Judgment:
$~81 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Date of decision:
10. h December, 2018 + W.P.(C) 3033/2018 % 1. AVINASH KUMAR .....
... PetitionerThrough: Mr. Mritunjay Kumar Singh, Adv. versus UNIVERSITY OF DELHI AND ORS …..Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR Through: Mr. Amit Bansal, Adv. for R-1
JUDGMENT(ORAL) The petitioner, a student pursuing his LL.M course with the Delhi University, has been awarded only 102 marks, out of 200, for his dissertation in the Term-IV examination. He seeks re-evaluation thereof.
2. The petitioner claims to be an extremely meritorious student. He completed his LL.B Course from the Faculty of Law in the Delhi University (hereinafter referred to as “the University”), in 2011-2014. For the year 2013-2014, the petitioner was elected President of the Students Union. In his LL.B, the petitioner scored 1759 marks out of 3000. In July-August, 2014, the petitioner joined the two-year course of LL.M with the University. The petitioner avers that he secured the first position in the General category in the entrance examination conducted by the University for the said purpose. W.P.(C) 3033/2018 Page 1 of 19 3. The petitioner further alleges that certain frivolous complaints were made, against the petitioner, at the Police Station Maurice Nagar, in January and February, 2014, and that Respondent No.4 herein has been “nursing grudges against the petitioner till date” and had “not spared a single chance to exploit the petitioner”. Owing, purportedly, to the “terrorising” behaviour of the professors, the petitioner avers that he did not opt for the subjects being taught by the said professors. It is further alleged that, in his third-year LL.M paper of “Research Methodology” Respondent No.4, in order to further harass the petitioner, awarded him only 20 marks out of 50.
4. From 20th May, 2016 till 25th November, 2016, Respondent No.4 was the Dean of the Faculty of Law.
5. In the fourth term of his LL.M course, the petitioner was required to submit a dissertation on “Cross Border Mergers and Acquisitions”. His guide, for the said dissertation, was Ms. Rajni Abbi, Associate Professor – against whom, it may be stated, the petitioner has no grievance. The dissertation was submitted, by the petitioner, on 25th May, 2016.
6. The petitioner claimed that he was shocked to find, from his mark sheet, issued on 29th August, 2016, that he had been awarded only 102 marks, out of 200, for the dissertation, while he had successfully passed in all the theory papers of the LL.M. course, securing 60.27% in the aggregate. The writ petition alleges that the W.P.(C) 3033/2018 Page 2 of 19 petitioner “came to know from reliable sources that his dissertation was deliberately marked for examination” to Respondent No.5, Rahul Kumar, who was an ad hoc Faculty of the Campus Law Centre, by Respondent No.4, in his capacity as Dean, “with a tacit understanding that the petitioner would be given least marks for his dissertation” though, elsewhere in the writ petition, it is admitted that the selection of Respondent No.5, as evaluator of the dissertation of the petitioner, was not by Respondent No.4 individually, but by a Committee of which Respondent No.4 was a member. It is alleged that, at the time of his appointment, Respondent No.5 was undergoing his Ph.D. under the supervision of Respondent No.4.
7. The petitioner further submits that “mostly the students who have secured below 60% marks in their theory papers have secured 70-75% marks in the dissertation whereas the petitioner, who scored more than 60.27% marks in his theory papers, was given only 51%, i.e.
for his dissertation”. The petitioner has also sought to rely on the results declared by the University in the past three years which, according to him, “clearly indicate that the students generally score between 120-170/200 marks in the dissertation paper”.
8. The writ petition further alleges that, as per the “policy” – the details/particulars whereof are not forthcoming – of the University, ad hoc/guest teachers are not allowed to teach LL.M students, save in extreme cases when senior teachers are not available. Respondent No.5, it is pointed out, has never taught any LL.M student, and has always been teaching LL.B students. The appointment of Respondent No.5, W.P.(C) 3033/2018 Page 3 of 19 as the evaluator of the dissertation of the petitioner was, therefore, it is alleged, mala fide, engineered by Respondent No.4 as an ex-officio member of the Committee which selected Respondent No.5.
9. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner sought re- evaluation of his dissertation and, on the said request being rejected by the Faculty of Law, has approached this Court by means of the present writ petition, seeking issuance of a mandamus for his dissertation to be re-evaluated, to Respondent No.2.
