1 R IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH DATED THIS THE14H DAY OF MARCH, 2022 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION No.100704 OF2021BETWEEN:
1. VARALAKSHMI W/O CHANDRASHEKHARA GOUDA AGED ABOUT60YEARS, OCC.: HOUSE WIFE, R/O.1/134, G.C. COLONY, UNDABANDA, VIDAPANAKAL MANDAL ANANTHAPUR DISTRICT ANDHRA PRADESH DISTRICT – 515 870.
2. CHANDRASHEKHAR GOUDA S/O.LATE BASAVANNA GOUDA AGED ABOUT67YEARS, OCC.: AGRICULTURIST, R/O.1/134, G.C.COLONY, UNDABANDA, VIDAPANAKAL MANDAL ANANTHAPUR DISTRICT ANDHRA PRADESH DISTRICT – 515 870.
3. PRATHYUSHA D/O.CHANDRASHEKHAR GOUDA AGED ABOUT24YEARS, OCC.: STUDENT, R/O.1/134, G.C. COLONY, UNDABANDA VILLAGE, VIDAPANAKAL MANDALAM, 2 URURAKONDA, ANANTHAPUR DISTRICT – 515 870, ANDHRA PRADESH DISTRICT.
4. SMT.SHWETHA W/O.C.DEVA GOUDA AGED ABOUT28YEARS, OCC.: HOUSE WIFE, YELUBENCHI VILLAGE, BALLARI, NOW R/AT.R/O.FLAT NO,.105, ADITYA BLUE MOON APARTMENTS, WHITE FIELD, BENGALURU – 560 066. ... PETITIONERS (BY KUM.ARCHANA A.MAGADUM, ADVOCATE) AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA BY MARRIYAMMANAHALLI P.S. SANDUR CIRCLE, BALLARI, REP.BY ITS STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD – 580 011.
2. SMT. B. SHRUTHI, W/O. A. PRASANTH AGED ABOUT26YEARS, OCC.: HOUSE WIFE UNDABANDA VILLAGE, VIDAPANAKALLU (M) ANDHARA PRADESH DISTRICT NOW RESIDING AT R/O14H WARD M.M.HALLI, HOSPET TALUK, BALLARI – 583 201. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI RAMESH CHIGARI, HCGP FOR R1; SRI M. AMAREGOUDA, ADVOCATE FOR R2) 3 THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION482OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN C.C.NO.285/2021 (CRIME NO.121/2019) ON THE FILE OF THE III ADDL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC HOSPET, BELLARY, FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION498A) 323, 504, 506 R/W34OF IPC AND3AND4OF D.P.ACT AND ETC., THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
ORDERS ON2402.2022, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
ORDERPetitioners are before this Court calling in question the proceedings in C.C.No.285 of 2021 pending before the III Additional Civil Judge & JMFC, Hospet, Bellary, registered for offences punishable under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 of the IPC r/w. Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (‘the Act’ for short).
2. Heard Ms. Archana A. Magadum, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Ramesh Chigari, learned High Court Government Pleader for respondent No.1 and Sri M. Amaregowda, learned counsel for respondent No.2.
3. Shorn of unnecessary details, facts in brief, are as follows:
4. Before embarking upon consideration of the case, it is necessary to notice the relationship of the parties to the lis. The 2nd respondent is the complainant, wife of one A. Prashanth - accused No.1, who is not before the Court. Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 who are accused Nos.2 and 3 are the mother-in-law and father-in-law respectively, of the complainant. Petitioner No.3 - accused No.4 is the sister-in-law and petitioner No.4 - accused No.5 is another sister-in-law of the complainant and sisters of accused No.1. The aforesaid is the relationship between the parties to the lis. On 21-12-2018, accused No.1 and the complainant got married at Hospet. Relationship between accused No.1 and the complainant turned sore. The allegation of the complainant against accused No.1 is that, he has meted out grave torture upon the complainant. Being unable to bear the onslaught of accused No.1, the complainant registers a complaint on 21-10-2019, alleging offences punishable under Section 498A, 323, 504, 506 r/w. Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. The Police after investigation have 5 filed a charge sheet against all the petitioners and accused No.1 for the aforesaid offences. It is at that juncture, the petitioners have knocked the doors of this Court in the subject petition.
4. The learned counsel Ms. Archana A. Magadum, appearing for the petitioners would vehemently argue and contend that the petitioners who are in no way connected to the life of either accused No.1 or the complainant and have no knowledge of any torture meted out by accused No.1 to the wife/complainant, are simply dragged into these proceedings. The petitioners did not and do not reside with the complainant and accused No.1. The complainant and accused No.1 stayed separately from the family members. Petitioner Nos.1 to 3 are staying in Ananthapur District, Andhra Pradesh and petitioner No.4 is married and stays at Bangalore. Therefore, the learned counsel would submit that there is no cause for dragging the petitioners into these proceedings. 6
5. On the other hand, the learned counsel Sri M. Amare Gowda, appearing for the 2nd respondent/complainant would refute the submissions and contends that the petitioners are equally responsible for the acts of accused No.1 as they have instigated accused No.1 to do all that is alleged. He would submit that since the charge sheet is already filed in the case at hand, it is a matter for trial and there is no warrant for interference by this Court at this stage.
6. The learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the State would also toe the lines of the learned counsel appearing for the complainant/2nd respondent and would contend that it is a matter for trial for the petitioners to come out clean.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. In furtherance whereof, the only issue that falls for my consideration is, 7 “Whether the proceedings against the petitioners can be permitted to be continued in the subject crime?.
