M S Faneesha Vs State of Karnataka - Citation 1234521 - Court Judgment

Judgment:

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU R DATED THIS THE16H DAY OF MARCH, 2023 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION No.7507 OF2022C/W CRIMINAL PETITION No.7504 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.7594 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.7798 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.7801 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.7843 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.7971 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.7980 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.8055 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.8059 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.8060 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.8069 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.8072 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.8073 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.8076 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.8080 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.8148 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.8149 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.8151 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.8354 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.8397 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.8429 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.8432 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.8952 OF2022CRIMINAL PETITION No.9090 OF20222 IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.7507 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R., ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ARAKAKALAGUDU POLICE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS3(BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDING AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.673/2016 OF ARAKALAGUDU POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S.408 AND409R/W SEC.34 OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HONBLE CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.7504 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA, S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY, AGED57YEARS, WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH, ARAKALAGUDU, HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER, DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING, TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU, HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R., ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA, BY KONANUR POLICE, REPRESENTED BY4STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH, DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH, HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.1365/2017 OF KONANUR POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S.408 AND409R/W SEC.34 OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HONBLE ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.7594 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF5EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY KONANUR POLICE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.295/2016 OF KONANUR POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S.408 AND409OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HONBLE II ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.7798 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY AGED57YEARS6WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY KONANUR POLICE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.1364/2017 OF KONANUR POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S.408 AND409R/W SEC.34 OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF7THE HONBLE ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.7801 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY KONANUR POLICE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) 8 ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.1366/2017 OF KONANUR POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S.408 AND409R/W SEC.34 OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HONBLE ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.7843 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) 9 AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY KONANUR POLICE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.1376/2017 OF KONANUR POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S.408 AND409R/W SEC.34 OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.7971 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS10SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY KONANUR POLICE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.287/2016 OF KONANUR POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S.408, 409 R/W SEC.34 OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE II ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.7980 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY11AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY KONANUR POLICE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.1367/2017 OF KONANUR POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S.408, 409 R/W SEC.34 OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE12HONBLE ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.8055 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY KONANUR POLICE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) 13 THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.1363/2017 OF KONANUR POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S.408 AND409R/W SEC.34 OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HONBLE ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.8059 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ARAKALAGUDU POLICE REPRESENTED BY14STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.615/2016 OF ARAKALAGUDU POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S.408 AND409R/W SEC.34 OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HONBLE II ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.8060 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF15EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ARAKALAGUDU POLICE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.682/2016 OF ARAKALAGUDU P.S., WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S408 409 R/W34OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE II ADDL. CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.8069 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY16AGED57YEARS R/AT #36, MARITHAMMANAHALLI HASSAN PIN – 573 102 WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ARAKALAGUDU POLICE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) 17 THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.590/2016 OF ARAKALAGUDU POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S408 409 R/W34OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE II ADDL. CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.8072 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ARAKALAGUDU POLICE REPRESENTED BY18STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.630/2016 OF ARAKALAGUDU POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S.408 AND409R/W SEC.34 OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HONBLE II ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.8073 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF19EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ARAKALAGUDU POLICE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.631/2016 OF ARAKALAGUDU POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S.408 AND409R/W SEC.34 OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HONBLE II ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.8076 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY20AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ARAKALAGUDU POLICE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.616/2016 OF ARAKALAGUDU POLICE21STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S.408 AND409R/W SEC.34 OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HONBLE II ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.8080 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ARAKALAGUDU POLICE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001. 22

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.672/2016 OF ARAKALAGUDU POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S.408 AND409R/W SEC.34 OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HONBLE II ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.8148 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) 23 AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ARAKALAGUDU POLICE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.617/2016 OF ARAKALAGUDU POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S408AND409R/W34OF IPC PENDING FILE OF HONBLE II ADDL.CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C AT ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.8149 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. 24 NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ARAKALAGUDU POLICE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.668/2016 OF ARAKALAGUDU POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S.408 AND409R/W SEC.34 OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HONBLE II ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT ARAKALAGUDU. 25 IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.8151 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ARAKALAGUDU POLICE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) 26 THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.589/2016 OF ARAKALAGUDU POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S.408 AND409R/W SEC.34 OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HONBLE II ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.8354 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ARAKALAGUDU POLICE REPRESENTED BY27STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.288/2016 OF ARAKALAGUDU POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S408 409 R/W34OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE II ADDL. CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.8397 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF28EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ARAKALAGUDU POLICE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.614/2016 OF ARAKALAGUDU POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S.408 AND409R/W SEC.34 OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HONBLE II ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.8429 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY29AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY KONANUR POLICE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.1374/2017 OF KONANUR POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S.408 AND409R/W SEC.34 OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF30THE HONBLE II ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.8432 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY KONANUR POLICE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) 31 ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.1373/2017 OF KONANUR POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S.408 AND409R/W SEC.34 OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HONBLE II ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC AT ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.8952 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) 32 AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY KONANUR POLICE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. LAKSHMI NARASAIAH DEPUTY SECRETARY (DEVELOPMENT) ZILLA PANCHAYATH HASSAN – 573 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN C.C.NO.1362/2017 OF KONANUR POLICE STATION WHICH HAS BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S.408 AND409R/W SEC.34 OF IPC PENDING ON THE FILE OF ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C., AT ARAKALAGUDU. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.9090 OF2022BETWEEN: M.S.FANEESHA S/O M.R.SRINIVASA MURTHY AGED57YEARS WORKED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARAKALAGUDU TALUK PANCHAYATH ARAKALAGUDU HASSAN DISTRICT – 573 102. 33 NOW WORKING AS SENIOR LECTURER DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING TAVARADEVARAKOPPALU HASSAN – 573 219. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MANJUNATH B.R, ADVOCATE) AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY KONANUR POLICE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001.

ORDER

S, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

ORDER

The petitioner, common in all these cases, calls in question similar but separate charge sheets filed by the Police and all of them are pending as different criminal cases on such charge sheets. In the light of the petitioner being the same and the issue being similar, all these cases are taken up together and considered by this common order. For the sake of convenience the facts obtaining in Criminal Petition No.7507 of 2022 which are similar in all these cases are narrated briefly.

2. Heard Sri B.R. Manjunath, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Smt. K.P. Yashoda, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1 in all these cases.

3. The petitioner is an employee of the Department of Rural Development and Panchayat Raj. The employment of the petitioner is not the issue in the lis. During the years 2009 and 2010 certain works under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 35 Guarantee Act (‘MGNREGA’ for short) were entrusted to several Gram Panchayats of Arkalgud Taluk. The petitioner then was working as Executive Officer of Arkalgud Taluk Panchayat. Alleging that the petitioner had misappropriated funds of MGNREGA, a complaint comes to be registered by the 2nd respondent against several persons/accused. The petitioner is accused No.1. The allegation against the petitioner was that he had executed works without obtaining necessary permission from other Departments concerning the technical implementation of works under MGNREGA. Due to the act of the petitioner in getting the works executed without such clearances from respective Departments, it is alleged that huge loss is caused to Government. The police conduct investigation for five long years and file charge sheets in all these cases. Criminal Petition No.7507 of 2022 concerns C.C.No.673 of 2016 pending before the Civil Judge & JMFC, Arkalgud. In all the cases, the allegations against the petitioner or any other accused, are the offences punishable under Sections 408 and 409 r/w Section 34 of the IPC. Though charge sheets were filed in the year 2016, the petitioner chose not to challenge the same at that point in time. 36

4. Simultaneously, departmental enquiry was also initiated against the petitioner on the same set of facts. In the departmental enquiry, it transpires, the findings of the Inquiry Officer are that the charges are not proved and that acts of the petitioner have not caused any loss to the State exchequer. Once that communication comes about on 06-02-2020, the petitioner springs into action by raising a challenge to the continuation of proceedings in the charge sheets challenged in the cases at hand. It is, therefore, the charge sheets of the year 2016 come to be challenged in the year 2022.

