Judgment:
1 R IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE DATED THIS THE02D DAY OF AUGUST, 2014 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE B.V.NAGARATHNA WRIT PETITION NO.8405/2013 (LR-RES). BETWEEN:
1. SRI.G.MANJUNATH, AGED ABOUT23YEARS, MAJOR, S/O LATE R.K.GOVINDAPPA, R/AT NO.402, KEERTHY REGENCY, 2ND MAIN ROAD, KODIHALLI, BANGALORE560008. 2.SMT.GAYATHRI, AGED ABOUT28YEARS, MAJOR, D/O LATE R.K.GOVINDAPPA, W/O SRI VENKATESH, R/AT NO.901, 4TH CROSS, BRUNDAVANA LAYOUT, VIJINAPURA, BANGALORE-16. ... PETITIONERS (BY SRI.S.D.N.PRASAD, ADV.) AND:
1. THE SECRETARY, KARNATAKA GOLF ASSOCIATION, WIND TUNNEL ROAD, N.A.L ROAD, MURUGESHPALYA, BANGALORE-560 017. A.MADHUSUDHANA SRI: RAO, FOR22.KARNATAKA STATE TOURISUM DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, BANGALORE-DODDABALLAPURA SUB DIVISION, BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT-561 203. REP. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR. 3.THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONER, BANGALORE DIVISION, B.M.T.C. BUILDING, 2ND FLOOR, SHANTHINAGARA, BANGALORE-560 035. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI.PRAKASH.T.HEBBAR SMT.SAVITHRAMMA, HCGP FOR R3) SRI: B.K.SAMPATH KUMAR FOR FOR R1, R2, ***** THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES226AND227OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED
ORDERPASSED BY THE R3, IN CASE NO.INA.RP.1/06-07 DT.21.1.12, VIDE ANN- F, & CONSEQUENTLY HOLD THE PETITION, PENDING BEFORE THE R3 AS NOT MAINTANABLE. THE
JUDGMENTIN THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN RESERVED ON1006/2014 AND IT BEING LISTED FOR PRONOUNCEMENT TODAY, COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
3.
ORDERThis writ petition raises a short but interesting question regarding the maintainability of a revision petition before the Regional Commissioner under Section 27A of the Karnataka (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 (hereinafter, referred to as “the Act”: for the sake of brevity).
2. The petitioners have assailed order dated 21/01/2013 in Case No.INA.RP.01/2006-07 (Annexure “F”) passed by the third respondent – Regional Commissioner, Bangalore Division, Bangalore. By that order, the Regional Commissioner has held that the revision filed under Section 27A of the Act, is maintainable. Thus, the bone of contention between the parties in this writ petition is with regard to the maintainability of the revision petitions filed by the first and second respondents herein, before the third Regional Commissioner. 4 3. The facts germane to the disposal of this writ petition are that the Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore Division Bangalore, had passed an order of regrant in favour of one Akkayamma in Case No.5A/1959-60 on 28/08/1965 under Section 10 of the Act. That order is stated to be in operation since then. That order has been assailed by first and second respondents in two revision petitions filed by them before the third respondent invoking Section 27A of the Act. In those revision petitions, petitioners’ father, late R.K.Govindappa, had entered appearance being the son of the original grantee namely, late Akkayamma and had raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the revision petitions under the provisions of the Act as well as the delay in filing the revision petitions and the locus standi of the respondent Nos.1 and 2 to file those petitions. The third respondent initially passed an order on maintainability as well as on merits and set aside the order of regrant made in favour of late 5 Akkayamma, on 09/04/2001, vide Annexure “C”. That order was challenged in W.P.No.24331/2001 by late R.K.Govindappa. This Court by order dated 31/05/2006 allowed the writ petition and directed the third respondent to initially consider the question of maintainability. The order of the learned Single Judge was challenged by respondent Nos.1 and 2 in W.P.No.1340/2006 connected with W.P.No.1736/2006. The Division Bench by its order dated 21/02/2009 dismissed the writ appeal by confirming the order of the learned Single Judge. Pursuant to the directions issued by this Court, the third respondent considered the question of maintainability of the revision petitions and passed the impugned order, holding that he had the jurisdiction and was competent to consider the revision petitions on merits. That order is assailed in this writ petition by the petitioners who are the Legal Representatives of R.K.Govindappa. 6 4. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that pursuant to the orders passed by this Court, the third respondent had to consider the issue of maintainability of the revision petitions at the first instance and thereafter, to pass an order on merits. However, the impugned order not only erroneously holds that revision petitions were maintainable but also touches upon the merits of the matter. It was further contended that the third respondent has not considered the aspect of jurisdiction under Section 27A of the Act in its proper perspective. The delay in filing the revision petition and also the locus standi of the first and second respondents to maintain the revision petitions have also not been considered in accordance with law, was the submission. It was contended that the impugned order is illegal and may be quashed.
