Mr V Varshith Vs the State of Karnataka - Citation 1235431 - Court Judgment

Judgment:

1 Reserved on :

07. 06.2024 R Pronounced on :

21. 06.2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE21T DAY OF JUNE, 2024 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA WRIT PETITION No.39981 OF2015(GM-RES) BETWEEN: MR. V.VARSHITH S/O B.VENUGOPAL AGED ABOUT19YEARS RESIDING AT NO.902 STERLING TERRACE APARTMENT NO.3, 100 FEET ROAD V BLOCK, BSK III STAGE BENGALURU – 560 085. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI SURESH BABU B.N., ADVOCATE) AND:

1. . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF SPORTS AND YOUTH SERVICES, VIDHANA SOUDHA DR. B.R.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI BENGALURU - 560 001 REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY. 2 2 . THE COMMISSIONER YOUTH SERVICES AND SPORTS STATE YOUTH CENTER NRUPATHUNGA ROAD BENGALURU - 560 001. 3 . THE DIRECTOR YOUTH SERVICES AND SPORTS STATE YOUTH CENTER NRUPATHUNGA ROAD BENGALURU - 560 001. 4 . THE COMMITTEE CONSTITUTED FOR SELECTION OF CANDIDATE FOR AWARDING KARNATAKA EKALAVYA AWARD YOUTH SERVICES AND SPORTS STATE YOUTH CENTER NRUPATHUNGA ROAD BENGALURU – 560 001 REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.NAVYA SHEKHAR, AGA) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES226AND227OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE NOTIFICATION DT.24.8.2015 VIDE ANNX-J ISSUED BY R-3. DIRECT THE R-4 TO ALLOCATE THE MARKS TO THE PETITIONER FOR PARTICIPATION UNDER THE NATIONAL CHAMPIONSHIP ON PAR WITH THE MARKS ALLOTTED TO SENIOR NATIONAL CHAMPIONSHIP (INTER STATE/FEDERATION CUP/INTER ZONAL). THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR

ORDER

S ON0706.2024, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:- 3

ORDER

The petitioner is before this Court calling in question an order dated 24-08-2015 issued by the 3rd respondent/Youth Services and Sports Department of the State Government in drawing up of guidelines for award/allocation of marks for participation under the National Championship on par with marks allotted for participation in Senior National Championship.

2. Heard Sri B. N. Suresh Babu, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Smt. Navya Shekar, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the respondents.

3. Sans details, facts in brief are as follows:- The petitioner claims to be a young roller skating player and further claims to have participated in junior and senior National, International and Asian Championships and has won gold, silver and bronze medals and accordingly appended plethora of documents to the petition to demonstrate his participation in such events. The 1st respondent/Department of Sports and Youth 4 Services encourages development of games and sports in the State by giving recognition to those players who participate and win medals by conferring awards called Karnataka Ekalavya Award on those participants. The eligibility for enlistment in those awards and grant is dealt with in the guidelines issued by the State Government from time to time by way of orders. The guidelines depict allocation of marks for participation in junior level National Championship or senior level National Championship, as the case would be. The guidelines that held the field from 2010 are the guidelines of the year 2010 issued by the 1st respondent for conferring Ekalavya awards. The process depicted under the said order was the one that was carried forward for conferring such awards in the year 2010-2011. What comes about as new guidelines for the year 2015 is what has become the material for challenge before this Court in the subject petition in terms of the order dated 24-08-2015, the impugned order.

4. The learned counsel Sri Suresh Babu B. N., appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that allocation of marks for participation in the events is grossly arbitrary, as the 5 participants who participate in senior level National Championship or the like are assigned higher marks than those who participate in junior level National Championship. The learned counsel would further submit that Ekalavya awards are conferred on the basis of points and the points are allotted differently for senior and junior levels. Therefore, the petitioner has not been enlisted for conferring Ekalavya award at any point in time. On this score, the learned counsel would submit that it is highly arbitrary and should be made equal to all participants in all Championships to be eligible for conferment of award on the basis of marks allotted.

5. Per-contra, the learned Additional Government Advocate would vehemently refute the submissions to contend that it is the policy of the State Government to divide senior and junior level National Championship participants and on that basis award marks. It is his submission that it is highly ununderstandable as to how such differentiation can even construed to be arbitrary. The participation is clearly indicated. The sports tournaments conducted at junior level are entirely different from National Championship at senior level. The sport that the petitioner plays is a non-Olympic 6 game. It is a roller skating and since the petitioner is in a non- Olympic game, he is entitled to participate in any number of tournaments. Therefore, the marks would grossly vary qua others. It is therefore, keeping in mind and after holding deliberations with all the sporting experts, guidelines are drawn in the form of a policy. This Court would not interfere with such policy, unless it is demonstrably shown that it is so arbitrary, that would warrant interference. The learned Additional Government Advocate would submit that participants at the senior level are in a higher pedestal than those who are in junior level. Both cannot be equated by any stretch of imagination. She would seek dismissal of the petition.

6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record.

7. The issue lies in a narrow compass. It is not in dispute that to recognize the participants in sporting events organized by the Sports Federation, the State confers Karnataka Ekalavya awards. The conferment of award is foundationed upon guidelines issued by 7 the State Government from time to time. In the year 2010, the State formulates certain guidelines for allocation of marks and on that basis, brings the sports persons into the eligibility list for conferment of Ekalavya awards. The guidelines issued in the year 2010 insofar as marks being allotted read as follows: “CAPÀ ¥ÀnÖ CAvÀgÀgÁ¶ÖçÃAiÀÄ- (ªÉÊAiÀÄQÛPÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ UÀÄA¥ÀÄ QæÃqÉUÀ¼ÀÄ) PÀæ.¸À. ¸ÀàzÉsðUÀ¼ÀÄ ¨ÁsUÀªÀ»¸ÀÄ«PÉ a£Àß ¨É½î PÀAZÀÄ 1 M®A¦Pïì 100 100 80 60 2 ªÀ¯ïØð PÀ¥ï 80 80 60 50 3 KµÀå£ï UÉÃªÀiïì 60 60 50 40 4 KµÀå£ï ZÁA¦AiÀÄ£ï¶¥ï 55 55 45 35 5 PÁªÀÄ£ï ªÉ¯ïÛ UÉÃªÀiïì 50 50 40 30 6 J£ïJJDgï¹/J¸ïJJ¥ïs 30 40 30 25 7 EvÀgÉ (QjAiÀÄgÀ QæÃqÉUÀ¼ÀÄ 20 25 20 15 ¸ÉÃjzÀAvÉ) gÁ¶æöÖÃAiÀÄ- (ªÉÊAiÀÄQÛPÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ UÀÄA¥ÀÄ QæÃqÉUÀ¼ÀÄ) PÀæ.¸À. ¸ÀàzÉsðUÀ¼ÀÄ ¨ÁsUÀªÀ»¸ÀÄ«PÉ a£Àß ¨É½î PÀAZÀÄ 1 £ÁåµÀ£À¯ï 20 20 15 10 ZÁA¦AiÀÄ£ï¶¥ï (EAlgï ¸ÉÖÃmï/¥sÉqÀgÉÃµÀ£ï PÀ¥ï/EAlgï eÉÆÃ£À¯ï) 2 £ÁåµÀ£À¯ï UÉÃªÀiïì 15 15 10 5 (cid:2)ೌಲ(cid:5)(cid:2)ಾಪನ ಸಮಯದ(cid:13)(cid:14) (cid:15)ೆ(cid:17), (cid:18)ೇಬ(cid:21) (cid:18)ೇ(cid:22)(cid:17), (cid:23)ಾ(cid:5)(cid:24)(cid:25)ಂಟ(cid:28) ಇ(cid:30)ಾ(cid:5)(cid:31) !ೕ"ೆಗಳ(cid:13)(cid:14) %ೈಯ ’ಕ )ಾಧ+ೆಗಳನು- (cid:2)ಾತ! ಪ/ಗ0ಸುವ2ದು 3ಾಗೂ gÁåA ಂ5 ಪಂ6ಾ(cid:5)ವ7ಯ )ಾಧ+ೆಗಳನು- ಪ/ಗ0ಸ8ಾಗುವ2(cid:31)ಲ(cid:14). %ೆ9!(cid:28): / (cid:2)ಾಸ;< !ೕ"ೆಗಳ )ಾಧ+ೆಯನು- ಪ/ಗ0ಸ8ಾಗುವ2(cid:31)ಲ(cid:14). ಏ>?.ಾ(cid:28) 3ಾಗೂ ಏ>ಯ @ೆABC6ೕಶಗಳE ಸಂಘ9ಸುವ !ೕ"ೆಗಳನು- ಪ/ಗ0ಸ8ಾಗುವ2(cid:31)ಲ(cid:14). 8

21. ಪ!ಶA’Gೆ ಪ/ಗ0ಸ8ಾಗುವ !ೕ"ಾ )ಾಧ+ೆಗಳE: Hಾ>Iೕಯ ಮತು’ ಅಂತರHಾ>Iೕಯ ಮಟLದ(cid:13)(cid:14) (cid:2)ಾನ(cid:5)(cid:30)ೆ ಪ"ೆದ !ೕ"ಾ ಸಂ)ೆMಗಳE ಆOೕPAರುವ !ೕ"ಾಕೂಟಗಳ(cid:13)(cid:14) 6ಾಖ8ಾRರ(cid:23)ೇಕು. Sಾತರ ಸTಾUರದ ಯುವ ವ(cid:5)ವ3ಾರ ಮತು’ !ೕ"ಾಸV%ಾಲಯ TಾಲTಾಲTೆ; !ೕ"ಾ ಸಂ)ೆMಗ7Gೆ (cid:22)ೕಡುವ (cid:2)ಾನ(cid:5)(cid:30)ೆಗಳನು- ಆX; ಸಮಯದ(cid:13)(cid:14) ಪ/ಗಣ+ೆGೆ (cid:30)ೆGೆದುTೊಳZ8ಾಗುವ2ದು. !ೕ"ಾ ಸಂ)ೆMಗಳ (cid:2)ಾನ(cid:5)(cid:30)ೆ ಬGೆ[ \%ಾದಗ7ದ].(cid:13)(cid:14) !ೕ"ಾಪಟು\Gೆ ಪ!ಶA’ (cid:22)ೕಡುವ ಬGೆ[ ಸTಾUರ (cid:22)ಣUಯªÉ ಅಂ^ಮ 22. KPÀ®ªÀå ¥Àæ±À¹Û ¸À°è¹gÀÄªÀ J¯Áè zÁR¯ÉUÀ¼À ªÉÄÃ¯É ಅPU ಸ(cid:13)(cid:14)ಸು^’ರುವ !ೕ"ಾಪಟು ಸ_ತಹ ಕ"ಾaಯ%ಾR ಸb (cid:2)ಾc ದೃeೕಕ/ಸತಕ;ದು]. ಈ /ೕw ಸ_ಯಂ ದೃeೕಕರಣ\ಲ(cid:14)ದ ಅPUಗಳನು- ^ರಸ;/ಸ8ಾಗುವ2ದು.