5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would seek to urge two grounds in support of the prayers that are sought viz., (i) cognizance is taken by the learned Magistrate in all these cases without there being sanction to prosecute the petitioner and it is in violation of Section 197 of the CrPC and (ii) the findings of the Enquiry Officer in the departmental enquiry are that the charges are not proved and there is no loss caused to the exchequer by the acts of the petitioner. On these two grounds, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner would be contrary to 37 law. It is his submission that the acts alleged are during the discharge of official duties and, therefore, without sanction, the proceedings cannot continue, he would submit that sanction is not even sought. It is his further submission that the charges having been not proved in the departmental enquiry, criminal proceedings on the same set of facts should not be permitted to be continued and, therefore, seeks quashment of charge sheets.

6. On the other hand, the learned High Court Government Pleader representing the State would vehemently refute the submissions to contend that the offences alleged against the petitioner are for offences punishable under Sections 408 and 409 of the IPC, for which offences sanction is not required, as the allegation is that the petitioner has misappropriated funds. Therefore, when there is such allegation, the prosecution can continue without sanction. She would further contend that communications between the Departments are to the effect that the petitioner has not caused any loss, but that has not resulted in any order being passed by the Disciplinary Authority accepting the findings of the Inquiry Officer and closing the departmental inquiry 38 on the said ground. The communications have remained only as communications and, therefore, she would submit that the petitioner cannot contend that he has been exonerated in the departmental inquiry and criminal proceedings cannot continue. The learned High Court Government Pleader would admit that no sanction is even sought to prosecute the petitioner as it was opinioned that it was not necessary.

7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record.

8. The petitioner was working in Arkalgud Gram Panchayat at the relevant point in time. Under MGNREGA several developmental works were undertaken under the aegis of MGNREGA through the Department of Rural Development and Panchayat Raj. Certain works were undertaken by the petitioner and other accused. On 10-02-2011, the 2nd respondent/Deputy Secretary of the Zilla Panchayat, Hassan registers a complaint against 10 accused, one of whom is the petitioner, on the allegation that funds of MGNREGA are misappropriated by the accused, the reason for such 39 misappropriation was that works under MGNREGA were undertaken without there being necessary permission from the concerned Departments. It was found that accused 1 to 3, in particular, were responsible for such misappropriation. The complaint becomes a crime in Crime No.44 of 2011 for offences punishable under Sections 408 and 409 r/w 34 of the IPC. The Police conduct investigation and, on completion of such investigation, filed a charge sheet against eight accused in which the petitioner is accused No.1. The learned Magistrate before whom the charge sheets were presented, takes cognizance of the offences alleged against all the accused by his order dated 24-08-2016 and registers criminal cases against all the accused – against the petitioner as accused no.1 in C.C.No.673 of 2016. The charge sheet numbers vary in all the cases and the petitioner is accused No.1 in all the charge sheets. The act of the petitioner and other accused in the aforesaid charge sheets is said to have resulted in huge loss to the Government. The petitioner chose not to challenge the action of the learned Magistrate taking cognizance for over six years. 40

9. Simultaneously, departmental inquiry was also initiated against the petitioner and other accused. An Inquiry Officer by name Sri S.Y. Kumbar was appointed to conduct departmental proceedings against all the accused. It appears that the said Inquiry Officer held the charges against the officers therein as not proved. Few of the officers were accused in the aforesaid crimes. The Government by its order dated 06-08-2016 accepting the report of the Inquiry Officer passed orders of exoneration against four accused but not against the petitioner in these cases.

10. A communication is made by the Executive Officer of Taluk Panchayat to the Chief Executive Officer of Zilla Panchayat, Hassan. The narration in the communication is that departmental enquiry was conducted against the petitioner and several others and the inquiry report records that charges are not proved and no loss is caused to the exchequer. The communication dated 06.02.2020 of the Executive Officer of Taluk Panchayat reads as follows: “¸ÀA:vÁ.¥ÀA.C/PÁ.¤.C/G.§AiÉÆÃ.zÀÆgÀÄ/2019-20/1400 ¢£ÁAPÀ:-06-02-2020 gÀªÀjUÉ, 41 ªÀiÁ£Àå ªÀÄÄRå PÁAiÀÄð¤ªÁðºÀPÀ C¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ, f¯Áè ¥ÀAZÁAiÀÄvï, ºÁ¸À£À. ªÀiÁ£ÀågÉÃ, MGNREGA «µÀAiÀÄ: AiÉÆÃd£ÉAiÀÄr 2009-10£ÉÃ ¸Á°£À°è CgÀPÀ®UÀÆqÀÄ vÁ. ««zÀs UÁæªÀÄ ¥ÀAZÁ¬Äw ªÁå¦ÛAiÀÄ°è C£ÀÄµÁÖ£ÀUÉÆArgÀÄªÀ PÁªÀÄUÁjAiÀÄ°è £ÀqÉ¢zÉ J£Àß¯ÁzÀ CªÀåªÀºÁgÀzÀ°è DyðPÀ £ÀµÀÖzÀ PÀÄjvÀÄ ªÀgÀ¢ ¸À°è¸ÀÄªÀ §UÉÎ. G¯ÉèÃR:- vÀªÀÄä PÀbÉÃj ¥ÀvÀæÀ ¸ÀA:f¥ÀAºÁ/D¹(15)/C©ü(4)/G.§AiÉÆÃ.zÀÆgÀÄ/80/2010 -11. ¢£ÁAPÀ:-18-01-2020. ***** MGNREGA ªÉÄÃ®ÌAqÀ «µÀAiÀÄPÉÌ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ, AiÉÆÃd£ÉAiÀÄr 2009-10£ÉÃ ¸Á°£À°è CgÀPÀ®UÀÆqÀÄ vÁ®ÆèPÀÄ ««zÀs UÁæªÀÄ ¥ÀAZÁ¬ÄwAiÀÄ°è C£ÀÄµÁÖ£ÀUÉÆArgÀÄªÀ C©üªÀÈ¢Þ PÁªÀÄUÁjAiÄÀ°è £ÀqÉ¢zÉ J£Àß¯ÁzÀ CªÀåªÀºÁgÀzÀ°è F PÉ¼ÀPÀAqÀ 3 C¢üPÁj/£ËPÀgÀgÀ «gÀÄzÀÝ E¯ÁSÁ «ZÁgÀuÉ £ÀqÉzÄÀ C¥ÁzÀ£ÉUÀ¼ÀÄ ¸Á©ÃvÁV®èªÉAzÀÄ ¥ÀæPÀgÀtªÀ£ÀÄß ªÀÄÄPÁÛAiÀÄ ªÀiÁqÀÄªÀ ¸ÀA§AzsÀzÀ°è ¸ÀPÁðgÀ¢AzÀ ¸ÀzÀj ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ°è K£ÁzÀgÀÆ ¸ÀPÁðgÀPÉÌ DyðPÀ £ÀµÀÖªÁVzÀÝ°è ¸ÀA¥ÀÆtð ªÀgÀ¢ ¸À°è¸À®Ä G¯ÉèÃRzÀ°è ¸ÀÆa¹gÀÄªÀÅzÀÄ ¸ÀjAiÀÄµÖÉ, DzÀgÉ ¸ÀzÀj ¥ÀæPÀgÀtPÉÌ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ

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11. It transpires that another accused in the same crime which was in C.C. No.1365 of 2017 had knocked at the doors of this 44 Court in Criminal Petition No.5594 of 2019. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court, in terms of its order dated 04-07-2022, quashed the proceedings against the said accused who was accused No.7, on the ground that there was no sanction accorded by the Government to prosecute the accused therein. On the co-ordinate Bench quashing the case against the co-accused, the petitioner then springs into action by filing the subject petitions on 30-07-2022 onwards.