5. Elaborating the aforesaid submissions, it was stated that Sy.No.145 of Kodihalli village was 7 granted in favour of late Akkayamma, under Section 10 of the Act. That order was passed on 28/05/1965. As against that order, an appeal was maintainable under Section 28 of the Act. Section 28 of the Act was amended by Act No.26/1979 (hereinafter, referred to as the “Amendment Act”) w.e.f. 01/05/1979 by deleting the remedy of appeal against an order passed under Section 10 of the Act. The Amendment Act was assailed before this Court in case of Shri Kudli Sringeri Mahasamsthanam & Others v. State of Karnataka [ILR1992KAR1827. A Division Bench of this Court struck down the Act both on the ground of legislative incompetence as well as on other grounds. In fact, the Amendment Act also amended certain provisions of the Karnataka (Religious & Charitable) Inams Abolition Act, 1955. However, this case does not concern those amendments. The Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid decision held that the Amendment Act was still born, void and invalid and 8 did not affect the Act as such. That judgment was assailed by State of Karnataka before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The civil appeals were dismissed by the Hon’ble Court. Consequently, the Amendment Act did not remain on the statute book and the original provisions of the Act continued to operate and the right of appeal under Section 28 of the Act was available to the first and second respondents, assuming but not conceding, that the said appeal was otherwise maintainable. Instead, the first and second respondents have invoked Section 27A of the Act, which is the revisional jurisdiction of the Regional Commissioner, which was not applicable to assail an order of regrant. It was therefore contended that the Regional Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision petitions filed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 under Section 27A of the Act. 9 6. It was further contended that the revision petitions were filed nearly 35 years after the regrant order and hence, the revision petitions had to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
7. That apart, petitioners’ counsel also contended that on the enforcement of the Act, the land in question stood vested with the State Government and the authority constituted under the Act had to determine the claims of persons seeking regrant. That was a matter between the claimants and the State Government and the order regranting the land in question to the petitioners’ grand mother was not one which could have been assailed by strangers particularly, respondent Nos.1 and 2. It was hence contended that respondent Nos.1 and 2 had no locus standi to assail the order of regrant made in the year 1965.
8. Drawing my attention to the impugned order, it was contended that the consideration of the 10 case on the aforesaid aspects has not been in accordance with law and hence, the impugned order stating that the third respondent – Regional Commissioner had the jurisdiction to entertain the revision petitions is illegal and would call for interference by this Court. During the course of submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners referred to certain decisions of this Court as well as of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which shall be referred to later.
9. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents in unison contended that the Regional Commissioner had the jurisdiction to entertain the revision petition under Section 27A of the Act. The revisional jurisdiction under that Act is wide enough as the Regional Commissioner is competent to revise any order so as to give effect to the provisions of the Act and conferment of jurisdiction cannot be viewed in a restrictive way. Supporting the impugned order, 11 learned counsel contended that the writ petition is premature and the Regional Commissioner could have considered the case on merits and thereafter, the petitioners could have availed the remedy by way of the writ petition. Relying on certain decisions, they submitted that there is no merit in the writ petition and the same may be dismissed.
10. Before considering the issues on the aspect of jurisdiction of the third respondent - Regional Commissioner to entertain the revision petitions filed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 as well as the other aspects such as delay in filing those revision petitions and the locus standi of the first and second respondents to file those petitions, it would be useful to set out the relevant provisions of the Act as well as the Amendment Act, as also the relevant paragraphs of the judgment touching upon the aspect of the Amendment Act. 12 11. The Act came into force on 15/03/1955. The object of the Act is to provide for the abolition of personal inams and certain miscellaneous inams in Karnataka except Bellary District and other matters connected therewith. It applies to the whole of Karnataka except Bellary District. It applies to all kinds of personal inams as stated in sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act. Section 2 is the definition clause. Sub-section (6) of Section 2 states that an “Inamdar” means a person holding in trust or owning for his own benefit an inam village or a minor inam or a share therein and includes the successors in interest of an inamdar and (i) where an inamdar is a minor or of unsound mind or an idiot, his guardian, committee or other legal curator, (ii) where an inamdar is a joint Hindu family, such joint Hindu family. Chapter II deals with vesting of inam in the State and its consequences. Section 3 specifically deals with consequence of vesting of an inam in the State. Section 10 deals 13 with determination of claims under Sections 4 to 9A. Those sections deal with registration of Kadim tenant, permanent tenant, quasi- permanent tenant, holder of a minor inam as well as other tenants of an Inamdar. Section 10 prior to the Amendment Act read as under:- “10. Determination of claims under section 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 9A: (1) The Deputy Commissioner shall examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which a kadim tenant, a permanent tenant, a quasi-permanent tenant, the holder of a minor inam or an inamdar claims to be registered as occupant under sections 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 or the holder of a minor inam claims to be registered as holder under section 8 or in respect of which any person claims to be continued as tenant under Section 9-A, as the case may be, and decide in respect of which lands the claims should be allowed. 14 (2) A tenant found to be in possession of any land on the first day of July, 1948, shall be presumed to be a quasi-permanent tenant as defined in clause (14) of sub-section (1) of section 2 unless the inamdar proves that such tenant is not a quasi-permanent tenant as defined in clause (14) of sub-section (1) of section 2. Provided that in the case of a tenant in minor inam such presumption shall be raised if such tenant is found to be in possession of any land on the 1st day of July 1970. (3)(a) No person shall be entitled to be registered as an occupant under sections 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 unless the claimant makes an application to the Deputy Commissioner. Every such application shall be made,- (i) in respect of lands in inams which have vested in the State before the date of commencement of the Karnataka Inams Abolition (Amendment) 15 Act, 1973 within one year from the date of commencement of the said Amendment Act and (ii) in respect of lands in inams which vest in the State on or after the commencement of the Karnataka Inams Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973 within one year from the date of vesting of the inam concerned. (b) where no application is made within the period specified in clause(a), the right of any person to be registered as an occupant shall stand extinguished and the land shall vest in the State absolutely.
