T.N. Singh, J.
1. On 21.11.1977 Motilal Das was travelling in a bus when at a place near Raha, at about 7.30 pm, the bus dashed against a stationary truck. The impact was so big that the bus capsized. Though some of the other passengers received minor injuries. Motilal was severely injured and was therefore taken to Nowgong Civil Hospital, where he was declared dead. He left behind his wife and three minor daughters. An application under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for short the Act or Motor Vehicle Act, was filed by the widow claiming compensation for herself and for her three minor daughters on account of death of her husband in the said motor accident. In the application the registered owner of the bus, the insurer, as well as the financier under the Hire Purchase Agreement which the registered owner had entered with it, were impleaded as opposite parties. After the matter was heard by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nowgong, for short the Tribunal, an award was passed by him allowing the claim in part. In terms of the award the insurer (Opp. party No. 5) has to pay Rs. 5,000/- and the balance of Rs. 25,000/- has to be paid jointly and severally by the registered owner (Opp. Party No. 1) and the financier (Opp. party No. 3). Being aggrieved by the award the financier has come up before us in this appeal. The claimant is also aggrieved by the quantum of compensation and has filed a cross-objection. Both these matters were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. In the course of hearing written statements were filed before the Tribunal by the opposite parties. The occurrence is not denied. The registered owner claimed that the accident did not take place as a result of rash and negligent driving of her vehicle. The financier's objection was that he could not be saddled with any liability in respect of the claim arising out of the accident as he was in no way connected with the ownership or possession of the said vehicle. The insurer took up a number of defences and asserted that the claim was excessive and in any event its liability was limited to Rs. 5,000/- only.
3. The learned Tribunal struck 4 issues for trial. As many as 8 witnesses were examined by the claimant besides herself (as PW 9) in support of her claim. Learned Tribunal on a discussion of the evidence came to the finding that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the bus. Indeed, this finding is not challenged before us by any party. What the appellant, the financier, challenges in the appeal is that the award passed against it was illegal inasmuch as it had no liability either jointly with Opp. Party No. 1, or independently, in respcet of the claim arising out of the accident. What the claimants, the cross-objectors, challenge is that the determination of compensation payable to the dependants was erroneous both on facts and law. Therefore, the same ought to be set aside and on a reappraisal of evidence and by applying appropriate principles of law the compensation ought to be determined and accordingly enhanced. On behalf of the insurer-respondent it is contended that the limit of their liability was rightly determined by the learned Tribunal and whether or not the compensation is enhanced it cannot be saddled with any further liability. We proceed accordingly to discuss and decide each of the three points agitated before us by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties.
4. The deceased was a paddler in ready made garments. He used to visit weekly hats and bazars and did business there. He was 43 years old at the time of his death. He had rented a house in which he used to right wish his family. At the time of his death, as observed earlier, his wife and three minor daughters were living with him. The wife appears to be 33 years old when the deceased met his death.
5. In determining the compensation payable to the claimant the learned Tribunal came to the finding on discussion of evidence that the monthly income of Late Motilal Das was Rs. 500/-. His further finding is that out of this amount be expended only Rs. 150/- p m. for the upkeep and maintenance of the family. In arriving at this finding he took into consideration the fact that out of the monthly income of Rs. 500/- be must have kept some amount as capital for his business and also for his personal expenditure and on this account learned Tribunal appears to have made a deduction of Rs. 350/- p m. out of the total income of the deceased. Considering the fact that the normal life expectancy of the deceased could be fixed 65 years he assessed the total compensation accordingly at Rs. 39,600/- (Rs. 150X12X22). However, he deducted Rs. 9,600/- for uncertainty of life and held that the claimants were entitled to award of Rs. 30,000/- on account of death Late Motilal Das.