12. The issue is, whether the case of the petitioner would require sanction at the hands of the Competent Authority for continuation of prosecution against him?. To consider the said issue it is germane to notice Section 197 of the CrPC. Section 197 of the CrPC reads as follows:- “197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.— (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013— (a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government; 45 (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government: Provided that where the alleged offence was committed by a person referred to in clause (b) during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution was in force in a State, clause (b) will apply as if for the expression “State Government” occurring therein, the expression “Central Government” were substituted. Explanation.—For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that no sanction shall be required in case of a public servant accused of any offence alleged to have been committed under Section 166-A, Section 166-B, Section 354, Section 354- A, Section 354-B, Section 354-C, Section 354-D, Section 370, Section 375, Section 376, Section 376-A, Section 376-AB, Section 376-C, Section 376-D, Section 376-DA, Section 376-DB]. or Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). (2) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Union while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. (3) The State Government may, by notification, direct that the provisions of sub-section (2) shall apply to such class or category of the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order as may be specified therein, wherever they may be serving, and thereupon the provisions of that sub-section will apply as if for the expression “Central Government” occurring therein, the expression “State Government” were substituted. (3-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3), no court shall take cognizance of any offence, alleged to have been committed by any member of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order in a State while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 46 356 of the Constitution was in force therein, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. (3-B) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code or any other law, it is hereby declared that any sanction accorded by the State Government or any cognizance taken by a court upon such sanction, during the period commencing on the 20th day of August, 1991 and ending with the date immediately preceding the date on which the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1991, receives the assent of the President, with respect to an offence alleged to have been committed during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution was in force in the State, shall be invalid and it shall be competent for the Central Government in such matter to accord sanction and for the court to take cognizance thereon. (4) The Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, may determine the person by whom, the manner in which, and the offence or offences for which, the prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is to be conducted, and may specify the Court before which the trial is to be held.” (Emphasis supplied) The aforesaid provision of law mandates that a public servant cannot be prosecuted on the allegations that have been committed by him, while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty and no Court would take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction. Therefore, the concerned Court which took cognizance of the offence and registered criminal cases against the petitioner on 24-08-2016 could not have taken 47 cognizance except on a valid order of sanction being placed before it by the prosecution.

13. The offences alleged against the petitioner are all offences punishable under Sections 408 and 409 of the IPC. Sections 408 and 409 read as follows: “408. Criminal breach of trust by clerk or servant.— Whoever, being a clerk or servant or employed as a clerk or servant, and being in any manner entrusted in such capacity with property, or with any dominion over property, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.

409. Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent.—Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property in his capacity of a public servant or in the way of his business as a banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” Section 408 deals with criminal breach of trust by clerk or servant. Section 409 deals with criminal breach of trust by a public servant, banker, merchant or its agent. Therefore, the petitioner being a public servant is said to have committed ingredients of offence of criminal breach of trust. The allegation comes about on the ground 48 that the petitioner while working as an officer in Arkalgud Town Panchayat along with others had indulged in certain acts which would become aforesaid offences. Therefore, it is a case where the petitioner is alleged to have committed those acts while discharging his official duty. If the ingredients of offence are that while performing official duties the offences come about, sanction for such prosecution of any officer, the petitioner in the case at hand, is imperative. The view of mine, in this regard, is fortified by the judgments rendered by the Apex Court from time to time.

14. The Apex Court interpreting Section 197 of the CrPC right from the year 1995 has delineated the principle of requirement of sanction to prosecute Government servants. The Apex Court in the case of AMRIK SINGH v. STATE OF PEPSU1 has held as follows: “7. The result of the authorities may thus be summed up: It is not every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure; nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary; and that would be so, irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a proper discharge of his duties, because 1 (1955)1 SCR130249 that would really be a matter of defence on the merits, which would have to be investigated at the trial, and could not arise at the stage of the grant of sanction, which must precede the institution of the prosecution.

8. It is conceded for the respondent that on the principle above enunciated, sanction would be required for prosecuting the appellant under Section 465, as the charge was in respect of his duty of obtaining signatures or thumb impressions of the employees before wages were paid to them. But he contends that misappropriation of funds could, under no circumstances, be said to be within the scope of the duties of a public servant, that he could not, when charged with it, claim justification for it by virtue of his office, that therefore no sanction under Section 197(1) was necessary, and that the question was concluded by the decisions in Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor [AIR1939FC43:

1939. FCR159 and Albert West Meads v. King [AIR1948PC156:

75. IA185 , in both of which the charges were of criminal misappropriation. We are of opinion that this is too broad a statement of the legal position, and that the two decisions cited lend no support to it. In our judgment, even when the charge is one of misappropriation by a public servant, whether sanction is required under Section 197(1) will depend upon the facts of each case. If the acts complained of are so integrally connected with the duties attaching to the office as to be inseparable from them, then sanction under Section 197(1) would be necessary; but if there was no necessary connection between them and the performance of those duties, the official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required.” (Emphasis supplied) Later, the Apex Court in the case of PUKHRAJ v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN2 has held as follows: “2. The law regarding the circumstances under which sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is necessary is by now well settled as a result of the decisions from Hori Ram Singh's case [AIR1939FC43 1939 FCR159 40 Cri LJ468 to the latest decision of 2 (1973) 2 SCC70150 this Court in Bhagwan Prasad Srivastava v. N.P. Misra [(1970) 2 SCC56 (1971) 1 SCR317. While the law is well settled the difficulty really arises in applying the law to the facts of any particular case. The intention behind the section is to prevent public servants from being unnecessarily harassed. The section is not restricted only to cases of anything purported to be done in good faith, for a person who ostensibly acts in execution of his duty still purports so to act, although he may have a dishonest intention. Nor is it confined to cases where the act, which constitutes the offence, is the official duty of the official concerned. Such an interpretation would involve a contradiction in terms, because an offence can never be an official duty. The offence should have been committed when an act is done in the execution of duty or when an act purports to be done in execution of duty. The test appears to be not that the offence is capable of being committed only by a public servant and not by anyone else, but that it is committed by a public servant in an act done or purporting to be done in the execution of duty. The section cannot be confined to only such acts as are done by a public servant directly in pursuance of his public office, though in excess of the duty or under a mistaken belief as to the existence of such duty. Nor need the act constituting the offence be so inseparably connected with the official duty as to form part and parcel of the same transaction. What is necessary is that the offence must be in respect of an act done or purported to be done in the discharge of an official duty. It does not apply to acts done purely in a private capacity by a public servant. Expressions such as the “capacity in which the act is performed”, “cloak of office” and “professed exercise of the office” may not always be appropriate to describe or delimit the scope of section. An act merely because it was done negligently does not cease to be one done or purporting to be done in execution of a duty. In Hori Ram Singh case Sulaiman, J.

observed: “The section cannot be confined to only such acts as are done by a public servant directly in pursuance of his public office, though in excess of the duty or under a mistaken belief as to the existence of such duty. Nor is it necessary to go to the length of saying that the act 51 constituting the offence should be so inseparably connected with the official duty as to form part and parcel of the same transaction.” In the same case Varadachariar, J.

observed: “there must be something in the nature of the act complained of that attaches it to the official character of the person doing it”. In affirming this view, the Judicial Committee ofthe Privy Council observed in Gill [AIR1948PC128:

1948. LR75IA41:

49. Cri LJ503 case: “A public servant can only be said to act or purport to act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is such as to lie within the scope of his official duty…. The test may well be whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim that, what he does in virtue of his office.” In Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari [AIR1955SC44 (1955) 2 SCR925 1956 Cri LJ140 the Court was of the view that the test laid down that it must be established that the act complained of was an official act unduly narrowed down the scope of the protection afforded by Section 197. After referring to the earlier cases the Court summed up the results as follows: “There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.” Applying this test it is difficult to say that the acts complained of i.e. of kicking the complainant and of abusing him, could be said to have been done in the course of performance of the 2nd respondent's duty. At this stage all that we are concerned with is whether on the facts alleged in the complaint it could be said that what the 2nd respondent is alleged to have done could be said to be in purported exercise of his duty. Very clearly it is not. We must make it clear, however, that we express no opinion as to the truth or falsity of the allegations.” (Emphasis supplied) 52 Elaborating the said consideration, the Apex Court in the case of SANKARAN MOITRA v. SADHNA DAS3 has raised the following issue: “6. The High Court by order dated 11-7-2003 dismissed the application. It overruled the contention of the accused based on Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure thus: “In its considered view Section 197 CrPC has got no manner of application in the present case. Under Section 197 CrPC sanction is required only if the public servant was, at the time of commission of offence, ‘employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State’ and he was ‘not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government’. The bar under Section 197 CrPC cannot be raised by a public servant if he is removable by some authority without the sanction of the Government. Committing an offence can never be a part of an official duty. Where there is no necessary connection between the act and the performance of the duties of a public servant, Section 197 CrPC will not be attracted. Beating a person to death by a police officer cannot be regarded as having been committed by a public servant within the scope of his official duties.” Finding on the said issue by the Apex Court is as follows: “25. The High Court has stated that killing of a person by use of excessive force could never be performance of duty. It may be correct so far as it goes. But the question is whether that act was done in the performance of duty or in purported performance of duty. If it was done in performance of duty or purported performance of duty, Section 197(1) of the Code cannot be bypassed by reasoning that killing a man 3 (2006) 4 SCC58453 could never be done in an official capacity and consequently Section 197(1) of the Code could not be attracted. Such a reasoning would be against the ratio of the decisions of this Court referred to earlier. The other reason given by the High Court that if the High Court were to interfere on the ground of want of sanction, people will lose faith in the judicial process, cannot also be a ground to dispense with a statutory requirement or protection. Public trust in the institution can be maintained by entertaining causes coming within its jurisdiction, by performing the duties entrusted to it diligently, in accordance with law and the established procedure and without delay. Dispensing with of jurisdictional or statutory requirements which may ultimately affect the adjudication itself, will itself result in people losing faith in the system. So, the reason in that behalf given by the High Court cannot be sufficient to enable it to get over the jurisdictional requirement of a sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We are therefore satisfied that the High Court was in error in holding that sanction under Section 197(1) was not needed in this case. We hold that such sanction was necessary and for want of sanction the prosecution must be quashed at this stage. It is not for us now to answer the submission of learned counsel for the complainant that this is an eminently fit case for grant of such sanction.

26. We thus allow this appeal and setting aside the order of the High Court quash the complaint only on the ground of want of sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The observations herein, however, shall not prejudice the rights of the complainant in any prosecution after the requirements of Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure are complied with.” (Emphasis supplied) The Power of High Court which was questioned before the Apex Court was set aside on the sole ground that there was no sanction 54 under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. to prosecute the petitioners. Again, the Apex Court in the case of DEVINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB4, has held as follows: “39. The principles emerging from the aforesaid decisions are summarised hereunder:

39. 1. Protection of sanction is an assurance to an honest and sincere officer to perform his duty honestly and to the best of his ability to further public duty. However, authority cannot be camouflaged to commit crime. 39.2. Once act or omission has been found to have been committed by public servant in discharging his duty it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. Public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent Section 197 CrPC has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. 39.3. Even in facts of a case when public servant has exceeded in his duty, if there is reasonable connection it will not deprive him of protection under Section 197 CrPC. There cannot be a universal rule to determine whether there is reasonable nexus between the act done and official duty nor is it possible to lay down such rule. 39.4. In case the assault made is intrinsically connected with or related to performance of official duties, sanction would be necessary under Section 197 CrPC, but such relation to duty should not be pretended or fanciful claim. The offence must be directly and reasonably connected with official duty to require sanction. It is no part of official duty to commit offence. In case offence was incomplete without proving, the 4(2016) 12 SCC8755 official act, ordinarily the provisions of Section 197 CrPC would apply. 39.5. In case sanction is necessary, it has to be decided by competent authority and sanction has to be issued on the basis of sound objective assessment. The court is not to be a sanctioning authority. 39.6. Ordinarily, question of sanction should be dealt with at the stage of taking cognizance, but if the cognizance is taken erroneously and the same comes to the notice of court at a later stage, finding to that effect is permissible and such a plea can be taken first time before the appellate court. It may arise at inception itself. There is no requirement that the accused must wait till charges are framed. 39.7. Question of sanction can be raised at the time of framing of charge and it can be decided prima facie on the basis of accusation. It is open to decide it afresh in light of evidence adduced after conclusion of trial or at other appropriate stage. 39.8. Question of sanction may arise at any stage of proceedings. On a police or judicial inquiry or in course of evidence during trial. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage and material brought on record depending upon facts of each case. Question of sanction can be considered at any stage of the proceedings. Necessity for sanction may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case and it would be open to the accused to place material during the course of trial for showing what his duty was. The accused has the right to lead evidence in support of his case on merits. 39.9. In some cases it may not be possible to decide the question effectively and finally without giving opportunity to the defence to adduce evidence. Question of good faith or bad faith may be decided on conclusion of trial.” 56 Following these judgments, the Apex Court in the case of D.DEVARAJA v. OWAIS SABEER HUSSAIN5 has held as follows: “30. The object of sanction for prosecution, whether under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or under Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act, is to protect a public servant/police officer discharging official duties and functions from harassment by initiation of frivolous retaliatory criminal proceedings. As held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari [Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR1956SC44:

1956. Cri LJ140 : (AIR p. 48, para

15) “15. … Public servants have to be protected from harassment in the discharge of official duties while ordinary citizens not so engaged do not require this safeguard. … There is no question of any discrimination between one person and another in the matter of taking proceedings against a public servant for an act done or purporting to be done by the public servant in the discharge of his official duties. No one can take such proceedings without such sanction.

31. In Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan [Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan, (1973) 2 SCC701 1973 SCC (Cri) 944]. this Court held: (SCC p. 703, para

2) “2. … While the law is well settled the difficulty really arises in applying the law to the facts of any particular case. The intention behind the section is to prevent public servants from being unnecessarily harassed. The section is not restricted only to cases of anything purported to be done in good faith, for a person who ostensibly acts in execution of his duty still purports so to act, although he may have a dishonest intention. Nor is it confined to cases where the act, which constitutes the offence, is the official duty of the official concerned. Such an interpretation would involve a contradiction in terms, because an offence can never be an official duty. The offence should have been committed when an act is done in the execution of duty or when an 5 (2020)7 SCC69557 act purports to be done in execution of duty. The test appears to be not that the offence is capable of being committed only by a public servant and not by anyone else, but that it is committed by a public servant in an act done or purporting to be done in the execution of duty. The section cannot be confined to only such acts as are done by a public servant directly in pursuance of his public office, though in excess of the duty or under a mistaken belief as to the existence of such duty. Nor need the act constituting the offence be so inseparably connected with the official duty as to form part and parcel of the same transaction. What is necessary is that the offence must be in respect of an act done or purported to be done in the discharge of an official duty. It does not apply to acts done purely in a private capacity by a public servant. Expressions such as the “capacity in which the act is performed”, “cloak of office” and “professed exercise of the office” may not always be appropriate to describe or delimit the scope of section. An act merely because it was done negligently does not cease to be one done or purporting to be done in execution of a duty.

32. In Amrik Singh v. State of PEPSU [Amrik Singh v. State of PEPSU, AIR1955SC309:

1955. Cri LJ865 this Court referred to the judgments of the Federal Court in Hori Ram Singh v. Crown [Hori Ram Singh v. Crown, 1939 SCC OnLine FC2 AIR1939FC43; H.H.B. Gill v. King Emperor [H.H.B. Gill v. King Emperor, 1946 SCC OnLine FC10 AIR1947FC9 and the judgment of the Privy Council in Gill v. R. [Gill v. R., 1948 SCC OnLine PC10 (1947-48) 75 IA41 AIR1948PC128 and held: (Amrik Singh case [Amrik Singh v. State of PEPSU, AIR1955SC309 1955 Cri LJ865 , AIR p. 312, para

8) “8. The result of the authorities may thus be summed up : It is not every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure; nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be 58 necessary; and that would be so, irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a proper discharge of his duties, because that would really be a matter of defence on the merits, which would have to be investigated at the trial, and could not arise at the stage of the grant of sanction, which must precede the institution of the prosecution.

33. Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, hereinafter referred to as the old Criminal Procedure Code, which fell for consideration in Matajog Dobey [Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR1956SC44 1956 Cri LJ140, Pukhraj [Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan, (1973) 2 SCC701 1973 SCC (Cri) 944]. and Amrik Singh [Amrik Singh v. State of PEPSU, AIR1955SC309 1955 Cri LJ865 is in pari materia with Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has repealed and replaced the old Code of Criminal Procedure.