12. Section 28 prior to the Amendment Act read as under :- “(1) Against any decision of the Deputy Commissioner under Section 10 or Section 11 the Government may, within six months from the date of commencement of the Mysore Inams Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1969 16 or from the date of the decision, whichever is later, and any person aggrieved by such decision may, within thirty days from the said date, appeal to the prescribed authority and the decision of the prescribed authority shall be final. (2): If any question arises whether any building or land falls within the scope of sub-section (2) of section 7 or sub- section (2) of section 7 or sub-section (2) of section 9 or section 12, it shall be referred to the prescribed authority whose decision shall be final.” 13. The relevant portion of the Amendment Act reads as under:
2. Amendment of Mysore Act 1 of 1955: In the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 (Mysore Act 1 of 1955),- x x x x (2) in section 10,- (A) in the heading, for the figures, letter and word "9 and 9A", the word and figures "and 9" shall be substituted; 17 (B) in sub-section (1), for the words "Deputy Commissioner" the word "Tribunal" shall be substituted and the words "or in respect of which any person claims to be continued as tenant under section 9A" shall be omitted; (C) in sub-section (3),- (a) in clause (a),- (i) for the words "Deputy Commissioner" the word "Tribunal" shall be substituted; (ii) in sub-clause (i), for the words "one year", to words "six years" shall be and shall be deemed always to have been substituted; (iii) in sub-clause (ii), for the words "one year" the words "three years" and for the words "the inam concerned" the figures, letters and words "the inam concerned or 31st December 1979, whichever is later" shall be and shall be deemed always to have been substituted; (b) in clause (b), at the end, the following shall be inserted, namely:- 18 "Such land shall be disposed of in accordance with the rules relating to grant of lands."
; (c) after clause (b), the following clause shall be inserted namely:- "(c) The provisions of sections 48A, 48C and 112 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 and the relevant rules framed thereunder shall mutatis mutandis apply to an enquiry for determination of a claim under this section and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final."
; x x x x (6) in section 28,- (a) for the heading, the following shall be substituted, namely:-
"28. Appeal from orders under section 11."
