$~ * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + L.A. APP. 672/2011 TEJ PRATAP SINGH Reserved on:
5. h January, 2018 Date of Decision:
13. h April, 2018 ..... Appellant Through: Ms. Deepmala, Advocate. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. versus .....
... RESPONDENTSThrough: Mr. Sanjay Poddar, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak, Mr.Sunil Kumar Jha & Mr. Kushal Raj Tater, Advocates for UOI/R-1. Ms. Mrinalini Sen and Mr. Shatrajit Banerji, Advocates for DDA. L.A. APP.117/2013 RANBIR SINGH & ORS. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ..... Appellants Through: Mr. S.S.Gulia, Advocate. versus .....
... RESPONDENTSThrough: Mr. Sanjay Poddar, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak, Mr.Sunil Kumar Jha & Mr. Kushal Raj Tater, Advocates for UOI/R-1. Ms.Mrinalini Sen and Mr. Shatrajit Banerji, Advocates for DDA. L.A. APP.370/2014 BHURE LAL Through: Mr. S.S.Gulia, Advocate. versus ..... Appellant % L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected Page 1 of 23 JAI KUMAR JAIN L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected UNION OF INDIA & ANR. .....
... RESPONDENTSThrough: Mr.Yeeshu Jain, Standing Counsel, Ms.Jyoti Tyagi and Govind Kumar, Advocates for UOI/R-1. Ms.Mrinalini Sen and Mr. Shatrajit Banerji, Advocates for DDA. L.A. APP.386/2015 NATHIA DECD THR. LRS. ..... Appellants Through: Mr.L.B. Rai and Mr. Mohit Kumar Sharma, Advocate. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. versus .....
... RESPONDENTSThrough: Mr.Yeeshu Jain, Standing Counsel, Ms.Jyoti Tyagi and Govind Kumar, Advocates for UOI/R-1. Ms.Mrinalini Sen and Mr. Shatrajit Banerji, Advocates for DDA. RAJ PAL L.A. APP.387/2015 Through: Mr.Prashant Shukla & Mr. Sumit ..... Appellant UNION OF INDIA & ANR. Versus Shekhar, Advocates. .....
... RESPONDENTSThrough: Mr.Sanjay Poddar, Sr. Advocate with Mr.Sanjay Kumar Pathak, Mr. Sunil Kumar Jha & Mr. Kushal Raj Tater, Advocates for UOI/R-1. Ms.Mrinalini Sen and Mr. Shatrajit Banerji, Advocates for DDA. L.A. APP.392/2015 ..... Appellant Page 2 of 23 Through: Mr.L.B. Rai and Mr. Mohit Kumar Sharma, Advocate. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. versus .....
... RESPONDENTSThrough: Mr.Yeeshu Jain, Standing Counsel, Ms.Jyoti Tyagi and Govind Kumar, Advocates for UOI/R-1. Ms.Mrinalini Sen and Mr. Shatrajit Banerji, Advocates for DDA. L.A. APP.439/2015 PARSANDI (DECEASED) THR. LRS. ..... Appellants Through: Mr.Sukhbir Sejwal, Advocate. UNION OF INDIA Versus ..... Respondent Through: Mr.Yeeshu Jain, Standing Counsel, Ms.Jyoti Tyagi and Govind Kumar, Advocates for UOI/R-1. L.A. APP.441/2015 DHARAM PAL & ORS. ..... Appellants Through: Mr.Sukhbir Sejwal, Advocate. Versus UNION OF INDIA & ANR. .....
... RESPONDENTSThrough: Mr.Yeeshu Jain, Standing Counsel, Ms.Jyoti Tyagi and Govind Kumar, Advocates for UOI/R-1 Mr.Astander Kumar, Adv. for LAC. DHARAMBIR L.A. APP.453/2015 Through: Ms.Smita Maan and Mr. Vishal Maan ..... Appellant Advocate. L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected Page 3 of 23 Versus UNION OF INDIA & ANR. .....
