S.K. Chattopadhyaya, J.
1. These two civil revision applications have been referred to Division Bench for decision as to whether the order passed by the appellate authority under Section 23(1) of (The Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is revisable by the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
2. As the point of reference is very limited, we need not go into the facts of the case in detail. Suffice is to say that the petitioners of both the cases filed claim cases against the ex-owners opposite parties under Section 23 of the Act before the Assistant Commissioner of Payments. After hearing the parties, the learned Commissioner allowed the claim of the petitioner of civil revision No. 104/92 (R) to some extent with interest. Against the said order the opposite party filed Misc. Appeal No. 159/80 under the provisions of the Act. As the entire claim of the petitioner of C.R. No. 225/92 (R) was disallowed by the learned Commissioner, the petitioner preferred Misc. Appeal No. 29/82 under the provisions of the Act. Whereas the appeal filed by the opposite party of C.R. No. 104/92 (R) was allowed by the appellate court, the appeal filed by the petitioner of C.R. No. 225/92 (R) was dismissed.
3. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have moved this Court in the instant revision applications. By order dated 22.3.93 passed in civil revision No. 225/92 (R) a Division Bench directed that this application will be heard on the question of maintainability of the civil revision applications in terms of the provision as contained in Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act. Similarly, Civil Revision No. 104/92 (R) was referred to the Division Bench by order dated 30.8.94 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court.
4. Section 23(1) of the Act reads as follows:
Claim to be made to the Commissioner;
(1) Every person having a claim against the owner of a coking coal mine or cole oven plant shall prefer such claim before the Commissioner within thirty days from the specified date.
Provided that if the Commissioner is satisfied that the claimant was prevented by sufficient cause, from preferring the claim within the said period of thirty days, he may, on the expiry of the said period of thirty days, entertain the claim within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.
5. As already indicated above, claim was preferred by the petitioners before the Commissioner of Payment under Section 23(1) of the Act. Section 23(10) of the Act reads as follows:
A claimant or owner who is dissatisfied with the decision of the commissioner may prefer an appeal within a period of sixty says from the date of the decision, to the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the coking coal mine or coke oven plant, as the case may, be, is situated.
Provided that where a person who is a judge of a High Court is appointed to be the Commissioner, such appeal shall lie to the High Court for the State in which the coking coal mine or coke oven plant, as the case may be, is situated and such appeal shall be heard and disposed of by not lets than two judges of that High Court.
Provided further that any appeal which has not been preferred before the date on which the coal mines Nationalisation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972, receives the assent of the President shall be preferred within a period of sixty days from such date.
6. Mr. Mehta appearing on behalf of the petitioners has submitted that the 3rd Addl. District Judge is not a Personae designata, rather a Court, which is subordinate to the High Court and as such civil revision application is maintainable against his order. On the other hand, Mr. Rajendra Prasad and Mr. Marathic appearing for the opposite parties submit that the order of the 3rd Addl. District Judge is not revisable and can be impugned only by invoking writ jurisdiction.
7. The question arises as to what is the remedy of the claimants or the owners who are dissatisfied with the decision of the appellate court. There is no provision in the Act for second appeal and, therefore, the remedy will be to move the High Court either under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The point to be decided is as to whether if instead of filling writ application, the aggrieved person files civil revision application, the same shall be maintainable or not.
8. Section 115 of (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the High Court may call for the records of any case which has been decided by a Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto. As the learned Counsel have contended that at this juncture the merits of the application need not be gone into, it is not, necessary for us to deal with other provision of Section 115, CPC
9. From a bare reading of the provisions of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is clear that the High Court can entertain a revision application against the order passed by a Court which is subordinate to the High Court. So it is to be decided as to whether the Court of 3rd Addl. District Judge is a Court which is subordinate to the High Court.
10. It cannot be disputed that the scope of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not restricted to Courts governed by the CPC only. Its scope extends to all courts which was subordinate to the High Court and undoubtedly, the District Judge while exercising powers under Section 23 of the Act, is a Court subordinate to the High Court.