34. In Ganesh Chandra Jew [State of Orissa v. Ganesh Chandra Jew, (2004) 8 SCC40:

2004. SCC (Cri) 2104]. this Court held : (SCC pp. 46-47, para

7) “7. The protection given under Section 197 is to protect responsible public servants against the institution of possibly vexatious criminal proceedings for offences alleged to have been committed by them while they are acting or purporting to act as public servants. The policy of the legislature is to afford adequate protection to public servants to ensure that they are not prosecuted for anything done by them in the discharge of their official duties without reasonable cause, and if sanction is granted, to confer on the Government, if they choose to exercise it, complete control of the prosecution. This protection has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. If in doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant of the protection. The question is not as to the nature of the offence such as whether the alleged offence contained an 59 element necessarily dependent upon the offender being a public servant, but whether it was committed by a public servant acting or purporting to act as such in the discharge of his official capacity. Before Section 197 can be invoked, it must be shown that the official concerned was accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. It is not the duty which requires examination so much as the act, because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The act must fall within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant concerned. It is the quality of the act which is important and the protection of this section is available if the act falls within the scope and range of his official duty.” (emphasis supplied) 35. In State of Orissa v. Ganesh Chandra Jew [State of Orissa v. Ganesh Chandra Jew, (2004) 8 SCC40 2004 SCC (Cri) 2104]. this Court interpreted the use of the expression “official duty” to imply that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in course of his service and that it should have been in discharge of his duty. Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not extend its protective cover to every act or omission done by a public servant while in service. The scope of operation of the section is restricted to only those acts or omissions which are done by a public servant in discharge of official duty.

36. In Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay [Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay, AIR1955SC287:

1955. Cri LJ857 this Court explained the scope and object of Section 197 of the old Criminal Procedure Code, which as stated hereinabove, is in pari materia with Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This Court held: (AIR pp. 292-93, paras 18-19) “18. Now it is obvious that if Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is construed too narrowly it can never be applied, for of course it is no part of an official's duty to commit an offence and never can be. But it is not the duty we have to examine so much as the act, 60 because an official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The section has content and its language must be given meaning. What it says is— ‘When any public servant … is accused of any “offence” alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty….’ We have therefore first to concentrate on the word “offence”.

19. Now an offence seldom consists of a single act. It is usually composed of several elements and, as a rule, a whole series of acts must be proved before it can be established. In the present case, the elements alleged against Accused 2 are, first, that there was an “entrustment” and/or “dominion”; second, that the entrustment and/or dominion was “in his capacity as a public servant”; third, that there was a “disposal”; and fourth, that the disposal was “dishonest”. Now it is evident that the entrustment and/or dominion here were in an official capacity, and it is equally evident that there could in this case be no disposal, lawful or otherwise, save by an act done or purporting to be done in an official capacity. Therefore, the act complained of, namely, the disposal, could not have been done in any other way. If it was innocent, it was an official act; if dishonest, it was the dishonest doing of an official act, but in either event the act was official because Accused 2 could not dispose of the goods save by the doing of an official act, namely, officially permitting their disposal; and that he did. He actually permitted their release and purported to do it in an official capacity, and apart from the fact that he did not pretend to act privately, there was no other way in which he could have done it. Therefore, whatever the intention or motive behind the act may have been, the physical part of it remained unaltered, so if it was official in the one case it was equally official in the other, and the only difference would lie in the intention with which it was done : in the one event, it would be done in the discharge of an official duty and in the other, in the purported discharge of it.” 61 37. The scope of Section 197 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, was also considered in P. Arulswami v. State of Madras [P. Arulswami v. State of Madras, AIR1967SC776:

1967. Cri LJ665 where this Court held : (AIR p. 778, para

6) “6. … It is the quality of the act that is important and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties the protection contemplated by Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code will be attracted.” “If the act is totally unconnected with the official duty, there can be no protection. It is only when it is either within the scope of the official duty or in excess of it that the protection is claimable….

38. In B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar [B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC177:

1979. SCC (Cri) 939]. this Court held : (SCC p. 185, para

18) “18. In sum, the sine qua non for the applicability of this section is that the offence charged, be it one of commission or omission, must be one which has been committed by the public servant either in his official capacity or under colour of the office held by him.

39. In Virupaxappa Veerappa Kadampur v. State of Mysore [Virupaxappa Veerappa Kadampur v. State of Mysore, AIR1963SC849: (1963) 1 Cri LJ814 cited by Mr Poovayya, a three-Judge Bench of this Court had, in the context of Section 161 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, which is similar to Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act, interpreted the phrase “under colour of duty” to mean “acts done under the cloak of duty, even though not by virtue of the duty”.

40. In Virupaxappa Veerappa Kadampur [Virupaxappa Veerappa Kadampur v. State of Mysore, AIR1963SC849: (1963) 1 Cri LJ814 this Court referred (at AIR p. 851, para

9) to the meaning of the words “colour of office” in Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edn., which is as follows: “Colour of office, when an act is unjustly done by the countenance of an office, being grounded upon corruption, to which the office is as a shadow and colour.” 62 41. This Court also referred (at AIR p. 852, para

9) to the meaning of “colour of office” in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn., set out hereinbelow: “Colour:“Colour of office” is always taken in the worst part, and signifies an act evil done by the countenance of an office, and it bears a dissembling face of the right of the office, whereas the office, is but a veil to the falsehood, and the thing is grounded upon vice, and the office is as a shadow to it. But “by reason of the office” and “by virtue of the office” are taken always in the best part.

42. After referring to the Law Lexicons referred to above, this Court held : (Virupaxappa Veerappa Kadampur case [Virupaxappa Veerappa Kadampur v. State of Mysore, AIR1963SC849: (1963) 1 Cri LJ814 , AIR p. 852, para

10) “10. It appears to us that the words “under colour of duty” have been used in Section 161(1) to include acts done under the cloak of duty, even though not by virtue of the duty. When he (the police officer) prepares a false panchnama or a false report he is clearly using the existence of his legal duty as a cloak for his corrupt action or to use the words in Stroud's Dictionary “as a veil to his falsehood”. The acts thus done in dereliction of his duty must be held to have been done “under colour of the duty”.

43. In Om Prakash v. State of Jharkhand [Om Prakash v. State of Jharkhand, (2012) 12 SCC72: (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 472]. this Court, after referring to various decisions, pertaining to the police excess, explained the scope of protection under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as follows : (SCC p. 89, para

32) “32. The true test as to whether a public servant was acting or purporting to act in discharge of his duties would be whether the act complained of was directly connected with his official duties or it was done in the discharge of his official duties or it was so integrally connected with or attached to his office as to be inseparable from it (K. Satwant Singh [K. Satwant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR1960SC266:

1960. Cri LJ410 ). The protection given under Section 197 of the 63 Code has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. If in doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant of the protection (Ganesh Chandra Jew [State of Orissa v. Ganesh Chandra Jew, (2004) 8 SCC40:

2004. SCC (Cri) 2104]. ). If the above tests are applied to the facts of the present case, the police must get protection given under Section 197 of the Code because the acts complained of are so integrally connected with or attached to their office as to be inseparable from it. It is not possible for us to come to a conclusion that the protection granted under Section 197 of the Code is used by the police personnel in this case as a cloak for killing the deceased in cold blood.” (emphasis supplied) 44. In Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das [Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das, (2006) 4 SCC584 (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 358]. the majority referred to Gill v. R. [Gill v. R., 1948 SCC OnLine PC10 (1947-48) 75 IA41 AIR1948PC128, H.H.B. Gill v. King Emperor [H.H.B. Gill v. King Emperor, 1946 SCC OnLine FC10 AIR1947FC9; Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay [Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay, AIR1955SC287 1955 Cri LJ857; Amrik Singh v. State of PEPSU [Amrik Singh v. State of PEPSU, AIR1955SC309 1955 Cri LJ865 ; Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari [Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR1956SC44:

1956. Cri LJ140; Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan [Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan, (1973) 2 SCC701 1973 SCC (Cri) 944].; B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar [B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC177 1979 SCC (Cri) 939].; Bakhshish Singh Brar v. Gurmej Kaur [Bakhshish Singh Brar v. Gurmej Kaur, (1987) 4 SCC663:

1988. SCC (Cri) 29].; Rizwan Ahmed Javed Shaikh v. Jammal Patel [Rizwan Ahmed Javed Shaikh v. Jammal Patel, (2001) 5 SCC7 and held: (Sankaran Moitra case [Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das, (2006) 4 SCC584 (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 358]. , SCC pp. 602-603, para