... RESPONDENTSThrough: Mr.Yeeshu Jain, Standing Counsel with Ms.Jyoti Tyagi, Advocate. L.A. APP.18/2016 MAHIPAL (DECEASED) THR. LRS ..... Appellants Through: Mr.Arun Kumar Kaushik, Advocate. Versus UNION OF INDIA & ANR. .....
... RESPONDENTSThrough: Mr.Yeeshu Jain, SC & Ms. Jyoti Tyagi, Advocates for respondent. Mr.Siddharth Panda, Advocate for the LAC. Ms.Mrinalini Sen and Mr. Shatrajit Banerji, Advocates for DDA. L.A. APP.19/2016 CHHATTAR SINGH ..... Appellant Through: Mr.Arun Kumar Kaushik, Advocate. Versus UNION OF INDIA & ANR. .....
... RESPONDENTSThrough: Mr.Yeeshu Jain, Standing Counsel & for Ms.Jyoti Tyagi, Advocate respondent-UOI. Mr.Siddharth Panda, Advocate for LAC. Ms.Mrinalini Sen and Mr.Shatrajit Banerji, Advocates for DDA. L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected Page 4 of 23 L.A. APP.47/2016 KULDEEP SINGH (SINCE DECEASED) THR. LRS. ..... Appellants Through: Mr.S.K. Solanki, Advocate. versus UNION OF INDIA & ANR. .....
... RESPONDENTSThrough: Mr.Yeeshu Jain, Standing Counsel & for Ms.Jyoti Tyagi, Advocate respondent UOI. L.A. APP.114/2016 SUKHBIR SINGH & ANR ..... Appellants Through: Mr.S.K. Rout and Mr. Aman Malhotra, Advocates. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. versus .....
... RESPONDENTSThrough: Mr.Yeeshu Jain, Standing Counsel & for Ms.Jyoti Tyagi, Advocate respondent UOI CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT NATH SANJIV KHANNA, J.
A single Judge of this Court vide order dated 6th September, 2016, after referring to Dhiraj Singh (Dead) through Legal Representatives and Others versus State of Haryana and Others, (2014) 14 SCC127 and different orders passed in land acquisition appeals condoning delay, and discerning that contra view has been expressed in other set of orders passed L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected Page 5 of 23 by another Single Judge in Land Acquisition Appeal No.66/2013, Inder Singh versus Union of India & Ors., decided on 8th July, 2014, after referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mewa Ram (deceased) by his Legal Representatives & Others versus State of Haryana through The Land Acquisition Collector, Gurgaon, (1986) 4 SCC151 Baswaraj and Others versus Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC81and Brijesh Kumar and Others versus State of Haryana and Others, (2014) 11 SCC351has made this Reference to a larger Bench observing as under:-
"“7. It is, therefore, seen that there are one line of judgments of the Supreme Court which say that condonation of delay must be on the same principles which are otherwise applicable under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and that there should be no condonation of delay merely because the land holders have woken up on other land owners succeeding in their appeals and thereby getting higher compensation, other line of judgments as in the case of Dhiraj Singh (supra) hold that courts should be completely liberal in condoning the delay in filing Land Acquisitions Appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act although appeals are delayed by many years.
8. Accordingly, let the present order and these Land Acquisition Appeals be placed before Hon‟ble the Chief Justice on 19.9.2016 to constitute a Larger Bench to decide the reference question as to whether courts should apply normal principles under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delays in filing of Land Acquisition Appeals as held in the Supreme Court judgments referred to in the Judgment of this L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected Page 6 of 23 2. Court dated 8.7.2014 in the case of Inder Singh (supra) or that courts hearing applications for condonation of delays should take a liberal approach by condoning delay even if they be of years, and as held by the Supreme Court in the judgment in the case of Dhiraj Singh (supra) and which is followed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, Vipin Sanghi, J., in various land acquisition appeals including L.A. Appeal Nos. 282/2015, 374/2014 and 211/2014. An early date is given because the decision of the reference will affect large number of cases which are pending in this Court, including these cases in which by this order Hon‟ble the Chief Justice has been requested to constitute a Larger Bench.” As there are a number of appeals, we would not go into and advert to the facts of each case to avoid prolixity. We would confine ourselves to the legal issue and answer the Reference made.