:- (b) in sub-section (1), the words and figure "section 10 or" shall be omitted and for the figures
"1969. the figures
"1979. shall be substituted: (c) sub-section (2) shall be omitted; 14. After the amendments, sections 10 and 28 read as under:- 19 “Section 10. Determination of claims under section 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, [and 9].: (1) The Tribunal shall examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which a kadim tenant, a permanent tenant, a quasi-permanent tenant, the holder of a minor inam or an inamdar claims to be registered as occupant under sections 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 or the holder of a minor inam claims to be registered as holder under section 8, as the case may be, and decide in respect of which lands the claims should be allowed. (2) A tenant found to be in possession of any land on the first day of July, 1948, shall be presumed to be a quasi-permanent tenant as defined in clause (14) of sub-section (1) of section 2 unless the inamdar proves that such tenant is not a quasi-permanent tenant as defined in clause (14) of sub-section (1) of section 2. Provided that in the case of a tenant in minor inam such presumption 20 shall be raised if such tenant is found to be in possession of any land on the 1st day of July 1970. (3)(a) No person shall be entitled to be registered as an occupant under sections 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 unless the claimant makes an application to the Tribunal. Every such application shall be made,- (i) in respect of lands in inams which have vested in the State before the date of commencement of the Karnataka Inams Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1973 within six years from the date of commencement of the said Amendment Act and (ii) in respect of lands in inams which vest in the State on or after the commencement of the Karnataka Inams Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973 within three years from the date of vesting of the inam concerned or 31st December 1979 whichever is later 21 (b) where no application is made within the period specified in clause(a), the right of any person to be registered as an occupant shall stand extinguished and the land shall vest in the State absolutely such land shall be disposed of in accordance with the rules relating to grant of lands. (c) The provisions of sections 48-A, 48-C and 112 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 and the relevant rules framed thereunder shall mutatis mutandis apply to an enquiry for determination of a claim under this section and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final. x x x x Section 28. [Appeal from orders under Section 11].: (1) Against any decision of the Deputy Commissioner under Section 11, the Government may, within six months from the date of commencement of the Mysore Inams Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1979 or from the date of the decision, 22 whichever is later, and any person aggrieved by such decision may, within thirty days from the said date, appeal to the prescribed authority and the decision of the prescribed authority shall be final. (2) x x x x x.” 15. The Division Bench of this Court in Shri Kudli Sringeri Mahasamsthanam struck down, the entire Amendment Act which amended certain provisions of Personal and Miscellaenous as well as Religious and Charitable Inams Abolition Act. That decision was affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court by its judgment reported in State of Karnataka Vs. Sri Kudli Sringeri Mahasamsthanam (JT1996(7) SC214.
16. Subsequently, in the case of M.B.Ramachandran v. Gowramma and others [2005 (4) KLJ321(SC)]. (M.B.Ramchandran), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:- 23 “We hold that the judgment of the High Court in Sri Kudli Sringeri Maha Samsthanam’s case, insofar as it declared the Karnataka Inams Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1979 (Act 26 of 1979) void in its entirety is not correct. At best, the High Court could have declared the amendments brought about by Section 3 of the aforesaid Act to the Mysore Act 18 of 1955 as ultra vires, since the question of validity of the amendments to the Mysore Act 1 of 1955 was not in issue. We order accordingly Civil Appeal No.5687 of 1999 is allowed to the extent indicated above.” 17. Mysore Act No.1 of 1955 is the Personal and Miscellaneous Inams Abolition Act which is the Act under consideration, while the Mysore Act No.18 of 1955 is the Religious and Charitable Inams Abolition Act, 1955. The implication of the aforesaid observations would mean that the amendments made to Mysore Act No.1 of 1955 i.e., the Act under consideration could not have been held to be invalid 24 or still born. Therefore, the Amendment Act was validated, insofar as the Act under consideration is concerned by the aforesaid observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
18. In view of the amendment to Section 28, an appeal against an order passed under Section 10 is no longer available as the words “Section 10 “ has been deleted in Section 28. The resultant position is that the appellate authority to consider an order passed under Section 10 is no longer available as an appeal against the order made under Section 10 is not appealable in view of the omission of the words “Section 10” in Section 28 by virtue of the Amendment Act, which is now enforceable. In other words, the appellate remedy against an order made under Section 10 of the Act is omitted under to the Amendment Act, which is now in force. This also becomes clear from the Amendment Act, which is extracted supra. Be that as it may. Prior to the 25 Amendment Act of 1979, the remedy of appeal against orders of regrant and the jurisdiction of control under Section 27A were both available. But after the enforcement of the Amendment Act and the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.B.Ramachandran (supra), the appellate remedy no longer survives.