6. We feel inclined to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the cross-objectors that the learned Tribunal, in fixing the monthly dependency at Rs. 150/-, overlooked certain important aspects of the evidence. In the first place it is submitted that although he accepted the evidence of payment of Rs. 50/- p.m. as house rent by the deceased for the accommodation of his family it was not taken into consideration in fixing the monthly dependency. Nextly, it is contended that the deduction of Rs. 350/- from the total monthly income of the deceased on account of capital for business and personal expenditure was pure guess work. As there was no evidence on this point, in our opinion, these criticisms are well founded. It appears clear to us that the learned Tribunal only considered 'livelihood' aspect in finding the monthly dependency at Rs. 150/- although he has observed that the claimants were getting the said amount for their 'livelihood and for their family expenses'. Because, we find it difficult to accept that even in 1977 for fooding and clothing of a family of four members a sum of Rs. 150/- p.m. could be sufficient. Indeed, this could possibly only meet their minimum needs of fooding and clothing and therefore the house rent of Rs. 50/- could not evidently be included in this amount. We are also of the opinion that the learned Tribunal definitely erred in holding that the deceased would be needing a recurring capital every month for his business although we may accept his finding that the deceased must have kept some amount for his personal expenses and also for meeting expenses for conveyance for going to different hats and bazars on different dates for his business. It is true that on this aspect of the matter there is no evidence and we have therefore to indulge ourselves in some amount of guess work. However, we consider, in the facts and circumstances of the case, taking an overall view of the matter, that out of tne monthly income of Rs. 500/- a deduction of Rs. 250/- against conveyance and other expenses in connection with the business and personal expenses of the deceased can be held to be reasonable. Accordingly, the monthly dependency can reasonably be fixed at Rs. 250/- taking into consideration the house rent of Rs. 50/- and giving a rise of another Rs. 50/- against the 'other family expenses'.
7. What principles are judicially accepted as appropriate in such cases in determining compensation payable to the dependents of the deceased was discussed in a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ratneshwar Barani v. Gaurishankar Agarwalla MA(F) 14/76 dt. 6.6.1983 One of us Lahiri, J.) speaking for the court, culled out the relevant principles from the decisions of the apex court and observed that in calculating the compensation, after the annual dependency of the dependents in terms of annual loss accrued to them due to abrupt termination of life is determined, the resultant figure should be multiplied by a 'multiplier'.
8. How the 'multiplier' was to be determined as also stated. Such factors had to be taken into consideration as the number of years of dependency of the dependants, the number of years by which the life of the deceased was cut short and various other imponderable factors like the possibility of early natural death of the deceased, possibility of his incapacity of supporting the dependents due to illness or other causes, the prospect of re-marriage of the widow and coming of age of the dependents and possibility of acquisition of independent source of income by them. There cannot be any doubt, therefore, that consideration has to be paid for this, among others, to the respective ages of the deceased and her dependents the relationship of the dependents with the deceased, the sex of the dependents and the nature of a avocation followed by the deceased at the time of death.
9. On the facts of that case the court adopted a multiplier of 18. In that case the deceased was age 34 years at his death. Be was a bus conductor and led a hard life. He was a bachelor and had six dependents, who were his mother, three brothers and two sisters. In this case, as we have seen, the deceased was aged 43 years at his death. However, he had a comparatively easier life as an independent businessman with greater expectancy of life. His widow was not too young for re-marriage. He left three daughters and from the evidence it appears they were too young at the time of his death. The eldest, according to PW 9, was reading in Class 1 in 1979. The widow for her life time, and the daughters until their marriage, were bound to be dependent on the deceased and acquisition of an independent source of income by them was a remote possibility. PW 9 has deposed that after her husband's death she moved out to stay with her brother. In that case it was also observed that the highest multiplier adopted in such cases by courts was 22.