3. During the hearing, question whether the limitation period specified in Article 116 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter, referred to as 'Limitation Act', for convenience) would apply to appeals preferred before the High Court under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'Land Acquisition Act', for convenience) was raised. To appreciate this question we would reproduce Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act and Article 116 to the Schedule of the Limitation Act which read as under :-
"“54. Appeals in proceedings before Court.- —Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected Page 7 of 23 Court from the award, or from any part of the award of the Court and from any decree of the High Court passed on such appeal as aforesaid an appeal shall lie Supreme Court subject to the provisions to the contained in section 110 of the Code of Civil Proce- dure, 1908, and in Order XLIV thereof. xxxx xxxx xxxx Limitation Act Second Division of Schedule to Limitation Act, 19
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"Description of appeal 116. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908— (a) to a High Court from any decree or order; (b) to any other court from any decree or order. Period of limitation from Time which period begins to run Ninety days Thirty days The date of the decree or order. The date of the decree or order."
Section 54 states that an appeal would lie to the High Court from an award or any part of the award subject to the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure applicable to appeals from original decrees. Thereafter, further appeal would lie before the Supreme Court, subject to the provisions of Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Order XLIV thereof. Section 54 does not state and specify any period within which an appeal under the said section should be filed. However, language of Section 54 of L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected Page 8 of 23 the Land Acquisition Act "subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to appeals from original decrees" is significant.
4. This controversy is not new and had arisen nearly a century ago when the Madras High Court in A. Ramaswami Pillai versus The Thasildar of Madura and Another, 1919 ILR43Madras 51 had interpreted Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act and whether Article 156 of Limitation Act, 1908, which was identically worded would apply. It was observed that the Land Acquisition Act gives right to appeal under Section 54 stating, “subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to appeals from original decrees, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from the award or from any part of the award of the Court in any proceedings under the Act”. No period of limitation was provided under the Land Acquisition Act, either specifically or by necessary implication. Referring to Article 156 of the then Limitation Act, 1908 it was observed that it speaks of "under the Code of Civil Procedure", an enactment in the form of code which relates to procedure and not substantive rights. It was interpreted that Article 156 would refer to an appeal governed by the Code of Civil Procedure so far as procedure was concerned and not as stating that an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure would mean the right to prefer an appeal conferred by the Code itself. There was no good reason and justification to hold that an appeal under the Civil Procedure Code would mean only an appeal the right to prefer which was conferred by the Code itself. On the other hand, such interpretation would amount to straining the language of the Article. Semantics of the Article states that it would apply to an appeal which from inception to its disposal was governed by the Civil L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected Page 9 of 23 Procedure Code. Such appeals would be considered as an appeal under the Code. Reference was made to some other Articles relating to appeals from decree or order of the High Court in exercise of original jurisdiction to show that Article 156 was meant to apply to all appeals, hearing and disposal of which was governed by the rules and procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code.
5. In Ramaswami Pillai (supra) reference was made to the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Rangoon Botatong Company Limited versus The Collector Rangoon, ILR (1912) C. 21 that the awards provided for in Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act would be governed as to the procedure and rules provided in the Civil Procedure Code from date of filing of the appeal to its disposal. Other enactments like Succession Act, Probate and Administration Act also make the Code of Civil Procedure applicable and gave a right to appeal to the High Court, but had not prescribed any specific period of limitation.