25) 64 “25. The High Court has stated [Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhana Das, 2003 SCC OnLine Cal 309 : (2003) 4 CHN82 that killing of a person by use of excessive force could never be performance of duty. It may be correct so far as it goes. But the question is whether that act was done in the performance of duty or in purported performance of duty. If it was done in performance of duty or purported performance of duty, Section 197(1) of the Code cannot be bypassed by reasoning that killing a man could never be done in an official capacity and consequently Section 197(1) of the Code could not be attracted. Such a reasoning would be against the ratio of the decisions of this Court referred to earlier. The other reason given by the High Court that if the High Court were to interfere on the ground of want of sanction, people will lose faith in the judicial process, cannot also be a ground to dispense with a statutory requirement or protection. Public trust in the institution can be maintained by entertaining causes coming within its jurisdiction, by performing the duties entrusted to it diligently, in accordance with law and the established procedure and without delay. Dispensing with of jurisdictional or statutory requirements which may ultimately affect the adjudication itself, will itself result in people losing faith in the system. So, the reason in that behalf given by the High Court cannot be sufficient to enable it to get over the jurisdictional requirement of a sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We are therefore satisfied that the High Court was in error in holding that sanction under Section 197(1) was not needed in this case. We hold that such sanction was necessary and for want of sanction the prosecution must be quashed at this stage. It is not for us now to answer the submission of the learned counsel for the complainant that this is an eminently fit case for grant of such sanction.

45. The dissenting view of C.K. Thakker, J.

in Sankaran Moitra [Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das, (2006) 4 SCC584: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 358]. supports the contention of Mr Luthra to some extent. However, we are bound by the majority view. 65 Furthermore even the dissenting view of C.K. Thakker, J.

was in the context of an extreme case of causing death by assaulting the complainant.

46. In K.K. Patel v. State of Gujarat [K.K. Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2000) 6 SCC195:

2001. SCC (Cri) 200]. this Court referred to Virupaxappa Veerappa Kadampur [Virupaxappa Veerappa Kadampur v. State of Mysore, AIR1963SC849: (1963) 1 Cri LJ814 and held : (K.K. Patel case [K.K. Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2000) 6 SCC195:

2001. SCC (Cri) 200]. , SCC p. 203, para

17) “17. The indispensable ingredient of the said offence is that the offender should have done the act “being a public servant”. The next ingredient close to its heels is that such public servant has acted in disobedience of any legal direction concerning the way in which he should have conducted as such public servant. For the offences under Sections 167 and 219 IPC the pivotal ingredient is the same as for the offence under Section 166 IPC. The remaining offences alleged in the complaint, in the light of the averments made therein, are ancillary offences to the above and all the offences are parts of the same transaction. They could not have been committed without there being at least the colour of the office or authority which the appellants held.” … … .. ..

55. Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2016) 12 SCC87 (2016) 4 SCC (Cri) 15: (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 346]. cited by Mr Luthra is clearly distinguishable as that was a case of killing by the police in fake encounter. Satyavir Singh Rathi v. State [Satyavir Singh Rathi v. State, (2011) 6 SCC1 (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 782]. also pertains to a fake encounter, where the deceased was mistakenly identified as a hardcore criminal and shot down without provocation. The version of the police that the police had been attacked first and had retaliated, was found to be false. In the light of these facts, that this Court held that it could not, by any stretch of imagination, be claimed by anybody that a case of murder could be within the expression “colour of duty”. This Court dismissed the appeals of the policemen concerned against conviction, inter alia, under Section 302 of the Penal Code, which had duly been confirmed [Satyavir Singh 66 Rathi v. State, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 2973]. by the High Court. The judgment is clearly distinguishable. …. …. ….

61. In Om Prakash v. State of Jharkhand [Om Prakash v. State of Jharkhand, (2012) 12 SCC72: (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 472]. this Court held : (SCC pp. 90-91 & 95, paras 34 & 42-43) “34. In Matajog Dobey [Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR1956SC44:

1956. Cri LJ140 the Constitution Bench of this Court was considering what is the scope and meaning of a somewhat similar expression ‘any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty’ occurring in Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code (5 of 1898). The Constitution Bench observed that no question of sanction can arise under Section 197 unless the act complained of is an offence; the only point to determine is whether it was committed in the discharge of official duty. On the question as to which act falls within the ambit of abovequoted expression, the Constitution Bench concluded that there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim that he did it in the course of performance of his duty. While dealing with the question whether the need for sanction has to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations contained therein, the Constitution Bench referred to Hori Ram Singh [Hori Ram Singh v. Crown, 1939 SCC OnLine FC2: AIR1939FC43 and observed that at first sight, it seems as though there is some support for this view in Hori Ram Singh [Hori Ram Singh v. Crown, 1939 SCC OnLine FC2: AIR1939FC43 because Sulaiman, J.

has observed in the said judgment that as the prohibition is against the institution itself, its applicability must be judged in the first instance at the earliest stage of institution and Varadachariar, J.

has also stated that : (Matajog Dobey case [Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR1956SC44:

1956. Cri LJ140 , AIR p. 49, para

20) 67 ‘20. … the question must be determined with reference to the nature of the allegations made against the public servant in the criminal proceedings.’ *** The legal position is thus settled by the Constitution Bench in the above paragraph. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. If, at the outset, the defence establishes that the act purported to be done is in execution of official duty, the complaint will have to be dismissed on that ground. *** 42. It is not the duty of the police officers to kill the accused merely because he is a dreaded criminal. Undoubtedly, the police have to arrest the accused and put them up for trial. This Court has repeatedly admonished trigger-happy police personnel, who liquidate criminals and project the incident as an encounter. Such killings must be deprecated. They are not recognised as legal by our criminal justice administration system. They amount to State-sponsored terrorism. But, one cannot be oblivious of the fact that there are cases where the police, who are performing their duty, are attacked and killed. There is a rise in such incidents and judicial notice must be taken of this fact. In such circumstances, while the police have to do their legal duty of arresting the criminals, they have also to protect themselves. The requirement of sanction to prosecute affords protection to the policemen, who are sometimes required to take drastic action against criminals to protect life and property of the people and to protect themselves against attack. Unless unimpeachable evidence is on record to establish that their action is indefensible, mala fide and vindictive, they cannot be subjected to prosecution. Sanction must be a precondition to their prosecution. It affords necessary protection to such police personnel. The plea regarding sanction can be raised at the inception.

43. In our considered opinion, in view of the facts which we have discussed hereinabove, no inference can be drawn in this case that the police action is indefensible or vindictive or that the police were not acting in discharge of their official duty. In Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. [Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque, (2005) 1 SCC122:

2005. SCC (Cri) 283]. this Court has held that the power under Section 68 482 of the Code should be used sparingly and with circumspection to prevent abuse of process of court but not to stifle legitimate prosecution. There can be no two opinions on this, but, if it appears to the trained judicial mind that continuation of a prosecution would lead to abuse of process of court, the power under Section 482 of the Code must be exercised and proceedings must be quashed. Indeed, the instant case is one of such cases where the proceedings initiated against the police personnel need to be quashed.” … … … 65. The law relating to the requirement of sanction to entertain and/or take cognizance of an offence, allegedly committed by a police officer under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act, is well settled by this Court, inter alia by its decisions referred to above.

66. Sanction of the Government, to prosecute a police officer, for any act related to the discharge of an official duty, is imperative to protect the police officer from facing harassive, retaliatory, revengeful and frivolous proceedings. The requirement of sanction from the Government, to prosecute would give an upright police officer the confidence to discharge his official duties efficiently, without fear of vindictive retaliation by initiation of criminal action, from which he would be protected under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act. At the same time, if the policeman has committed a wrong, which constitutes a criminal offence and renders him liable for prosecution, he can be prosecuted with sanction from the appropriate Government.

67. Every offence committed by a police officer does not attract Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act. The protection given under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act has its limitations. The protection is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and official duty is not merely a cloak for the objectionable act. An offence committed entirely outside the scope of the duty of the police officer, would certainly 69 not require sanction. To cite an example, a policeman assaulting a domestic help or indulging in domestic violence would certainly not be entitled to protection. However, if an act is connected to the discharge of official duty of investigation of a recorded criminal case, the act is certainly under colour of duty, no matter how illegal the act may be.