8. The aforementioned facts are not in dispute and are, therefore, not reiterated. The marriage between accused No.1 and the complainant took place in the year 2018 and alleging certain instances of torture by accused No.1, the complainant / wife registers the complaint. Since the entire issue springs from the complaint, the same is extracted hereunder for the purpose of quick reference: “EªjÀU,É ªÀiÁ£Àå ¥ÉÆ°Ã¸ï ¸¨À ï E£ïì¥PÉÀÖgï ªÀÄjAiÀĪÀÄ䣺À ½Àî ¥Éưøï oÁu É ªÀÄjAiÀĪÀÄ䣺À ½Àî. ªÀiÁ£ÀågÃÉ, ²ÃæªÀÄw.©.±ÀÈw UAÀq ÀJ.¥PÀæÁ±À 26 ªµÀ ðÀ, °AUÁAiÀÄv Àd£ÁAU À ªÀÄ£PÉ®É ¸ ÀªÁ¸À:GAq§À Aq ÉUÁªæ ÀÄ «qÀÄ¥£ÀPÀ®À Äè ªÀÄAq®À C£AÀvÀ¥ÀÄg À(f) DAz¥sÀæ zÀæ Ãɱ À(gÁdå) ºÁ°, ªÁ¸ À 14 ªÁqðÀ, ªÀÄjAiÀĪÀÄ䣺À À½î ¥ÉÆã À£AÀ:
89718. 3289. ¸gÀï, £Á£ÀÄ ²ÃæªÀÄw. ©.±ÀÈw UAÀqÀ J.¥PÀæÁ± ÀvªÀ ÀÄä°è PÃɽPÉƼÀÄîªÀÅzÃÉ£AÉzgÀ,É ££ÀÀߣÀÄß ¢:
21. 12-2018 gAÀzÀÄ ££ÀÀß vAÀz ÉvÁ¬ÄU¼ÀÀÄ DAzzsÀæ ÀGAq§À Aq É 8 UÁªæ ÀÄ ªÁ¹AiÀiÁz ÀJ ZAÀzÀæ±ÃÉRg ÀUËqgÀ ÀªÀÄU£ÀÁz ÀJ ¥PÀæÁ± ÀEªjÀUÉ £ªÀ ÀÄä ºÁUÀÆ CªgÀ À¸AÀ§A¢PügÀÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ UÀÄgÀÄ»jAiÀÄg À¸ªÀ ÀÄPÀëªÀÄz°À è ºÉƸ¥À ÃÉmAÉiÀÄ ²Ãæ.ªÀiÁPðÀAqÃɱÀég À P¯À Áåt ªÀÄAl¥zÀ °À è ªÀÄzÀÄªÉ ªÀiÁr PÉÆnÖzÀÝgÀÄ. ªÀÄzÀĪAÉiÀÄ ªÃɼAÉiÀÄ°è £ªÀ ÀÄä vAÀzAÉiÀĪgÀÁz À ©.«±Àé£Áx À ºÁUÀÆ £ªÀ ÀÄä vÁ¬ÄAiÀÄ CtAÚ¢gÁz ÀJªÀiï.¥AÀ¥£ÀUÀËq ÀJªÀiï.²ª±ÀAÀPgÀUÀËq ÀºÉƸ¥À ÃÉmAÉiÀÄ ºÉƸÀÆj£ À GªÀiÁ¥wÀ ºÁ¯Á¼ À «Ãg¨À zsÀ ¥Àæ Àà ªÀÄjAiÀĪÀÄ䣺À ½Àî »jAiÀÄgÁz À JA.£fÀ Ãgï CºªÀ ÀÄäz ÀJ®ègÀÆ ¸ÃÉj ££ÀÀß UAÀq£À ÀvAÀz ɺÁUÀÆ CªgÀ ÀzÉÆqÀØ¥Àà jlAiÀÄgï nÃZgÀÀ ºÁUÀÆ CªgÀ À¸AÀ§A¢PüÀgÉÆAzUÉ ÉªÀÄvÀÄPvÀ ɪÀiÁr 15 ®PÀë £UÀzÀ ÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ 20 vÉÆ® §AUÁgzÀ ÀD¨gsÀtÀ U¼À£ÀÀÄß £À£Àß UAÀq£À ÀªÀÄ£AÉiÀĪjÀU É PÉÆnÖzÀÄÝ ªÀÄzÀĪ É ªÀiÁrzÀÝgÀÄ. ªÀÄzÀĪAÉiÀiÁz À ¢£ªÀ ÃÉ ££ÀÀߣÀÄß GAq§É Aq É UÁªæ ÀÄPÉÌ PgÀzÉ ÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ ºÉÆÃzgÀÀÄ. ªÀÄzÀĪAÉiÀiÁz À £AÀvÀg À ££ÀÀß UAÀq À ªÀÄvÀÄÛ CvÉÛ ªÀiÁª À ºÁUÀÆ £Á¢¤AiÀÄgÀÄ Z£ÉÁßV £ÉÆÃrPÉÆArzÀÝgÀÄ. ££ÀÀß UAÀq£ÀÀÄ §j¨Á¬Ä ªÀiÁw£°À è ££ÀÀß ªÉÄï É ¦ÃæwAiÀÄ£ÀÄß vÉÆÃj¸ÀÄwÛzÀÄÝ ªÀÄzÀĪAÉiÀiÁzÁV¤Az À££ÀÀß eÉÆvUÉ É¸AÀ¸ÁgªÀ £ÀÉßà ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀÅ¢®è. P®É ªÀÅ ¢£ À P¼ÀzÉ £ÀAÀvgÀ À ££ÀÀß CvÉÛ ªÀg®À Qëöä ªÀiÁª À ZAÀz±ÀæÃÉRgÀUËq À ºÁUÀÆ £À£Àß £Á¢¤AiÀÄgÁz À ¥vÀæÀÄåPÀë, ±ÉéÃvÁ EªgÀÀÄU¼ÀÀÄ ££ÀßÀ UAÀq¤ÀUÉ ¥ZÀæ ÉÆÃz£ÀÉ ªÀiÁr E£ÀÆß ºaÉ £Ñ À ªgÀzÀ QÀëu É vÀgÀĪAÀv É MvÁ۬ĸ®À Ä ¥ÁgæÀA©¹üzgÀÀÄ. £Á£ÀÄ ªÀiÁqÀĪ ÀP®É ¸UÀ¼À°À è ¸tÀ Ú¥ÀÄlÖ v¥À ÀÄàU¼À£ÀÀÄß ºÀÄqÀÄQ ¤£ÀU ɸjÀAiÀiÁV CqÀÄU É ªÀiÁq®À Ä §gÀĪÀÅ¢®è. ¤£Àß UAÀq£À£ÀÀÄß Z£ÉÁßV £ÉÆÃrPÉƼÀî®Ä §gÀĪÀÅ¢®è JAzÀÄ ¨ÉÊAiÀÄĪÀÅzÀÄ ºÉÆqAÉiÀÄĪÀÅzÀÄ £ªÀ ÀÄä ªÀÄ£UÉ ÉAiÀiÁgÀÄ §gÀĪÀÅ¢®è ºÁUÀÆ £ªÀ ÀÄä ªÀÄ£AÉiÀÄ°è £qÀ AÉiÀÄĪÀÅzÀÄ AiÀiÁjUÀÆ UÉÆvÁÛUÀĪÀÅ¢®è JAzÀÄ ££ÀUÀ É ¨AsÀiÀĪ£ÀÀÄß ºÀÄnÖ¹ ££ÀÀߣÀÄß ¸ÀĪÀÄä£ ÉEgÀĪAÀv ɪÀiÁqÀÄwÛzÀÝgÀÄ. £ªÀ ÀÄä Hj£°À è eÁvAÉæiÀÄ°è §AzÁU À CAzgÀÉ vÁ:
2. 4-2019 gAÀzÀÄ £À£ÉÆßA¢U É dU¼ÀªÀ Ár CªÁZÀå ±§À ÝU½ÀAz À¨ÉÊzÀÄ PÉÊU½ÀAz À§rzÁU À£ªÀ ÀÄä ªÀÄ£AÉiÀĪgÀÀÄ ©r¹PÉÆAqÀÄ §Ä¢Ý ºÃɽgÀÄvÁÛg.É ªÀÄzÀĪÉAiÀiÁz À £Á®ÄÌ wAU¼À À £AÀvÀg À ££ÀÀß UAÀq À P®É ¸ À ªÀiÁqÀĪ ÀHgÁz ÀºÉÊzgÀÁ¨Áz£À°À è ¨ÁrU ɪÀÄ£AÉiÀÄ£ÀÄß ªÀiÁr ££ÀÀߣÀÄß ºÁUÀÆ CªgÀ ÀÀ vÁ¬Ä ªgÀ®À Qëöä ªÀÄvÀÄÛ vAÀV ±ÉéÃvÁ¼£ÀÀÄß ºÉÊzgÀÁ¨Áz£À À ªÀÄ£UÉ É PgÀzÉ ÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ §AzÀÄ C°èAiÀÄÆ ¸ºÀ À ££ÀÀß CvÉÛ ªgÀ®À Qëöäà ºÁUÀÆ £Á¢¤ ±ÉéÃvÁgÀÄ ££ÀUÀ ÉE£ÀÆß ºÉa£ÑÀ QgÀÄPÀļ ÀºÉÆq ɧq ɪÀiÁrgÀÄvÁÛg.É F «ZÁg À ¤ªÀÄä vAÀz É vÁ¬ÄU½ÀU É ºÉýzgÀ É ¤£ÀߣÀÄß ¸Á¬Ä¸ÀÄvÉÛê É JAzÀÄ ¨zÉ jÀP É ºÁQgÀÄvÁÛg.É ¤zsÁ£ªÀ ÁV £Á£ÀÄ £ªÀ ÀÄä vÁ¬ÄU É w½¸®À Ä ££ÀÀß vAÀzAÉiÀĪgÀÀÄ GAq§À Aq É UÁªæ ÀÄPÉÌ ºÉÆÃV ££ÀßÀ ªÀiÁª£ÀªÀ gÀÁzÀ ZAÀz±ÀæÃÉRgUÀËqjÀU É ¨ÉÊ¢gÀÄvÁÛg.É F «ZÁg À w½zÀÄPÉÆAq À ££ÀÀß UAÀq À ££ÀÀߣÀÄß ¨ÉÊzÀÄ ªÁ¥Á¸ÀÄ ªÀÄÄAq§À AqUÉ É PgÀzÉ ÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ §AzgÀÀÄ. £AÀvgÀzÀ °À è PÀÆq À QgÀÄPÀļªÀ £ÀÀÄß ªÀÄÄAzÀĪgÀ¹ÉPÉÆAq ɺÉÆÃUÀÄwÛzÀÝgÀÄ. MAzÀÄ ¢£ ÀCAzgÀÉ 25-5-2019 gAÀzÀÄ ¨½ÉUÉÎ 11-00 UAÀm ɸÀĪÀiÁjU ÉvÀÄqÀÄUÀĸÀƼ ÉE°è £qÀ AÉiÀÄĪ À«ZÁgªÀ £ÀÀÄß ¤£Àß vAÀz ÉvÁ¬ÄU½ÀU Éw½¸ÀÄwÛAiÀiÁ ¤ªÀÄä¥àÀ E°èU ɧAzÀÄ £ªÀ ÀÄä ªÀiÁ£ ÀªÀÄAiÀiÁðz É vUÉ¢É gÀÄvÁÛ£AÉzÀÄ ¨Á¬ÄU É §AzAÀv É ¨ÉÊzÀÄ PÉÊPÁ®ÄU½ÀAzÀ MzÀÄÝ ££ÀUÀ É ¥ÉlÄÖ ªÀiÁrzÀÝgÀÄ. ªÀÄÆgÀÄ ¢£ À©lÄÖ £ªÀ ÄÀä vAÀzAÉiÀÄÄ £ªÀ ÀÄä HjU ɧAzÀÄ £ªÀ ÀÄä 9 ªÀiÁª À ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ££ÀÀß UAÀq À ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÀÄ£AÉiÀĪjÀU É §Ä¢ÞºÉý ¸Àé®à¢£ À HjU É PgÀzÉ ÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ ºÉÆÃUÀĪÀÅzÁV w½¹ £ªÀ ÀÄä HjU É PgÀzÉ ÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ §A¢zÀÝgÀÄ. £Á£ÀÄ ªÀÄjAiÀĪÀÄ䣺À À½îU ɧAzÁV¤Az À££ÀÀß UAÀq À£À£UÀ É¥ÉÆÃ£ï ªÀiÁr ¤ªÀÄä vAÀz¬É ÄAz À MqªÀ UɼÀÀ£ÀÄß ¥qÀ zÉ ÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ ¤Ã£É ¨Á £Á£ÀÄ C°èU É §gÀÄ¢®èªAÉzÀÄ ªÀiÁ£¹ÀP À »A¸ É ¤ÃqÀÄwÛzÀÄÝ ¤Ã£ É E°èU É §AzÀÄ ££ÀÀߣÀÄß PgÀzÉ ÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ ºÉÆÃUÀĪAÀvÉ £Á£ÀÄ ºÃɽzÉÝ£ÀÄ. ¢£ÁAP:À22-6-2019 gAÀzÀÄ ££ÀÀß UAÀq ÀºÁUÀÆ ££ÀÀß ªÀiÁª ÀE§âgÆÀ £ªÀ ÀÄä HjU ɧAzÁU ÀCªjÀU É£ªÀ ÀÄä vAÀz É vÁ¬ÄU¼ÀÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ £ªÀ ÀÄä ¸AÀ§A¢üPgÀÁz À ºÁ¯Á¼ À «Ãg¨À zsÀ ¥Àæ Àà JªÀiï.¥AÀ¥£ÀUÀËq À ªÀÄjAiÀĪÀÄä£Àº½ÀîAiÄÀ JªÀiï.£fÀ Ãg À CºªÀ ÀÄz À EªgÀÀÄU¼ÀÀÄ ££ÀUÀ É ªgÀzÀ QÀëu É QgÀÄPÀļÀ ¤ÃqÄÀwÛgÀĪ À §UÉÎ ¥AÀZÁ¬Äw ªÀiÁr §Ä¢ÞºÃɽzÀÝjAz À MAzÀÄ ªÁgzÀ À £AÀvgÀÀ PgÀzÉ ÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ ºÉÆÃUÀĪÀÅzÁV ºÃɽ ºÉÆÃzªÀ gÀÀÄ ¥ÀÄ£À: PgÀzÉ ÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ §A¢gÀĪÀÅ¢®è. ££ÀÀß UAÀq£ÀÀÄ £Á£ÀÄ ªÀÄzÀĪAÉiÀiÁz À ¢£¢À Az À F ¢£zÀ À ªgÀUÉÀÆ ££ÀÉÆßA¢U É zÉÊ»P À ¸AÀ¥PÀðÀ ºÉÆA¢gÀĪÀÅ¢®è §j £ªÀ ÀÄä vAÀzAÉiÀĪgÀÀÄ ¤Ãrz ÀªgÀzÀ QÀëu ɺtÀ ª£ÀÀÄß ºÁUÀÆ §AUÁgzÀ ÀD¸¬É ÄAz ÀªÀÄzÀĪ ÉDV E£ÀÆß ºaÉ £Ñ ÀªgÀzÀ ÀQëu ÉvgÀÀĪAÀv É££ÀUÀ É zÉÊ»P À ºÁUÀÆ ªÀiÁ£¹ÀP À »A¸ É ¤ÃrgÀÄvÁÛg.