6. The Supreme Court by majority in Vidyacharan Shukla versus. Khubchand Baghel and Others, AIR1964SC1099 while dealing with the question of construction of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908 in the context of Section 116A of the Representation of Peoples Act, which refers to a right to appeal before the High Court against the order of the Election Tribunal, had referred to with approval the decision of the Madras High Court in A. Ramaswami Pillai (supra) and held that the expression under the Code of Civil Procedure means appeal to which the procedure prescribed under the said Code would apply and not right to appeal conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure. Principle of stare decisis was L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected Page 10 of 23 invoked as the ratio and reasoning had held field for 77 years. Ratio expounded in A. Ramaswami Pillai (supra) has since then remained unchallenged.
7. Law of limitation, which fixes a life span or a time period for taking recourse to legal remedy for redressal of legal injury suffered, is founded on public policy that it is in general welfare that a period should be fixed for initiation of litigation. Unending period for invoking a legal remedy leads to uncertainty, disturbs settled rights, and precipitates and causes anarchy, as with the efflux of time, newer causes spring up and positions change. Evidence invariably dissipates and turning back the clock would invariably subject people to harassment and inconvenience. Time is precious and wasted time can never be re-visited. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy rights of parties, but to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek their remedy promptly. The aforesaid position has long existed and has been reiterated not once but on several occasions [see N. Balakrishnan versus M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC123.
8. At the same time, a somewhat a contrarian view it could be said is applied when the Courts examine and decide applications for condonation of delay in filing of an appeal, etc. Expression "sufficient cause", which is the parameter and test applied to condone or not condone delay, has been given liberal meaning vide pronouncement in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Another versus Mst. Katiji & Others, (1987) 2 SCC107to mean an elastic term that enables the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner to sub-serve the end of justice, which is the life purpose for existence of the institution of courts. The said decision holds :-
"L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected Page 11 of 23 to condone delay can result “1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. “Every day's delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay?. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.” and substantial justice The aforesaid decision in the case of Mst. Katiji (supra), we note, relates to land acquisition proceedings. L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected Page 12 of 23 9. Recently, the Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee versus Managing Committee of Ranghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, (2013) 12 SCC649 examined as many as 24 earlier decisions including the decision in Mst, Katiji (supra) and quoted the following passage from G. Ramegowda, Major and Others versus Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore (1988) 2 SCC142- India , Concord of “14. The contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in a number of pronouncements of this Court. See Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [AIR1962SC361: (1962) 2 SCR762 , Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari [AIR1969SC575: (1969) 1 Insurance Co. SCR1006 Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi [(1979) 4 SCC365: AIR1979SCC1666: (1979) 3 SCR694 , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC770: (1970) 2 SCR90 and Collector (LA) v. Katiji[(1987) 2 SCC107, etc. There is, it is true, no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. However, the expression „sufficient cause‟ in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona the party seeking condonation of the delay.” imputable fides is to 10. Reference was also made to Improvement Trust, Ludhiana versus Ujagar Singh & Others, (2010) 6 SCC786to observe that while L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected Page 13 of 23 considering an application for condonation of delay, no straitjacket formula was prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not. Referring to the case of Maniben Devraj Shah versus Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC157 it was pronounced that a liberal and justice-oriented approach was required to be adopted while exercising power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes. Courts however should not become oblivious of the fact that the successful party would acquire certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time was consumed at various stages of litigation. Expression “sufficient cause” has to be interpreted in the factual matrix of the given case and would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. Negligence should not be tolerated but where the delay did not lack bona fides, it could be condoned. Where the explanation was concocted and the applicant had been thoroughly negligent, discretion should not be exercised to condone the delay. Having said so, the following principles were broadly set out in Esha Bhattacharjee (supra):-
"“21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected Page 14 of 23 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected Page 15 of 23 to the technicalities of 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:
22. 1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected Page 16 of 23 yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires legal parameters.” to be curbed, of course, within 11. We would respectfully observe that the aforesaid principles would squarely apply to the appellate proceedings under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, when question of condonation of delay arises for consideration.