10. Accordingly, taking an over-all view of the matter, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we consider that we may reasonably adopt the multiplier in this case as 17. The compensation payable to the cross-objectors is, therefore, to be fixed at Rs. 51,000.00 taking annual dependency at Rs. 3,000.00 as we have fixed about the monthly pecuniary loss caused to the dependents at Rs. 250.00. However, we consider that ends of justice will be met if the impugned award is enhanced from Rs. 30,000.00 to Rs. 50,000.00 in this case.
FINANCIER'S LIABILITY
11. Mr. B.K. Goswami, the learned Counsel for the appellant submits that this is a pure question of law. The Hire Purchase Agreement in this case was not proved but on that count no objection could be taken inasmuch as the award passed against his client was wholly without jurisdiction. His client, submits Mr. Goswami, took the earliest opportunity to oppose being impleaded in the claim petition. The admitted position was that his client was not the registered owner of the vehicle and further it was not denied by the insurer that the registered owner had an insurable interest in the vehicle and that the later was therefore rightly insured in respect of the same. His submission is that Section 110-B of the Act envisages an award being passed only against the persons named therein, namely, the insurer, the owner, driver and the financier is in no way in the picture. His further submission is that the term 'owner' refers merely to the registered owner and none else. The fact that the registered owner, in this case, was in possession of the vehicle is admitted and also admitted is the position that the driver was her employee. Therefore, the liability arising out of the accident ought to be satisfied by her or the insurer and in no case it could be fastened on his client.
12. In support of his contention Mr. Goswami has drawn our attention to Sections 2(19) and 31-A of the Act and has in addition relied on the provisions of Sub-sections (e) and (f) of Section 2 and Section 6(1)(a) of the Hire Purchase Act, 1972, for short H.P. Act. He has also relied on two unreported Bench decisions of this Court and certain other decisions.
13. We may first discuss the statutory provisions. The terms 'hirer' and 'owner' are defined in Section 2(e) and (f) of the H.P. Act. One who obtains or has obtained possession of goods from an owner under a Hire Purchase Agreement is defined as 'hirer'. One who delivers or has delivered possession of goods to hirer under such agreement is defined as the 'owner'. An owner, further, is said to 'include' a person to whom the owner's property in the goods or any of the owner's rights or liabilities under the agreement has passed. The implied warrantees and conditions of a Hire Purchase Agreement are stated in Section 6 of the said Act. Sub-section 1(a) thereof states that the 'hirer' shall have and enjoy quiet possession of the goods. On a plain reading of these provisions it appears to us that although the term 'financier' is not defined he may be the 'owner' of goods sold on hire purchase system in a case in which he has delivered possession thereof to the hirer but the rights and incidents of his ownership are determined by the agreement under which such transaction takes place. We may also read Clause (g) of Section 2. It states that the definitions contained therein shall prevail against those given in the Contract Act and the Sale of Goods Act. Thus, although the term 'hirer' definitely and inexoerably invests the person with the right to possess the goods and thereby postulates that a person who is a hirer under the Hire Purchase Agreement is in possession of the goods, as respects the term 'owner' such a position does not obtain under the H.P. Act. However, if these terms have any other meaning in respect of any certain species of goods under any other Central Act, according to us, the definition given in such Act is to prevail as that would be a special enactment in the sense that it would relate to the particular species of goods dealt with under that Act. We may, therefore, read Section 2(19) of the M.V. Act:
Owner means where the person in possession of a motor vehicle is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject matter of a Hire Purchase Agreement, the person in possession of such vehicle under the agreement.
14. Special provisions regarding motor vehicles subject to hire purchase agreement are made in Section 31-A of the Act. An entry as to the existence of a hire purchase agreement in respect of a motor vehicle is required to be made in its certificate of registration. Such entry is cancelled when the agreement is terminated. The implications of Sub-section (5) are significant. At the instance of 'the person with whom the registered owner has entered into a hire purchase agreement', on his having taken possession of the vehicle in the event of any default by the registered owner, and the latter having refused to deliver the certificate of registration or having absconded, cancellation of such certificate and issuance of fresh certificate to the said person is contemplated. Undoubtedly, this is indicative of (1) the possession of the vehicle being usually and normally with the registered owner; and (2) the possibility only of the possession coming lawfully to the financier.
