Judgment:
H.N. Sarma, J.
1. This revision petition is filed by the defendants/petitioners on being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Deputy Commissioner, Yupia on 2.1.2008 transferring the Title Suit No. 1/08 to the Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court) Yupia for disposal as well as order dated 4.1.2008 passed in M.C. 1/08 granting ad-interim injunction against the defendants/petitioners by the transferee Court.
2. I have heard Mr. T. Pertin, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. K. Jini, learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff/respondent.
3. The plaintiff/respondent instituted the aforesaid title suit in the Court of learned Deputy Commissioner, Yupia along with an application praying for ad-interim injunction. The plaint was admitted on 2.1.2008 and on the same day the suit along with the Misc. case was transferred to the Court of learned Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Yupia for early hearing. The record of the case was transmitted to the transferee Court on 3.1.2008 and the matter was placed before the learned Court on 4.1.2008. On that day, the plaintiff moved the application for temporary injunction. The learned trial Court, upon elaborate consideration of the submissions made on behalf of the plaintiff, passed an ex-parte ad-interim order of injunction for a period of thirty days, vide order dated 4.1.2008. Challenging the order transferring the suit to the Court of learned Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court) and the order granting ad-interim injunction, the present revision petition has been filed.
4. Mr. T. Pertin, learned Counsel for the defendants/petitioners contends that the Court of Additional District and Session Court (Fast Track Court) has been established vide notification dated 4.6.2002 by the State Government allotting different jurisdictional area to be operated by the respective Courts. Again, vide order dated 28.8.2003, the Secretary Law and Judicial, State of Arunachal Pradesh directed to transfer the civil cases with relevant records which are pending for more than two years to the Fast Track Court at Yupia for trial and disposal in terms of the schemes approved by the Apex Court in the case of Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India. Learned Counsel submits that the learned Deputy Commissioner committed jurisdictional error in transferring the suit on the date of its filing itself which is violative of the instruction contained in the order circulated by message dated 28.8,03. It is contended that as per the said order the suits which are more than two years old only could have been transferred and the present suit not being of such category ought not to have been transferred. Learned Counsel, however, does not dispute the jurisdictional authority of the Court of the Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court) to decide civil cases.
5. Challenging the impugned order dated 4.1.2008 it is submitted that while passing the order of ad-interim injunction the learned trial Court, in fact, decided everything against the petitioners leaving nothing to be decided at later point of time and the said order was passed ex-parte without issuing notice to him. The submission of the learned Counsel relates to the procedural propriety in passing the impugned order rather than on merit of the order.
6. Mr. K. Jini. learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff/respondent, per contra, submits that the transferee Court has/ had the jurisdiction and authority to decide civil cases in terms of the decision of the Apex Court rendered in Brij Mohan Lal (supra) and although the case was transferred to be decided by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court) before completion of two years that would not make the impugned order dated 4.1.2008 void ab-initio. If a Court has the jurisdiction to pass such an order, it is no matter at what stage the power is exercised by the Court. His further submission is that the petitioner can very well appear before the learned trial Court and raise his grievance and ad-interim order of injunction being an appealable order, the impugned order is not liable to be challenged under the revisional jurisdiction, when an appeal lies against suit or order.
7. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties.
8. In the State of Arunachal Pradesh judiciary is still being run by the executive officers appointed by the State, the effect of separation of the judiciary has not been implemented till date. The Deputy Commissioners who are the principal Civil Courts in the State always remain busy with other administrative problems thereby delaying in the disposal of the cases, more particularly, civil cases. The speedy disposal of cases is one of the principles enshrined in the Constitution. It is submitted at the bar that the Deputy Commissioner, Yupia has recently passed a general order that no cases for hearing would be taken up by him upto 31.3.2008 as he is busy in administrative works. Temporary injunction as prayed for in this suit obviously is of urgent nature.
9. Vide notification dated 4.6.2002 Ad-hoc Additional Session Courts (Fast Track Court) at Namsai, Basar and Yupia have been established under Section 9 of the Cr PC, 1973. By W.T. message dated 28.8.2003 the civil cases pending for more than two years have also been directed to be transferred to the Fast Track Court for necessary disposal in terms of the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Brij Mohan Lal (supra).
10. In the case of the Brij Mohan Lal (supra) T.C. Cases No. 22/01, the Apex Court at paragraph 8 has held as follows:
Priority shall be given by the Fast Track Courts for disposal of those Sessions cases which are pending for the longest period of time, and or those involving under-trials. Similar shall be approach for civil cases i.e., old cases shall be given priority.