12. There are certain aspects which we must bear in mind when we deal with the question of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, for the said Act relates to and deals with compulsory acquisition of land. Erstwhile owner or right holder is not a consenting party and not given an option and choice. There are a number of cases including decisions in Dhiraj Singh (supra), Imrat Lal & Others versus Land Acquisition Collector and Others, (2014) 14 SCC133 Samiyathal & Others versus SPL Tahsildar & Others, 2013 Law Suit (SC) 1295, K. Subbarayudu and Others versus The Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition), 2017 (8) SCALE61and Ranjit Singh & Another versus State of Haryana & Others, 2014 (9) SCALE291wherein delay going up to 4000 days or delay exceeding 10 years, have been condoned. Recently in Narendra and Others versus State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2017) 9 SCC426 the Supreme Court highlighted need to award just and fair compensation to those whose land was acquired under L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected Page 17 of 23 the same notification and were similarly situated, notwithstanding that a particular appellant had prayed for a lower compensation and had accordingly paid court fee. There was no cap of maximum amount of compensation that the Court could award for the law does not restrict and restrain the Courts from awarding only that amount as prayed in the application. In this context, reference was made to Section 28-A and its salutary objective. Adversarial form of adjudication has element of limitations in social context adjudication and the Courts must promote and administer fair justice to marginalised section of the society, otherwise the latter being unequal would be discriminated. In such cases, Courts should adopt problem solving therapeutic approach to ensure payment of just compensation to bridge the gap between law and life. Core of jurisprudence behind the said reasoning predicated on fair and distributive justice is elucidated in paragraph 13 of the said judgment, which reads:-
"“13. From the human rights perspective, persons belonging to the weaker sections are disadvantaged people who are unable to acquire and use their rights because of poverty, social or other constraints. They are not in a position to approach the courts even when their rights are violated; they are victimised or deprived of their legitimate due. Here lies the importance of access to justice for socially and economically disadvantaged people. When such people are denied the basic right of survival and access to justice, it further aggravates their poverty. Therefore, even in order to eliminate poverty, access to justice to the poor sections of the society becomes imperative. In the instant case, it is the poverty which compelled the appellants to restrict the claim to Rs 115 per square yard, as they were not in a position to pay the court fee on a higher amount.” L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected Page 18 of 23 Our reasoning resonates the said view.
13. Invariably the underlying reason to condone delay in the land acquisition appeals was social and economic status of the appellants, whose land was acquired. The appellants/claimants were agriculturists and not men of means, thus the acquisition by the all powerful government had deprived them of their source of livelihood. The question invariably related to access to justice and denial of equal treatment, for the appellants/claimants did not have ability, resources and money to approach the Court in time and pay the court fee. In this context, it was observed that the Court would be taking hyper-technical view rather than a pragmatic, just and equitable approach if delay in such cases were not to be condoned.
14. Such cases have to be distinguished, and cannot be treated at par with the cases where land had been transferred and sold and is under ownership of investors who seek to derive benefit from rising prices. All appellants are not equal and cannot claim violation of principle of equality when their social and economic status is different. Land is an asset and is also transferable and, therefore, can be bought and sold. Over a period of time, due to rising population and limited availability and other reasons, land has become a precious and priced possession. Galloping and zooming land prices have made investments in land as most paying and lucrative.
15. Courts would accept and be considerate to an agriculturist primarily dependent upon agricultural income for sustenance, therefore would merit highest degree of indulgence. This factual position may not be universally true, especially in Delhi where we have luxurious farm houses purportedly on agricultural land and there is speculative buying and sales in view of increasing land prices. This deprives and denies majority of the middle and L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected Page 19 of 23 marginalised landless from having a roof over their head. Owning a house is a distant dream for a many due to exorbitant land prices, totally disproportionate to the per capita income of an average Indian. Universal and omnibus dictum, whether or not explanation regarding “sufficient cause” should be accepted, would have its pitfalls and drawbacks. On one hand, the land owner is deprived of his land, which may be his only source of livelihood and on the other hand land is required for housing for poor and landless and creating jobs required for jobless.