23. ಈ ಮೂರು ಪ!ಮುಖ )ಾಧ+ೆಗಳ ಒ(cid:18)ಾLHೆ ಅಂಕಗಳನು- ಪ/hೕಲ+ಾ ಸ(cid:25)^ ಪ/hೕ(cid:13)A ದೃeಕ/Aದ ನಂತರ ಆX; ಸ(cid:25)^ಯು ಪ!ಶA’Gೆ ಪ/ಗ0ಸತಕ;ದು]..” In the said guidelines it was not explicitly indicated with regard to allocation of marks by division of junior and senior. It was indicated that marks would be allotted on the basis of the kind of medals that the participants would get for participation viz., gold, silver and bronze to which different marks are allocated. This has held the field and the petitioner is said to have participated in several tournaments from 2010 and onwards and is said to have won certain medals. The total medals that the petitioner has in his kitty are 145. They are all for participation in National and International Championships. The State then issues guidelines for the years 2012 and 2013 for conferment of medals. Here again 9 what was prevailing in 2010 was taken note of. The marks table in 2014 reads as follows: “Marks Table INTERNATIONAL – (Individual & Team Games) SL Competition Participation Gold Silver Bronze 1 Olympics 100 100 80 60 2 World cup 80 80 60 50 3 Asian Games 60 60 50 40 4 Asian 55 55 45 45 Championship 5 Common 50 50 40 30 Wealth Games 6 SAARC/SAF3040 30 25 7 Others 20 25 20 15 (Including Junior) NATIONAL – (Individual & Team Games) 1 National Games 20 20 15 10 2 Sr. National 15 15 10 5 Championship (Inter State/Federation Cup/Inter Zonal) ¸À»/- («. gÁªÀÄPÀÈµÀÚAiÀÄå) ¸ÀPÁðgÀzÀ C¢üÃ£À PÁAiÀÄðzÀ²ð AiÀÄÄªÀ ¸À§°ÃPÀgÀt ªÀÄvÀÄÛ QæÃqÁ E¯ÁSÉ.” The marks in the tabulation for 2010 and 2014 are quoted only to juxtapose the present problem. In 2014, it appears that senior 10 level National Championship was brought in the marks table. This becomes a subject matter of challenge by this very petitioner in Writ Petition No.49543 of 2014. This Court disposed of the writ petition directing to provide opportunity to all categories of sportsmen who have participated in the National level Championship and thereafter assessment be made on the number of performances in a tournament in a transparent manner. The coordinate Bench holds as follows: “…. …. ….

4. Though the rival contentions are advanced, taking note of the fact that the instant case relates to the year 2014, consideration of the petitioner's claim for the said year at this juncture would not arise, since the person who was entitled would have already been considered for the said year. The question, however, is whether such notification made would be justified even for the subsequent year. The notification of the earlier period produced at Annexure-C would disclose that consideration will be made from among persons having performed in National Championship(Inter State/Federation cup/Inter Zonal). It was for the first time when the notification was made on 22.07.2014 the word "Senior" was incorporated, thus limiting it to a particular category. In the objection statement, except stating that Junior would have time to achieve, has not referred to any specific distinction made for the change to be effected.

5. The learned Government Advocate during the course of hearing has referred to the order passed in W.P.No.38600/2013 to contend that the change was due to the directions therein. On perusal of the order dated 12.06.2014, in my opinion, this Court has not issued any such direction to the respondents. What has been indicated therein is that the 11 discretion is available with the respondents in conferring award and such discretion should be exercised in an appropriate manner. Therefore, even if the earlier procedure of permitting all Sports persons who have achieved in the field as permitted to apply, it would still open for the respondents to judge their performance based on the medals that they have obtained or laurels achieved and it is only if the persons who have taken part in the Junior Championships have performed much better than the senior persons, the Junior person's claim can be considered for conferring award. Therefore, excluding the petitioner totally from even applying is not justified.

6. Therefore, the respondents are directed to provide opportunity to all the categories of Sportsmen who had participated in the National level Championship to apply if the choose to and thereafter assessment be made based on the number of performance in the tournament in a transparent manner and confer the award.” The result of the aforesaid order is the impugned order. The order is in detail and allocation of marks is as follows: “gÁ¶çÖÃAiÀÄ- (ªÉÊAiÀÄQÛPÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ UÀÄA¥ÀÄ QæÃqÉUÀ¼ÀÄ) PÀæ.¸À ¸ÀàzsÉðUÀ¼ÀÄ A£Àß ¨É½î PÀAZÀÄ ¨sÁUÀªÀ»¸ÀÄ«PÉ 1 £ÁåµÀ£À¯ï UÉÃªÀiïì 40 30 20 30 2 »jAiÀÄgÀ £ÁåµÀ£À¯ï 30 20 15 25 ZÁA¦AiÀÄ£ï¶¥ï (EAlgï ¸ÉÖÃmï/¥sÉqÉgÉÃµÀ£ï PÀ¥ï/EAlgï eÉÆÃ£À¯ï) 3 D¯ï EArAiÀiÁ EAlgï 20 15 10 5 AiÀÄÆ¤ªÀ¹ðn 4 dÆ¤AiÀÄ£ï £ÁåµÀ£À¯ï 10 8 5 3 (D¯ï EArAiÀiÁ gÀÆgÀ¯ï £ÁåµÀ£À¯ïì/«ªÉÄ£ïì £ÁåµÀ£À¯ïì/ CAVÃPÀÈvÀ 12 QæÃqÁ ¥sÉqÀgÉÃµÀ£ï ªÀÄvÀÄÛ £ÁåµÀ£À¯ï ¸ÀÆÌ¯ï UÉÃªÀiïì £ÀqÉ¸ÀÄªÀ AiÀÄÄ/19 & AiÀÄÄ/16 QæÃqÉUÀ¼ÀÄ) ¸À»/- 24.08.2015 (f.ºÀ£ÀÄªÀÄAvÀgÁAiÀÄ¥Àà) ¸ÀPÁðgÀzÀ D¢üÃ£À PÁAiÀÄðzÀ²ð(¥Àæ) AiÀÄÄªÀ ¸À§°ÃPÀgÀt ªÀÄvÀÄÛ QæÃqÁ E¯ÁSÉ.” What is indicative on a perusal of the chart supra is, a senior participant in National level Championship would get 30 marks if he wins a gold medal, 20 marks for silver and 15 marks for bronze and for participation 25 marks. Column No.4 pertains to junior level nationals viz., All India Rural Nationals or all other championships including under 19 and under 16 sporting events. The junior level National Championship participant even if he wins the gold medal, he would get 10 marks for gold, 8 marks for silver and 5 marks for bronze in comparison to 30, 20 and 15 for senior level National Championship participant. The sporting events are also indicated as both Olympic and non-Olympic. The Chart is as follows: “ಅಅಅಅನನನನುುುುಬಬಬಬಂಂಂಂಧಧಧಧ-1 ಏಏಏಏಕಕಕಕಲಲಲಲವವವವ(cid:5)(cid:5)(cid:5)(cid:5) ಪಪಪಪ!!!!ಶಶಶಶAAAAGG’’GG’’ೆೆೆೆ ಪಪಪಪ////ಗಗಗಗ0000ಸಸಸಸ8888ಾಾಾಾಗಗಗಗುುುುವವವವ !!!!ೕೕೕೕ""""ೆೆೆೆಗಗಗಗಳಳಳಳ \\\\ವವವವರರರರ: ಪಪಪಪ9999LLLL- ಎಎಎಎ (ಒಒಒಒಲಲಲಲಂಂಂಂBBBBCCCC !!!!ೕೕೕೕ""""ೆೆೆೆಗಗಗಗಳಳಳಳEEEE) ಪಪಪಪ9999LLLL- kkkk ( ಒಒಒಒಲಲಲಲಂಂಂಂBBBBTTTTೆೆೆೇೕೕೕತತತತರರರರ !!!!ೕೕೕೕ""""ೆೆೆೆಗಗಗಗಳಳಳಳEEEE) 1. CxÉènPïì 1. ¨Ár ©°ØAUï 13 2. CZÀðj 2. ©°AiÀÄqïìð 3. ¨ÁåräAl£ï 3. ¨Á¯ï ¨ÁåräAl£ï 4. ¨Á¸ÉÌmï¨Á¯ï 4. ZÉ¸ï 5. ¨ÁQìAUï 5. QæPÉmï (¥ÀÄgÀÄµÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÀÄ»¼É) 6. ¸ÉÊQèAUï 6. SÉÆÃ-SÉÆÃ 7. ¥sÀÄmï¨Á¯ï 7. PÀ§rØ 8. fªÀiÁß¹ÖPï 8. ¥ÀªÀgï °¦ÖüAUï 9. ºÁQ(¥ÀÄgÀÄµÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 9. ¸ÉÌÃnAUï ªÀÄ»¼É) 10. AiÉÆÃUÀ 10. ºÁåAqï¨Á¯ï 11. ¸ÉÆàÃmïìð PÉèöÊA©AUï (ªÁ¯ï 11. dÄqÉÆÃ PÉèöÊA©AUï) 12. ±ÀÆnAUï 12. £Émï ¨Á¯ï 13. gÉÆÃ¬ÄAUï 13. xÉÆæÃ¨Á¯ï 14. FdÄ (qÉÊ«AUï ¸ÉÃj) 14. ¸ÁÌ÷éµï 15. ¯Á£ï mÉ¤ß¸ï 16. mÉÃPÁéAqÉÆÃ 17. læAiÀÄvÁè£ï 18. ªÁ°¨Á¯ï 19. ¨sÁgÀ JvÀÄÛ«PÉ 20.¥sÉ¤ìAUï 21. FPÉéÃ¹ÖçÃAiÀÄ£ï 22.ªÁlgï ¸ÉÆàÃmïÖð (PÀAiÀiÁQAUï, PÉ£ÉÆÃ¬ÄAUï ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¸ÉÃ°AUï) 23.gÀVâ 24.PÀÄ¹Û 25.UÁ¯ïá 26.mÉÃ§¯ï mÉ¤ß¸ï ¸À»/- 24.08.2015. (f.ºÀ£ÀÄªÀÄAvÀgÁAiÀÄ¥Àà) ಸTಾUರದ ಅlೕನ TಾಯUದhU( ¥Àæ), ಯುವ ಸಬ(cid:13)ೕಕರಣ ಮತು’ !ೕ"ಾ ಇ8ಾmೆ.” The sport of the petitioner comes under non-Olympic sporting event as he is said to be a roller skating champion. If the plea of the petitioner is accepted, then every sporting event should bear the 14 same marks whether it is junior or senior which would result in serious anomaly.