10. I have heard Mr. Mritunjay Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Amit Bansal, learned counsel for the University, at length.
11. Mr. Mritunjay Singh essentially belabours his plea of mala fides, juxtaposing it with his submission that Respondent No.4 was not competent to evaluate his dissertation.
12. I may first deal with the allegation of mala fides, as pressed into service, by Mr. Singh, to buttress his case of his client.
13. It is well-established, in law, that mala fides are easier alleged than proved and, to his credit, Mr. Singh candidly acknowledges this legal position. Needless to say, having so admitted, Mr. Singh, contends nevertheless, that the circumstances obtaining in the present case were more than sufficient to prove the existence of mala fides, against his client, by Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 which, in turn, entirely W.P.(C) 3033/2018 Page 4 of 19 vitiated the exercise of evaluation, by Respondent No.5, of the dissertation submitted by his client.
14. The parameters of the concept of mala fides, in judicial review of administrative action, stand exhaustively explored by the Supreme Court in Mutha Associates v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC304thus : lead in nature and can “42. The law regarding pleading and proof of “malice in fact” or mala fides as it is in common parlance described is indeed settled by a long line of decisions of this Court. The decisions broadly recognise the requirement of allegations suggesting “malice in fact” to be specific and supported by necessary particulars. Vague and general averments to the effect that the action under review was taken mala fide would not therefore suffice. Equally well settled is the principle that the burden to establish that the action under challenge was indeed mala fide rests heavily upon the person making the charge; which is taken as quasi-criminal to adverse consequence for the person who is proved to have acted mala fide. There is in fact a presumption that the public authority acted bona fide and in good faith. That presumption can no doubt be rebutted by the person making the change but only on cogent and satisfactory proof whether direct or circumstantial or on admitted facts that may support an inference that the action lacked bona fides and was for that reason vitiated. The third principle equally sanctified by judicial pronouncements is that the person against whom the charge is made must be impleaded as a party to the proceedings and given an opportunity to refute the charge against him. We may at this stage refer to a few decisions to illustrate the above for a copious reference to all the pronouncements is unnecessary and can be avoided.
43. In State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC222:
1992. SCC (Cri) 192]. this Court explained the W.P.(C) 3033/2018 Page 5 of 19 juristic significance of mala fides and the questions that need to be determined while examining plea based on mala fides. The following passage is apposite in this regard: (SCC p. 260, paras 50-51) “50. Mala fides means want of good faith, personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper motive or ulterior purpose. The administrative action must be said to be done in good faith, if it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not. An act done honestly is deemed to have been done in good faith. An administrative authority must, therefore, act in a bona fide manner and should never act for an improper motive or ulterior purposes or contrary to the requirements of the statute, or the circumstances contemplated by law, or improperly exercised discretion to achieve some ulterior purpose. The determination of a plea of mala fide involves two questions, namely, (i) whether there is a personal bias or an oblique motive, and (ii) whether the administrative action is contrary to the objects, requirements and conditions of a valid exercise of administrative power. the basis of for fide 51. The action taken must, therefore, be proved to have been made mala such considerations. Mere assertion or a vague or bald statement is not sufficient. It must be demonstrated either by admitted or proved facts and circumstances obtainable in a given case. If it is established that the action has been taken mala fide for any such considerations or by fraud on power or colourable exercise of power, it cannot be allowed to stand.” 44. That the allegations of mala fides would require a high degree of proof to rebut the presumption that administrative action has been taken bona fide was laid down as one of the principles governing burden of proof of allegations of mala fides levelled by an aggrieved W.P.(C) 3033/2018 Page 6 of 19 party. The Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd.[(2005) 7 SCC764:
2005. SCC (L&S) 1020]. observed thus: (SCC p. 790, para
56) burden is ‘very heavy’. “56. … It is well settled that the burden of proving mala fide is on the person making the allegations and the (44Vide E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. [(1974) 4 SCC3:
1974. SCC (L&S) 165]. ) There is every presumption in favour of the administration that the power has been exercised bona fide and in good faith. It is to be remembered that the allegations of mala fide are often more easily made than made out and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high degree of credibility. As Krishna Iyer, J.