19. It is in the aforesaid context that counsel for the respondents contended that respondent Nos.1 and 2 availed the revisional remedy under Section 27A of the Act. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Regional Commissioner to entertain a revision against an order of regrant has to be examined in the above context. Section 27A and B were inserted by Act No.33 of 1969 with effect from 1/7/1970 and is deemed to have been inserted from inception. Section 27A after amendment of 2007 reads as under:- 26 “Section 27A. Control by the Regional Commissioner: The Regional Commissioner shall, within his jurisdiction have power;- (a) to give effect to the provisions of this Act and in particular to superintendent the taking over of inams and to make due arrangements for the administration thereof; (b) to issue instructions for the guidance of the Deputy Commissioner; (c) to cancel or revise any order of the Deputy Commissioner declaring whether a particular area is part of an inam or not.” Section 27-B. Revision by Government: The Government may cancel or revise any order passed by the [Regional Commissioner]. under clause (c) of Section 27A]. 27 20. Section 3 of the Karnataka Land Revenue and Certain Other Laws (Amendment) Act, 2007 reads as under:- “Section 3. Amendment of the Mysore (Personnel and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 (Mysore Act 1 of 1955): In the Mysore (Personnel and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 (Mysore Act I of 1955),- (i) in Section 27A, in the heading and in the section for the words “Divisional Commissioner” the words “Regional Commissioner” shall be substituted; (ii) in Section 27-B, for the words “Divisional Commissioner” the words “Regional Commissioner” shall be substituted.” After the aforesaid amendment the words Divisional Commissioner is substituted by the words Regional Commissioner. 28 21. It is necessary to understand the scope of the aforesaid provisions before giving a finding as to whether the Regional Commissioner had the jurisdiction to entertain the revision petitions by the respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein. The Regional Commissioner within his jurisdiction has the power :- (a) to give effect to the provisions of this Act and in particular to superintend the taking over of inams and to make due arrangements for the administration thereof; (b) to issue instructions for the guidance of the Deputy Commissioner; (c) to cancel or revise any order of the Deputy Commissioner declaring whether a particular area is part of an inam or not. The aforesaid aspects are matters over which the Regional Commissioner can exercise his control. The State Government has the power to revise any order passed by the Regional Commissioner. 29 22. The aforesaid jurisdiction of the Regional Commissioner is to be examined in light of the order that is passed by the Deputy Commissioner whose jurisdiction is now vested with the Tribunal after amendment under Section 10 of the Act. Section 10 of the Act states that the Deputy Commissioner, (now the Tribunal) on examination of the nature and history of all lands, which are Inam lands and tenanted lands register the occupants as tenants or as holders as the case may be by deciding the claims made on the lands. The claims are made based on Sections 4 to 9. The powers of the Deputy Commissioner under Section 10 are now being exercised by the Land Tribunal pursuant to the enforcement of the Amendment Act. An order passed by the Land Tribunal is final, which means there can be no revision or an appeal as against such an order. The Land Tribunal is an authority which has substituted the Deputy Commissioner popularly called “Inam Deputy Commissioner” under 30 Section 10. Prior to the Amendment Act, an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner in the matter of determination of claims under Section 10 was appealable to the prescribed authority. As noted above in view of the amendment made to Section 28 of the Act, the appellate remedy is not available. This is in line with clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act which states that a decision of the Tribunal is final. Judicial notice can also be taken note of the fact as against an order of the Land Tribunal passed under Section 10 of the Act, writ petitions are filed before this Court invoking Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Till the Amendment Act was enforced, the remedy by way of an appeal was available under Section 28 of the Act. But after the enforcement of the Amendment Act the appellate remedy is no longer available under Section 28 of the Act. In my view that would not imply that the remedy by way of revision under section 27A can be sought by a person being aggrieved by an order 31 passed by the Deputy Commissioner (now the Land Tribunal) under Section 10 of the Act.
23. In this context, it is relevant to note that until the Amendment Act was enforced, the appellate remedy against the order passed under Section 10 of the Act was available under Section 28. Also the Regional Commissioner had and continues to have controlling jurisdiction under Section 27A which was also on the statute book along with the appellate remedy. Assuming that the jurisdiction under Section 27A also provides for revision of orders as mentioned in that Section, the difference in the scope of the two jurisdictions of an appeal as well as a revision have to be examined. Both a revision as well as an appeal are creations of a statute and they cannot be read as being inherent in any authority much less as a concurrent power.
24. The distinction between an appeal and a revision can be adverted to at this stage. A right of 32 appeal is a substantive right conferred by the statute while the revisional power is only discretionary in nature. An appeal lies on a question of fact or of law or of fact and law while a revision application lies only on the point of jurisdictional error. While an appeal has to be filed by an aggrieved party, filing of an application is not necessary in case of revision. A revisional authority even suo motu can exercise powers of revision. Where by an express provision the appellate remedy is revoked that would not imply that automatically the revisional jurisdiction under that statute would become available to a person aggrieved by an order passed by the original authority.
25. In this context, reliance could be placed on certain decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the case of Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and others v. Rangaswamy Chettiar [(1980) 4 SCC259, it has been observed as under:- 33 “2. “Appeal” and “revision” are expressions of common usage in Indian statute and the distinction between “appellate jurisdiction” and “revisional jurisdiction” is well known though not well defined. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing, as it were, on law as well as fact and is invoked by an aggrieved person. Such jurisdiction may, however, be limited in some way as, for instance has been done in the case of second appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, and under some Rent Acts in some States. Ordinarily, again, revisional jurisdiction is analogous to a power of superintendence and may sometimes be exercised even without its being invoked by a party. The extent of revisional jurisdiction is defined by the statute conferring such jurisdiction. The conferment of revisional jurisdiction is generally for the purpose of keeping tribunals subordinate to the revising Tribunal within the bounds of their authority to make them act according to law, according to the procedure 34 established by law and according to well defined principles of justice. Revisional jurisdiction as ordinarily understood with reference to our statutes is always included in appellate jurisdiction but not vice versa. These are general observations. The question of the extent of appellate or revisional jurisdiction has to be considered in each case with reference to the language employed by the statute. (Underlining by me) 26. Thus, the revisional jurisdiction is analogous to a power of superintendence and to ensure that the object of the Act is given effect to in accordance with the procedure established by law. Revisional jurisdiction is normally included in appellate jurisdiction but no vise-a-versa. Thus the extent of the revisional jurisdiction has to be considered with reference to the language employed in the statute. To the same effect, are the observations in Chandrika Prasad (dead) through 35 L.Rs v. Umesh Kumar Verma [2002 (1) SCC531.