11. The matter can be viewed from another angle also. First proviso to Sub-clause (1) of Section 23 of the Act contemplates that where a person who is a judge of a High Court is appointed to be the Commissioner, such appeal shall lie to the High Court and such appeal shall be heard and disposed of by not less than two judges of that High Court. Now, if this is the intention of the Legislature that where the claim petition has been decided by judge of a High Court, straightway appeal will lie to the Division Bench of a High Court, then were instead of a Judge of a High Court, a Commissioner of a Payments has been appointed to entertain such claim petition and law provides that an appeal will lie under Section 23(1) of the Act to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the coking coal mine or coke oven plant is situated, can it be said that such appellate court is not a court subordinate to the High Court In my view, that cannot be the intention of the law makers.
12. In the present case the appeal was heard by the Add. District Judge, Dhanbad against whose decision no further appeal has been provided under the Act. Section 2(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure defines 'district' which means the local limits of the jurisdiction of a Principal Civil Court or original jurisdiction (hereinafter called as 'the District Court') and includes the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court. Thus, where Sub-clause (1) of Section 23 provides that the aggrieved person can prefer an appeal against the decision of the Commissioner to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, it means that appeal is to be preferred before the District Court. There cannot be two opinions about the position in law that the district court is subordinate to the High Court. In this view of the matter I am of the opinion that the 3rd Add. District Judge is a Court which is a Court subordinate to the High Court.
13. In the case of Central Commercial Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. D.K. Barman and Anr. reported in : AIR1969Pat371 a Division Bench of this Court was of the opinion that the labour Court is subordinate to the High Court. Relying on a decision reported in : (1967)ILLJ384Pat , their lordships held that to all intends and on the basis, the scope of the application under Section 115 of the Code of Article 227 of the Constitution is not very different.
14. In the case of Central Talkies, Kanpur v. Dwarika Prasad reported in 1961 SC 606, their lordships while defining meaning of the word 'personae designata' has observed as follows:-
The argument that the District Magistrate was a persona designate, cannot be accepted. Under the definition of 'District Magistrate' the special authorisation by the District Magistrate had the affect of creating officers exercising the powers of a District Magistrate under the Eviction Act. To that extent, those officers would, on authorization, be equated to the District Magistrate. A persona designata is a person who is pointed out or described as an individual as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character'. (See Obsborn's Concise Law Dictionary, 4th Adn. page 253). In the words of Schwabe C.J. in A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 551 (FB) personae designata are 'person selected to Act in their private capacity and not in their capacity as judges.
15. The decision of the Supreme Court sets at rest all controversies on this point. The effect of the decision of the Apex Court is that where a judge is appointed purely in his individual capacity by name, he acts as a .person persona designata but where he is appointed by his designation alone, he acts as a court and not as persona designata.
16. In the instant case it would appear that the 3rd Addl. District Judge was appointed by his designation alone and, as such, in our opinion considered opinion, he acts as a court and not an a persona designata.
17. In the case of Anirudh Prasad Ambastha and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. reported in (1990) 1 BLJR 622; 1990 PLJR 1, a Full Bench of this Court was called upon to decide as to whether the Claims Tribunal including the Additional Claims Tribunals functioning at different district headquarters, have been validly constituted and the appointment of the District Judges and the Addl. District Judges as members, was valid or not. According to their lordships, the District Judges and the Addl. District Judges belong to the same cadre as under Article 236 of the Constitution and the District Judge includes Addl. District Judge. After considering several decisions, their lordships held that the District Judges and Addl. District Judges are courts and are subordinate to High Court, both administrative and revisional.
18. Similarly, in the case of Thakur Das by LRs v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. reported in A.I.R. 1978 SC I, the Supreme Court has held that the appellate authority under Section 6C of the Essential Commodities Act is not a persona designata and this authority is amenable to revisional jurisdiction of High Court. No contrary decision could bee brought to our notice by the learned Counsel for the parties.
19. Considering the various decisions and the legal aspects of the matter we are of the opinion that the 3rd Addl. District Judge, which is an appellate authority under Sub-clause (1) of Section 23 of the Act is not a persona designata, rather, be is appointed by his designation and, as such, he acts as a Court which is undisputedly subordinate to the High Court.
20. Thus answering the point referred by the Division Bench we hold that the present civil revision applications are maintainable and as such, should be heard on merits. Let both the applications be placed before an appropriate Bench for disposal on merits. As the claim cases relate to the year 1973 and 1975, let these applications be listed for hearing on priority basis.