stated in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra [(1976) 1 SCC800 (SCC p. 802, para 2): ‘It (mala fide) is the last refuge of a losing litigant.’” In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [(1986) 4 SCC45 566]. this Court laid emphasis on the need for furnishing full particulars of allegations suggesting mala fides. The use of words such as “mala fides”, “corruption” and “corrupt practice” was held to necessitate an enquiry into such allegations. The Court observed: (SCC p. 611, para
39) insufficient to be “39. Before we part with this case we must express our strong disapproval of the observations made by B.M. Lal, J.
in paras 1, 9, 17, 18, 19 and 34 of his concurring opinion. The learned Judge made sweeping observations attributing mala fides, corruption and underhand dealing to the State Government. These observations are in our opinion not at all justified by the record. In the first place it is difficult to appreciate how any such observation could be made by the learned Judge without any foundation for the same being laid in the pleadings. It is true that in the writ petitions the fide’, petitioners used words such as ‘mala W.P.(C) 3033/2018 Page 7 of 19 ‘corruption’ and ‘corrupt practice’ but the use of such words is not enough. What is necessary is to give full particulars of such allegations and to set out the material facts specifying the particular person against whom such allegations are made so that he may have an opportunity of controverting such allegations. The requirement of law is not satisfied insofar as the pleadings in the present case are concerned and the absence of necessary particulars and material facts, we fail to see how the learned Judge could come to a finding that the State Government was guilty of factual mala fides, corruption and underhand dealing.” in 46. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Swaran Lata v. Union of India [(1979) 3 SCC165:
1979. SCC (L&S) 237]. the Court held that in the absence of particulars, the Court would be justified in refusing to conduct an investigation into the allegations of mala fides. In A. Peeriakaruppan v. Sobha Joseph [(1971) 1 47. SCC38 this Court held that even when the Court examining the validity of an action may find a circumstance to be disturbing it cannot uphold the plea of mala fides on ground of mere probabilities. A note of caution was similarly sounded by this Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. [(1974) 4 SCC3:
1974. SCC (L&S) 165]. , where the Court held that it ought to be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts particularly when imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has high responsibility the administration. The following passage from the decision is apposite: (E.P. Royappa case [(1974) 4 SCC3:
1974. SCC (L&S) 165]. , SCC pp. 41-42, para
92) in “92. Secondly, we must not also overlook that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegations of mala W.P.(C) 3033/2018 Page 8 of 19 lend themselves fides are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. Here the petitioner, who was himself once the Chief Secretary, has flung a series of charges of oblique conduct against the Chief Minister. That is in itself a rather extraordinary and unusual occurrence and if these charges are true, they are bound to shake the confidence of the people in the political custodians of power in the State, and therefore, the anxiety of the Court should be all the greater to insist on a high degree of proof. In this context it may be noted that top administrators are often required to do acts which affect others adversely but which are necessary in the execution of their duties. These acts may to misconstruction and suspicion as to the bona fides of their author when the full facts and surrounding circumstances are not known. The Court would, therefore, be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. Such is the judicial perspective in evaluating charge of unworthy conduct against ministers and other high authorities, not because of any special status which they are supposed to enjoy, nor because they are highly placed in social life or administrative set up—these considerations are wholly judicial approach—but because otherwise, functioning effectively would become difficult in a democracy. It is from this standpoint that we must assess the merits of the allegations of mala fides made by the petitioner against the second respondent.” irrelevant in 48. The charge of mala fides levelled against the appellant Mr. Rane, the then Minister was not supported by any particulars. The writ petition filed by APMC did not provide specific particulars or details of how the W.P.(C) 3033/2018 Page 9 of 19 decision taken by the Minister was influenced by Mutha Associates or by any other person for that matter. The averments made in the writ petition in that regard appeared to be general and inferential in nature. Such allegations were, in our opinion, insufficient to hold the charge of “malice in fact” levelled against the Minister proved.” 15. Tested on this touchstone, this Court is unable to sustain the plea, of learned counsel for the petitioner, that the evaluation, of the petitioner’s dissertation, by Respondent No.5, was hit by mala fides. In the first place, learned counsel for the petitioner candidly acknowledges that there is no direct evidence of any mala fides having been harboured, towards the petitioner, by Respondent No.5. This acknowledgement, even by itself, considerably takes the wind out of the sails of the petitioner’s plea of mala fides. The evaluation of the petitioner’s dissertation was done, not by Respondent No.4, but by Respondent No.5. To succeed in his plea of mala fides, therefore, it would be essential for the petitioner to establish that Respondent No.5 was acting under the dictates of Respondent No.4, while evaluating the petitioner’s dissertation. I am unable to find any material which could sufficiently lay the foundation for such a claim. The University points out, on the other hand, in its counter-affidavit, that, more than three months prior to the submission, by the petitioner, of his dissertation for evaluation, on 25th May, 2016, Respondent No.5 had completed his Ph.D under the supervision of Respondent No.4, on 17th February, 2016. In the absence of any material, sufficiently cogent, to establish that Respondent No.5, while evaluating the dissertation of the petitioner, was acting, not independently, but W.P.(C) 3033/2018 Page 10 of 19 effectively as a stooge of Respondent No.4, the plea of mala fides necessarily has to fail.
