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Shri.shivanand Vs. Shri.bhimappa - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citation
CourtKarnataka Dharwad High Court
Decided On
Case NumberMFA 100626/2014
Judge
AppellantShri.shivanand
RespondentShri.bhimappa
Excerpt:
r in the high court of karnataka dharwad bench dated this the07h day of september, 2022 before the hon’ble mr. justice pradeep singh yerur mfa no.100626/2014 (mv-i) between: shri.shivanand s/o. mahadev bannur, age:43. years, occ: advocate, r/o. vidyanagar, gokak, dist: balgaum. ...appellant (by sri : sanjay s.katageri, advocate) and1. shri.bhimappa s/o basalingappa kalsannavar, age:33. years, occ: agriculture, r/o. balobal,tq: gokak. (owner of jeep no.ka-23/m-3312) (since deceased by his l.rs.) 1 a) smt. shreedavi w/o bhimappa kalsannavar, age:32. years, occ: agriculture, r/o balobal, tq.gokak. . 1 b) mahantesh s/o bhimappa kalsannavar, age:16. years, occ: student. minor (r/by their m/g natural mother-respondent no.1a) 2 1c) nagaratna d/o bhimappa kalsannavar, age:14. years, occ:.....
Judgment:

R IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH DATED THIS THE07H DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2022 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP SINGH YERUR MFA NO.100626/2014 (MV-I) BETWEEN: SHRI.SHIVANAND S/O. MAHADEV BANNUR, AGE:

43. YEARS, OCC: ADVOCATE, R/O. VIDYANAGAR, GOKAK, DIST: BALGAUM. ...APPELLANT (By SRI : SANJAY S.KATAGERI, ADVOCATE) AND1. SHRI.BHIMAPPA S/O BASALINGAPPA KALSANNAVAR, AGE:

33. YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O. BALOBAL,TQ: GOKAK. (OWNER OF JEEP NO.KA-23/M-3312) (SINCE DECEASED BY HIS L.RS.) 1 A) SMT. SHREEDAVI W/O BHIMAPPA KALSANNAVAR, AGE:

32. YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O BALOBAL, TQ.GOKAK. . 1 B) MAHANTESH S/O BHIMAPPA KALSANNAVAR, AGE:

16. YEARS, OCC: STUDENT. MINOR (R/BY THEIR M/G NATURAL MOTHER-RESPONDENT NO.1A) 2 1C) NAGARATNA D/O BHIMAPPA KALSANNAVAR, AGE:

14. YEARS, OCC: STUDENT. MINOR (R/BY THEIR M/G NATURAL MOTHER-RESPONDENT NO.1A) 1 D) RAMESH S/O BHIMAPPA KALSANNAVAR, AGE:

12. YEARS, OCC: STUDENT. MINOR (REP.BY THEIR M/G NATURAL MOTHER-RESPONDENT NO.1A) 1 E) GAYATRI D/O BHIMAPPA KALSANNAVAR, AGE:

11. YEARS, OCC: STUDENT. MINOR (R/BY THEIR M/G NATURAL MOTHER-RESPONDENT NO.1A) 2 . THE RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY R/BY ITS DEPUTY MANAGER, CTS NO.472 TO474 V.A. KALBURGI SQUARE, DASAL CROSS, DESHPANDE NAGAR, HUBLI … RESPONDENTS (BY SRI.NAGARAJ C.KOLLOORI, ADVOCATE FOR R2; NOTICE IS SERVED TO R-1) *** MFA FILED U/SEC.173(1) OF MV ACT, AGAINST

JUDGMENT

AND AWARD DTD:28.11.2013, PASSED IN MVC.NO.2706/2011 ON THE FILE OF THE PRL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND ADDL. MACT GOKAK, DISMISSING THE CLAIM PETITION FILED U/S.166 OF MV ACT. THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON0807.2022 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF

ORDER

THIS DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

3.

JUDGMENT

This appeal is preferred by the claimant aggrieved by the judgment and award dated 28.11.2013 passed by the Principal Senior Civil Judge and Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Gokak, in MVC No.2706/2011. This appeal is premised on the ground of arbitrary dismissal of the claim petition without application of mind by the Tribunal and for awarding suitable compensation, 2. Though this matter is listed for admission, with consent of learned counsel on both sides, matter is taken up for final disposal.

