N.S. Singh, J.
1. Upon hearing learned counsel on both the sides, it appears to me that the writ petitioner, namely, Jagneswar Dey and Bibhash Ranjan Dey, P. O. Haflong, District : N. C. Hills, made a prayer in this writ petition for a direction to respondent No. 1, namely, the Income-tax Officer, A Ward, Silchar, Cachar, Assam, to cancel, withdraw or forbear from giving effect to the impugned notice/order dated March 4, 1992, as in annexure-I to the writ petition and to quash the entire proceedings made under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by contending, inter alia, that the petitioner-firm is a dealer of petrol, diesel, super kerosene oil and lubricants and the same are supplied by the Indian Oil Corporation, Digboi, from its various depots ; and that the firm has been assessed to income-tax under Section 143 since the assessment years 1973-74 to 1987-88 as per the provisions of law laid down under Section 143 which was in force till its amendment came into force on and from April 1, 1989 ; and that the petitioner firm had submitted its return for the assessment year 1981-82 on September 30, 1981, and has been assessed to income-tax by the Income-tax Officer, A-Ward, Silchar, vide his order dated September 8, 1983, under Section 143 of the Income-tax Act and, accordingly, the petitioner paid the taxes and there was no further demand. According to the writ petitioner, the concerned Income-tax Officer without complying with the mandatory provisions of law laid down under Section 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which is hereinafter referred to as 'Act', which is applicable in the case of prior amendment which came into force on and from April 1, 1989, issued the impugned notice/order dated March 4, 1992, as annexure-I to the writ petition. It is also the case of the writ petitioner that as the firm/petitioner has been assessed for income-tax since the assessment years 1973-74 to 1987-88 as per related provisions of law laid down under Section 143 which was in force till its amendment came into force as stated above, the impugned notice cannot be issued and as such the impugned order/notice is violatiye of all the related provisions of law contemplated under the Act. According to the writ petitioner, the Income-tax Officer had issued the impugned notice/order for the assessment year 1981-82 most illegally realising the alleged fact that the peak credit of Rs.3,54,385 selected for the assessment year 1983-84 includes earlier years' liabilities amounting to Rs. 2,51,356 which is not legally assessable in the assessment year 1983-84 for which the writ petitioner has also preferred another writ petition being Civil Rules Nos. 223 of 1992 and 224 of 1992 before this court and the same were disposed of by the related order of February 7, 1992. According to the writ petitioner, the concerned Income-tax Officer most arbitrarily completed the assessment for the assessment year 1983-84 summarily under Section 144/147 of the Act, vide order dated March 30, 1992, and had raised a huge demand and has started the penal proceeding against the petitioner. Being dissatisfied with the assessment, the writ petitioner has filed a separate writ petition as against the assessment order made by the competent authority in respect of the related assessment year 1983-84 before this court.
2. The contesting respondents resisted the case of the writ petitioner by filing counter-affidavit contending, inter alia, that the related notice under Section 148 of the Act dated March 4, 1992, is a valid notice issued for the purpose of calling for the return of the assessment year 1981-82 in the case of the assessee, Jagneswar Dey and Bibhash Ranjan Dey, Haflong, and that the Income-tax Officer concerned had complied with the mandatory provisions of law laid down under the Act while issuing the impugned notice/order and as such the impugned notice/order was issued within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. The contesting respondents went on to contend that the concerned Income-tax Officer obtained sanction from the appropriate authority as required under the related provisions of law laid down under Section 147(1)(b)(iii) of the Act and as such the statement and the allegations so far made by the writ petitioner are not correct and not sustainable in the eye of law.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner at the very outset argued that the authority concerned had passed the impugned notice/ order dated March 4, 1992, annexure-I to the writ petition in complete violation of the provisions of law laid down under Section 148 of the Act for the alleged assessment year 1981-82, for reassessment proceeding under Section 147 of the Act, sanction for issuance of such notice/ impugned order has been obtained from the Commissioner of Income-tax, North Eastern Region, Shillong, who is not the competent authority in the instant case and as such the impugned order/notice was passed without jurisdiction by the authority concerned. According to learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, non-compliance with procedure laid down in the relevant Section of the Income-tax Act for issuance of the impugned notice/order under Section 148 of the Act, which were in force prior to the related amendment effective from April 1, 1989, the impugned order/notice is not tenable in the eye of law and as such the impugned notification/order dated March 4, 1992, deserves to be set aside.