8. The petitioner is a roller skating champion and the roller skating is a non-Olympic event. Senior or junior who participates in Olympic events would be given higher recognition. The differentiation of List-A and List-B qua Olympic and non-Olympic sporting events is not under challenge. What is challenged is bifurcation as senior and junior. In the considered view of this Court, no fault can be found with the bifurcation of marks qua senior or junior. The level of participation and the rigour of such participation of senior level National Championship is undoubtedly different from a junior level National Championship. It is on the basis of preparation and players contribution to the game, the marks are allocated. If both the eggs are put in the same basket it would get scrambled and it cannot be unscrambled for the purpose of conferment of Ekalavya awards.

9. The contention of the petitioner is that the 3rd respondent modified the guidelines and called for fresh applications for 15 conferment of the award in the year 2014. The submission is that it is willfully kept away from consideration of junior level National Championships by increasing the marks of senior level National Championships by 100% and awarding nominal marks for juniors and the resultant submission is that, marking scheme is only an eye wash. These are the submissions on the impugned guidelines. As observed hereinabove, there is no merit in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner on bifurcation of marks for the purpose of conferment of the award. This Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would not sit in the arm chair of experts and decide the marks to be allotted for a sporting event, despite such marks being awarded pursuant to the opinion of experts. This Court would be loathe to peep into such opinion of experts, unless it is arbitrary and such arbitrariness is palpable and demonstrable, which is absent in the case at hand.

10. It becomes apposite to consider the law laid down by the Apex Court and that of other High Courts qua judicial review with the opinion of selection committee, particularly of sporting events 16 and conferment of awards on such sporting events. The Apex Court in the case of TAJVIR SINGH SODHI v. STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR1 has held as follows: “Selection Process for Public Employment : Interference by Courts:

65. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to preface our judgment with the view that Courts in India generally avoid interfering in the selection process of public employment, recognising the importance of maintaining the autonomy and integrity of the selection process. The Courts recognise that the process of selection involves a high degree of expertise and discretion and that it is not appropriate for Courts to substitute their judgment for that of a selection committee. It would be indeed, treading on thin ice for us if we were to venture into reviewing the decision of experts who form a part of a selection board. The law on the scope and extent of judicial review of a selection process and results thereof, may be understood on consideration of the following case law: i) In Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v. Dr. B.S. Mahajan, (1990) 1 SCC305: AIR1990SC434 this Court clarified the scope of judicial review of a selection process, in the following words: “9…It is needless to emphasise that it is not the function of the court to hear appeals over the decisions of the selection committees and to scrutinise the relative merits of the candidates. Whether the candidate is fit for a particular post or not has to be decided by the duly constituted selection committee which has the expertise on the subject. The court has no such expertise. The decision of the selection committee can be interfered with only on limited grounds, such as illegality or patent material irregularity in the constitution of the committee or its procedure vitiating the selection, or proved malafides affecting the selection etc…..” 1 2023 SCC OnLine SC34417 ii) In a similar vein, in Secy. (Health) Deptt. Of Health & F.W. v. Dr. Anita Puri, (1996) 6 SCC282 this Court observed as under as regards the sanctity of a selection process and the grounds on which the results thereof may be interfered with: “9. … It is too well settled that when a selection is made by an expert body like the Public Service Commission which is also advised by experts having technical experience and high academic qualification in the field for which the selection is to be made, the courts should be slow to interfere with the opinion expressed by experts unless allegations of mala fide are made and established. It would be prudent and safe for the courts to leave the decisions on such matters to the experts who are more familiar with the problems they face than the courts. If the expert body considers suitability of a candidate for a specified post after giving due consideration to all the relevant factors, then the court should not ordinarily interfere with such selection and evaluation…….” iii) This position was reiterated by this Court in M.V. Thimmaiah v. Union Public Service Commission, (2008) 2 SCC119 in the following words: “21. Now, comes the question with regard to the selection of the candidates. Normally, the recommendations of the Selection Committee cannot be challenged except on the ground of mala fides or serious violation of the statutory rules. The courts cannot sit as an Appellate Authority to examine the recommendations of the Selection Committee like the court of appeal. This discretion has been given to the Selection Committee only and courts rarely sit as a court of appeal to examine the selection of the candidates nor is the business of the court to examine each candidate and record its opinion… xxx 30. We fail to understand how the Tribunal can sit as an Appellate Authority to call for the personal records and constitute Selection Committee to undertake this exercise. This power is not given to the Tribunal and it should be clearly understood that the assessment of the Selection Committee is not subject to appeal either before the Tribunal or by the courts. One has to give credit to the Selection Committee for making their assessment and it is not subject to appeal. Taking the overall view of ACRs of the candidates, one may be held to be very good and another may be held to be good. If this type of interference is permitted then it would virtually amount that 18 the Tribunals and the High Courts have started sitting as Selection Committee or act as an Appellate Authority over the selection. It is not their domain, it should be clearly understood, as has been clearly held by this Court in a number of decisions…..” iv) Om Prakash Poplai and Rajesh Kumar Maheshwari v. Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd., (1994) 2 SCC117 was a case where an appeal was filed before this Court challenging the selection of members to the Delhi Stock Exchange on the ground that the Selection Committee formed for the aforesaid purpose, arbitrarily favoured some candidates and was thus, against Article 14. This Court rejected the allegation of favouritism and bias by holding as under: “5. …the selection of members by the Expert Committee had to be done on the basis of an objective criteria taking into consideration experience, professional qualifications and similar related factors. In the present cases, we find that certain percentage of marks were allocated for each of these factors, namely, educational qualifications, experience, financial background and knowledge of the relevant laws and procedures pertaining to public issues etc. Of the total marks allocated only 20 per cent were reserved for interviews. Therefore, the process of selection by the Expert Committee was not left entirely to the sweet-will of the members of the Committee. The area of play was limited to 20 per cent and having regard to the fact that the members of the Expert Committee comprised of two members nominated by the Central Government it is difficult to accept the contention that they acted in an unreasonable or arbitrary fashion……

66. Thus, the inexorable conclusion that can be drawn is that it is not within the domain of the Courts, exercising the power of judicial review, to enter into the merits of a selection process, a task which is the prerogative of and is within the expert domain of a Selection Committee, subject of course to a caveat that if there are proven allegations of malfeasance or violations of statutory rules, only in such cases of inherent arbitrariness, can the Courts intervene.

67. Thus, Courts while exercising the power of judicial review cannot step into the shoes of the Selection 19 Committee or assume an appellate role to examine whether the marks awarded by the Selection Committee in the viva-voce are excessive and not corresponding to their performance in such test. The assessment and evaluation of the performance of candidates appearing before the Selection Committee/Interview Board should be best left to the members of the committee. In light of the position that a Court cannot sit in appeal against the decision taken pursuant to a reasonably sound selection process, the following grounds raised by the writ petitioners, which are based on an attack of subjective criteria employed by the selection board/interview panel in assessing the suitability of candidates, namely, (i) that the candidates who had done their post-graduation had been awarded 10 marks and in the viva-voce, such PG candidates had been granted either 18 marks or 20 marks out of 20. (ii) that although the writ petitioners had performed exceptionally well in the interview, the authorities had acted in an arbitrary manner while carrying out the selection process, would not hold any water.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court holds that it is not within the domain of Courts to exercise the power of judicial review to enter into the merits of a selection process, a task which is the prerogative of and is within the expert domain of a Selection Committee, unless it is seen that it suffers from violation of a statute and is inherently arbitrary.