3. Parties to the appeal shall be referred to as per their status before the Tribunal.

4. Brief facts of the case: On 26.01.2010, when the claimant along with his relatives had been to Hubli on private work in a Jeep bearing Registration No.KA-23 / M-3312 and when they were returning to Gokak at about 11.30pm, near Kurubagatti Cross on Gokak Yaragatti Road the driver of the jeep drove the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. 4 At the same time, a tractor coming from the opposite side lost control over the same and dashed against the jeep resulting in accident, due to which claimant sustained grievous injuries.

5. Immediately, he was taken to the hospital for treatment, he suffered fracture of radius and ulna middle 1/3 (R) forearm, cut lacerated wound ®side of chest, cut lacerated wound on frontal scalp bony deep, abrasions on (R) forearm and other multiple injuries all over the body. He spent Rs.50,000/- towards medical expenses and he requires another Rs.50,000/- for future medical expenses.

6. The claimant filed a claim petition against the respondents seeking compensation. Originally the claim petition was filed under Section 163-A of IMV Act, subsequently during the pendency of the petition, it was converted into one under Section 166 of IMV Act by way of amendment.

7. On service of notice, respondent Nos.1 and 2 appeared and filed their respective objections. Respondent No.1 – owner of the jeep, represented by his L.Rs., filed 5 written statement on 18.04.2012 admitting the petition averments and the accident. Later, they filed additional objections on 06.02.2013 after amendment of the petition, wherein they denied the averments, inter alia, contending that if the Court comes to a conclusion that they are liable to pay compensation, the liability may be fastened upon the respondent No.2 - Insurer as the policy was in force as on date of occurrence of accident.

8. Respondent No.2- Insurer filed written statement, inter-alia, denying petition averments and contended that there is delay in filing the complaint. The driver of the tractor not having any valid license and tractor was not insured. Further it pleaded that police have file “C’ report before JMFC stating that the accused could not be traced. It also contended that owner and insurer of the tractor are also necessary parties and without whom the present petition is not maintainable. After amendment of the claim petition respondent No.2 - Insurer filed additional written statement contending that claimant has failed to bring his case within the purview of Section 166 of IMV Act, in view of the fact that connected 6 matters are filed under Section 163-A of IMV Act in MVC No.332 & 333 of 2011 before the Addl. Senior Civil Judge and Addl. MACT, Gokak and they are disposed of as not maintainable. It also pleaded that the amount of compensation sought was exorbitant and pleaded for dismissal of the claim petition.

9. Based on the pleadings, the Tribunal framed relevant issues for consideration. In order to substantiate and establish the case, claimant examined herself as PW1 and the doctor as PW2 and another witness as PW3 and got marked Exs.P1 to P22. On the other hand, no evidence came to be adduced either by respondent No.1– Owner of the jeep or respondent No.2 - Insurance company neither marked any documents.

10. The Tribunal considering the evidence both oral and documentary, dismissed the claim petition filed under Section 166 IMV Act.

11. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the claim petition by the Tribunal, the claimant is before this Court seeking to set aside the dismissal order and in turn award 7 compensation on several grounds urged in the appeal and direct the respondent No.1-owner of the jeep and respondent No.2 - Insurer jointly and severally to pay the same.

12. It is the vehement contention of the learned counsel for the claimant that the Tribunal has committed a gross error in dismissing the claim petition, which is illegal on the basis of facts and law and hence liable to be set aside. He further contends that when the Insurance policy is produced at Ex.R1, the Tribunal committed an error in rejected the same on the ground that appellant is not a 3rd party to the policy, but ought to have considered the claim of the claimant. He further contends that the Tribunal ought to have considered the claim of the claimant and erroneously rejected it on the ground that merely the other vehicle on which the complaint, FIR and charge sheet were filed, stating that the driver of the tractor was not traced and as such ‘C’ report came to be filed. He further contends that the Tribunal held that when the allegations and documents are against the unknown vehicle which is involved in the accident and claimant 8 failed to prove rash and negligent driving on the driver of the jeep and dismissed the claim petition which is an error and illegal and the same is liable to be set aside.

