T.C. Das, J.
1. This revision petition is directed against the order of acquittal passed by the learned Appellate Court below in Criminal Appeal No. 8(2) of 1978 and Criminal Appeal No. 14 (2) of 1978. The learned Sessions Judge disposed of both the appeals by a common judgment dated 29th Aug, 1979. The Criminal Appeal No. 8(2) of 1978 was preferred against the order of conviction of the accused (Respondent No. 1 herein) who was convicted under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code by the learned trial Court. While considering to inflict the sentence, the learned trial court released the accused with certain conditions under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act but imposed penalty of a fine of Rs. 1,000/- with a direction to pay the said amount of penalty to the family of the deceased within three months from the date of the order. The other appeal, viz. Criminal Appeal No. 44(2) of 1978 was preferred by the State against the order of release of the accused under the provision of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. The learned Sessions Judge heard both the appeals together and by a common judgment acquitted the accused by setting aside the conviction and sentence inflicted on him. The State of Manipur has not preferred any appeal or revision, as the case may be, against the impugned order of acquittal which fact has been confirmed by Mr. Munindra Kumar Singh, the learned Public Prosecutor for the State appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2. This revision petition is presented by a private party, the widow of the deceased, who was even also not examined by the prosecution as witness in the trial. The petitioner in this revision petition had challenged the propriety and legality of the judgment and the order 'of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge.
2. We have heard Mr. Ibobi Singh, the learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. Priyananda Singh, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 (accused). We have also heard Mr. Munindra Kumar Singh, the learned Public Prosecutor for the State appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2.
3. In this revision petition we are called upon to consider two pertinent legal aspects of the matter as appearing before us in course of submissions of the learned Counsel of the parties. They are - (i) whether a private party can invoke the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a revision petition under Section 401/397, Cr.P.C. against the order of acquittal while the State did not prefer any appeal or revision against such an order of acquittal? (ii) How far and in what manner the High Court can exercise its revisional jurisdiction while dealing with a revision petition of such nature? Before we take up these two legal points in the context of the submissions of the learned Counsel of the respective parties, it would be necessary to have a cursory glance of the facts of the case.
4. The incident relating to this revision petition took place about a decade back in the year 1975. According to the prosecution, on 12-4-75 at about 11.30 A.M. in a room of constable Kunjo Singh in the first floor of a double storied building which was used as a police barrack at Singjamei Police Station, the accused Mangi Singh respondent No. 1), a Sub-Inspector of Police, and Md. Sahabuddin (the deceased), Sub-Inpector of Police, who was then Off icer-in-charge of the said Police Station along with one L. Iboton Singh were having a party in the said room. When the party was over at about 11.40 A. M. Sahabuddin asked the accused to give him some ammunition of his pistol and while the accused was negotiating his 99 MM pistol, it went off and a bullet hit Sahabuddin on the left thigh as a result of which Sahabuddin sustained grievous injuries. He was immediately taken to the Lamphel General Hospital in a police jeep but he breathed his last. Thus the unfortunate and premature death came to Sahabuddin, the deceased, due to the injuries sustained by him. The matter was investigated by the police on lodgement of First Information Report by one constable attached to Singjamei Police Station. The concerned Police Officer took up investigation which was later on followed by a charge-sheet against the accused, respondent No. 1 herein. The accused was tied up for trial in the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Imphal East, Manipur. The charge was framed against the accused under Section 304A, I.P.C. While explaining the charge, the accused pleaded not guilty. Therefore, the prosecution had to examine witnesses to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In course of trial, the prosecution examined official and non-official witnesses including the police officers and the autopsy surgeon who held the,post-mortem examination on the body of deceased Sahabuddin. The learned trial Court, on considering the evidence on record found the-accused guilty under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code but released him under the provision of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act with certain conditions and by imposing a fine of Rs. 1,000/- as penalty as aforesaid. In appeal, the learned Sessions Judge, upon hearing the learned Counsel in both the appeals acquitted the accused holding that the prosecution could not prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. Therefore, the widow of the deceased, a private party, has preferred this revision petition in this Court.
