. Although the claim of the contractor was for more than rupees four lacs but after hearing both the parties and on completion of arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator made an award of Rs. 2,90,000/- with 18% interest. The said award was filed in Arbitration (Title) Suit No. 244 of 1985 for making it a rule of the court. The objection was raised under Section 30/33 of the Arbitration Act (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act') by the appellant Company and the same has been registered as Miscellaneous Case No. 89 of 1985. After hearing the parties at length and on going through the materials on record, the above- mentioned miscellaneous case was dismissed vide order dated 28.6.1986 by making a modification in the interest portion of the order by the learned Special Subordinate Judge, Ranchi, and in view of that modified arbitration award, the said Arbitration (Title) Suit was also disposed of.
4. These two appeals have been preferred by the appellant-Central Coalfields Limited, Darbhanga House, Ranchi, one against the decision of Miscellnious Case No. 89 of 1985 and the other against the disposal of Arbitration (Title) Suit No. 244 of 1985. On the basis of the decision of the above-mentioned miscellaneous case and practically the subject matter of these appeals are the same and similar.
5. In these two appeals Mr. Suresh Prasad appearing for and on behalf of the appellant-Central Coalfields Limited has canvassed on the point that there was no scope of giving any award in favour of the claimant-respondent in view of sub-clause (3) of the General Terms and Conditions of the Agreement and Clause 1 (f) and 14 of the Works Order. Clause 3 (3) of the Agreement is as follows:
The Executive Engineer shall have power to make any alternations in or additions to the original specifications, drawings, designs and instructions that may appear to him necessary or advisable during the progress of the work and the contractor/contractors shall be bound to carry out the work in accordance with any instructions which might be given to them in writing signed by the Executive Engineer and such alterations shall not invalidate the contract and any additional work which the contractor/contractors may be directed to do in the manner above specified as part of the work, the work shall be carried out by the contractor/contractors on the same conditions in all respects on which they agreed to do the main work and at the same rate as are specified in the tender for the main work.
6. According to Mr. Suresh Prasad, as per that agreement, even if there is any alterations or additions to the specification or any excessive work is to be done then specific contract for which the agreement had been arrived at then the contractor is bound to do the work under the revised specification and alterations on the same rate as specified in the tender for the original work and as such there remains no scope for any demand from the side of the contractor for extra payment on the basis of escalation in P.O.L. and price of other materials. This point was specifically referred to the arbitrator and as such Clause 3 (3) of the agreement was within the seisin of the arbitrator while deciding as per the terms of the reference and as such it cannot be said that the arbitrator has not considered the terms of the agreement. Practically because of that terms of the agreement, the difference and dispute arose and then the matter was referred to the arbitrator. Various rulings of the Supreme Court and other High Courts were referred to before the Subordinate Judge and. those have been referred to before this Court also. According to Mr. Suresh Prasad, the legal inference drawn on the ratio of those judgments are not legal proper. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Gobardhan Das v. Lachhmi Ram and Ors. : AIR1954SC689 . The above decision decides the point of misconduct when the arbitrator had misdirected and have exceeded the scope of the authority. In that case some extraneous policy was taken into consideration and hence the Apex Court held that the arbitration award was bad in the eye of law.
7. Generally the arbitration awards are liberally constructed by the courts for the purpose of upholding the award given by the arbitrators unless there is some error apparent on the face of it. Again the Thawardas Pherumal and Anr. v. Union of India : [1955]2SCR48 , their Lordships of the Apex Court held that if no specific question of law is referred to the arbitrator and the arbitrator decisions that point of law then such decision by the arbitrator should not be considered as final and may be interferred by the court. This is not the question here. In the present case, when the dispute arose whether the contractor is entitled for POL and price of the materials other than steel because of alteration and specification of the work order was the question in view of arbitration clause and other terms and conditions of the work order and the agreement, the question of law was not to be decided and there was no scope of the decision of the same also. If we look to the decision of the Apex Court in Tarapore and Company v. Cochin Shipyard Ltd. Cochin : [1984]3SCR118 , we find that while liberally construing the arbitration award, the court should not interfere with when it could be found that the Court in the circumstances of the case, may have a different view when the view taken by the arbitrator is also plausible one then also the court should not interfere with the arbitration award. Similar is the view taken by the Patna High Court in the case of Rajmani Sinha and Ors. v. Basant Sinha, and Ors. : AIR1973Pat26 . Another vital argument has been placed that no reasoning has been given by the arbitrator is support of his award and as such it cannot be understood whether the arbitrator had considered the debarring clause, namely, clause 3 (3) of the agreement or not.
8. It has now been settled principles of law as enunciated by the Apex Court is Bungo Steel Furniture (Pvt.) Limited v. Union of India : [1967]1SCR633 that the arbitrator is not bound to record his reasonings and indicate the principles of law of which he has proceeded in making the award. When the question as to whether the contractor is entitled for P.O.L. or not in view of the agreement existing between the two was a matter of decision by the arbitrator then there cannot be any argument that the arbitrator might not have considered debarring the clause in the agreement itself. When that was the subject matter and when both the parties have been heard while making the award then it can be legally construed that the arbitrator had considered the clause of the agreement itself.
9. It has not been submitted by the learned Advocate for the appellant that some documents although filed had been ignored by the arbitrator and as such he has committed misconduct. The question of non-consideration of document does not arise itself when the clause in the agreement document was the only point to be considered while determining the claim of the contractors. In that view of the matter, the principle enunciated by the Apex Court in the case of K.P. Potdose v. State of Kerala and Anr. : AIR1975SC1259 , has no application. Lastly Mr. Suresh Prasad has referred to a recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. G.S. Atwal and Company, (Asansole) : [1996]2SCR940 . In that case, by express agreement of parties particular dispute had been referred to the arbitrator but while considering the claim, certain other claims made by the party were also considered by the arbitrator and as claims were pressed by one party, the other party no option but to participate in the proceeding before the arbitrator and those extraneous claims which were not referred to by express agreement of the parties was held to be a r sconduct on the part of the arbitrator to entertain those extra claims and the award was set aside, but here in the present case, there is no extra claim made. The claims which had already been made and the management had denied to make payment of those, then by express agreement, the matter had been referred to the arbitrator, although the claim of the arbitrator was on higher side, but only Rs. 2,90, 000/- had been awarded together with interest. So it cannot be said that any extra claim or extraneous matter besides the scope of reference had been considered by the arbitrator and as such committed misconduct. This ruling has got no bearing in the present circumstances of the cases.
10. It is true that the arbitrator had awarded some interest beyond the scope which had been rightly modified by the Subordinate Judge and no counter-claim has been made by the claimant with respect to the interest portion which has been modified by the impugned order from the side of the respondent.
11. On consideration of the legal and factual aspect of the case I do not find any force in these two appeals and hence the same is rejected, but in the circumstances no cost is awarded to either of the parties.