11. Long before the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court considering the appointment to the post of Professor of Neurology 20 in NIMHANS in a judgment reported in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH AND NEURO SCIENCES v. DR. K.KALYANA RAMAN2 has held as follows: “….. …. … 7. We will first consider the second point. In the first place, it must be noted that the function of the Selection Committee is neither judicial nor adjudicatory. It is purely administrative. The High Court seems to be in error in stating that the Selection Committee ought to have given some reasons for preferring Dr Gauri Devi as against the other candidate. The selection has been made by the assessment of relative merits of rival candidates determined in the course of the interview of candidates possessing the required eligibility. There is no rule or regulation brought to our notice requiring the Selection Committee to record reasons. In the absence of any such legal requirement the selection made without recording reasons cannot be found fault with. The High Court in support of its reasoning has however, referred to the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor [(1973) 2 SCC836:

1974. SCC (L&S) 5: (1974) 1 SCR797. That decision proceeded on a statutory requirement. Regulation 5(5) which was considered in that case required the Selection Committee to record its reasons for superseding a senior member in the State Civil Service. The decision in Capoor case [(1973) 2 SCC836:

1974. SCC (L&S) 5: (1974) 1 SCR797 was rendered on September 26, 1973. In June 1977, Regulation 5(5) was amended deleting the requirement of recording reasons for the supersession of senior officers of the State Civil Services. The Capoor case [(1973) 2 SCC836:

1974. SCC (L&S) 5: (1974) 1 SCR797 cannot, therefore, be construed as an authority for the proposition that there should be reason formulation for administrative decision. Administrative authority is under no legal obligation to record reasons in support of its decision. Indeed, even the principles of natural justice do not require an administrative authority 2 1992 Supp (2) SCC48121 or a Selection Committee or an examiner to record reasons for the selection or non-selection of a person in the absence of statutory requirement. This principle has been stated by this Court in R.S. Dass v. Union of India [1986 Supp SCC617 (1987) 2 ATC628 in which Capoor Case [(1973) 2 SCC836 1974 SCC (L&S) 5: (1974) 1 SCR797 was also distinguished.

8. As to the first point we may state at the outset that giving of reasons for decision is different from, and in principle distinct from, the requirements of procedural fairness. The procedural fairness is the main requirement in the administrative action. The ‘fairness’ or ‘fair procedure’ in the administrative action ought to be observed. The Selection Committee cannot be an exception to this principle. It must take a decision reasonably without being guided by extraneous or irrelevant consideration. But there is nothing on record to suggest that the Selection Committee did anything to the contrary. The High Court however, observed, that Dr Kalyana Raman did not receive a fair and reasonable consideration by the Selection Committee. The inference in this regard has been drawn by the High Court from the statement of objections dated February 18, 1980 filed on behalf of the Selection Committee. It appears that the Selection Committee took the stand that Dr Kalyana Raman did not satisfy the minimum requirement of experience and was not eligible for selection. The High Court went on to state that it was somewhat extraordinary for the Selection Committee after calling him for the interview and selecting him for the post by placing him second, to have stated that he did not satisfy the minimum qualifications prescribed for eligibility. According to the High Court the stand taken by the Selection Committee raises serious doubts as to whether the deliberations of the Selection Committee were such as to inspire confidence and reassurance as to the related equality and justness of an effective consideration of this case. It is true that selection of the petitioner and the stand taken by the Selection Committee before the High Court that he was not eligible at all, are, indeed, antithetical and cannot co-exist. But the fact remains that the case of Dr Kalyana Raman was considered and he was placed second in the panel of names. It is not shown that the selection was arbitrary or whimsical or the Selection Committee did not act fairly towards Dr Kalyana Raman. The fact that he was placed second in the panel, itself indicates that 22 there was proper consideration of his case and he has been treated fairly. It should not be lost sight of that the Selection Committee consisted of experts in the subject for selection. They were men of high status and also of unquestionable impartiality. The Court should be slow to interfere with their opinion.” (Emphasis supplied) What is observed by the Apex Court in TAJVIR SINGH SODHI supra is reiteration of the finding in DR. K. KALYANA RAMAN. The aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court were concerning power of judicial review qua the decision of the selection committee in general parlance.

12. The High Court of Delhi has considered interference with the decision of the Selection Committee and evaluation of merits of different candidates relating to sports. The High Court of Delhi in PUNJABI UNIVERSITY v. UNION OF INDIA3 has held as follows: “….. …. ….

10. The question which arises is, whether this Court should allow itself especially at this stage, to be drawn into the controversy aforesaid. Entertaining the petition would certainly take away the gleam from the respondent No.3 Guru Nanak Dev University of owning the Trophy for the remaining eight days also. I have wondered, whether in the event of the petition 3 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3496 23 failing, any amount of compensation would be sufficient to restore the said gleam. In my opinion, No.11. It is a settled principle of law that in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court can refuse to exercise jurisdiction even when the petitioner may have a claim in law. The Supreme Court in Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR2003SC2889held that issuance of a writ is a discretionary remedy and that the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not strike down an illegality although it would be lawful to do so and in a given case, may refuse to extend the benefit of discretionary relief to the applicant. It was so reiterated in ONGC Ltd. v. Sendhabhai Vastram Patel (2005) 6 SCC454 Similarly, in Taherakhatoon v. Salambin Mohammad (1999) 2 SCC635even at the time of the dealing with the appeal after grant of special leave, it was held that the Court was not bound to go into the merits and even if entering into the merits and finding an error, was not bound to interfere if the justice of the case on facts does not require interference or if the relief could be moulded in a different fashion. This Court has echoed the same views in Filmistan Exhibitors Ltd. v. N.C.T., thr. Secy. Labour 131 (2006) DLT648by holding that even if there is a violation of law, this Court is not bound to exercise discretionary jurisdiction and in Babu Ram Sagar v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court MANU/DE/9235/2006 by refusing to interfere in exercise of discretionary powers inspite of holding the reasons given by the Labour Court to be not convincing.

12. I am further of the opinion that if the power of judicial review were to be extended to in matters such as these also, it would adversely affect the sports. This Court cannot appropriate to itself a position as of a Super Umpire or a Super Referee. If the powers were to so extend, then there would be no limit to the extent to which the Court will be called upon to exercise the same. The decision as to whom to award the Trophy, though based on an elaborate procedure still remains a decision as of a Referee or an Umpire in a Sport and the Court ought not to exercise domain over the same. Similar doubts were raised in Law v. National Grey Hound Racing Club Ltd. [1983]. 1 WLR1302where it was held that if such matters are made to fall within the public law then “Where should we stop”. The majority Judgment in Zee 24 Telefilms v. UOI2005(4) SCC649also found merit in the argument that if sporting bodies as Board for Control of Cricket in India (BCCI) were to be amenable to Writ Jurisdiction it would open the flood Gates of litigation under Article 226 and 32 of Constitution of India. (See para 34 of the Judgment) 13. No doubt this Court on an earlier occasion did exercise the jurisdiction. The petitioner had however filed the earlier petition on the same day when the decision awarding the Trophy to respondent No.3 Guru Nanak Dev University was announced and it appears that under interim orders in that petition, the Trophy was not allowed to be conferred on the respondent No.3 Guru Nanak Dev University. However now, as aforesaid, the position is different.

14. One cannot also lose sight of the fact that the guidelines for selection for the Trophy make the decision of the MYAS to be final and binding. The petitioner made a claim for the Trophy agreeing to the guidelines which provide for the decision of the Government to be final and binding on all. Considering the nature of the claim, the decision of MYAS is found to be final and not interfere able even in exercise of powers under Article 226 and binding on the petitioner especially when there are no allegations of mala fide or bias. As aforesaid, there is an elaborate procedure for selection, with the Scrutiny Committee of AIU invites applications and claims, computes and prepares a statement of marks with the help of members of IOA, SAI and prominent sportspersons and the same is submitted to the Selection Committee constituted by MYAS and which Selection Committee as aforesaid also comprises of eminent sportspersons. Such experts having applied their mind, not only once but twice and having reached a conclusion that the respondent No.3 Guru Nanak Dev University deserves the Trophy for the year 2009-2010, the self-imposed limit of judicial interference prohibits this Court from looking further into the matter.

15. The counsel for the petitioner, has from the documents on record also urged that there are obvious mistakes in the computation done. It is however a settled principle that a mere mistake is not sufficient for this Court to exercise powers under Article 226. The 25 Authority/Body whose decision under the Rules/Guidelines has been conferred finality and against whose decision no appeal is permitted, even if makes a mistake, such mistake is no ground for the powers under Article 226 to be exercised. A Six Judge Bench of the Apex Court as far back as in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque AIR1955SC233held that Certiorari will not issue as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. It exists to correct error of law where revealed on the face of an order or a decision or irregularity or absence of or excess of jurisdiction where shown. It was further held that for a Writ of Certiorari to be issued, it should be something more than a mere error. Again, in Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bnak v. Munna Lal Jain AIR2005SC584it was held that this court would not interfere with the decision unless it is illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or shocks the conscience of the court in the sense that it is an defiance of logic or moral standards; the court would not go into the correctness of the choice open to the person vested with the power to make such choice and the court should not substitute it's decision over that of the said person. The scope of Judicial Review is limited to deficiency in decision making process and not the decision. In the present case, neither is there anything shocking the conscience of the court nor any error pointed out in the decision making process. It is the decision which is said to be erroneous and which adjudication is outside the ambit of exercise of powers of Judicial Review.

16. I am of the opinion that in matters relating to sports, Judicial Review is entertain able only on charge of bad faith in declaring the winner and not on the charge of an error of Judgment in declaring the winner. This has been evolved as the principle, though in cases seeking Judicial Review of decisions of umpire and Referee made on the sports field but I see no reason to not apply the same to decision though not made on the sports field but of the like naturre.