15. It appears to us, reading conjointly the provisions of the M.V. Act (Sections 2(19), 31-A and 110-B and H.P. Act Sections 2(e) to (f) and 6(1), that the liability, prima facie, in case of an accident, is that of the registered owner and the financier's liability arises only when he becomes so and after he has obtained possession of the vehicle in virtue thereof. Indeed, Section 110-B contemplates that in an application for compensation made Under Section 110-A only the owner and driver, who would be in actual or constructive possession at the time of the accident, besides the insurer, whose liability is statutorily inscribed in Sections 95 and 96 of the Act, would be the persons against whom an award can be passed. This provision, according to us, was meant to ensure that only the specified persons should be either severally or jointly liable to satisfy a claim arising out of a motor accident. Therefore, care is taken by the legislature to define the term 'owner' in Section 2(19) to specify there under the person in possession of the vehicle to be the owner of the vehicle in a case where the vehicle was the subject matter of a Hire Purchase Agreement to exclude the possibility being attached to, a person who was merely the legal owner (real or ostensible) but without possession and for that matter, the financier also, when so situated.
16. Now the case law. The definition of 'owner' given in Section 2(19) of the Act came up for consideration in a decision of this Bench in Raghubir Singh v. State of Assam Civil Rule No. 970/81 dt. 5.10.83. In dealing with the purport of the above Section 2(19) we observed that cases and contingencies concerning doubt about ownership were sought to be resolved thereunder with reference to the fact of possession. In our opinion, Section 2(19), though inexhaustively and rather inartistically defines 'owner', it deals specifically with the case of a minor as also of a case relating to Hire Purchase Agreement, The doubt as to ownership in both cases is resolved with reference to the fact of possession. Therefore, according to us, irrespective of the terms of the Hire Purchase Agreement, in case of a motor vehicle, the person lawfully in possession of the vehicle must be considered as 'owner' of the vehicle in so far as the rights and liabilities of such person in relation to any transaction, or event are dealt with by the Act. The case of K.L. Johar AIR 1965 SC 1082 relied on by Mr. Goswami does indeed relate to Hire Purchase Agreement of motor vehicles and although the question mooted in that case was different the general incidents of such agreements were indicated therein by the court. It was observed that such agreements contain two elements: (1) bailment; and (2) sale in the special sense that it contemplates an eventual sale. The element of sale fructifies when the option to purchase, which is usually a term of Hire Purchase Agreement, is exercised by the intending purchaser and title passes to the hirer only when he has finally exercised his option after complying with the terms of the agreement. This position, in our opinion, is reflected in the relevant provisions of the two Acts, discussed above.
17. The scope of Section 110-B was discussed in a Bench decision of this Court. In the case of Narmada Choudhury v. MACT Kamrup Civil Rule No. 24/79 dt. 25.7.83 this Court speaking through one of us (Dr. Singh, J.) observed that the general law of Tort being uncodified, and the Tribunal which was given the power to adjudicate the tortious liability under the Act being a creature of the Act, it was considered necessary to name the tortfeasors along with the statutorily named indemnifier contemplated Under Section 95(5). It was necessary to do so because the Act made a distinct departure from the general law of Tort in dealing with the liability of joint tort-feasors as appeared from a combined reading of Sections 97, 99, 101 and 102 of the Act. To buttress this view we may refer to Common Law rule as to joint liabiliry that a judgment against one released all even though it was wholly unsatisfied (see, Winfield on Tort, 8th edn. page 661). Evidently this rule was considered unsatisfactory by the Indian legislature to deal with cases under the Act.