4. In reply, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents argued that the impugned notice/order dated March 4, 1992, is a valid notice for the purpose of calling for the return for assessment year 1981-82 in the case of the assessee, the petitioner herein and the same was validly issued under the related provisions of the Act and as such there is no infirmity or illegality or irregularity in the impugned notice/order. According to the contesting respondents, the concerned Income-tax Officer was very much satisfied about the requirements in the instant case before issuance of the impugned notice under Section 148 of the Act and as such the present writ petition is not maintainable. Learned counsel for the respondents further contended that the amended provisions of law under the Act which came into force with effect from April 1, 1989, was duly complied with, while issuing the impugned notice/order, under Section 148 of the Act and as such the writ petitioner's contention that the law as it stood prior to the amendment would apply in the instant case is misconceived and based on misinterpretation of related law. Learned counsel further contended that the impugned notice was issued well in time after obtaining prior sanction from the competent authority.
5. Now, this court is to examine as to whether the present writ petitioner has an enforceable right in the instant case and whether the impugned notice/order dated March 4, 1992, annexure-I to the writ petition deserves to be set aside and quashed or not.
6. Before entering into merits of the case, this court is to see and examine as to whether there is an alternative remedy which is appropriate, efficacious under the related provisions of the Act in the instant case.
7. The law is quite clear on this aspect that if any person or persons is/ are aggrieved and dissatisfied by the order of the concerned Income-tax Officer in respect of the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act, he/ she or they has/have appropriate recourse and forum to file appeal or prefer revision before the appellate authority as required and contemplated under Chapter-XX of the Act. But, in the instant case, the writ petitioner did not approach the appropriate and competent authority for his redress under the related provisions of law as stated above, instead, the writ petitinor filed this writ petition on May 1, 1992, as against the impugned notice/order dated March 4, 1992, annexure-I to the writ petition. On a bare perusal of the statement of the writ petitioner made in paragraph 14 of the writ petition, it has been revealed that the petitioner made such statement that he has no other alternative efficacious remedy available to him except to approach this court for appropriate relief which in my considered view is not a reasonable one in the eye of a man of reasonable prudence for the following reasons :
(i) As discussed above, there is an appropriate forum for appeal or revision from an order/notice passed by the concerned Income-tax Officer under Section 148 of the Act as required and contemplated under Chapter XX of the Act. But the writ petitioner did not approach the competent authority as mentioned above, instead, the writ petitioner approached this court.
(ii) It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restriction . . . But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary ; it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain well imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by the statute, Ordinarily, the court will not entertain a petition for a writ under article 226 where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy . . . The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or Tribunal to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by a statute for obtaining relief where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another Tribunal or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute. The High Court normally will not permit by entertaining under article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created by the statute to be bypassed and leave the party applying to it to seek resort to that machinery so set up.
This established principle of law finds its place in the decision of the apex court rendered in Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes [1964] 15 STC 468 ; [1964] AIR 1964 SC 1419.
(iii) The present petition raises complex questions of fact, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken ; and moreover other considerations from the end of the parties concerned is called for ; in such case, the High Court shall decline to try such a petition. Therefore, this court is of the view that it would be proper and appropriate to decide and settle the matter by the appropriate authority, namely, appellate authority as discussed above in accordance with law as per related provisions of law contemplated under Chapter-XX of the Act in view of the decision of the apex court rendered in Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot [1974] AIR 1974 SC 2105.
(iv) Further, I am of the view that this court cannot act or sit as an appellate authority in the instant case inasmuch as the matter involves certain complex questions of fact. Moreover, this court does not like to encroach upon the domain of the concerned appellate authority which has its own ample jurisdiction and power to examine the validity of the impugned notification/order under the related provisions of the Act as discussed above.
9. For the foregoing reasons and discussions made above, the writ petitioner could not make out a case to justify the interference of the impugned notice/order dated March 4, 1992, as in annexure-I to the writ petition and accordingly, this writ petition is devoid of merit and it is accordingly dismissed without costs.
10. Despite dismissal of the writ petition, this court made the following orders and directions considering the facts and circumstances of the case:
The writ petitioner is at liberty to approach the appropriate appellate authority under the related provisions of law as discussed above by filing an 'appeal from the impugned notice/order dated March 4, 1992, as in annexure-I to the writ petition within a period of two weeks from today if so advised as this court took the liberal view in condoning the delay in filing such appeal. It is made clear that the appellate authority concerned shall dispose of the appeal if so preferred by the writ petitioner within the stipulated time as mentioned above ; within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the memo of appeal in accordance with the law by affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned. Any ad interim order passed in this case shall stand vacated. No costs.