17. It was held as far as back in 1945 in the case of SHAPIRO v. Queen County Jockey Club 184 Misc. 295 [53 N.Y.S.2d 135]., that in more than one sense officials such as 26 Referees/umpires are truly judges of the fact and their decisions should receive great credence and consideration than the complaints of a disgruntled looser of a wager. It was further held that where there is no charge of bad faith against the steward, Judges/Referee or other officials of the sports, it can't ordinarily be the duty of the court to substitute its decision for that of those persons who were specifically charged with the duty of determining the winners. There is nothing to suggest that in India the position is any different or that it was intended to impose upon the courts any duty of decision in such matters. Similarly in Michael Discenza v. The New York City Racing Association, Inc 134 Misc.2d 3 (1986) it was held that fear of a lawsuit for damages by anyone disappointed by decision of the Referee/umpire as a result of good faith determination rendered pursuant to broad discretion necessarily granted to such official would have a drastic inhibiting effect on their exercise of discretion and their professional judgment; that the decision of such officials who are otherwise well qualified must be final and binding. It was held that in the absence of a showing of fraud, collusion, gross abuse of discretion or a palpable abuse of authority amounting to illegality, interference by the courts cannot be invited. The Supreme Court of Georgia in Georgia High School Association v. Waddell 248 Ga. 542, 285 S.E.2d 7 (1981) went to the extent of saying that courts of equity are without authority to review decisions of Referee and umpires because those decisions do not present judicial controversy. I do not see the position of the Scrutiny Committee and the Selection Committee in the present case to be any different.

18. The counsel for the petitioner has urged that this Court had directed that the decision of the Scrutiny Committee will be communicated to the Selection Committee as per the prescribed procedure but the same has not been done. However as aforesaid, the letter dated 27th June, 2011 records that re- examination/re-calculation of the marks by the Scrutiny Committee has been accepted by the competent authority in the MYAS and which competent authority can be nothing but the Selection Committee. There is thus no merit in the said argument also.

19. I am also of the opinion that the shadow of the dispute as to claimant of the 2009-2010 Trophy should not be allowed to lurk over the events for the current year or over the 27 conferment of the Trophy for the year 2010-2011 and which undoubtedly will be the result if the present petition is to be entertained.

20. In the end I can but express a hope that the sportspersons continue to participate in the sports in the legendary spirit and do not equate competitive sports to legal battles in Courts. “Win or lose you will never regret working hard, making sacrifices, being disciplined or focusing too much. Success is measured by what we have done to prepare for competition.” Said the American explorer John Smith.” (Emphasis supplied) The Delhi High Court holds that if the powers of judicial review were to extend to areas such as sports, it would have an adverse impact on the sporting event itself. Such selection, which on elaborate procedure, will still remain a decision of the Authority vested with the power to make the same. The Court further holds that in matters relating to sports, judicial review could be exercised only on charges of bad faith and not on decision of choice or error of judgment. A little earlier to the aforesaid judgment, again, the High Court of Delhi in the case of SHUMEL v. UNION OF INDIA4 had held as follows: “…. …. ….

11. Learned counsel for the Petitioner vehemently argued that she was never earlier informed of not being regular in her attendance at the NIS, Patiala camp. He also disputed the fact 4 2010 SCC OnLine Del. 4706 28 that the Petitioner lost two bouts in the same category i.e. 72 kg in the selection trials-cum-assessment test held on 10th and 11th February 2010. He maintained that this was only a “performance” trial. According to him, one of the wrestlers was 10 kg more in weight than the Petitioner. He disputed that there was a second bout held.

12. This Court finds that the Petitioner is raising highly disputed questions as regards the selection trial-cum- assessment test which took place on 10th and 11th February 2010. The Petitioner not only disputes that there were two bouts, one of which she lost, but about the weight of one of the wrestlers to whom she lost as well. These questions obviously cannot be decided by this Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

13. Considering that the best possible candidate has to be selected to represent India in the CWG2010in the 72 kg category, the methodology adopted by the Respondents by holding a coaching camp, followed by a national championship and conducting selection trials for the top women wrestlers in such championship, to ultimately choose one, cannot be held to be arbitrary or unreasonable. Consistent with the high standards of the CWG2010 it is but essential that the candidate who qualifies by consistent performance through a rigorous procedure of selection, is picked up to represent India in the various sports events. How the relative merits of the different candidates should be evaluated is not a matter for this Court to decide. That is best left to the experts in a particular field of sport. Irrespective of what may have been the past performance of a sportsperson, the current consistent form of such sportsperson should be critical in such decision making given the objective of ensuring that the best performing candidate should represent India at the CWG2010 On an overall conspectus of what has transpired, this Court is not able to conclude that the exclusion of the Petitioner from the selection trials for the 72 kg class women's wresting for the CWG2010which is to take place on 7th and 8th August 2010 is either arbitrary or unreasonable.” (Emphasis supplied) 29 The challenge before the Delhi High Court was selection of the national team for the Common Wealth Games 2010. The High Court holds that the decision, on the process of evaluation of merits of different candidates, cannot be within the domain of Courts to interfere, particularly in the field of sport.

13. Insofar as conferment of awards by way of choice which would be an administrative decision, the Delhi High Court again holds that there can be no exercise of power of judicial review in a judgment reported in VINOD KUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA5 where in it is held as follows: “…. …. ….

16. I am sure the Courts, as originally perceived, were not meant to adjudicate disputes as the present. I am further sure, if we proceed in the direction in which this writ petition is directed, the day is not far when the power of the High Courts of judicial review will be invoked also with reference to the decision of the Umpires/Referees on the sports field and to axiomatically have the outcome/result of a tournament/sport event/match annulled. The question which thus arises is, whether the Courts should allow themselves to be drawn into such disputes.

17. I have in this context in Punjabi University supra, concerned with the challenge to the conferment by the UOI and the Association of Indian Universities of Maulana Abul Kalam 5 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3122 30 Azad trophy, to be given to overall top performing university in Inter University Tournaments of preceding year, inter alia held: “12. I am further of the opinion that if the power of judicial review were to be extended to in matters such as these also, it would adversely affect the sports. This Court cannot appropriate to itself a position as of a Super Umpire or a Super Referee. If the powers were to so extend, then there would be no limit to the extent to which the Court will be called upon to exercise the same. The decision as to whom to award the Trophy, though based on an elaborate procedure still remains a decision as of a Referee or an Umpire in a Sport and the Court ought not to exercise domain over the same. Similar doubts were raised in Law v. National Grey Hound Racing Club Ltd. [1983]. 1 WLR1302where it was held that if such matters are made to fall within the public law then “Where should we stop”. The majority Judgment in Zee Telefilms v. UOI (2005) 4 SCC649also found merit in the argument that if sporting bodies as Board for Control of Cricket in India (BCCI) were to be amenable to Writ Jurisdiction it would open the flood Gates of litigation under Article 226 and 32 of Constitution of India. (See para 34 of the Judgment) 14. One cannot also lose sight of the fact that the guidelines for selection for the Trophy make the decision of the MYAS to be final and binding. The petitioner made a claim for the Trophy agreeing to the guidelines which provide for the decision of the Government to be final and binding on all. Considering the nature of the claim, the decision of MYAS is found to be final and not interfere able even in exercise of powers under Article 226 and binding on the petitioner especially when there are no allegations of mala fide or bias. As aforesaid, there is an elaborate procedure for selection, with the Scrutiny Committee of AIU invites applications and claims, computes and prepares a statement of marks with the help of members of IOA, SAI and prominent sportspersons and the same is submitted to the Selection Committee constituted by MYAS and which Selection Committee as aforesaid also comprises of eminent sportspersons. Such experts having applied their mind, not only once but twice and having reached a conclusion that the respondent No.3 Guru Nanak Dev University deserves the Trophy for the year 2009-2010, the self- imposed limit of judicial interference prohibits this Court from looking further into the matter. 31

15. The counsel for the petitioner, has from the documents on record also urged that there are obvious mistakes in the computation done. It is however a settled principle that a mere mistake is not sufficient for this Court to exercise powers under Article 226. The Authority/Body whose decision under the Rules/Guidelines has been conferred finality and against whose decision no appeal is permitted, even if makes a mistake, such mistake is no ground for the powers under Article 226 to be exercised. A Six Judge Bench of the Apex Court as far back as in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque AIR1955SC233held that Certiorari will not issue as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. It exists to correct error of law where revealed on the face of an order or a decision or irregularity or absence of or excess of jurisdiction where shown. It was further held that for a Writ of Certiorari to be issued, it should be something more than a mere error. Again, in Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank v. Munna Lal Jain AIR2005SC584it was held that this court would not interfere with the decision unless it is illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or shocks the conscience of the court in the sense that it is an defiance of logic or moral standards; the court would not go into the correctness of the choice open to the person vested with the power to make such choice and the court should not substitute it's decision over that of the said person. The scope of Judicial Review is limited to deficiency in decision making process and not the decision. In the present case, neither is there anything shocking the conscience of the court nor any error pointed out in the decision making process. It is the decision which is said to be erroneous and which adjudication is outside the ambit of exercise of powers of Judicial Review.

17. It was held as far as back in 1945 in the case of SHAPIRO v. Queen County Jockey Club 184 Misc. 295 [53 N.Y.S.2d 135]., that in more than one sense officials such as 32 Referees/umpires are truly judges of the fact and their decisions should receive great credence and consideration than the complaints of a disgruntled looser of a wager. It was further held that where there is no charge of bad faith against the steward, Judges/Referee or other officials of the sports, it can't ordinarily be the duty of the court to substitute its decision for that of those persons who were specifically charged with the duty of determining the winners. There is nothing to suggest that in India the position is any different or that it was intended to impose upon the courts any duty of decision in such matters. Similarly in Michael Discenza v. The New York City Racing Association, Inc 134 Misc.2d 3 (1986) it was held that fear of a lawsuit for damages by anyone disappointed by decision of the Referee/umpire as a result of good faith determination rendered pursuant to broad discretion necessarily granted to such official would have a drastic inhibiting effect on their exercise of discretion and their professional judgment; that the decision of such officials who are otherwise well qualified must be final and binding. It was held that in the absence of a showing of fraud, collusion, gross abuse of discretion or a palpable abuse of authority amounting to illegality, interference by the courts cannot be invited. The Supreme Court of Georgia in Georgia High School Association v. Waddell et al 248 Ga. 542, 285 S.E.2d 7 (1981) went to the extent of saying that courts of equity are without authority to review decisions of Referee and umpires because those decisions do not present judicial controversy. I do not see the position of the Scrutiny Committee and the Selection Committee in the present case to be any different.

18. Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Johri Mal (2004) 4 SCC714held that the scope and extent of power of the judicial review of the High Court contained in Article 226 of the Constitution of India would vary from case to case, the nature of the order, the relevant statute as also the other relevant factors including the nature of power exercised by the public authorities, namely, whether the power is statutory, quasi-judicial or administrative. It was held that the power of judicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or don the robes of omnipresent or to review governance under the rule of law or to enable the Courts to step into the areas exclusively reserved by the suprema lex to the other organs of the State. It was yet further held that decisions and actions which do not have adjudicative 33 disposition may not strictly fall for consideration before a judicial review Court. It was expressly observed that an order passed by an administrative authority exercising discretion vested in it, cannot be interfered in judicial review unless it is shown that exercise of discretion itself is perverse or illegal.

19. The Dronacharya Award with which this petition is concerned is an award for excellence in the field of coaching in sports. Such excellence is to necessarily depend on the perception of the person/s conferred with the power of selection and may vary from person to person. The very fact that the Scheme for conferment of the award drawn up on the direction of this Court itself, though laying down the parameters of selection, confers the Selection Committee with a discretion of as much as 20%, is indicative of the selection being guided not by reason but by choice. Owing to the same, the person who has secured the highest marks as per the parameters laid down in the Scheme can still be denied the award by using the discretionary 20% marks. The said scheme is not under challenge.

20. In my view, jurisprudentially there can be no exercise of the power of judicial review over any administrative function which is based on such ‘choice’. Judicial review as has been repeatedly said is of the decision making process and not of the decision. The power of judicial review can thus be exercised only when the decision making process is without any element of ‘choice’ and there can be no judicial review of a decision which is guided by ‘choice’ and not by reason. To hold otherwise would amount to the Court making a ‘choice’ and which the Courts ought not to and are not to make.

21. I find that Justice K.G. Balakrishnan sitting as a Single Judge of the High Court of Kerala in William John @ Gandeevan v. Minister for Cultural Affairs concerned with a challenge to the presentation of “Ezhuthachan Award” observed that conferring of Awards and the mode of selection would always be subject to opposition and criticism and that even the Award of Nobel Prize is not free from such things but held that for matters like this, the principles of judicial review could not 34 be applied and the Court cannot assume the role of the decision-making authority and do contrary to what has been done by the authorities. It was yet further observed that in the absence of any plea of any external considerations having motivated the conferment of the Award, the choice/selection made by the authorities empowered to do so could not be interfered with by the Court.

22. The Division Bench of this Court in Vijay Shankar Pandey v. Union of India 108 (2003) DLT383 concerned with the challenge to the conferment of President's Police Medal for gallantry inter alia on the ground that the person selected for the Award had not shown any gallantry, also observed that in the absence of any allegations of mala fides, the decision could not be interfered with.

23. The High Court of England and Wales in Mckeown v. British Horseracing Authority also, citing earlier precedents, emphasised the desirability of affording bodies exercising jurisdiction over sporting activities as great a latitude as is consistent with the fundamental requirements of fairness and the fact that sports regulating bodies ordinarily have unrivalled practical knowledge of the particular sport that they are required to regulate. It was further held that the Courts must be slow to review honest decisions of bodies exercising jurisdiction over sporting and other activities which those bodies are far better fitted to judge than the Courts. It was yet further observed that the decisions of such bodies should not be tested on the anvil of the procedure and the reasoning followed by the Courts.

24. Similar view has been echoed by the American Courts also as noted in the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Jilin Pharmaceutical USA, Inc. v. Michael CHERTOFF. It was held that where there is no meaningful standard of review for an administrative decision within a statute's text, the decision is not subject to judicial review. It was further held that a Court would have no meaningful standard of review against which to judge the exercise of discretion. Finding that the parameter on which the decision of which judicial review was sought was required to be taken was “what the Secretary deems good and sufficient cause” it was 35 held that it was so vague as to be useless as a guide to a reviewing Court.

25. I may add that even in the context of appointment of Members of Tribunals, Supreme Court as far as back as R.K. Jain v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC119held that (a) judicial review is concerned with whether the incumbent possessed of the qualifications for appointment and the manner in which the appointment came to be made or the procedure adopted was fair, just or reasonable; (b) exercise of judicial review is to protect the citizen from the abuse of the power etc. by an appropriate Government or department etc; (c) granting the compliance of the power of appointment has been conferred on the executive and when a candidate was found qualified and eligible and was accordingly appointed by the executive to hold an office, the Courts cannot sit over the choice of the selection and have to leave it to the executive to select the personnel as per law or procedure in this behalf. Supreme Court again in Centre for PIL v. Union of India (2011) 4 SCC1 concerned with the challenge to the appointment of the Central Vigilance Commissioner, reiterated that the Court cannot sit in judgment over the choice of the person made by the Central Government so long as the person chosen possesses the prescribed qualification and is otherwise eligible for appointment.

26. It is not the case of the petitioner that the respondent No.4 was not nominated in accordance with the scheme for Dronacharya Award or was/is not eligible for the award or that the constitution of the Selection Committee was not as per the Scheme or that the Criteria for giving Dronacharya Award prescribed in the Scheme was not followed. What the petitioner points out is errors in application of the Criteria. However as per Clause 1 of prescribed Criteria, 80% weightage will be given for the medals won in various International Championships by the sportspersons trained by the Coach for at least 240 days immediately preceding the tournament and as per the Clause 4 of the Scheme, 20% weightage has to be given to the marks given by the Selection Committee for assessment of the eligible coach keeping in view the profile and standard of the sports events in which his trainees have won medals. Clause 9 of the said Criteria further provides “Selection Committee may not 36 mechanically recommend Dronacharya Award to the recipient of the highest marks across disciplines. But in a particular sport discipline, the award will be recommended only for the recipient of the highest aggregate marks”. Clause 10 further provides “the marking criteria will not apply to coaches to be selected on the basis of lifetime contribution in coaching. Selection Committee will give its recommendations for such two coaches taking into consideration the contribution made by them over a period of 20 years or more in terms of producing outstanding sportspersons”. Clause 11 makes a decision of the Union Minister of Youth Affairs and Sports final.

27. It will thus be seen that besides laying down the point-wise criteria, sufficient leeway has been given to the Selection Committee to make the choice of the recipient for the Dronocharya Award.

28. I am also pained to see that the challenge is being made by the petitioner himself, claiming to be entitled to the award instead of the respondent No.4 who has been selected therefor. In this context it may be noted that as per the Scheme aforesaid, it is not open to any person to nominate himself for the award. The persons who are entitled to nominate have been specified in the Scheme. The grievance if any for non-selection by the Selection Committee of the petitioner should have been of the person/body who had nominated the petitioner and ought not to be of the petitioner who was nominated. Need is felt to remind the petitioner that “Dignity does not consist in possessing honours. But in deserving them”, as was said by Aristotle.” (Emphasis supplied) The Delhi High Court holds that conferring of awards and the mode of selection would always be subject to opposition and criticism and even the award of Nobel Prize is not free from such criticism. The 37 principles of judicial review cannot extend to a Court assuming the role of decision making authority qua conferment of awards.

14. In a later judgment, again the High Court of Delhi in SWASTIKA GHOSH v. TABLE TENNIS FEDERATIOIN OF INDIA6 holds that selection process involves a multitude of factors and cannot by a very simple exercise of judicial review undo those factors. The Delhi High Court holds as follows: “…. …. ….

7. I have considered the submissions and perused the record carefully.

8. It is a settled proposition of law that issuance of a writ is a discretionary remedy and the court can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction even if the petitioner may have a claim in law. The scope of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a matter pertaining to conferring of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Trophy was discussed by this Court in Punjabi University v. Union of India [Punjabi University v. Union of India, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3496]. and it was inter alia held as under : “11. It is a settled principle of law that in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court can refuse to exercise jurisdiction even when the petitioner may have a claim in law. The Supreme Court in Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan [Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 6 SCC545:

2003. SCC (L&S) 951]. held that issuance of a writ is a discretionary remedy and that the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not strike down an 6 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1817 38 illegality although it would be lawful to do so and in a given case, may refuse to extend the benefit of discretionary relief to the applicant. It was so reiterated in ONGC Ltd. v. Sendhabhai Vastram Patel [ONGC Ltd. v. Sendhabhai Vastram Patel, (2005) 6 SCC454. Similarly, in Taherakhatoon v. Salambin Mohammad [Taherakhatoon v. Salambin Mohammad, (1999) 2 SCC635 even at the time of the dealing with the appeal after grant of special leave, it was held that the court was not bound to go into the merits and even if entering into the merits and finding an error, was not bound to interfere if the justice of the case on facts does not require interference or if the relief could be moulded in a different fashion. This Court has echoed the same views in Filmistan Exhibitors Ltd. v. NCT of Delhi [Filmistan Exhibitors Ltd. v. NCT of Delhi, 2006 SCC OnLine Del 471 : (2006) 131 DLT648 by holding that even if there is a violation of law, this Court is not bound to exercise discretionary jurisdiction and in Babu Ram Sagar v. Labour Court [Babu Ram Sagar v. Labour Court, 2006 SCC OnLine Del 1648]. by refusing to interfere in exercise of discretionary powers in spite of holding the reasons given by the Labour Court to be not convincing.

9. This Court in Punjabi University case [Punjabi University v. Union of India, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3496]. also inter alia held that if the power of judicial review were to be extended into matters such as these also, it would adversely affect the sports. I am in complete agreement with the finding of this Court that the court cannot appropriate to itself a position as that of a super umpire or a super referee or in the present case to the position of super selector.