68. If in doing an official duty a policeman has acted in excess of duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the fact that the act alleged is in excess of duty will not be ground enough to deprive the policeman of the protection of the government sanction for initiation of criminal action against him.

69. The language and tenor of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act makes it absolutely clear that sanction is required not only for acts done in discharge of official duty, it is also required for an act purported to be done in discharge of official duty and/or act done under colour of or in excess of such duty or authority.

70. To decide whether sanction is necessary, the test is whether the act is totally unconnected with official duty or whether there is a reasonable connection with the official duty. In the case of an act of a policeman or any other public servant unconnected with the official duty there can be no question of sanction. However, if the act alleged against a policeman is reasonably connected with discharge of his official duty, it does not matter if the policeman has exceeded the scope of his powers and/or acted beyond the four corners of law.” (Emphasis supplied) 15. On a coalesce of the judgments rendered by the Apex Court as afore-quoted, what would unmistakably emerge is, 70 prosecution cannot continue against public servants, if the acts of such public servants were in the course of discharge of their official duties or has reasonable nexus to the discharge of official duties. An illustration is also given by the Apex Court in all the above cases as to what would amount to discharge of official duty and what would amount to private duty and the unmistakable inference that can be drawn, in the considered view of this Court is that, if there is nexus qua the allegation to the discharge of official duty, sanction for such prosecution of public servant is imperative. In all the aforesaid cases, the Apex Court was considering the ingredients of allegations which sprung from the acts of those Government servants while performing their official duty. If, on the bedrock of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid cases, the case at hand is noticed, it becomes unmistakably clear that the allegations or the ingredients of Sections 408 and 409 IPC are laid against the petitioner alleging criminal breach of trust in performance of his official duty. Therefore, cognizance by the learned Magistrate could not have come about without a valid sanction in the eye of law being placed before him, as the act of the learned Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence against the 71 petitioner without a sanction would run foul of the very statute and its interpretation by the Apex Court in the aforesaid cases.

16. It further becomes germane to notice the subsequent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of INDRA DEVI v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN6 where the Apex Court holds that even if the offences are punishable under Sections 467, 420 or any other provision of the IPC and if it touches upon the discharge of official duty, sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC becomes mandatory. The Apex Court in the said case has held as follows: “10. We have given our thought to the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. Section 197 CrPC seeks to protect an officer from unnecessary harassment, who is accused of an offence committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties and, thus, prohibits the court from taking cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction of the competent authority. Public servants have been treated as a special category in order to protect them from malicious or vexatious prosecution. At the same time, the shield cannot protect corrupt officers and the provisions must be construed in such a manner as to advance the cause of honesty, justice and good governance. (See Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh [Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC64 (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 1041:(2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 666]..) The alleged indulgence of the officers in cheating, fabrication of records or misappropriation cannot be said to be in discharge of their official duty. However, such sanction is necessary if the offence alleged against the public servant is 6 (2021) 8 SCC76872 committed by him “while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty” and in order to find out whether the alleged offence is committed “while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty”, the yardstick to be followed is to form a prima facie view whether the act of omission for which the accused was charged had a reasonable connection with the discharge of his duties. (See State of Maharashtra v. Budhikota Subbarao [State of Maharashtra v. Budhikota Subbarao, (1993) 3 SCC339 1993 SCC (Cri) 901]..) The real question, therefore, is whether the act committed is directly concerned with the official duty.

11. We have to apply the aforesaid test to the facts of the present case. In that behalf, the factum of Respondent 2 not being named in the FIR is not of much significance as the alleged role came to light later on. However, what is of significance is the role assigned to him in the alleged infraction i.e. conspiring with his superiors. What emerges therefrom is that insofar as the processing of the papers was concerned, Surendra Kumar Mathur, the Executive Officer, had put his initials to the relevant papers which was held in discharge of his official duties. Not only that, Sandeep Mathur, who was part of the alleged transaction, was also similarly granted protection. The work which was assigned to Respondent 2 pertained to the subject-matter of allotment, regularisation, conversion of agricultural land and fell within his domain of work. In the processing of application of Megharam, the file was initially put up to the Executive Officer who directed the inspection and the inspection was carried out by the Junior Engineer and only thereafter the Municipal Commissioner signed the file. The result is that the superior officers, who have dealt with the file, have been granted protection while the clerk, who did the paper work i.e. Respondent 2, has been denied similar protection by the trial court even though the allegation is of really conspiring with his superior officers. Neither the State nor the complainant appealed against the protection granted under Section 197 CrPC qua these two other officers. 73

12. We are, thus, not able to appreciate why a similar protection ought not to be granted to Respondent 2 as was done in the case of the other two officials by the trial court and High Court, respectively. The sanction from the competent authority would be required to take cognizance and no sanction had been obtained in respect of any of the officers. It is in view thereof that in respect of the other two officers, the proceedings were quashed and that is what the High Court has directed in the present case as well.” (Emphasis supplied) Therefore, in the light of the judgments so rendered by the Apex Court including the one rendered in the year 2021 in the case of INDRA DEVI what would unmistakably emerge is that previous sanction for prosecution either under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act or under Section 197 of the CrPC is mandatory. The afore-quoted judgments rendered by the Apex Court would cover the issue on its fours.

17. The State has placed much reliance upon the judgment in the case of PUNJAB STATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION v. BHUSHAN CHANDER AND ANOTHER7 to buttress its submission that sanction for offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471 or 409 of the IPC would not require any sanction by their very nature. The issue before the Apex Court can be gathered from the beginning of the judgment and it reads as follows:

7. (2016) 13 SCC4474 “The singular question that has emanated in this appeal, by special leave, is whether the High Court has correctly accepted [Bhushan Chander v. State of Punjab, 2011 SCC OnLine P&H5393 the submission advanced on behalf of the first respondent, who was convicted for offences punishable under Sections 409/467/468/471 of the Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”) and had been awarded sentence for each of the offences with the stipulation that they would run concurrently, that he being an employee of the appellant Corporation is a public servant and the trial had commenced without obtaining sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and hence, the trial in entirety was invalid and as a result the conviction and sentence deserved to be set aside.” The Apex Court was answering a question whether an employee of Punjab State Warehousing Corporation was a public servant or otherwise and the trial which had commenced without obtaining sanction under Section 197 CrPC was invalid in its entirety, which resulted in the conviction and sentence being set aside. The Apex Court answers the issue at paragraphs 20 to 24, which reads as follows: “20. A survey of the precedents makes it absolutely clear that there has to be a reasonable connection between the omission or commission and the discharge of official duty or the act committed was under the colour of the office held by the official. If the act(s), omission or commission of which is totally alien to the discharge of the official duty, question of invoking Section 197 CrPC does not arise. We have already reproduced few passages from the impugned order from which it is discernible that to arrive at the said conclusion the learned Single Judge has placed reliance on the authority in B. Saha [B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC177:

1979. SCC (Cri) 939]. . The conclusion is based on the assumption that the allegation is that while being a public servant, the alleged criminal breach of 75 trust was committed while he was in public service. Perhaps the learned Judge has kept in his mind some kind of concept relating to dereliction of duty. The issue was basically entrustment and missing of the entrusted items. There is no dispute that the prosecution had to prove the case. But the public servant cannot put forth a plea that he was doing the whole act as a public servant. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to appreciate the reasoning of the High Court. As is noticeable he has observed that under normal circumstances the offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC may be of such nature that obtaining of sanction under Section 197 CrPC is not necessary but when the said offences are interlinked with an offence under Section 409 IPC sanction under Section 197 for launching the prosecution for the offence under Section 409 is a condition precedent. The approach and the analysis are absolutely fallacious. We are afraid, though the High Court has referred to all the relevant decisions in the field, yet, it has erroneously applied the principle in an absolute fallacious manner. No official can put forth a claim that breach of trust is connected with his official duty. Be it noted the three-Judge Bench in B. Saha [B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC177:

1979. SCC (Cri) 939]. has distinguished Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli [Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay, AIR1955SC287:

1955. Cri LJ857 keeping in view the facts of the case. It had also treated the ratio in Amrik Singh [Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu, AIR1955SC309:

1955. Cri LJ865 to be confined to its own peculiar facts. The test to be applied, is as has been stated by Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J.

in the Constitution Bench in Matajog Dobey [Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR1956SC44:

1956. Cri LJ140 which we have reproduced hereinbefore. The three-Judge Bench in B. Saha [B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC177:

1979. SCC (Cri) 939]. applied the test laid down in Gill case [Gill v. R., (1948) 10 FCR19 AIR1948PC128 (1947-48) 75 IA41 1948 SCC OnLine PC10 wherein Lord Simonds has reiterated that the test may well be whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim, that what he does, he does in virtue of his office.