13. Learned counsel for claimant further contends that the claimant has been able to prove the allegations made in the complaint but apparently it is evident that the accident has occurred in the middle of the road due to rash and negligent driving by both the drivers of the vehicles involved in the accident. But merely on the ground that the FIR, charge sheet as against the involved vehicle was not traced by the investigating authority, cannot be a ground to dismiss the claim petition itself. He further contends that the Tribunal has ignored to look into Ex.P3 and P4 which are spot panchanama and sketch.

14. Learned counsel for claimant further contends that though initially the claim petition came to be filed under Section 163-A of the IMV Act, it came to be subsequently amended to Section 166 of the IMV Act. He further contends that subsequent to the amendment the Tribunal is required to consider the evidence pursuant to the amendment and not those adduced prior to the 9 amendment invoking Section 166 of the IMV Act. The Tribunal has committed an error in not appreciating the fact that the claimant is a third party to both the vehicles as he was an inmate in the jeep which dashed against the on coming tractor and trailer, which was not traced. Hence, it is his contention that non-tracing of the tractor and trailer would not disprove the occurrence of accident and injury sustained by the claimant and the same would not disentitle the claimant.

15. Learned counsel for claimant further contends that the Tribunal has lost sight of the fact that apparently there is a FIR filed as per Ex.P2, spot panchanama as Ex.P3 and hand sketch as Ex.P4 are prepared and filed, but pursuant to conducting investigation a ‘C’ report is filed by the police, which by itself cannot be concluded that there was no case made out by the claimant. He further contends that the Tribunal has solely relied on the claim petition filed earlier under Section 163-A of the IMV Act and the pleadings made there under to disbelieve the version of the claimant with regard to injuries having been suffered in the accident occurred due to the negligence of 10 both the vehicles, namely, the jeep, in which the claimant was traveling and the tractor and trailer.

16. Learned counsel for claimant further contends that the Tribunal has erred in committing gross error on the ground that the claimant being an Advocate by profession, has not inspired confidence in narration of the events of occurrence of accident, lodging of complaint, involvement of the vehicle and negligence of the drivers of both the vehicles. The Tribunal has distinguished the veracity of the statement made by that of a practicing Advocate with that of a common layman. He further contends that the Tribunal has also committed an error that the claimant has not pleaded with regard to rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the jeep in which he was travelling, ignoring the testimony of the claimant himself as PW1.

17. Learned counsel for claimant further contends that the Tribunal has erred in coming to the conclusion that the judgment in MVC No.332/2011 and 333/2011 would not be applicable and helpful to the claimant herein. He further contends that Ex.P1 – Complaint itself is 11 apparently evident of the occurrence of accident between the tractor and trailer and jeep, in which there is clear mention with regard to the claimant herein having suffered injures and shifted to the Hospital for treatment, which is ignored by the Tribunal.

18. Learned counsel for claimant further contends that claimant being an inmate passenger of the jeep involved in the road traffic accident, being the third party is entitled to claim compensation from either of the vehicles involved in the accident and this being the composite negligence of both the vehicles, claimant is entitled to claim compensation against any one or both of the joint tort feasors, which has been ignored and not considered by the Tribunal.

19. Learned counsel for claimant further contends that the claimant having suffered injuries got examined the doctor as PW2, who has stated on oath that after clinical and radiological findings the claimant has suffered total physical disability of 50% in relation to right upper limb and he has issued a disability certificate as per 12 Ex.P21. It is submitted that this fact has also been ignored by the Tribunal.

20. Learned counsel for claimant further contends that the claimant being a practicing Advocate was earning atleast Rs.25,000/- to Rs.30,000/- per month and aged 40 years and appropriate multiplier of 15 requires to be computed by this Court for awarding compensation. He further contends that the claimant has produced documents with regard to the expenditure met by him towards treatment of injuries as per Ex.P10 to P15, wherein the claimant has incurred expenses to an extent of Rs.20,750/- along with an additional amount of Rs.10,000/-. Hence, on these grounds he seeks to set aside the judgment of dismissal passed by the Tribunal and allow the appeal by awarding suitable compensation. Learned Counsel relies on the following authorities in support of his case.