18. Mr. Goswami has cited the decision reported in AIR 1935 Bombay 333 Goolbai v. Pestonji in which it was held that the most question to be considered in such cases was determination of relationship of the person driving the vehicle to the defendant. In that case the defendant being found to be a mortgages and the person driving the vehicle a mortgagor, the Court held on these facts that there did not exist between them such relation as would indicate that the defendant had any control on him. Evidently there could be no discussion in that case of the provisions (of Chapter VIII) of the Act which did not then exist. In AIR 1972 Mysore 73 Ariyamma v. Narasimhiah the court relied on K.L. Johar (supra) and on a consideration of the terms of the Hire Purchase Agreement held that the second respondent was not the owner of the vehicle on the date of accident on whom liability for the accident could be saddled as be had not exercised his option to purchase the vehicle till that date. This case was relied on in a subsequent decision of the same court in 1980 ACJ 377 Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. D.G. Nanjappa and here also relevance of the definition of 'owner' in Section 2(19) of the Act was held doubtful. However, a different view is expressed in the other cases cited at the Bar. In Padma Devi v. Gurbaksh Singh and : AIR1974All90 Babu Singh v. Champa Devi reliance was placed on Section 2(19) to hold that the financier could not be saddled with liability and further (in the latter case) that he was not a necessary party as he was not the owner of the vehicle.
19. In this view of the matter we have no hesitation to hold that in the instant case the appellant financier was wrongly impleaded as it is nobody's case that the Bus was in its possession. No award could therefore be legally passed against the firm as it was not with the registered owner in virtue of Section 31-A. The order of the learned Tribunal in so far as it held the appellant-financier to be jointly and severally liable with the registered owner in respect of a part of the award (Rs. 25,000) is therefore entirely without jurisdiction and is accordingly set aside.
LIMIT OF INSURER'S LIABILITY
20. Mr. S.S. Sharma, the learned Counsel appearing for the insurer, made a faint attempt to establish the position that in the award passed under Section 110-B the learned Tribunal having specified the amount payable by the insurer in the instant case and that part of the order not having been challenged in the appeal and in the cross objection this Court will not interfere with the same. We do not, however, think that this contention of Mr. Sharma merits serious consideration in view of what has been held by this Court in Narmada Choudhury (supra). In that case this Court held that Sub-sections 2(b) and (5) of Sections 95 and 96 cast a statutory duty on the insurer to satisfy the liability of the insured determined under Section 110-B. It was held on a reading of the provisions of Sections 95, 96 and 110-B that the liability to discharge the judgment debt of the insured created by Section 96 was indefeasible and ultimate and it was independent of the 'amount' specified in the award in terms of Section 110-B. It was further observed that Sections 97, 99 and 110 reflected the position that the 'amount' so specified created merely a tentative and inchoate obligation which is perfected in the course of discharge of the judgment debt arising under the award in respect of the total 'amount' of compensation payable.
21. We may, however, examine the main contention of Mr. Sharma that the statutory limit of insurer's liability was correctly determined in the instant case to be Rs. 5,000/- as is laid down in Section 95(2)(b)(ii)(4) of the Act. We, therefore, read the following extracts from relevant provisions:
(2) Subject to the proviso to Sub-section (1), a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any one accident up to the following limits, namely:
(a) X X X
(b) where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment:
(i) x X X
(ii) in respect of passengers:
(1) a limit of fifty thousand rupees in all where the vehicle is registered to carry not more than thirty passengers;
(2) a limit of seventy-five thousand rupees in all where the vehicle is registered to carry more than thirty but not more than sixty passengers;
(3) a limit of one lakh rupees in all where the vehicle is registered to carry more than sixty passengers; and
(4) subject to the limits aforesaid, ten thousand rupees for each individual passenger where the vehicle is a motor cab, and five thousand rupees for each individual passenger in any other case.