27. The scope of revisional jurisdiction can however be contrasted to an appellate jurisdiction. In James Joseph Vs. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC642 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has formulated the following principles with reference to appeals. “(i) An appeal is a proceeding where an higher forum reconsiders the decision of a lower forum, on questions of fact and questions of law, with jurisdiction to confirm, reverse, modify the decision or remand the matter to the lower forum for fresh decision in terms of its directions. (ii) The appellate jurisdiction can be limited or regulated by the legislature and its extent has to be decided with reference to the language employed by the statute conferring the appellate jurisdiction. 36 (iii) The width of jurisdiction or the limitations on jurisdiction with reference to an appeal, does not depend on whether the appeal is a first appeal or a second appeal, but depends upon the limitations, if any, placed by the statute conferring the right of appeal. (iv) If the Legislature's intention is to limit the jurisdiction in an appeal, it may indicate such limits in the provision providing for appeal. Alternatively, it may expressly or impliedly incorporate the provisions of Section 100 of the Code, into the provision for appeals. (v) Generally statutory provisions for appeals against original orders or decrees (that is, first appeals) will not have any limitations and therefore rehearing on both law and fact is contemplated; and statutory provisions for appeals against appellate orders (that is, second appeals) will be restricted to questions of law. But such restriction is not on account of any legal principle that all second appeals should always be with 37 reference to questions of law, but would depend upon the wording of the statute placing the restrictions upon the scope of second appeal. (vi) Where the statute does not place any limitations or restrictions in regard to the scope and width of the appeal, it shall be construed that the appeal provides a right of rehearing on law as well as facts. If the Legislature enacts a self-contained provision for second appeals, without any limitation upon the scope of the second appeal and excludes the possibility of reading the provision of Section 100 of the Code, into such provision, then, it will not be permissible to read the limitations of Section 100 of the Code into the special provision.” 28. Keeping in view the aforesaid dicta the controversy could be unravelled in the instant case. Admittedly, order dated 28/05/1965 assailed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 before the revisional authority under Section 27A of the Act is one made 38 under Section 10 of the Act. Until the enforcement of the Amendment Act, i.e., in the year 1979, the first and second respondents could have assailed that order before the concerned appellate authority, assuming they had the locus standi to do so. After the enforcement of the Amendment Act and its validity being upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2005 (4) KLJ321(supra), it would imply that the Amendment Act is valid and in view of the deletion of Section 10 in Section 28 of the Amendment Act, the appellate remedy is no longer available. The question is as to whether such a situation would confer jurisdiction on the revisional authority to revise the order dated 28/05/1965. In my view, it would not do so. The reasons are not far to see. It is reiterated that until the enforcement of the Amendment Act, any person aggrieved by order of Section 10 of the Act, could have availed of the appellate jurisdiction. Subsequent to the amendment made to Section 28 of the Act, by virtue of the Amendment Act, the 39 appellate remedy is taken away. But the non- availability of the appellate remedy after the enforcement of the Amendment Act, would not automatically confer jurisdiction on the Regional Commissioner to revise the order of regrant. On the enforcement of the Amendment Act, orders of regrant cannot be assailed by way of a revision only because the appellate remedy is taken away by the Amendment Act.
29. The revisional jurisdiction is specific to the matters referred to in Section 27A which itself was inserted by Act No.3 of 1969 w.e.f. 01/07/1970 as a deeming provision to have been inserted right from the inception of the Act. In fact, under Section 27-B of the Act, the Government may cancel or revise the order passed by the Regional Commissioner under sub-section (c) of Section 27A of the Act. On the other hand, Section 28 of the Act has always been in the Act right from inception and 40 any person aggrieved by a decision of the Deputy Commissioner under Section 10 could file an appeal before the prescribed authority. Till the insertion of Section 27A, there was no remedy by way of a revision provided under the Act. This aspect also makes it apparent that the intention of the Legislature is to keep the scope of revision and appeal distinct. The revisional authority and the appellate authority are also different and the scope of their respective jurisdictions are distinct and separate. From the date of insertion of Section 27A till the Amendment Act, both the revisional authority as well as the appellate authority functioned simultaneously within their respective jurisdictions. Any order passed by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 10 was appealable and not revisable. Merely because the appellate remedy has been omitted by the Amendment act would not confer any jurisdiction on the Regional Commissioner to revise an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, (now the Land 41 Tribunal). In that view of the matter, the Regional Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain a revision petitions assailing an order passed under Section 10 of the Act.