É E°AèiÀĪgÀUÉÀÆ ££ÀÀß UAÀq£ÀÀÄ §AzÀÄ ££ÀÀߣÀÄß PgÀzÉ ÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ ºÉÆÃV ¸AÀ¸Ág À ªÀiÁq§À ºÀÄzAÉzÀÄ £ÉÆÃrzÀÄÝ DzgÀ É E°èAiÀĪgÀUÉ É CªgÀÀÄ §AzÀÄ ££ÀÀߣÀÄß PgÀzÉ ÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ ºÉÆÃUzÀ ÃÉ EzÀÄÝzjÀAz À F ¢£ À vqÀ ªÀ ÁV F zÀÆgÀÄ ¤ÃqÀÄwÛzÀÄÝ ªÉÄîÌAq À ££ÀÀß UAÀq À ºÁUÀÆ CªgÀ À ªÀÄ£AÉiÀĪgÀ À «gÀÄzÀÞ PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ jÃw PªÀæ ÀÄ dgÀÄV¸®À Ä vªÀ ÀÄä°è PÃɽPÉƼÀÄîvÉÛã.É zÀÆgÀÄ §gzÉ ªÀ gÀÀÄ EAw vªÀ ÀÄä «±Áé¹, ¸»À /- ¸»À /- 8971833289” The narration in the complaint would unmistakably lead to the inference that the allegations or events made by the complainant were only against the husband. Grave instances of torture and valiant behavior of the husband are clearly brought out in the complaint. But, insofar as the petitioners are 10 concerned, omnibus statements of instigation for such behavior of accused No.1 is narrated. There are no specific overt acts alleged against the petitioners herein, who are other members of the family of accused No.1. It is also not in dispute that the parents of accused No.1 never stayed with the couple. They are residents of Anantapur District, Andhra Pradesh and accused No.5/petitioner No.4 is a resident of Bangalore after her marriage. Petitioner No.3 is the daughter of petitioner Nos.1 and 2, who also resides in Anantapur District. Therefore, even according to the charge sheet, the petitioners do not or did not reside with the couple. Police after investigation in the matter have also filed charge sheet. Column 17 – summary of the charge sheet again indicates grave instances of torture by the husband/accused No.1 and none by the petitioners, who are other accused except stating that the petitioners have instigated accused No.1 to behave in the said manner. Rest of the allegations are all against the husband. Column No.17 of the charge sheet reads as follows:
11. “17. PÃɹ£ À¸AÀQë¥ÀÛ ¸ÁgÁA± À – – ¢£ÁAP À:
21. 12/2018 gAÀzÀÄ ¸ÁQë 1 gªÀ gÀ£ÀÀÄß ¸ÁQë 6 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 7 gªÀ gÀÀÄ – ¸ÃÉj ¸ÁQë 8 jAzÀ 12 gÀªgÀ ÀºÁUÀÆ D-2 & 3 gªÀ Àg À¸ªÀ ÀÄPÀëªÀÄz°À è D-1 gªÀ jÀUÉ ªgÀzÀ QÀëuAÉiÀiÁV15®PÀë £UÀzÀ ÀÄ ºtÀ , 20 v¯À É §AUÁgzÀ À D¨gsÀtÀ U¼À£ÀÀÄß ¤Ãr ºÉƸ¥À ÃÉmAÉiÀÄ ²Ãæ.ªÀiÁPðÀAqÉñÀég ÀP¯À Áåt ªÀÄAl¥zÀ °À è ªÀÄzÀĪ ɪÀiÁrPÉÆnÖzÀÄÝ ¸ÁQë-1 gªÀ gÀÀÄ ¸AÀ¸Ág À ªÀiÁq®À Ä UAÀq£À À ªÀÄ£UÉ É DAzzÀæ À GAqÀħAqUÉ É ºÉÆÃVzÀÄÝ DzgÀ É – ªÀÄzÀĪAÉiÀiÁzÁV¤Az ÀE°èAiÀĪgÀUÉ ÉD-1 Fv£ÀÀÄ ¸ÁQë 1 gªÀ gÀÉÆA¢U ɸAÀ¸ÁgªÀ £ÀÉßà ªÀiÁqzÀ ÃÉ ¸ÁQë-1 gªÀ gÀ ÀPqÀ AÉiÀĪgÀ À¤Ãrz ÀªgÀzÀ QÀëuAÉiÀÄ D¸UÉ É©zÀÄÝ D-1 jAz ÀD-5 gªÀ gÀÀÄ ¸ÃÉj ¸ÁQë-1 gªÀ gÀÀ ªÀiÁqÀĪ ÀªÀÄ£AÉiÀÄ P®É ¸zÀ °À è ¸Àt Ú¥ÀÄlÖ v¥À Àà ºÀÄqÀÄQ Cz£ÀÉßà £¥É ÀªÀiÁrPÉÆAqÀÄ ¤£Àß vAÀz¬É ÄAz ÀºaÉ £Ñ ÀªgÀzÀ QÀëu ɺÁUÀÆ §AUÁg ÀvUÉzÉ ÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ §gÀĪAÀv ÉMvÁÛAiÀÄ ªÀiÁr CªÁZÀå ±§À ÝU½ÀAz À¨ÉåAiÀÄĪÀÅzÀÄ, ºÉÆq§É q ɪÀiÁr ªÀiÁ£¹ÀPÀ ºÁUÀÆ zÉÊ»P À »A¸ É ¤ÃqzÀ ÀÝ®èzÃÉ QgÀÄPÀļÀ ¤ÃqÀĪÀ «ZÁgªÀ £ÀÀÄß ¤£Àß vAÀzÉ vÁ¬ÄUÉ w½¹zgÀ É ¸Á¬Ä¹©qÀĪÀÅzÁV ¨zÉ jÀP É ºÁQzÀÄÝ EgÀÄvÀÛz.É C®èzÃÉ ¢:
12. 04/2019 gAÀzÀÄ ªÀÄjAiÀĪÀÄä£Àº½ÀîU É ¸ÁQë-1 gªÀ gÀ À vªÀ gÀÀÄ ªÀÄ£UÉÉ D-1 Fv£ÀÀÄ eÁvUÉAÉzÀÄ §AzÁU À¸ºÀ Á ¸AÀ¸ÁgzÀ À «ZÁgzÀ °À è D-1 gªÀ gÀÀÄ ¸ÁQë -1 gªÀ jÀU ÉCªÁZÀå ±§À ÝU½ÀAz À ¨ÉÊzÁr PÉÊU½ÀAz À ºÉÆqzÉ ÀÄ QgÀÄPÀļ À ¤ÃrgÀÄvÁÛg.É C®èzÃÉ ¢:
25. 05/2019PÀÆÌ ¸ÀĪÀiÁgÀÄ 10-12 ¢£UÀ¼À ÀP¼ÉUÀ ÉD-1 Fv£ÀÀÄ ºÉÊzgÀÁ¨ÁzÀ è ¨ÃÉgÉÆAzÀÄ ªÀÄ£ ɪÀiÁr D-2 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 4 gªÀ gÀÉÆA¢U ɸÁQë-1 gªÀ gÀ£ÀÀÄß C°èU ÉPgÀzÉ ÀÄPÉÆAq ÀºÉÆÃVzÀÄÝ C°èAiÀÄÆ ¸ºÀ Á D-1, D-2 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 4 gªÀ gÀÀÄ ¸ÁQë-1 gªÀ jÀU ÉzÉÊ»P ÀºÁUÀÆ ªÀiÁ£¹ÀP ÀQgÀÄPÀļÀ ¤ÃrzÀÄÝ F «ZÁg ÀUÉÆvÁÛV ¸ÁQë-7gªÀ gÀÀÄ GAqÀħAq ÉUÁªæ ÀÄPÉÌ §AzÀÄ D-3 gªÀ jÀUÉ ¨ÉÊ¢gÀÄvÁÛgAÉzÀÄ ¸ÁQë-1 gÀªgÀ£ÀÀÄß ºÉÊzÁgÁ¨Ázï ¤Az À GAqÀħAq É UÁªæ ÀÄPÉÌ PgÀzÉ ÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ §AzÀÄ D-1 jAz À D-5 gªÀ gÀÀÄ ¸ÃÉj ¢:
25. 05/2019 gAÀzÀÄ ¨½ÉUÉÎ 11-00 UAÀm É ¸ªÀ ÀÄAiÀÄz°À è ¸ÁQë-1 gªÀ gÀÉÆA¢U É ‘¯ÃÉ vÀÄqÀÄUÀÄ ¸ÀƼÃÉ E°è £qÀ AÉiÀÄĪ À «ZÁgªÀ £ÀÉ߯Áè ¤ªÀÄä vAÀzUÉÉ w½¸ÀÄwÛÃAiÀiÁ ¤ªÀÄä §AzÀÄ £ªÀ ÀÄä ªÀiÁ£ À ªÀÄAiÀiÁðz É vUÉ¢É zÁÝ£’É CAvÁ ¨ÉÊzÀÄ PÉÊPÁ®ÄU½ÀAz ÀºÉÆqzÉ ÀÄ QgÀÄPÀļÀ ¤ÃrgÀÄvÁÛgAÉzÀÄ v¤ÀSAÉiÀÄ°è ¸ÁPÁëöåzsÁgUÀ½ÀAz À DgÉÆÃ¥ À ¸Á©vÁVzÀÝjAz À D-1 jAz À D-5 gªÀ gÀ À «gÀÄzÀÝ P®À A, 498(J), 323, 504, 506, DzsÁg À34 L.¦.¹ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ P®À A3& 4 r.¦.AiÀiÁPïÖ jÃvÁå zÉÆÃ.¥.À¥vÀªÀæ £ÀÀÄß ¸°À è¹gÀÄvÀÛz.É” Thus, the complaint, the investigation and the summary of investigation as found in the final report/charge sheet do not make out any offence against the petitioners. The petitioners do 12 not even reside with the couple. In a squabble between accused No.1 and the complainant, members of the family of accused No.1 who are the petitioners in this petition are hauled into criminal proceedings without any rhyme or reason.
9. The Apex Court has time and again reiterated the principle for quashment of such proceedings, where the members of the family are simply dragged into the proceedings, without there being any allegation of performance of overt act by them. The Apex Court in the case of PREETI GUPTA v. STATE OF JHARKHAND1, has held as follows: “28. We have very carefully considered the averments of the complaint and the statements of all the witnesses recorded at the time of the filing of the complaint. There are no specific allegations against the appellants in the complaint and none of the witnesses have alleged any role of both the appellants.