5. Mr. Ibobi Singh, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the widow of the deceased has approached this Court with this revision petition as she is aggrieved by the order of acquittal passed by the Appellate : Court. Admittedly, the widow of the deceased was not examined as a prosecution witness and she is an outsider to the proceedings. It is further submitted by the learned Counsel that the widow of the deceased is an aggrieved party and if there is any miscarriage of justice, the aggrieved party may approach the Court for redress. This broad proposition may be applied in an appropriate case but not in all cases. Mr. Priyananda Singh, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 has on the other hand, submits that admittedly the State did not file any appeal against the order of acquittal. The petitioner being not a witness nor the informant had challenged the impugned order as a private party and this being the position, as submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, the petition is not maintainable on that score alone. To answer both the questions as stated above, let us now consider as to whether this revision petition can be entertained for any consideration. In this respect and to get the legal status and locus standi of the petitioner, we may refer the case of Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram reported in : 1973CriLJ1404 . It was a revision against the order of acquittal by a private complainant filed in the High Court and thereafter the matter went up to the Supreme Court against the order of the High Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that in a revision against acquittal by a private party the High Court cannot reappraise evidence for itself as if it is acting as a Court of appeal and then order a retrial. Adopting the ratio of the judgment rendered in Amar Chand v. Shanti Bose : 1973CriLJ577 , their Lordships held that normally the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 439, Cr.P.C. is to be exercised only in exceptional cases, when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error of point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. In the background of the proposition stated above we are to consider whether a private party can move this petition for redress. In this context also we would like to quote the relevant portion of the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court rendered in Akalu (supra). In para. 8 of the judgment their Lordships held - 'the unrestricted right of appeal from acquittal is specifically conferred only on the State and a private complainant is given this right only when the criminal prosecution was instituted on his complaint and then also subject to special leave.by the High Court, Lt is further provided in Section 439(5), Cr.P.C. that where no appeal is brought in a case in which an appeal is provided, no proceedings by way of revision would be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed. The State Government, therefore, having failed to appeal cannot apply for revision of an order of acquittal. Again, on revision, the High Court is expressly prohibited from converting an acquittal into a conviction. Considering the problem facing the Court in this case in the background of this scheme, the High Court when approached by a private party for exercising its power of revision from an order of acquittal should appropriately refrain from interfering except when there is a glaring legal defect of a serious nature which has resulted in grave failure of justice'. The Supreme Court has, however, by way of illustration indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. They are- (i) where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the accused; (ii) where the trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce, (iii) where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible, (iv) where the material evidence has been overlooked only either by the trial Court or by the appellate Court; and (v) where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law.
6. If further authority is required for this proposition we may refer to : 1973CriLJ978 , C. Kotaiah v. G. Venkateshwara). Their Lordships while considering the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court in case of a revision against acquittal by a private party, adopted the principles' laid down in case of K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in : [1963]3SCR412 wherein it was observed : 'that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction in revision only in exceptional cases when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice.'
7. In a recent case of the Supreme Court as reported in : 1986CriLJ1603 (Bansi Lal v. Laxman Singh) while dealing with the scope of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, the Supreme Court held as per para 9 of the judgment, the relevant portion of which we would like to quote hereinbelow:
Even in an appeal against an order of acquittal no interference will be made with the judgment of the trial Court except in rare and exceptional cases where there has been some manifest illegality in the approach to the case or the appreciation of the evidence or where the conclusl6n of fact recorded by the trial Judge is wholly unreasonable so as to be liable to be characterised as perverse and there has been a resultant miscarriage of justice. The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court while dealing with an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court is more narrow in its scope. It is only in glaring cases of injustice resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the trial court, that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of the acquittal and direct a retrial of the acquitted accused, From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution.
8. The law is settled in this regard relating to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court with its limited power to exercise in interfering with the order of acquittal, more so, when the revision petition is moved by a private party. The above referred decisions we have cited are the complete answer to both the questions canvassed before us having legal impact in the present nature of the case. We have, therefore, no doubt to say and most unhesitatingly, that we cannot reappreciate the evidence on record nor can we exercise our revisional jurisdiction beyond the limit as prescribed by the provision of law. Moreover, we do not find any glaring mistake amounting to miscarriage of justice committed by the learned appellate Court below. In such a situation we are not in a position to interfere with the impugned judgment and to have another finding of our own on the facts of the case.
9. For the reasons set forth above we reject this petition.