30. In this context, reference could also be made to a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in case of B.K.Narasinga Rao v. State of Mysore & another [1966 (2) MLJ152, wherein, it has been opined as under:- “The scheme of the Act and its purpose make it clear that what vests in the State is the Inam village in respect of which a notification is made under S.1(4). The consequences enumerated in S.3 of the Act ensue only in respect of that village, and likewise persons who can get themselves registered as kadim tenants or permanent tenants or a quasi permanent tenants are only those who make an application, for that purpose in respect of lands in the Inam village which has so vested. That, is also the 42 position with respect to an application under S.9 under which an Inamdar would be entitled to be registered as an occupant of the lands specified in that section. When an application is made under any of these four sections the Deputy Commissioner has a duty under S.10 to examine the nature and history of all the lands in respect of which a person claims to be registered as an occupant, to make his adjudication upon those claims. Similarly for the determination of the compensation payable to the Inamdar under S.17, the Deputy Commissioner has in the first instance to decide whether an area or land in respect of which compensation is claimed by the Inamdar is or is not part of the Inam Village referred to in the notification under S.1(4). So it would follow that when the question properly arises before the Deputy Commissioner, it becomes his duty to decide whether a land or area is 43 within the Inam village which has vested in the Government. The power to make that investigation is a creature of the power flowing from Ss.10 and 17. So every such case would demand the exercise of that concomitant power for a decision on the question whether the Inam village in respect of which a notification is made under S.1(4) includes the land or area in respect of which there is a controversy.” 31. The Division Bench further opined that the Inams Abolition Act is an exhaustive Code on the subject of abolition of inam villages. When a Deputy Commissioner functioning under that Act makes an adjudication of any of the matters on which he could make such adjudication, he functions as a special tribunal appointed for the purpose and not as a revenue Deputy Commissioner to whom the Land Revenue Code now Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, refers. 44 32. In the case of B.K.Narasinga Rao vs. Divisional Commissioner, Mysore and Others, [1974(1) KLJ272, which decision is between the same parties as above, a learned single Judge of this Court opined as under:
2. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to refer to a few facts in order to appreciate the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. The petitioner, along with some others, was the major ‘Vrittidar’ of the inam village of Melahalli situated in Yelandar Taluk. The said village was notified under the Inams Act as stated earlier. Accordingly, claims were preferred by the inamdars, including the petitioner, and other persons interested in the lands comprised therein for registration of occupancy and other rights as provided under the various provisions of the Act, before the Special Deputy Commissioner constituted for the purpose. X X X458. It was next urged that the Special Deputy Commissioner under the Inams Act would function as a Tribunal. Therefore, if he acts under S.1(4) read with S.3 of that Act, it was not open to the Commissioner in the exercise of his controlling power under S.27A of the Act to interfere with such a finding. This argument, in my opinion, clearly overlooks the plain language of S.27A (c), whereby power is conferred on him to cancel or revise any order of the Deputy Commissioner under the Inams Act declaring whether a particular area is part of an inam or not’. It was sought to be argued that the word ‘area’ occurring in that sub-clause would not take within its ambit a separate and independent village like Y.K.Mole. There is no force in this contention. The ‘area’ in the context in which it is used would, in my view, take within its ambit the area of a ‘Dhakla’ or ‘Majare’ village, i.e., a hamlet. So long as such a finding, which is one of fact, remains unassailable, it would be open to the Commissioner, 46 acting under S.27A of the Inams Act, to see that the area of the hamlet is included in the ‘area’ of the notified inam village. Hence, this contention also has no force.” (Underlining supplied) Thus, this Court held that the Divisional Commissioner (now Regional Commissioner) in exercise of the power of control and supervision vested in him under Section 27A (c) of the Act, can legally examine the evidence available and conclude that ‘Dhakala’ or ‘Majare’ village was included in an Inam village which had been notified under sub-section (4) Section 1 of the Act. Thus under Clause (c) of Section 27A of the Act the Regional Commissioner can cancel or revise an order of the Deputy Commissioner declaring whether a particular area is part of an area or not. Thus, an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, (now Tribunal) under Section 10 of the Act determining a claim is not subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the Regional 47 Commissioner under Section 27A of the Act. In the instant case, an order of regrant made under Section 10 to petitioner’s grand mother cannot be revised under Section 27A of the Act by the Regional Commissioner as the Revision Petitions were not maintainable. Therefore, the revision petitions have to be dismissed on the ground of maintainability.