29. Admittedly, Appellant 1 is a permanent resident of Navasari, Surat, Gujarat and has been living with her husband for more than seven years. Similarly, Appellant 2 is a permanent resident of Goregaon, Maharashtra. They have never visited the place where the alleged incident had taken place. They had never lived with Respondent 2 and her husband. Their implication in the complaint is meant to harass and humiliate the husband's relatives. This seems to 1 (2010) 7 SCC66713 be the only basis to file this complaint against the appellants. Permitting the complainant to pursue this complaint would be an abuse of the process of law.
30. It is a matter of common knowledge that unfortunately matrimonial litigation is rapidly increasing in our country. All the courts in our country including this Court are flooded with matrimonial cases. This clearly demonstrates discontent and unrest in the family life of a large number of people of the society.
31. The courts are receiving a large number of cases emanating from Section 498-A of the Penal Code which reads as under: “498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, ‘cruelty’ means— (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” 14 32. It is a matter of common experience that most of these complaints under Section 498-A IPC are filed in the heat of the moment over trivial issues without proper deliberations. We come across a large number of such complaints which are not even bona fide and are filed with oblique motive. At the same time, rapid increase in the number of genuine cases of dowry harassment is also a matter of serious concern.
33. The learned members of the Bar have enormous social responsibility and obligation to ensure that the social fibre of family life is not ruined or demolished. They must ensure that exaggerated versions of small incidents should not be reflected in the criminal complaints. Majority of the complaints are filed either on their advice or with their concurrence. The learned members of the Bar who belong to a noble profession must maintain its noble traditions and should treat every complaint under Section 498-A as a basic human problem and must make serious endeavour to help the parties in arriving at an amicable resolution of that human problem. They must discharge their duties to the best of their abilities to ensure that social fibre, peace and tranquillity of the society remains intact. The members of the Bar should also ensure that one complaint should not lead to multiple cases.
36. Experience reveals that long and protracted criminal trials lead to rancour, acrimony and bitterness in the relationship amongst the parties. It is also a matter of common knowledge that in cases filed by the complainant if the husband or the husband's relations had to remain in jail even for a few days, it would ruin the chances of an amicable settlement altogether. The process of suffering is extremely long and painful.” (Emphasis supplied) 15 Later, the Apex Court in the case of GEETA MEHROTRA v. STATE OF U.P.2, has held as follows: “25. However, we deem it appropriate to add by way of caution that we may not be misunderstood so as to infer that even if there are allegations of overt act indicating the complicity of the members of the family named in the FIR in a given case, cognizance would be unjustified but what we wish to emphasise by highlighting is that, if the FIR as it stands does not disclose specific allegation against the accused more so against the co-accused specially in a matter arising out of matrimonial bickering, it would be clear abuse of the legal and judicial process to mechanically send the named accused in the FIR to undergo the trial unless of course the FIR discloses specific allegations which would persuade the court to take cognizance of the offence alleged against the relatives of the main accused who are prima facie not found to have indulged in physical and mental torture of the complainant wife. It is the well-settled principle laid down in cases too numerous to mention, that if the FIR did not disclose the commission of an offence, the court would be justified in quashing the proceedings preventing the abuse of process of law. Simultaneously, the courts are expected to adopt a cautious approach in matters of quashing, especially in cases of matrimonial disputes whether the FIR in fact discloses commission of an offence by the relatives of the principal accused or the FIR prima facie discloses a case of over implication by involving the entire family of the accused at the instance of the complainant, who is out to settle her scores arising out of the teething problem or skirmish of domestic bickering while settling down in her new matrimonial surrounding.
26. In the case at hand, when the brother and unmarried sister of the principal accused Shyamji Mehrotra approached the High Court for quashing the proceedings against them, inter alia, on the ground of lack of territorial 2 (2012) 10 SCC74116 jurisdiction as also on the ground that no case was made out against them under Sections 498-A/323/504/506 IPC including Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, it was the legal duty of the High Court to examine whether there were prima facie material against the appellants so that they could be directed to undergo the trial, besides the question of territorial jurisdiction. The High Court seems to have overlooked all the pleas that were raised and rejected the petition on the solitary ground of territorial jurisdiction giving liberty to the appellants to approach the trial court.
27. The High Court in our considered opinion appears to have missed that assuming the trial court had territorial jurisdiction, it was still left to be decided whether it was a fit case to send the appellants for trial when the FIR failed to make out a prima facie case against them regarding the allegation of inflicting physical and mental torture to the complainant demanding dowry from the complainant. Since the High Court has failed to consider all these aspects, this Court as already stated hereinbefore, could have remitted the matter to the High Court to consider whether a case was made out against the appellants to proceed against them. But as the contents of the FIR do not disclose specific allegation against the brother and sister of the complainant's husband except casual reference of their names, it would not be just to direct them to go through protracted procedure by remanding for consideration of the matter all over again by the High Court and make the unmarried sister of the main accused and his elder brother to suffer the ordeal of a criminal case pending against them specially when the FIR does not disclose ingredients of offence under Sections 498-A/323/504/506 IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
28. We, therefore, deem it just and legally appropriate to quash the proceedings initiated against the appellants Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji 17 Mehrotra as the FIR does not disclose any material which could be held to be constituting any offence against these two appellants. Merely by making a general allegation that they were also involved in physical and mental torture of Respondent 2 complainant without mentioning even a single incident against them as also the fact as to how they could be motivated to demand dowry when they are only related as brother and sister of the complainant's husband, we are pleased to quash and set aside the criminal proceedings insofar as these appellants are concerned and consequently the order passed by the High Court shall stand overruled. The appeal is accordingly allowed.” (Emphasis supplied) In another later judgment, in the case RASHMI CHOPRA v. STATE OF U.P.3, the Apex Court holds as follows: “18. The learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on various judgments of this Court in support of his submissions. In K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana [K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana, (2018) 14 SCC452: (2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 605]. , this Court laid down the following in paras 5 and 6 : (SCC p.
454) “5. A perusal of the charge-sheet and the supplementary charge-sheet discloses the fact that the appellants are not the immediate family members of the third respondent/husband. They are the maternal uncles of the third respondent. Except the bald statement that they supported the third respondent who was harassing the second respondent for dowry and that they conspired with the third respondent for taking away his child to USA, nothing else indicating their 3 (2019) 15 SCC35718 involvement in the crime was mentioned. The appellants approached the High Court when the investigation was pending. The charge- sheet and the supplementary charge-sheet were filed after disposal [T.S.K. Ashwin Kumar v. State of Telangana, 2016 SCC OnLine Hyd 432]. of the case by the High Court.