10. It is a settled proposition that a mere mistake is not sufficient for this Court to exercise powers under Article 226. A writ can be issued only when there is something more than a mere error/mistake. The court in its writ jurisdiction can interfere only if its decision is illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or shocks the conscience of the court in the sense that it is in defiance of logic or moral standards. The court cannot clothe itself with the power to make choice and should not substitute its decision over a decision of an Expert Committee. It may be reiterated that the scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision. 39

11. It is pertinent to mention here that a Committee of Administrators was appointed by this Court in Manika Batra v. Table Tennis Federation of India [Manika Batra v. Table Tennis Federation of India, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 4479]. after noting down the irregularities being committed in the functioning of Table Tennis Federation of India. In this case this Court inter alia held as under :

19. A Committee of Administrators to discharge the functions of Respondent 1 comprising of the following members is, accordingly, being constituted: (i) Chairperson : Chief Justice (Retd.) Gita Mittal, former Chief Justice, Jammu & Kashmir High Court. (Mobile:+919818000220) (ii) Member : Mr Chetan Mittal, Senior Advocate. (Mobile:+919814044609) (iii) Member : Mr SD Mudgil, a renowned athlete. (Mobile: +919811054307) 20. The following directions are being issued to facilitate the smooth functioning of this Committee of Administrators : (i) The executive body of Respondent 1 will acquiesce their administrative duties to the Committee of Administrators, while the staff engaged by Respondent 1 Federation will continue to work on the same terms and conditions as was applicable to them. Since, there are a number of tournaments coming up in the near future, it is expected that the executive members of the Committee, who claim to be working in the interest of the sportspersons, will render all assistance to the Committee of Administrators, as and when required. (ii) Even though this Committee is being constituted only to ensure that the morale of sportspersons and pride of the country is safeguarded, and the efforts which the three members will be required to put in cannot be compensated, it is directed that a monthly honorarium to be paid to the members of the Committee of Administrators, for the present is being 40 fixed at INR3lakhs for the Chairperson, and INR1lakh each for the two members. (iii) Upon the Committee of Administrators as nominated above assuming charge, the existing office- bearers of Respondent 1 Federation shall no longer be entitled to discharge any function of the Federation but will, as already directed, render assistance to the Committee of Administrators, as and when requested by the said Committee. (iv) The Committee of Administrators will have the power to issue all appropriate directions, under the signatures of the Chairperson, as may be necessary for the functioning of the Federation. The Committee of Administrators will be entitled to utilise the existing office of Respondent 1, as also to avail the services of the staff already employed by Respondent 1. (v) All communications on behalf of Respondent 1 Federation with any sportsperson or international sports bodies, will now take place only through the Committee of Administrators. (vi) Any of the two members of the Committee of Administrators will, with the prior approval of the Chairperson, be authorised to sign all cheques on behalf of Respondent 1. All the banks where Respondent 1 Federation have bank accounts, are directed to treat the members of the Committee of Administrator as being authorised signatories of Respondent 1. The Committee of Administrators will submit a periodic report, including that relating to accounts, every two months. (vii) It will be open for the Committee of Administrators to seek any such further directions from this Court, as may be necessary.

12. A perusal of the above order makes it clear that the Committee of Administrators was entrusted with all the powers and duties of functioning of the Federation. The Committee of Administrators has minutely examined the claim of each of the sportsperson and passed a detailed order while finalising the 41 list, which is under challenge. The power of judicial review in the matters relating to sports can be exercised only if there is an allegation of bad faith. In such matters, the courts should give great credence to the decision of the Expert Committee and the coaches. If the courts starts interfering in the decision of such Committees it would have a drastic inhibiting effect on its functioning. The scope of power of judicial review was also laid down by the Supreme court in State of U.P. v. Johri Mal [State of U.P. v. Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC714 wherein it was held that the scope and extent of power of the judicial review of the High Court contained in Article 226 of the Constitution of India would vary from case to case, the nature of the order, the relevant statute as also the other relevant factors including the nature of power exercised by the public authorities, namely, whether the power is statutory, quasi-judicial or administrative. It was held that the power of judicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or don the robes of omnipresent or to review governance under the rule of law or to enable the courts to step into the areas exclusively reserved by the suprema lex to the other organs of the State. It was expressly observed that an order passed by an administrative authority exercising discretion vested in it, cannot be interfered in judicial review unless it is shown that exercise of discretion itself is perverse or illegal.

13. This Court in Shumel v. Union of India [Shumel v. Union of India, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 4706]. has also inter alia held as under :

13. … How the relative merits of the different candidates should be evaluated is not a matter for this Court to decide. That is best left to the experts in a particular field of sport. Irrespective of what may have been the past performance of a sportsperson, the current consistent form of such sportsperson should be critical in such decision-making given the objective of ensuring that the best performing candidate should represent India at the CWG, 2010. On an overall conspectus of what has transpired, this Court is not able to conclude that the exclusion of the petitioner from the selection trials for the 72 kg class women's wresting for the CWG, 2010 which is to take place on 7-8-2010 and 8-8-2010 is either arbitrary or unreasonable.

14. In Sushil Kumar v. Union of India [Sushil Kumar v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3660]. , this Court inter alia held that a writ court will not interfere in 42 exercise of discretion of the National Sports Federation and substitute its own judgment except where discretion is shown to have been exercised in an arbitrary or capricious or perverse manner or is contrary to settled principles of practices. The court inter alia held that the decision, who should represent India in a sporting event is best left to the experts i.e. the National Sports Federation concerned. The judgment in Sushil Kumar case [Sushil Kumar v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3660]. was also followed by this Court in Karamjyoti v. Union of India [Karamjyoti v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6766]. whereby it was inter alia held as under:

42. I am in complete agreement with the view taken in Sushil Kumar case [Sushil Kumar v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3660]. that the decision, who should represent India in a sporting event, is best left to the experts. In the matters of selecting the best possible candidate to represent India in an international competitive event, there cannot be any interference by this Court in the selection criteria set down by the National Sports Federation concerned and also as to how the relative merits of the different candidates is to be evaluated, which is for the experts to decide and not this Court.

15. In Paralympic Committee of India v. Naresh Kumar Sharma [Paralympic Committee of India v. Naresh Kumar Sharma, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8443]. this Court has inter alia held as under:

11. The purpose of preparing the above tabular chart is to ascertain whether the Committee's process of selection is manifestly or prima facie arbitrary. This Court recollects the compass that it has to apply in such matters. It is beyond dispute that in matters of policy decisions, the court should be circumspect in interfering and must exercise its power of judicial review only to prevent manifest arbitrary or mala fide action. Beyond this narrow scope of enquiry, courts do not possess the ability or the wherewithal to “second-guess” policy decisions made by specialised bodies tasked with that purpose. Specifically, in the context of selection of athletes for sporting events, this Court in previous decisions such as Karamjyoti v. Union of India [Karamjyoti v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6766]. and Shumel v. Union of India [Shumel v. Union of India, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 4706]. , has held that a writ court will not interfere in the exercise of discretion of the National Sports Federation except where the 43 discretion is shown to have been exercised in an arbitrary or capricious or perverse manner or contrary to the settled principles or practices. What then is the task before this Court, is to ascertain whether on a broad, prima facie view, without getting into the intricacies of the policy decision, there is manifest arbitrariness or mala fides in the decision-making of the Committee.

13. The court must resist adopting a one-size-fits-all approach. In other words, any one single performance at one competition or trial cannot be used as a barometer to make the decision of whether to select an athlete. In sports, as the impugned order also notes, same players perform differently on different occasions and a number of factors influence an athlete's performance. Therefore, the petitioner's performance at the court ordered trial cannot, by and of itself, be considered sufficient to warrant his selection for particular events. The Committee has to take a broader view and analyse the performances of the athletes/sportspersons over different competitions and trials. As such therefore, the court does not find any infirmity with the reasoning of the Committee, insofar as all events other than R-7 are concerned (to which we will turn subsequently).

14. This Court is conscious that the Committee has to consider a wide variety of other factors, including logistical and practical considerations, in selecting athletes. For instance, age is a pertinent consideration; in order to promote budding talent and to ensure that through exposure over periods of time athletes become better prepared and in turn are likelier to win medals for the country, the Committee has found it necessary to give younger athletes a chance over some older athletes. This could for example explain preferring Avani, who is 16 years old, over the petitioner for event R-6 for the 2018 Al Ain Championship, even though the petitioner had a higher score than her in the 61st NSC in the said event. However, in the 2018 Al Ain Championship, Avani's score was higher than all the other athletes (even when compared to the petitioner's performance in the court ordered trial), and that too by a significant margin, thereby in some ways justifying the Committee's decision to send her over the petitioner.

16. Though the jurisdiction of the court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very wide but it has to be used with circumspection. The names in the present case have been finalised by the Committee of Administrators appointed by this 44 Court in Manika Batra v. Table Tennis Federation of India [Manika Batra v. Table Tennis Federation of India, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 4479]. vide judgment dated 11-2-2022. Learned counsel for the petitioners have taken this Court through the findings of the Committee of Administrators. A bare perusal of the findings of the Committee of Administrators makes it clear that the Committee has threadbare examined the entire issue and then after taking into account all aspects finalised the names to be sent for participating in the Commonwealth Games. The court in the present jurisdiction cannot substitute its own view with the view arrived into by the Committee of Administrators and the Selection Committee. The courts do not have any expertise to get into the selection and finalisation of players for participation at the international level. This Court is conscious of the fact that any such findings can be interfered with only if there is any perversity or arbitrariness in the findings arrived into by the Federation concerned. However, I do not find any such arbitrariness or perversity in the such order and furthermore, Mr Moazzam Khan, learned counsel for Respondent 1 has stated at bar that the names have already been finalised and sent to the Indian Olympic Association.

17. The court has to take into account that the Selection Committee/Expert Committee has to take account numerous factors while taking decision of selecting sportsperson to represent the country. This exercise cannot be as simple as comparing scores based on individual performances. In the present case also Committee of Administrator has weighed different factors and therefore, this Court finds itself unable to interfere in exercise of its power of judicial review. This Court also finds complete absence of any arbitrariness or mala fide in the decision arrived at by the Committee of Administrators.