1. KHENYEI vs NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED AND OTHERS reported in 2015 ACJ1441 13 2. KAMLESH AND OTHERS vs ATTAR SINGH AND OTHERS reported in 2016 ACJ13. KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR vs ARUN @ ARAVIND AND OTHERS reported in ILR2004KAR2621. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No.2 - Insurance Company vehemently contends that the judgment and award passed by the tribunal is perfectly in consonance with the material evidence placed on record and the Tribunal has appreciated all the material evidence including both oral and documentary and has arrived at a well reasoned judgment dismissing the claim petition which does not call for interference by this Court. He further contends that the Tribunal is right in coming to the conclusion that the statement and the theory put forth by the claimant itself is unacceptable considering the fact that the claimant is a practicing Advocate, therefore, the theory put forth by the claimant initially with regard to filing of the petition under Section 163-A of the IMV Act, wherein a clear averment is made with regard to the negligence is only by the driver of the tractor and trailer has been rightly appreciated and the second theory of bringing out the 14 amendment to the original claim petition changing the provision of law to Section 166 of the IMV Act cannot be believed to be true. Hence, no interference is called for in the present case on hand.

22. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 - Insurer further contends that the Tribunal is right in holding that the claimant being the practicing Advocate is presumed to know the law and the procedures and therefore, he cannot take umbrage in the guise of a common layman to keep changing his version to suit his benefit. The Tribunal has also rightly concluded that no averment or pleading is made with regard to rash and negligent driving by the driver of the jeep. Hence, the amendment being an after thought of the claimant has been carefully examined by the Tribunal and after considering the same has rightly dismissed the claim petition. In view of the same there is no case made out by the claimant before this Court.

23. Learned counsel further contends that as no piece of evidence is placed before the Court with regard to proof of income, the question of awarding compensation on the basis of the income of Rs.25,000/- to Rs.30,000/- is 15 farfetched and imaginary without there being any material proof on record. He further contends that the evidence adduced by PW2 the doctor is on the higher side and the same cannot be taken up for consideration in view of the fact that the claimant is a practicing Advocate and the injuries suffered by him is not commensurate with the disability stated by the doctor. So also, the evidence of PW3 who is an interested person cannot be taken into consideration which has been rightly negatived by the Tribunal. It is also contended that the present case on hand would not come within the purview of the composite negligence in view of the fact that no allegation of rashness and negligence was made against the driver of the jeep at the first instance. He further contends that the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the claimant would not be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Hence, on these grounds also the appeal does not call for interference and seeks dismissal of the appeal. 16

24. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent-Insurer, the points that would arise for consideration are; (1) Whether the judgment and award passed by the Tribunal is liable to be set aside?. (2) Whether the claimant has made out a valid case to award compensation?. (3) What order?.

25. It is not in dispute that the claimant was traveling in a jeep returning to Gokak at about 11.30 p.m. When the said jeep met with an accident with the tractor trailer coming from the opposite direction in a high speed. It is also not in dispute that the claimant suffered five injuries due to the said accident. It is also an admitted fact that the claimant had initially filed a petition under Section 163-A of the Act and later got the petition amended to Section 166 of the Act and sought for compensation on the ground of negligence committed by the driver of jeep in which he was traveling and so also the negligence of the driver of tractor and trailer. In order to evidence this fact, claimant has got marked Exs.P1 to P6 17 which are all the Police records. These documents are not seriously disputed. It is also an admitted fact that the other inmates traveling along with claimant herein had filed a claim petition under Section 163-A of the Act, which came to be allowed. The question to be decided in this case is as to whether the amendment allowed by the Tribunal to seek compensation under Section 166 of the Act, would have any bearing on the earlier assertions and averments made by the claimant initially under Section 163-A of the Act.

26. Once the Tribunal has permitted the claimant to amend his petition by incorporating the provisions of Section 166 of the Act and the necessary amendments thereto, then the Tribunal will have to consider the claim petition on the requirement under the provisions of Section 166 of the Act rather than any assertions or averments made prior to the amendment. In the present case on hand, it is not in dispute that initially the claimant had filed the petition under Section 163-A of the IMV Act and thereafter, when he realized that he has committed a mistake by invoking the wrong provision, he sought for 18 amendment to invoke Section 166 of the Act which was been allowed by the Tribunal. It is no doubt true that as per law, the requirement of ingredients in both these provisions are different. In the provision under Section 163-A of the Act, it is the theory of ‘no fault liability’ and the claimant would not have to establish negligence by any party, whereas under the provisions of Section 166 of the IMV Act, the claimant will have to necessarily prove and establish rashness and negligence by the offending vehicle leading to the accident.