16. Law of compulsory acquisition predicated on the principle that acquisition of land was in larger public interest and for greater good of society, yet past is replete with cases of compulsory acquisition of land at minimal price and exorbitant profits being made by those to whom land was transferred post acquisition on the pretext of public interest. Law, justice and equity require balance and equanimity, and not strait-jacket uniformity notwithstanding difference in circumstances and backgrounds. Condonation of delay would always be a matter of discretion exercised on the basis of principles enunciated by the Supreme Court, albeit on consideration of the facts and circumstances.
17. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we would hold that the question of condonation of delay in filing of appeals under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act is case and factual matrix specific. The Court, while examining the question of delay, must keep in mind the social and economic status of the appellant and whether he had limited access to justice being a person of paltry means who has also been deprived of his source of livelihood. This first factor could constitute the sole and compelling reason that may justify condonation of delay even for extremely long periods and in L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected Page 20 of 23 such cases, principle of equality in treatment in view of higher compensation paid to those who had the means and resources to approach the Court would be a good second or additional ground to excuse the delay. The fact that in other cases, higher compensation had been paid may be a relevant consideration but would not be the sole and only consideration to satisfy the test of sufficient cause. It would be incorrect to state as a principle, that regardless of the social and economic status of the appellant, delay in filing of appeal howsoever long it may be, must be condoned by applying the principle of equal treatment. The said principle cannot be accepted and applied as determinative criteria to decide whether cause for delay was justified and stood explained.
18. While examining and interpreting newly enacted Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act in Babua Ram and Others versus State of U.P. & Another, (1995) 2 SCC689 the Supreme Court had held that benefit of Section 28A would not be available to a person, who had sought and secured reference under Section 18A but had not filed any appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act inasmuch as law recognizes finality to a decision or judgment which is not challenged. Doctrine of res judicata operates and is not to be ignored. Argument of violation of Article 14 when different compensation was paid was rejected. Similarly, in Mewa Ram (supra) there are observations that enhanced compensation granted in some other case would not alone be a good ground for condonation of delay to seek enhancement.
19. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the reference is answered in the following manner:-
"L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected Page 21 of 23 (i) Article 116 of the schedule of the Limitation Act applies to appeals preferred before the High Court under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. (ii) The expression “sufficient cause” as interpreted is an elastic term, which has to be meaningfully interpreted to sub-serve the purpose of justice and on the basis of the principles laid down in Katiji (supra) and Esha Bhattacharjee (supra). (iii) The principles laid down in Katiji (supra) and Esha Bhattacharjee (supra) are guidelines for exercise of discretion but whether the discretion is to be exercised and delay should be condoned in a particular case would be situation and case specific. (iv) Codonation of delay is not a vested right or to be granted on asking in all appeals seeking enhancement of compensation on acquisition of land. The social and economic condition of the appellant, including his educational background and other limitations are the most important and determinative factors to be taken into consideration so as not to deny justice and correct disparity. At the same time, indulgence need not be bestowed to the negligent and fence sitters, who had economic resources and were well versed and could have enforced right to appeal but for multifarious reasons were satisfied and did not pursue and enforce their right to appeal. (v) Enhanced or higher compensation awarded in other cases may be a relevant factor while considering application for condonation of delay, but would not be the sole or even dominant consideration. L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected Page 22 of 23 Social and economic condition of the appellant when the delay is substantial and long would be the primary and dominant consideration. In such cases, award of higher compensation in appeals preferred by others would justify condonation of delay for long periods. Principle of equality may also come into play and would be a relevant factor when issue of condonation of delay is equally balanced.
20. Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. Individual cases will be listed before the single Judge for disposal of the applications for condonation of delay on 25/4/18 when a date of hearing will be fixed. APRIL13h, 2018 NA/ssn/VKR L.A. APP No.672/2011+Connected (SANJIV KHANNA) JUDGE (RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW) JUDGE (JAYANT NATH) JUDGE Page 23 of 23