11. The Fast Track Courts have been constituted to solve the problems created by long pendency of cases in different Courts all over the country. Quick dispensation of justice has become the order of the day. In Brij Mohan Lal's case (supra), the Apex Court has adequately dealt with this aspect. From Para 8 of the judgment it is undisputedly clear that the Fast Track Courts are also empowered to decide the civil cases and old cases should be given priority. After pronouncement of the said judgment clarifying the power of the Fast Track Courts, the Government of Arunachal Pradesh, by message dated 28.8.03, directed to transfer the civil cases pending for more than two years to the Fast Track Court. As indicated above, the learned Counsel for the petitioners has not raised any doubt about the competence of the Fast Track Court to take up and decide civil cases but his grievance is that the present suit is not of two years old and in that view of the matter by transferring the instant suit to the Fast Track Court the learned Deputy Commissioner has violated the order dated 28.8.2003.
12. In view of the dictum of the Apex Court as discussed above, the Fast Track Court has the jurisdiction to decide the civil cases with priority to old cases. It is one of the principles of law that once a Court or authority get jurisdiction to decide a matter, the power can be exercised at any stage and exercise of such power at a particular stage, would not render the order passed thereon void ab-initio by that count. The Fast Track Court at Yupia, thus, having both latent and patent jurisdiction to decide the dispute involving in the suit, merely transferring the case before two years for such disposal, in my considered opinion, would not oust the jurisdiction of the Court to decide the same. In fact, the matter in dispute, more particularly, temporary injunction petition requires urgent disposal by a competent Court and for that purpose, the Deputy Commissioner transferred the matter for such disposal to the Fast Track Court. In view of the above discussion, I do not find that the learned Deputy Commissioner committed any error in transferring the case to the Fast Track Court at Yupia, nor the fast track Court would be ousted from exercising its power to deal with the case on that ground.
13. Learned Counsel then proceeds to assail the impugned order dated 4.1.2008 granting temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff/respondent. The injunction order was passed due to urgency of the matter. A Civil Court is always empowered to pass such an ex-parte order in case of urgency. The validity of the impugned order would continue for a period of thirty days i.e. up to 2.2.2008 only. That apart, it is an appealable order and a statutory appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(r) CPC lies against such an ex-parte ad-interim order of injunction. [See Full Bench decision of this Court reported in 1984 (1) GLR 133 Akmal Ali and Ors. v. State of Assam and Ors.]. In the above cited case, Hon'ble Justice K. Lahiri, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Court at paragraphs 10 and 11 held as follows:
10. As alluded, even an ex-parte ad-interim order rendered under Rule 1 or 2 of Order 39 is an order falling within the purview of Order 43 Rule (r). Orders rendered under Rules 1 and 2 of the Order 39 have been designated as orders appellable under Order 43 Rule 1(r), and , as such we are not to look at Section 2(9) or Section 2(14) of 'the Code'. Section 2 of 'the Code' clearly states that the definition should be understood in the manner stated in Section 2 'unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context'. If there is any repugnancy in Order 43 Rule 1(r) read with Order 39 Rules 1 and 2, the meaning of the term 'order' should be understood as set out in those provisions and definition need not be restored. That apart, any order rendered under Order 39 Rule 1 or 2 is a formal expression of the decision arrived at by the Civil Court relating to granting of ad interim injunction. How could a Court injunct a party without deciding whether to grant it or not. Form No. 8 of Appendix F to the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, clearly shows the manner in which the formal expression of the decision is required to be made. Further, to say that reasons must find place in an order to be regarded as a decision would land the litigants in great difficulty as, in limine disposal of many petitions by the Courts with one word 'Dismissed' would then not be 'Orders'. Such a proposition cannot be accepted. It is a different matter that all orders, interim or final, should contain reason. But to regard all non-speaking disposals as not even 'orders' of the appropriate authorities would create statements, as such disposals might then become non-appellable, or non-revisable, even under the relevant statutory . provisions.
11. For the reasons aforesaid, we hold that an appeal lies under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of 'the Code' against an ex-parte order of ad-interim injunction passed under Rule 1 and 2 of Order 39. In our opinion this is the answer to the question posed before us.
14. In view of the above consideration, I am not inclined to interfere with the order of ad-interim injunction dated 4.1.2008, life of which would come to an end after a few days. However, it is observed herein that in the event of extension of the prayer for injunction by the petitioners, the learned trial Court would pass appropriate order taking note of the objection that may be raised on behalf of the defendants/petitioners, if any. The defendants/petitioners would be entitled to file their objection against the prayer for ad-interim injunction before the learned Trial Judge.
15. It is needless to reiterate that the observations made by the learned trial Judge in passing the impugned order dated 4.1.2008 was only tentative one and not final, and the petitioners would certainly be entitled to raise necessary facts that are available to him for arriving a contrary view.
16. Subject to the aforesaid observations, this revision petition stands dismissed.
17. No costs.