21. Tested on the touchstone of the said principles, it cannot be said that in the obtaining factual matrix, sanction under Section 197 CrPC was necessary. We are compelled to observe that the High Court should have been more vigilant in understanding the ratio of the decisions of this Court. 76

22. Another line of argument was advanced on behalf of the appellant Corporation that even if the respondents are treated as public servants, they being the employees of the Corporation, they do not get the protective shelter of Section 197 CrPC. In Lakshmansingh Himatsingh Vaghela [Lakshmansingh Himatsingh Vaghela v. Naresh Kumar Chandrashanker Jah, (1990) 4 SCC169 1990 SCC (Cri) 558]., a three-Judge Bench dissecting the anatomy of Section 197(1) CrPC opined that the said provision clearly intends to draw a line between public servants and to provide that only in the case of the higher ranks should the sanction of the Government to their prosecution be necessary. While a public servant holding an office of the kind mentioned in the section is as such public servant appointed to another office, his official acts in connection with the latter office will also relate to the former office. Thereafter, the Court ruled: (SCC p. 171, para

5) “5. … The words “removable from office” occurring in Section 197 signify removal from the office he is holding. The authority mentioned in the section is the authority under which the officer is serving and competent to terminate his services. If the accused is under the service and pay of the local authority, the appointment to an office for exercising functions under a particular statute will not alter his status as an employee of the local authority.” In the said case, the appellant was admittedly a laboratory official in the service and pay of Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad. His appointment as Public Analyst by the Government, as held by this Court, did not confer him the status of a public servant or an officer under service and pay of the Government. Being of this view, the Court opined he was not a public servant removable only by the State Government and accordingly allowed the appeal.

23. In Mohd. Hadi Raja v. State of Bihar [Mohd. Hadi Raja v. State of Bihar, (1998) 5 SCC91:

1998. SCC (Cri) 1265 : AIR1998SC1945 the question arose whether Section 197 CrPC was applicable for prosecuting officers of the public sector undertakings or the government companies which can be treated as State within the meaning of Article 12 of the 77 Constitution of India. The Court referred to Section 197 CrPC, noted the submissions and eventually held that the protection by way of sanction under Section 197 CrPC is not applicable to the officers of government companies or the public undertakings even when such public undertakings are “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution on account of deep and pervasive control of the Government.

24. The High Court has not accepted the submission of the Corporation in this regard. We are constrained to note that the decision in Mohd. Hadi Raja [Mohd. Hadi Raja v. State of Bihar, (1998) 5 SCC91 1998 SCC (Cri) 1265 : AIR1998SC1945 has been referred to in the grounds in this appeal. There is nothing on record to suggest that the said decision was cited before the High Court. It has come to our notice on many an occasion that the relevant precedents are not cited by the Corporations and the government undertakings before the High Court. We should, as advised at present, only say that a concerted effort should be made in that regard so that a stitch in time can save nine.” The Apex Court was rendering its judgment on the facts obtaining in the cases therein. Subsequent judgments of the Apex Court which are quoted hereinabove would clearly indicate that sanction is imperative even for offences involving cheating, forgery or criminal breach of trust.

18. Yet another circumstance is that the Inquiry Officer has held that the charges against the petitioner are not proved on the departmental side and on such report of the Inquiry Officer, communications are made by the Chief Executive Officer of Zilla 78 Panchayat to the Secretary to Government/Disciplinary Authority to close the proceedings. The finding of the Inquiry Officer is that acts of the petitioner have not resulted in any loss to the Government. With the said finding, all that remains is an order has to be passed by the Disciplinary Authority. No doubt, the Disciplinary Authority is always empowered to agree/disagree with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. None of those stages have come about i.e., either acceptance of Inquiry Officer’s report or disagreement to it. Therefore, this Court would not delve deep into the said issue.

19. The co-ordinate Bench (supra) in one of the charge sheets has quashed the proceedings on account of sanction not being obtained to prosecute the accused therein. The accused therein was accused No.7 and the petitioner is accused No.1. The issue is similar as it springs from a solitary allegation of funds being misappropriated under MGNREGA. Therefore, the judgments that are rendered by the Apex Court later to the judgment in the case of PUNJAB STATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION would become applicable to the facts of the case at hand and not the one that is relied on by the learned High Court Government Pleader. 79

20. As a parting observation, it would not be inapt to notice that plethora of cases are brought before this Court seeking quashment of registration of criminal cases pending before concerned Courts against the public servants. In all such cases, either no sanction is sought for as in the case at hand or no decision is taken on the requisition for sanction as necessary under Section 197 of the CrPC. The continuation of trial in all such cases is obliterated on the ground of want of sanction. The State/Competent Authority in certain cases would not pass orders on the requisition of sanction by the respective Investigating Agencies for days or even months together. This has resulted in proliferation of litigation by those public servants, all for not seeking any sanction or indecisiveness on the requisition for according sanction. If only the State/Competent Authority would act without brooking any delay, either accepting or rejecting the requisition for sanction, it would avoid litigation being brought before this Court.

21. It is trite that this Court cannot issue a mandamus for grant of sanction, as it is in the realm of discretion of the Competent Authority to grant or refuse sanction after application of 80 mind. But, the concern of the Court is that the Competent Authority do not act immediately or within a reasonable time. If Government wants to curb corruption, a bane to the society in the present day, such intention of the Government should be reflected in swift action, particularly in cases concerning corruption or any act of a public servant in discharge of his official duty. On the other hand, the Government Advocates put up vehement opposition before this Court contending that sanction is not required for offences punishable under Sections 408, 409 and 420 IPC. Therefore, I deem it appropriate to observe that instead of Government putting up vehement opposition before this Court through its counsel, it would be imperative for the Competent Authority to pass orders on the requisitions for such sanction either granting or refusing and the Investigating Agencies send such requisitions wherever necessary.

22. In the wake of such litigation being generated on indecisiveness of respective Competent Authorities either on the ignorance of the Investigating Agency in not requesting for sanction or the indecisiveness of the respective Competent Authorities in not passing necessary orders, I deem it appropriate to observe that the 81 concerned Competent Authority shall henceforth decide on the requisitions sent by the Investigating agency, with an outer limit of six months, if not earlier, as only on account of want of sanction the proceedings are quashed even in cases where corruption is the allegation. Therefore, the State or the Competent Authority cannot sit over the files for sanction for months together and ‘contend not taking any decision is also a decision’.

23. For the aforesaid reasons, permitting further proceedings to continue against the petitioner on both the aforesaid counts would undoubtedly become contrary to law and result in miscarriage of justice.

24. Wherefore, the following:

ORDER

(i) Criminal petitions are allowed. (ii) The order of the learned Magistrate taking cognizance and registering criminal cases in all the C.Cs’. impugned in all these petitions stand quashed. (iii) The concerned Court shall proceed with the proceedings in all these criminal cases against the 82 petitioner only after the prosecution places on record, sanction for prosecuting the petitioner before the concerned Court from the hands of the Competent Authority. (iv) The Competent Authority shall take a decision with regard to the sanction of the prosecution of the petitioner, if any sought for, within a reasonable time without brooking any delay bearing in mind the observations made in the course of the order. Sd/- JUDGE bkp CT:MJ

Court	Karnataka High Court
Decided On	Mar-16-2023
Case Number	CRL.P 8429/2022
Judge	M.NAGAPRASANNA
Appellant	M. S. Faneesha
Respondent	State Of Karnataka

M. S. Faneesha Vs. State Of Karnataka - Court Judgment