16. It was also sought to be contended, by Mr. Singh, in the above context, that Respondent No.5 was ineligible to evaluate the dissertation of his client and that the very selection of such an ineligible evaluator, by Respondent No.4, was a pointer to the mala fides harboured by Respondent No.4 against his client. The fallacy, in this argument, is in the presumption that Respondent No.4 was the person who had appointed Respondent No.5 to evaluate the petitioner’s dissertation. Respondent No.4, admittedly, was only one of the members of the committee who selected Respondent No.5 to evaluate the petitioner dissertation, and there is no material which could sufficiently lead to a presumption that the committee was acting under the dictates of Respondent No.4, while taking the said decision. The fact that Respondent No.4 may have headed the said committee is also insufficient, in my opinion, to base such an inference. There is no presumption, in law, that the head of the committee controls the affairs of the committee, and that the remaining members of the committee are merely yes-men. As such, the somewhat bold assertions, in the writ petition, that the dissertation of the petitioner was marked for evaluation to Respondent No.5 “with a tacit understanding that the petitioner would be given the least marks” and that, acting under the direction of Respondent No.4, Respondent No.5 “gave the least marks to the petitioner for his dissertation though the petitioner deserved much more marks” have to be relegated to the realm of the belief of the petitioner, and no more. This Court cannot W.P.(C) 3033/2018 Page 11 of 19 conjecture on the correctness, or otherwise, of these beliefs; it can only opine that they are, legally speaking, insufficient to justify decimating the evaluation, of the petitioner’s dissertation, by Respondent No.5, on the ground of mala fides.
17. The submission, of learned counsel for the petitioner, to the effect that the evaluation, of the dissertation of his client, by Respondent No.5, was vitiated by mala fides is, therefore, rejected.
18. Equally, the attempt, in the writ petition, to compare the results of the petitioner with those of other students, and the submission that most of the students, who had secured below 60% marks in their theory papers had secured 70-75% marks in dissertation, while the
... Petitionerhad scored more than 60.27% marks in theory, was given only 51% i.e. 102 out of 200 for dissertation, are, ex facie, conjectural in nature, and can never be the foundation for claiming a mandamus from a writ court. Courts are hopelessly ill-equipped to hypothesise as to how a particular student would fare in an examination; neither can a court assess, for itself, the marks which a student ought to have obtained, and pronounce judgment on the basis that the marks actually awarded to a student are not in harmony with the court’s expectations.