27. The Tribunal having considered the evidence adduced by PWs 1 to 3 and the documents exhibited Exs.P1 to P22 dismissed the claim petition on the ground that the claimant had initially filed a claim petition under Section 163-A of the IMV Act, wherein he had not made any allegation of rashness and negligence by the driver of the Jeep, in which he was traveling, but later after amending the petition to Section 166 of the Act has made allegation against the driver of the Jeep, which is contrary to the complaint as per Ex.P1 and so also the FIR produced as Ex.P2. The Tribunal has also held that in view of 19 divergent assertions and averments made by the claimant initially under Section 163-A of IMV Act and later, post amendment under Section 166 of IMV Act, one cuts the other thereby inferring that it is contrary to each other, in view of the fact that the claimant had initially made allegations of rashness and negligence against the driver of the tractor and trailer and later alleged rashness and negligence against the driver of the jeep in which he was traveling.

28. I am unable to agree with the finding arrived at by the Tribunal for the simple reason that as stated earlier the occurrence of the accident is not disputed, the involvement of the vehicles, namely, the jeep and the tractor and trailer in the road traffic accident is also not in dispute. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that the accident has occurred due to the involvement of the aforesaid two vehicles, wherein the claimant sustained injuries.

29. The Tribunal has got swayed on the other two claim petitions having been filed by the other claimants in MVC No.332/2011 and 333/2011 arising out of the same 20 accident filed under Section 163-A of IMV Act, wherein the allegations were made against the driver of the jeep in question. It is worthy to mention here that the aforesaid two claim petitions came to be allowed directing the Insurer of the jeep to pay the compensation to the claimants therein. Though the afore stated two claim petitions came to be allowed, the Tribunal has drawn a difference from that of the present case in view of the fact that the present petition is filed under Section 166 of IMV Act and that the claimant had not proved the rashness and negligence on the part of the driver of the jeep.

30. It is also evident from Ex.P1 and P2, the complaint and FIR, that initially the allegations were made against the driver of the tractor and trailer which came from the opposite side and dashed against the jeep and the same is also forth coming in the police records. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the tractor and trailer which came in a rash and negligent manner and dashed against the jeep resulted in the injuries sustained by the claimant in the accident. Therefore, it is evident from the facts on record and the evidence, both oral and 21 documentary, that the tort feasors are the tractor and trailer and the jeep, which was involved in the accident resulting in injuries sustained by the claimant.

31. Apparently, on the face of record, it is a composite negligence, wherein the claimant was only an inmate in the jeep, who is a third party. In a case of composite negligence claimant is entitled to claim against both or any one of a joint tort feasors and to recover the entire compensation from either of the joint tort feasors, jointly or severally. This view is fortified by the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of KHENYEI, KAMLESH AND OTHERS, referred to supra, and the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR vs ARUN @ ARAVIND AND OTHERS, referred to supra, relied by the appellant/claimant.

32. In the present case on hand, claimant has not impleaded the driver or owner of the tractor and trailer and so also the Insurer. It is a case of the claimant that he being an inmate of the jeep, it was the duty of the driver of the jeep to have noted the Registration number of 22 the tractor and trailer. However, merely because the registration number of the tractor and trailer is not noted and the vehicle not traced by the investigating agency, the claimant cannot be deprived of the compensation from the joint tort feasors. The complaint at Ex.P1, the FIR at Ex.P2, the Ex.P3 to P6 being the spot panchanama, sketch map, MVI report and the charge sheet all go to show that the jeep in which the claimant was traveling met with an accident with the tractor and trailer.

33. PW1 in his evidence has clearly narrated in his sworn affidavit that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent act of driver of the jeep in which he was traveling and a categorical statement is made on oath to that effect. So also, PW3, who was also traveling along with the claimant, has stated on oath in his evidence that the driver of the jeep was rash and negligent and drove the jeep in a manner to endanger human life and safety and the driver of the tractor and trailer came from the opposite direction in a rash and negligent manner and dashed against the jeep having lost control. These two statements on oath will have to be taken into consideration 23 along with the pleadings and subsequent amendments made by the claimant to consider the veracity and genuinety of the claim made by the claimant.