(italics supplied)
22. It is true that a plain reading of the provisions relied on may be suggestive of such an interpretation. However, we cannot ignore that Chapter VIII of the Act is meant to achieve a wholesome social purpose consonant with the Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in Part IV of the Constitution. Indeed, the emerging interpretative norms highlighted in some of the recent decisions of the apex court mandated such course (see, Minerva Mills AIR 1980 SC 1789, 1850) Randhir Singh AIR 1982 SC 879, 881. In Narmada Choudhury (supra) it was observed that Artical 39A of the Constitution obligates this Court to ensure that economic justice is secured to the claimants and for this purpose the provision of Chapter VIII of the Act should be construed in a manner as would achieve such a result.
23. We are of the opinion that Sub-clauses (1) to (4) of Sub-section 2(b)(ii) of Section 95 lay down a total or outer limit as well as an inner limit and that the later has a special, and not a general or overriding, purpose like the former. It is our view that in every case the court must answer the question as to whether both or only the general limit is applicable to the facts of the case. For the first limit a graduated scale is laid down in Sub-clauses (1) to (3) which is calibrated to match the carrying capacity of a motor vehicle in terms of passengers and it is further qualified by the words 'in all' in each case. The second or inner or special limit is indicated entirely in Sub-clause (4). Accordingly, the expression 'subject to the limits aforesaid' used therein, according to us, must be deemed to, (1) control the provisions of the said Sub-Clause, and also (2) indicate the overriding character of the first limit or outer limit laid down in clauses (1) to (3). In our opinion the first limit fulfils the general purpose of providing a compulsory liability of the insurer arising out of 'any one accident' in respect of the motor vehicle and must in all cases prevail unless a case is made for the publication also of the special limit. The second or special limit is meant merely to determine the liability of the insurer in respect of 'each individual passenger' should occasion therefore arise in any case. The relevance or purpose of this limit is reflected in a situation where a vehicle, which is registered to carry passengers for hire or reward is involved in an accident, and there arises several claims due to several passengers being injured or dead. There would be no occasion to invoke the limit in case of a single claim of one passenger. The maximum liability of the insurer in respect of 'each individual passenger' is fixed by this second or inner limit only to meet such an eventuality. It stands to reason that there was a necessity for the legislature to fix such a limit for the simple reason that there would have to be, in such a case, a rateable distribution of the amount awarded. Therefore the legislature had to ensure that in case of a distribution a situation does not arise, as the Supreme Court has pointed out 'when the affluent victim will virtually monopolise the compensation by getting lion's share in it thereby adding insult to the injury caused to the heirs of the indigent litigants'. (See, Motor Owners Insurance Co. Para 14 AIR 1981 SC 2059, 2063) This special purpose is served, in our opinion, by the second or inner limit the application of which will only arise when there are several claims arising out of the same accident. This limit cannot be derogative of the first or the general limit which fixes the compulsory limit of liability of the insurer in respect of 'any one accident'.
24. In Motor Owners Insurance Co , the expressions 'any one accident' and 'in all' were considered by the apex court and it was held that Clause (a) of Section 95(2) did not stand alone and was not the only provision to be considered for determining the 'outside limit' of the insurer's liability. It was further observed that all the clauses (a) to (d) were' governed by the opening words of Section 95(2)', namely, by the expression 'any one accident'. The court was of the view that the expression was susceptible of two equally reasonable meanings or interpretations and that doubt arose because of correlation of the said expression with the words 'in all' and that the doubt must be resolved by having regard to the underlying legislative purpose of the provisions contained in Chapter VIII. Although that was a case on the interpretation of Clause (a) the court also dealth with Clause (b). Mr. Sharma's contention is that even in that case the court accepted the interpretation placed on Clause (b) in its earlier decision reported in : AIR1971SC1624 Sheikhupura Transport Co. v. Northern India Transport Co. We are, however, unable to accept this contention. In Sheikhupura Transport Co. the case arose under unamended Clause (b) as the accident had taken place in 1959, before it was amended in 1961. Indeed, it is for this reason that at para 26 of the judgment, the court (in Motor Insurance Co.) itself observed that 'different considerations may arise under Clause (b) as amended' but no interpretation was given of the amended Clause (b). In our opinion, though the expression 'any one accident' might not have any relevance in fixing the insurer's liability in respect of each passenger under the unamended Clause (b), its relevance is undoubtedly projected in the amended Clause (b). We say so because in amended Clause (b) we find the expression 'subject to the limits aforesaid' which was not in the old provision and this interpretation has made it necessary to consider the impact of it on the expressions 'any one accident' and 'in all'.