6. Criminal proceedings are not normally interdicted by us at the interlocutory stage unless there is an abuse of the process of a court. This Court, at the same time, does not hesitate to interfere to secure the ends of justice. See State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC335:
1992. SCC (Cri) 426]. . The courts should be careful in proceeding against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of the husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations unless specific instances of their involvement in the crime are made out. (See Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC207:
2000. SCC (Cri) 935]. and Kailash Chandra Agrawal v. State of U.P. [Kailash Chandra Agrawal v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC551: (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 536]. )” … … … … 24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint pertaining to Section 498-A and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. A perusal of the complaint indicates that the allegations against the appellants for the offences under Section 498-A and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act are general and sweeping. No specific incident dates or details of any incident have been mentioned in the complaint. The complaint having been filed after the proceeding for divorce was initiated 19 by Nayan Chopra in the State of Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce was ultimately granted. A few months after filing of the divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the Court of CJM, Gautam Budh Nagar with the allegations as noticed above. The sequence of the events and facts and circumstances of the case leads us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498-A and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act have been filed as counter- blast to divorce petition proceeding in the State of Michigan by Nayan Chopra.
25. There being no specific allegation regarding any one of the applicants except common general allegation against everyone i.e. “they started harassing the daughter of the applicant demanding additional dowry of rupees one crore” and the fact that all relatives of the husband, namely, father, mother, brother, mother's sister and husband of mother's sister have been roped in clearly indicates that the application under Section 156(3) CrPC was filed with a view to harass the applicants. Further, prior to filing of the application under Section 156(3) CrPC there was no complaint at any point of time by the girl or her father making allegation of demand of any dowry by any one of the applicants. When both Nayan Chopra and Vanshika started living separately since November 2013, had there been any dowry demand or harassment the girl would have given complaint to police or any other authority. Further, in the divorce proceedings at Michigan, USA, parties have agreed for dividing their properties including gifts given at marriage but no complaint was made in 20 those proceedings regarding harassment by her husband or his family members. …” (Emphasis supplied) Considering and following the aforesaid judgments, the Apex Court in the recent judgment in the case of KAHKASHAN KAUSAR v. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS4, has held as follows: “Issue Involved “11. Having perused the relevant facts and contentions made by the Appellants and Respondents, in our considered opinion, the foremost issue which requires determination in the instant case is whether allegations made against the in-laws Appellants are in the nature of general omnibus allegations and therefore liable to be quashed?.
12. Before we delve into greater detail on the nature and content of allegations made, it becomes pertinent to mention that incorporation of section 498A of IPC was aimed at preventing cruelty committed upon a woman by her husband and her in- laws, by facilitating rapid state intervention. However, it is equally true, that in recent times, matrimonial litigation in the country has also increased significantly and there is a greater disaffection and friction surrounding the institution of marriage, now, more than ever. This has resulted in an increased tendency to employ provisions such as 498A IPC as instruments to settle personal scores against the husband and his relatives. 4 2022 SCC Online SC16221 13. This Court in its judgment in Rajesh Sharma v. State of U.P. [(2018) 10 SCC472, has observed:— “14. Section 498-A was inserted in the statute with the laudable object of punishing cruelty at the hands of husband or his relatives against a wife particularly when such cruelty had potential to result in suicide or murder of a woman as mentioned in the statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act 46 of 1983. The expression ‘cruelty’ in Section 498A covers conduct which may drive the woman to commit suicide or cause grave injury (mental or physical) or danger to life or harassment with a view to coerce her to meet unlawful demand. It is a matter of serious concern that large number of cases continue to be filed under already referred to some of the statistics from the Crime Records Bureau. This Court had earlier noticed the fact that most of such complaints are filed in the heat of the moment over trivial issues. Many of such complaints are not bona fide. At the time of filing of the complaint, implications and consequences are not visualized. At times such complaints lead to uncalled for harassment not only to the accused but also to the complainant. Uncalled for arrest may ruin the chances of settlement.
14. Previously, in the landmark judgment of this court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar [(2014) 8 SCC273, it was also observed:— “4. There is a phenomenal increase in matrimonial disputes in recent years. The institution of marriage is greatly revered in this country. Section 498-A IPC was introduced with avowed object to combat the menace of harassment to a woman at the hands of her husband and his relatives. The fact that Section 498-A IPC is a cognizable and non-bailable offence 22 has lent it a dubious place of pride amongst the provisions that are used as weapons rather than shield by disgruntled wives. The simplest way to harass is to get the husband and his relatives arrested under this provision. In a quite number of cases, bed-ridden grandfathers and grand-mothers of the husbands, their sisters living abroad for decades are arrested.
15. Further in Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand [(2010) 7 SCC667, it has also been observed:— “32. It is a matter of common experience that most of these complaints under section 498A IPC are filed in the heat of the moment over trivial issues without proper deliberations. We come across a large number of such complaints which are not even bona fide and are filed with oblique motive. At the same time, rapid increase in the number of genuine cases of dowry harassment are also a matter of serious concern.
33. The learned members of the Bar have enormous social responsibility and obligation to ensure that the social fiber of family life is not ruined or demolished. They must ensure that exaggerated versions of small incidents should not be reflected in the criminal complaints. Majority of the complaints are filed either on their advice or with their concurrence. The learned members of the Bar who belong to a noble profession must maintain its noble traditions and should treat every complaint under section 498A as a basic human problem and must make serious endeavour to help the parties in arriving at an amicable resolution of that human problem. They must discharge their duties to the best of their abilities to ensure that social fiber, peace and tranquility of the society remains intact. The members of the Bar should also ensure that one complaint should not lead to multiple cases. 23
34. Unfortunately, at the time of filing of the complaint the implications and consequences are not properly visualized by the complainant that such complaint can lead to insurmountable harassment, agony and pain to the complainant, accused and his close relations.
35. The ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth and punish the guilty and protect the innocent. To find out the truth is a herculean task in majority of these complaints. The tendency of implicating husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon. At times, even after the conclusion of criminal trial, it is difficult to ascertain the real truth. The courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment of husband's close relations who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complaint are required to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection.