34. In a case of composite negligence where two vehicles are involved the claimant is at liberty to sue both of them or either of them. In the present case on hand, admittedly the claimant has not impleaded the driver, owner or insurer of the tractor and trailer. In such situation non-impleadment of one of the joint tort feasor whether the claimant would be disentitled to claim compensation. In my opinion, the answer would be in the negative.

35. As stated earlier the claimant would be at liberty to sue one of the joint tort feasors and the impleaded joint tort feasor would certainly be at liberty to sue the other joint tort feasor in an independent proceedings, if he wishes to.

36. It is evident from the records and the evidence adduced by the parties in support of their case that accident has occurred between jeep and tractor and trailer 24 and merely because the FIR is registered only against the driver of the tractor and trailer, this Court cannot loose sight of the fact that jeep was also involved in the accident, if it was careful, it could have avoided the occurrence of accident. The evidence on hand of PW1 and PW3 clearly depicts that the driver of the jeep was rash and negligent in driving the jeep. Therefore, it is apparently evident leaving no room for doubt that both the drivers were negligent in driving their respective vehicles.

37. In the present case, no doubt, initially the claimant preferred the claim petition under Section 163-A of IMV Act, but, has thereafter amended the petition to one under Section 166 of IMV Act, thereby necessary pleadings are already available on record, which will have to be evaluated on the evidentiary material placed on record by the parties. Hence, it can be safely concluded that both the drivers were equally or to some extent responsible for the occurrence of the accident leading to the injuries sustained by the claimant. In view of the same, the claim petition preferred by the claimant against one of the joint tort feasors, without making the other joint 25 tort feasor a party to the proceedings, would certainly be maintainable and the claim petition could be entertained without the impleadment of the other joint tort feasor. In case during the proceedings before the Tribunal either the claimant or the contesting joint tort feasor is able to identify or bring on record the other joint tort feasor involved in the road traffic accident, then it would become a duty cast upon the Tribunal to assess the apportionment of liability, which is not the situation in the present case on hand.

38. In the present case, only one of the joint tort feasor has been made as a party to the claim petition. This by itself will not dis-entitle the claimant from claiming compensation against one of the joint tort feasor. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the Tribunal has committed an error in dismissing the claim petition filed by the claimant on the ground of no allegation of rashness and negligence was made against the driver of the jeep, in which the claimant was traveling. Though the claimant pursuant to the amendment has involved both the joint tort feasors for rash and negligent driving, it would not act 26 contrary to his earlier pleadings made under Section 163-A of IMV Act.

39. Though the Tribunal has framed issue No.4 - ‘Whether the petitioner is entitled for compensation as prayed in the petition, if so, how much and from whom?.’, it has not dealt in detail with regard to income and award of compensation to the claimant. It has merely held that the claimant would not be entitled for compensation without elaborate discussion as the Tribunal decided to dismiss the claim petition since the provisions of Section 163-A and 166 of IMV Act would contradict itself. This Court would have disposed of the matter if sufficient material was placed on record and if both parties had the opportunity of adducing evidence and cross examining the witness on the aspect of quantum of compensation. Hence, it becomes imperative for this Court to provide an opportunity to both parties to adduce further evidence on the aspect of quantum of compensation, which requires to be decided by the Tribunal rather than this Court in a time bound manner so as to provide an opportunity to either side to examine and cross examine the witness. 27

40. Therefore Pont No.1 is answered in the affirmative 41. Point No.2 is also answered in the affirmative but is remanded to the tribunal to assess the income and quantum of compensation by affording opportunity to the parties.

42. Accordingly, I pass the following;

ORDER

(1) Appeal is partly allowed.; (2) The judgment and award dated 28.11.2013 passed by the Principal Senior Civil Judge and Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Gokak, in MVC No.2706/2011, is set aside.; (3) The matter is remanded to the jurisdictional Tribunal to the limited extent of considering the issue regarding award of quantum of compensation to the claimant.; 28 (4) The Tribunal shall provide opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence and produce documents if any on their behalf on the above said issue.; (5) The Tribunal is directed to dispose of the matter in a time bound manner within an outer limit of four months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment.; (6) It is made clear that this Court has already decided the claim petition to be maintainable and the Tribunal need not touch upon the issue of maintainability of the claim petition. (7) Registry is directed to transmit the trial Court records to the jurisdictional Tribunal forthwith.; SD JUDGE VK


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