19. Learned counsel for the petitioner is, however, on somewhat firmer ground, in his contention that the dissertation of the petitioner ought not to have been evaluated by Respondent No.5. It is specifically averred, in the writ petition, that Respondent No.5 had never taught any LL.M course and that, he was, in fact, only an ad hoc W.P.(C) 3033/2018 Page 12 of 19 teacher teaching LL.B students at the Campus Law Centre. The specific averments, to this effect, as contained in sub-paras (xxvii) and (xxviii) of para 2 in the writ petition, read thus : “(xxvii) That as per the Policy of the Respondent No.1 the Ad-hoc/ Guest Teachers are not allowed to teach the students of LL.M. course and only in extreme cases they are allowed to teach the LL.M. course, when the senior teachers are not available. In case of Mr. Rahul Kumar, as per the RTI information received from the Respondent No.1, he has not taught the students of LL.M. but only the students of LL.B. at Campus Law Centre. Moreover, he has submitted his Ph.D. on a topic related to Criminal Law, recently. At the time of checking the dissertation, he had not completed his Ph.D. (xxviii) That, in several Universities in India, dissertation is submitted by students only in Master of Philosophy course and submission of dissertation is not required for LL.M. course at various other Universities, whereas, in case of Respondent No.1, submission of dissertation is compulsory to complete the LL.M. Course. Since, M.Phil. is not conducted by the Respondent No.2, LL.M. is considered to be pre-Ph.D. research work. Thus it was inappropriate on the part of the then Dean of the Respondent No.2 to direct Mr. Rahul Kumar, a Ph.D. student to check the dissertation of LL.M. without having any experience of teaching LL.M course and research experience.” 20. To these, the response, in the counter affidavit of the University, is as under : “5. That in furtherance to the aforesaid reason, the
... Petitionerhas also challenged the appointment of Respondent No.5 as his examiner for evaluating his dissertation. It is submitted that Ad-hocs are not barred from evaluating the answer sheets/dissertations of LL.B and LL.M students. It is submitted that examiners for W.P.(C) 3033/2018 Page 13 of 19 evaluating the dissertations are appointed by a three member committee appointed by Dean and it is not uncommon that the Dean may have to make alternative arrangements in case the examiner suggested by the Committee is not available for evaluation. In such circumstances, the Ad-hoc teachers in the Faculty of Law have been given the duty to evaluate the dissertations. It is submitted that Respondent No.5, Dr. Rahul Kumar has been appointed as the examiner to evaluate
... Petitioner's dissertation in the usual manner. It pertinent to mention here that as per the records, two other ad-hoc teachers were also appointed as examiners for the purpose of evaluating the dissertations in the same semester in which the
... Petitioner's dissertation was evaluated.
6. It is submitted that there is no basis in the contention of the
... Petitionerthat since Respondent No.5, Dr. Rahul Kumar has done his Ph.D on a topic related to Criminal Law, he is unfit to evaluate his dissertation. It is submitted that all appointments in Faculty of Law are general in nature and teachers are given range of subjects to teach. It may be pertinent to mention here that Dr. Rahul Kumar has been teaching in the Faculty of Law since July, 2014 and has taught a range of subjects namely, Income Tax, Labour Law, Business Regulations including Competition Act 2002, Interpretation of Statues, Negotiable Instrument Acts, Banking and Insurance Laws, Law of Contract, Socio-Economic Offences and Law of Crimes. The range of topics taught by Respondent No.5 shows that he has knowledge of law relating to a range of subjects. It is pertinent to mention here that the then Dean of Faculty of Law had sought feedback forms filled by the Class Representatives of Campus Law Centre about the teaching quality and regularities of teachers and no complaint was received against the teaching quality or regularity of Respondent No.5.” 21. Mr. Singh had, during the course of his submissions, referred to Regulation 9.6 of the University Grants Commission (Minimum W.P.(C) 3033/2018 Page 14 of 19 Standards and Procedure) Regulation 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “2016 Regulation”) which deals with the persons who would be competent to evaluate the dissertations of M.Phil students, which reads as under: “9.6. M.Phil. dissertation submitted by a research scholar shall be evaluated by his/her Research Supervisor and at least one external examiner who is not in the employment of the Institution/College. The viva-voce examination, based among other things, on the critiques given in the evaluation report, shall be conducted by both of them together, and shall be open to be attended by Members of the Other interested experts/researchers.” 22. To a query, put to him, regarding the prescribed qualification for a faculty member of the Faculty of Law/University of Delhi, to be competent to evaluate the dissertation of an LL.M. student, Mr. Bansal, learned counsel appearing for the University, categorically submitted that there were no such rules or regulations in place. To say the least, this is unusual and, in fact, disconcerting. It defeats comprehension as to how an issue so pivotal, to the future of the candidates concerned, as evaluation of LL.M. dissertations, is not directed by any guidelines, rules or regulations. If this is the position, the University has necessarily to act with promptitude and frame, forthwith, appropriate regulations, providing for evaluation of dissertations of LL.M. students, pursuing their LL.M. courses under its aegis. Else, there would be rampant scope for arbitrariness, and challenges such as the present are bound to mushroom, which is something which courts can ill afford. W.P.(C) 3033/2018 Page 15 of 19 23. In the opinion of this Court, the response, of the University, to the submission, of the petitioner, that Respondent No.5 ought not to have evaluated his dissertation, is hopelessly insufficient to meet the challenge. There is no denial, in the counter affidavit, to the fact that Respondent No.5 has never taught an LL.M student, and was, in fact, an ad hoc teacher, teaching LL.B students. In the absence of any guidelines, rules or regulations permitting the same, the evaluation of the dissertation, of an end semester LL.M student, by an ad hoc teacher teaching LL.B. classes, clearly offends common sense. The court is constrained to observe that the selection, of Respondent No.5, as the evaluator of the dissertation of the petitioner, who was a fourth semester LL.M student was ill-conceived and unhappy in equal measure. Significantly, the counter affidavit of the University does not make out a case of Respondent No.5 having had to be chosen as the evaluator of the petitioner’s dissertation on the ground that there was no other competent evaluator, conversant with the LL.M course who ought to have taught LL.M students, available for such evaluation.