36. Experience reveals that long and protracted criminal trials lead to rancour, acrimony and bitterness in the relationship amongst the parties. It is also a matter of common knowledge that in cases filed by the complainant if the husband or the husband's relations had to remain in jail even for a few days, it would ruin the chances of amicable settlement altogether. The process of suffering is extremely long and painful.” 24 16. In Geeta Mehrotra v. State of UP [(2012) 10 SCC741, it was observed:— “21. It would be relevant at this stage to take note of an apt observation of this Court recorded in the matter of G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad reported in (2000) 3 SCC693wherein also in a matrimonial dispute, this Court had held that the High Court should have quashed the complaint arising out of a matrimonial dispute wherein all family members had been roped into the matrimonial litigation which was quashed and set aside. Their Lordships observed therein with which we entirely agree that: “there has been an outburst of matrimonial dispute in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate the disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their cases in different courts.” The view taken by the judges in this matter was that the courts would not encourage such disputes.” 25 17. Recently, in K. Subba Rao v. The State of Telangana [(2018) 14 SCC452, it was also observed that:— “6. The Courts should be careful in proceeding against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of the husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations unless specific instances of their involvement in the crime are made out.
18. The above-mentioned decisions clearly demonstrate that this court has at numerous instances expressed concern over the misuse of section 498A IPC and the increased tendency of implicating relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes, without analysing the long term ramifications of a trial on the complainant as well as the accused. It is further manifest from the said judgments that false implication by way of general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial dispute, if left unchecked would result in misuse of the process of law. Therefore, this court by way of its judgments has warned the courts from proceeding against the relatives and in-laws of the husband when no prima facie case is made out against them.
19. Coming to the facts of this case, upon a perusal of the contents of the FIR dated 01.04.19, it is revealed that general allegations are levelled against the Appellants. The complainant alleged that ‘all accused harassed her mentally and threatened her of terminating her pregnancy’. Furthermore, no specific and distinct allegations have been made against either of the Appellants herein, i.e., none of the Appellants have been attributed any specific role in furtherance of the general allegations made against them. This simply leads to a situation wherein one fails to ascertain the role played by each accused in furtherance of the offence. The allegations are therefore general and omnibus and can at best be said to have been made out on 26 account of small skirmishes. Insofar as husband is concerned, since he has not appealed against the order of the High court, we have not examined the veracity of allegations made against him. However, as far as the Appellants are concerned, the allegations made against them being general and omnibus, do not warrant prosecution.
20. Furthermore, regarding similar allegations of harassment and demand for car as dowry made in a previous FIR. Respondent No.1 i.e., the State of Bihar, contends that the present FIR pertained to offences committed in the year 2019, after assurance was given by the husband Md. Ikram before the Ld. Principal Judge Purnea, to not harass the Respondent wife herein for dowry, and treat her properly. However, despite the assurances, all accused continued their demands and harassment. It is thereby contended that the acts constitute a fresh cause of action and therefore the FIR in question herein dated 01.04.19, is distinct and independent, and cannot be termed as a repetition of an earlier FIR dated 11.12.17.
21. Here it must be borne in mind that although the two FIRs may constitute two independent instances, based on separate transactions, the present complaint fails to establish specific allegations against the in-laws of the Respondent wife. Allowing prosecution in the absence of clear allegations against the in-laws Appellants would simply result in an abuse of the process of law.
22. Therefore, upon consideration of the relevant circumstances and in the absence of any specific role attributed to the accused appellants, it would be unjust if the Appellants are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial, i.e., general and omnibus allegations cannot manifest in a situation where the relatives of the complainant's husband are forced to undergo trial. It has been highlighted by this court in varied instances, that a criminal trial leading to an 27 eventual acquittal also inflicts severe scars upon the accused, and such an exercise must therefore be discouraged.” A little later, the Apex Court in the case of SHAFIYA KHAN v. STATE OF U.P.5, has held as follows: “15. The exposition of law on the subject relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution or the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are well settled and to the possible extent, this Court has defined sufficiently channelized guidelines, to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. This Court has held in para 102 in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra) as under: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are 5 2022 SCC Online SC16728 taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 29 16. The principles laid down by this Court have consistently been followed, as well as in the recent judgment of three Judge judgment of this Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra.” (Emphasis supplied) On a coalesce of the judgments rendered by the Apex Court (supra), what would unmistakably emerge is that, other members of the family who have not been alleged to have performed any overt act against the complainant should not face trial or rigmarole of criminal proceedings. Such cases should be nipped in the bud i.e., quash the proceedings without letting it to degenerate into harassment. If the facts obtaining in the case at hand is considered on the touchstone of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid cases, this is an appropriate case where this Court would exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and quash the proceedings, failing which, it would be permitting a proceeding, which will ultimately result in miscarriage of justice or become an abuse of process of law. 30
10. It is germane to notice the paragraph in the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of MANOJ MAHAVIR PRASAD KHAITAN v. RAM GOPAL PODDAR6, wherein the Apex Court has held as follows: “12. We reiterate that when the criminal court looks into the complaint, it has to do so with an open mind. True it is that that is not the stage for finding out the truth or otherwise in the allegations; but where the allegations themselves are so absurd that no reasonable man would accept the same, the High Court could not have thrown its arms in the air and expressed its inability to do anything in the matter. Section 482 CrPC is a guarantee against injustice. The High Court is invested with the tremendous powers thereunder to pass any order in the interests of justice. Therefore, this would have been a proper case for the High Court to look into the allegations with the openness and then to decide whether to pass any order in the interests of justice. In our opinion, this was a case where the High Court ought to have used its powers under Section 482 CrPC.” (emphasis supplied) Thus, for the aforesaid manifold reasons, this Court exercises its inherent jurisdiction and obliterates further proceedings against the petitioners. 6 (2010) 10 SCC67331 11. In the result, I pass the following:
ORDER(i) The criminal petition is allowed. (ii) The proceedings in C.C.No.285 of 2021 pending before the III Additional Civil Judge & JMFC, Hospet, Bellary, stand quashed qua the petitioners. (iii) It is made clear that the observations made in the course of the order are only for the purpose of consideration of the case of the petitioners under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The Trial Court shall not be bound or be influenced by the observations made in the course of this order insofar it concerns further proceedings against any other accused. Sd/- JUDGE nvj CT:MJ