18. To represent a nation and to participate, perform and excel in the arena of international sports, a player must not only possess physical but great mental and emotional strength and agility. It is thus pivotal that there should be no uncertainty in the minds of the players. Such litigations may disrupt and impact the preparation and performance of the players.” (Emphasis supplied) 45 15. As observed hereinabove, it is a policy decision of the State with regard to drawing up of guidelines of comparative scores, in a sporting event, for the purpose of conferment of subject award. The Courts should be circumscribed in interfering with such guidelines, save as in the aforesaid circumstances. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in PARALYMPIC COMMITTEE OF INDIA v. NARESH KUMAR SHARMA7 has held as follows: “…. …. ….

11. The purpose of preparing the above tabular chart is to ascertain whether the Committee's process of selection is manifestly or prima facie arbitrary. This Court recollects the compass that it has to apply in such matters. It is beyond dispute that in matters of policy decisions, the Court should be circumspect in interfering and must exercise its power of judicial review only to prevent manifest arbitrary or mala fide action. Beyond this narrow scope of enquiry, Courts do not possess the ability or the wherewithal to “second-guess” policy decisions made by specialized bodies tasked with that purpose. Specifically, in the context of selection of athletes for sporting events, this Court in previous decisions such as Karamjyoti v. Union of India (W.P. (C) 6815/2016 decided on 11.08.2016) and Shumel v. Union of India (W.P. (C) 5034/2010), has held that a writ court will not interfere in the exercise of discretion of the national sports federation except where the discretion is shown to have been exercised in an arbitrary or capricious or perverse manner or contrary to the settled principles or practices. What then is the task before this 7 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8443 46 Court, is to ascertain whether on a broad, prima facie view, without getting into the intricacies of the policy decision, there is manifest arbitrariness or mala fides in the decision making of the Committee.

12. On an overall examination of the facts, this Court finds that there is no such arbitrariness or mala fides in the decision making of the Committee. Looking at the table compiled above, it can be seen that overall, the performance of the petitioner was not as good as that of the other selected candidates, judged over a number of competitions/trials. For instance, in respect of R1, the petitioner's performance does not measure to that of the selected candidate (Swaroop) in both the 61st NSC as well as the 2017 Bangkok Championship. In fact, the difference between the two in the 2017 Bangkok Championship is stark. True, the petitioner's performance in the court ordered trial was better than Swaroop's at the 2018 Al Ain Championship. Yet, what cannot be overlooked is that the game surroundings and the situation in a world championship are markedly different from those in a “one man” trial, and therefore it would not be appropriate to equate the results of the two disparate events. Without going into the minutiae, it is apparent from the above table that even for the other events, on taking an overall view, the performance of the other selected candidates was facially better than that of the petitioner.

13. The Court must resist adopting a one-size-fits- all approach. In other words, any one single performance at one competition or trial cannot be used as a barometer to make the decision of whether to select an athlete. In sports, as the impugned order also notes, same players perform differently on different occasions and a number of factors influence an athlete's performance. Therefore, the petitioner's performance at the court ordered trial cannot, by and of itself, be considered sufficient to warrant his selection for particular events. The Committee has to take a broader view and analyze the performances of the athletes/sportspersons over different competitions and trials. As such therefore, the Court does not find any infirmity with the reasoning of the Committee, insofar as all events other than R7 are concerned (to which we will turn subsequently). 47

14. This court is conscious that the Committee has to consider a wide variety of other factors, including logistical and practical considerations, in selecting athletes. For instance, age is a pertinent consideration; in order to promote budding talent and to ensure that through exposure over periods of time athletes become better prepared and in turn are likelier to win medals for the country, the Committee has found it necessary to give younger athletes a chance over some older athletes. This could for example explain preferring Avani, who is 16 years old, over the petitioner for event R6 for the 2018 Al Ain Championship, even though the petitioner had a higher score than her in the 61st NSC in the said event. However, in the 2018 Al Ain Championship, Avani's score was higher than all the other athletes (even when compared to the petitioner's performance in the court ordered trial), and that too by a significant margin, thereby in some ways justifying the Committee's decision to send her over the petitioner.

15. Similarly, another factor that the Committee has to weigh in is the cost element. In the budget that it has and in terms of directions of the Sports Authority of India, the Committee had to select para shooters for the various events keeping in mind the cost of sending the athletes for these international sporting events. Therefore, in certain cases, the same athlete has been sent for multiple events, even though he or she may have performed well in only one of those events and may not have performed as well in the other(s) as compared to the petitioner. Among other things, selecting the same athlete for multiple events means that the same rifle can be used across events, thereby proving to be cost effective. Therefore, for some events, the Committee decided to send the same athletes in order to cut costs, even though the petitioner's performance may have been in some senses, better in that particular event, considered individually. However, considered overall the Committee took the most appropriate alternative, in the circumstances, given the financial means at its disposal. This Court does not find any fault with such rationale adopted by the Committee. While cutting corners and reducing costs in sending athletes, on a principle level, may not be the best idea in the long run so far as the sporting future of the country is concerned, the burden to change that status quo and adopt measures for a better future where financial reasons do not impede or influence decision making by sporting authorities and 48 where talent and performance are the sole criteria for selection, would be on the Committee and all other concerned sporting authorities, and not this Court. In the existent circumstances, this Court discerns nothing illegal or arbitrary in the decision taken by the Committee on this score.

16. In the case of event R7, the petitioner is the only contestant who could have been sent by the Committee for the 2018 Korean Championship. In the trial held pursuant to the order of the learned single judge, the petitioner scored 1113 and it is stated that in the 2017 Hannover Championship, he scored 1120. Here, what must be considered is that one of the factors that the Committee consistently weighs in, while making its decision of selecting athletes, is the chances or the probability of the athlete winning a medal for the country. It is stated that if the petitioner's performance at the trial is considered, he would have finished at 16th place out of 19 athletes at the 2018 Al Ain Championship, based on the athletes' scores at the said event. It is stated that since the 2018 Korean Championship is an even larger and more competitive sporting event, the petitioner's performance would not hold any chance of winning a medal. Even if his score at the 2017 Hannover Championship is considered, his performance is still a far-cry from being a medal hope for India. It was therefore decided by the Committee to not send any athlete for the particular event. Here too, this Court cannot fault with the approach of the Committee. Given the financial constraints highlighted above and taking into consideration the chances of the petitioner winning a medal at the said event, the Committee's decision to not spend the amount required to send the petitioner for only one event, that too one where his medal chances seemed rather bleak, seems reasonable to this Court. Its decision to not send anyone at all for this event therefore, cannot be faulted, given that one major factor that the Committee considers in making its selection is the likelihood of the athlete returning with a medal for the country.

17. From the above discussion, it is apparent that wide gamut of factors have to be considered by the Committee in making its decision of selecting athletes to represent the country. It is not an exercise as simplistic as comparing scores based on individual performances. Different factors have to be weighed in. Which is 49 precisely why, the Courts should not ordinarily interfere in this process in exercise of its power of judicial review. Absent manifest or evident arbitrariness or mala fides, both of which are not discernible here, the Court cannot direct the Committee to select the petitioner for any particular event(s). Even otherwise, this Court is of the opinion that without deciding the challenge to the underlying policy (or absence thereof) of the Committee in selecting athletes for various paralympic sporting events, the learned single judge, could not have, by way of an interim order, directed the Committee to send the petitioner for the R7 event, if not the other events as well. This court is also of the opinion that granting an interim direction of the nature that the impugned order did, without considering the main challenge to the criteria setting exercise or the criteria, and based upon a one off court ordered test, is fraught and may not have been resorted to. For these reasons, with respect we disagree with the impugned order which has to be set aside.” (Emphasis supplied) The Division Bench of Delhi High Court was considering a case of Paralympic Committee of India challenging an order passed by the learned single Judge permitting the petitioner to participate in an event of Korean World Championship of 2018. The Division holds that judicial review is restricted only to cases which are manifest with arbitrariness or mala fide. The Division Bench further holds that Courts do not have the ability or the wherewithal to second guess policy decisions made by specialized bodies tasked with the purpose. 50

16. If the law as laid down by the Apex Court, the learned single Judges of the High Court of Delhi to which I am in complete agreement of, and the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi in the case of PARALYMPIC COMMITTEE OF INDIA supra is fitted qua the facts obtaining in the case at hand, what would unmistakably emerge is, that the doors of this Court to the petitioner are not even ajar but are completely closed, as the power of judicial review of a policy decision is unavailable except in cases of palpable and demonstrable arbitrariness. As observed hereinabove, this Court does not possess the wherewithal to ride over a policy decision, particularly in the sporting event or conferment of awards to those deserving in such sporting events.

17. It cannot be forgotten that the policy is only a course of action to deal with a subject matter. The Courts have always exercised judicial restraint and circumspection over the wisdom of the policies of the Government or statutory authorities, save in circumstances where such policy demonstrates caprice, arbitrariness, unreasonableness or is whimsical, so as to offend the tenets of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This is the only 51 parameter that would permit constitutional Courts to tinker with the policy particularly of the kind impugned – a policy for conferring awards on sporting events. To borrow the observation of the bench presided by Lord Justice Denning and the view expressed by Lord Justice Lawton, in LAKER AIRWAYS v. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE8, the role of a Judge is like referee, he can blow his judicial whistle when the ball goes out of play; but when the game restarts, the Judge must neither take part nor tell the players how to play. I deem it appropriate to paraphrase the said words to the issue in the case at hand. The ball of conferment of awards has not gone out of play, for this Court as a referee to interfere and tell the State how to manage conferment of awards.

18. Finding no merit warranting any interference with the policy of conferment of Ekalavya awards, the petition deserves to meet its dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Sd/- JUDGE Bkp/CT:SS8(1977)2 ALL ER18

Court	Karnataka High Court
Decided On	Jun-21-2024
Case Number	WP 39981/2015
Judge	M.NAGAPRASANNA
Appellant	Mr. V. Varshith
Respondent	The State Of Karnataka

Mr. V. Varshith Vs. The State Of Karnataka - Court Judgment