24. Pursuant to the directions of this Court, the record regarding evaluation of the petitioner dissertation, were produced, by Mr. Bansal. A perusal thereof discloses that the only person who has signed the evaluation form and evaluated the dissertation is Respondent No.5. Even though the 2016 Regulation of University Grants Commission, may not, on the face of it, apply to evaluation of the dissertations of LL.M students in the University, one may usefully note the fact that the said regulations contemplate the evaluation of the dissertation of an M.Phil student by his supervisor and an independent W.P.(C) 3033/2018 Page 16 of 19 examiner. In the present case, the petitioner’ supervisor, Ms. Rajni Abbi, has had no part to play in the evaluation of the petitioner’s dissertation. The evaluation has taken place entirely at the hand of Respondent No.5, who, it may be reiterated, was a faculty member teaching LL.B classes, and had never taught any LL.M class. This Court is unable to lend an imprimatur to the decision to allow a teacher, who had never taught a single LL.M class, to evaluate, independently and by himself, and without any other examiner or evaluator being co-opted, the fourth semester dissertation of an LL.M student. The court is also unable to discern, in the counter affidavit, any such pressing exigency that necessitated the selection of an ad hoc teacher of LL.B students, to evaluate the fourth semester dissertation of the petitioner, an LL.M student.
25. The principle that justice should not only be done, but must be seen to have been done, extends beyond the territories of the formal adjudicatory system and also applies to administrative action which impinges on the temporal rights of citizens, and results in civil consequences. The court is constrained to observe, therefore, that the discomfiture, of the petitioner, at having his dissertation evaluated by Respondent No.5, is understandable and, indeed, justifiable. The petitioner does not pray, in his writ petition that his dissertation should be accepted or that he should be awarded more marks. The only prayer in the writ petition is that the dissertation should be evaluated by an independent Committee. This court is inclined to accept, in part, the said request by directing that the LL.M. dissertation be revaluated by an independent committee or by an evaluator, who, at the very least is W.P.(C) 3033/2018 Page 17 of 19 familiar with teaching of LL.M. classes, so that the petitioner does not feel that he has been prejudiced.
26. This Court is aware of the law that re-evaluation of answer sheets is to be resorted to only in exceptional cases. The decisions on that score, however, relate to instances where grievances are raised regarding the manner in which answer sheets are evaluated, or answer keys are drawn up. The present case is not in that category. Here, the petitioner’s grievance is that Respondent No.5, not being conversant with teaching of LL.M. students, ought not to have evaluated his fourth semester dissertation. It cannot be said that the said grievance is unreasonable in any manner.
27. This Court makes it clear that it is not pronouncing on the professional competence of Respondent No.5 in any manner, or on his intellectual or the other ability, of his professional competence. The only reason for their passing of the present order is that the petitioner, being a final semester LL.M student, his grievance, is legitimate and deserves to be redressed. The present order does not prejudice anyone to any extent whatsoever, and would ensure complete justice to the petitioner.
28. For the above reason, this writ petition is allowed to the extent that the University is directed to have the petitioner’s LL.M. dissertation re-evaluated either by an independent committee or by a faculty member who has taught LL.M. students and who is competent with the LL.M. course, content and syllabus. W.P.(C) 3033/2018 Page 18 of 19 29. The said exercise may be concluded as expeditiously as possible, at any rate within two months from today.
30. The University is also directed to take steps to frame proper guidelines/rules/regulations governing the manner in which dissertations of LL.M. students are to be evaluated, and the persons who would be competent to do so.
31. There shall be no orders as to costs. C. HARI SHANKAR, J DECEMBER, 10, 2018 bh W.P.(C) 3033/2018 Page 19 of 19