25. We way, however, deal with the decisions cited by Mr. Sharma on the amended Clause (b). In 1977 ACJ 248 (Bansidhar v. Sarat Chandra) there is a simple statement apparently on a plain reading of the provision, that since the accident took place after the amendment the insurer's liability for every passenger was Rs. 5,000/-. The relevant provisions were not discussed. Indeed, the limit of insurer's liability does not appear to be in issue in that case and no argument was, therefore, advanced on this aspect of the matter. In 1979 ACJ 400 New India Assurance Co. v. P. Mahalaxmi the same position obtains. The decision reported in 1981 ACJ 399 K.R. Sivagami v. Mahaboob Nisa is in the same line. However, in Sundarama's case (supra) the construction of Section 95(2) was in issue. The court observed that the wordings of the provisions of Section 95(2)(b)(i)(ii)(4) were clear and that the sentence was simple. On 'grammatical construction' there being 'no ambiguity' the provision was held to postulate a compensation of Rs. 5,000/- to each passenger, injured or dead. For the reasons, already staled in para 24 above, relying on apex court's views, we find ourselves unable to agree with this view. In our opinion, the second or special limit is not meant to be general limit to provide a 'pro rata' reduction in a case where insurer's total liability exceeded the outer limit, as their Lordships held. But, it is provided to negate the invidious effect thereof which made the rich gainer and the poor loser.
CONCLUSION
26. We have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that according to the construction placed by us on Section 95(2)(b)(ii) the outer or overriding limit projected by the expression 'subject to the limits aforesaid' shall prevail in this case As the benefit of the second or the inner limit applicable in case of 'each individual passenger' is available to an insurer only in a case where it can show that application merely of the outer or overriding limit had become irrelevant as a result of several claims arising out of the same accident, in this case the insurer is not entitled to avail the benefit of the special limit. It has not been shown in this case that there were several claims in respect of the accident which had taken place on 21,11.77. Indeed, such a plea was not taken at any stage. The minimum 'outer or overriding' limit prescribed in Sub-clause (1) of Section 95(2)(b)(ii) comes into play in this case. Because, we have fixed the liability of the insured at Rs. 50,000/- and the same being covered by the said provision, the insurer must satisfy the award in full to fulfil its statutory obligation under Section 96 and Sub-sections (2) and (5) of Section 95.
27. In the result the appeal is allowed. The cross-objection is also allowed. We hold that the claimants are entitled to a compensation of Rs. 50,000/- on account of death of Motilal Das. Accordingly, the amount awarded is enhanced. The appellant-financier are, however, absolved of their liability under the award. We direct that the entire amount of the award, namely, Rs. 50,000/- shall be payable by the insurer-respondent to fulfil their statutory obligation as stated above. They shall also be liable to pay interest as awarded by the learned Tribunal calculated @ 61/2% per annum from the date of award till the payment. However, we make no order as to costs.
28. We direct that the insurer-respondent shall, within 2 months, deposit with the Tribunal the amount herein awarded to the claimants together with the interest. We further direct that out of the total amount deposited with the Tribunal, the three daughters of the deceased, namely, respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in this appeal, shall be paid Rs. 10,000/- each. However, this amount shall be made available to them when they attain majority and in the meantime the amount shall be invested in fixed deposit with the local branch of the State Bank of India. By this direction we propose to protect the interest of the minor girls because had their father been alive he could have made suitable provision for their marriage,
.