33. Next arguments on locus standi and delay in filing the revision petitions under Section 27A of the Act are considered. Locus standi :
34. Petitioner’s counsel contended that respondent Nos.1 and 2 had no locus standi to assail the order of regrant passed by the Deputy Commissioner on 28/05/1965 in favour of petitioner’s late father as they were not parties to the said proceeding as they were not the rival claimants. There is considerable force in this 48 submission as it is only a party who had participated in the proceedings before an authority or who ought to have been given an opportunity to participate in a proceeding and who was not given an opportunity can assail the order of authority and not third parties or strangers. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 had not made any claim before the Deputy Commissioner. Their rights are relatable to their allotment made by the State and not to the proceeding before the Deputy Commissioner. Hence, they have no locus standi to the order dated 28/08/1965 passed by the Deputy Commissioner.
35. In this context, it would be relevant to rely on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and others [(1976) 1 SCC671. In the said case, it was held that the proprietor of a cinema theatre holding a licence for exhibiting cinematograph films was not entitled to 49 invoke the certiorari jurisdiction ex debito justitiae to get a ‘No-objection Certificate’, granted under Rule 6 of the Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954 by the District Magistrate in favour of a rival in the trade, brought up and quashed.
36. In the said decision, the Supreme Court categorised the applicant seeking a writ of certiorari into three categories: i) person aggrieved ii) stranger and iii) busy body or meddlesome interloper. While distinguishing ‘person aggrieved’ from ‘strangers’ at Paragraph 38, the following tests have been laid:- “38. To distinguish such applicants from ‘strangers’, among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a person 50 whose legal right has been infringed?. Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense, that his interest, recognised by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of?. Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person “against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something?. Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public?. Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action?. If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority?. Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of the words “person aggrieved” is being considered, a social 51 welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community?. Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals?.” 37. At paragraph 49, it is opined as follows:- “49. While a procrustean approach should be avoided, as a rule, the Court should not interfere at the instance of a ‘stranger’ unless there are exceptional circumstances involving a grave miscarriage of justice having an adverse impact on public interests. Assuming that the appellant is a ‘stranger’, and not a busy body, then also there are no exceptional circumstances in the present case which would justify the issue of a writ of certiorari at his instance. On the contrary, the result of the exercise of these discretionary powers, in his favour, will, on balance, be against public policy. It will eliminate healthy competition in this business which is so 52 essential to raise commercial morality; it will tend to perpetuate the appellant’s monopoly of cinema business in the town; and above all, it will in effect, seriously injure the fundamental rights of respondents 1 and 2, which they have under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution, to carry on trade or business subject to ‘reasonable restrictions imposed by law’.
38. Placing reliance on an earlier decision in the case of Nagar Rice and Flour Mills v. N.T.Gowda [(1970) 3 SCR846, the Supreme Court opined that jurisdiction under Article 226 in general and certiorari in particular, is discretionary and in order to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction, locus standi must be insisted upon.
39. The aforesaid observations made in the context of filing a writ petition would squarely apply to Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 who have availed the revisional remedy under Section 27A of the Act in 53 the instant case. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 not being claimants under the provisions of the Act, could not have had their rights determined under Section 10 of the Act. Therefore the had no locus standi to file the revision petitions under section 27A of the Act.
40. Thus, respondent Nos.1 and 2 had no locus standi to challenge the order dated 28/05/1965 passed by the Deputy Commissioner in favour of the grand mother of the petitioners. Delay :- 41. The impugned order is dated 28/05/1965. That order was sought to be revised by respondent Nos.1 and 2 by filing revision petitions in the year 2000 i.e., after a period of 35 years. The respondents stated that until there was interference by the petitioners in the lands allotted to them, no cause of action arose and that it is on account of the interference by the petitioners in the allotment of 54 lands made by the second respondent to the first respondent which has given rise to a cause of action to assail the order dated 28/05/1965 which is an order of regrant made in favour of the grand mother of the petitioners. It is noted that the State Government has not assailed the order of regrant made on 28/05/1965 before the appellate authority for all these decades. That would imply acceptance and acquiescene to that order by the State Government. The first respondent who claims through the second respondent and the latter who claims through the State Government cannot now assail the order of regant made in the year 1965 based on an alleged interference caused by the petitioners herein as they were not parties to that order. The fact that the order dated 28/05/1965 had been in operation, for over three and a half decades prior to the filing of revision petitions implies that it had achieved finality between the parties to that order which includes the State Government. 55 Therefore no opinion is expressed on this aspect of the matter herein as the writ petition is allowed on other grounds and reasons. In the circumstances, the applicability of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the case of Vikram Singh v. State of Rajasthan [LAWS (SC) 2014-4-75]., is not considered.
42. In the result, the writ petition is allowed in the following manner:
1. It is held that the third respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision petitions filed by respondent Nos.1 and 2.
2. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 had no locus standi to assail the order dated 28/05/1965.
3. Parties to bear their respective costs. JUDGE. *mvs Sd/-