IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE29H DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2016 R PRESENT THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE N.KUMAR AND THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR CCC No.124/2016(CIVIL) BETWEEN: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR GENERAL BENGALURU-560 001 ..COMPLAINANT (BY SMT.S.SUSHEELA, AGA) AND: SRI. PERIYA SWAMY ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD., REPRESENTED BY ITS REGIONAL MANAGER SRI.PERIYA SWAMY MAJOR NO.44/45, RESIDENCY ROAD LEO SHOPPING COMPLEX BENGALURU-560 025 ..ACCUSED - 2 - THIS CCC SUO-MOTO CIVIL CONTEMPT PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION11AND12OF THE CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT1971R/W ARTICLE215OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INIDA, AGAINST THE ACCUSED SRI PERIYA SWAMY, THE REGIONAL MANAGER, ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD., FOR NOT COMPLYING WITH THE ORDER
DATED1903/2015 IN MFA.NOS.10536/12, 10537/2012 AND1053812 PASSED BY THIS HON'BLE COURT. THIS CCC SUO-MOTO CIVIL CONTEMPT IS BEING FILED AS PER THE ORDER
DATED610/2015 PASSED BY THIS HON'BLE COURT0 I.A.1/12 IN THE AFORESAID MFAS. THIS CCC COMING ON FOR ORDER
S THIS DAY, N.KUMAR J., MADE THE FOLLOWING: ORDER
This is a suo moto contempt proceedings initiated by High Court of Karnataka against accused to take action against Regional Manager with regard to disobeying the order dated 19.03.2015 passed in MFA105362012, MFA105372012 and MFA105382012 and punish the accused herein in accordance with law in the ends of justice.-. 3 - 2. Brief facts leading to contempt petition are as under: Petitioners in MVC13122008, MVC13132008 and MVC13142008 initiated proceedings under section 163A and 166 of the Indian Motor Vehicles Act for compensation. As these three claims arose out of a single accident, the petitions were clubbed together, common trial was conducted and disposed off by a common order. The operative portion of the said common order dated 20.07.2012 reads as under: ORDER
Petitions are partly allowed. The petitioners in MVC No.1312/2008, MVC No.1313/2008 and MVC No.1314/2008 are entitled for a total compensation of Rs.30,000/-, Rs.2,16,500/- and Rs.2,31,855/- respectively with interest at 6% p.a. from the date of petition till realization.-. 4 - Both the respondents are held jointly and severally liable to pay the said compensation amount. However as the offending vehicle is insured with respondent No.2, it is respondent No.2 who is directed to deposit the said compensation amount with 6% interest p.a. from the date of petition till realization, within 6 months from today. Out of the compensation amount, petitioners in MVC13132008 i.e., petitioner No.1 is held entitled for Rs.1,00,000/- with proportionate interest and petitioner No.2 is held entitled for Rs.1,16,500/- with proportionate interest. Out of the compensation amount awarded to the petitioners in MVC13132008, a sum of Rs.80,000/- each is ordered to be kept in F.D in any nationalized bank of the choice of the petitioners for a period of 3 years with liberty to them to draw periodical accrued - 5 - interest. Balance amount is ordered to be released to them. Out of the compensation amount awarded to the petitioner in MVC13142008, an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- is ordered to be kept in F.D in any nationalized bank of the choice of the petitioner for a period of 3 years with liberty to draw periodical accrued interest. Balance amount is ordered to be released to her. In respect of the petitioners in MVC13122008, the entire amount is ordered to be released to them. Advocate fee is fixed at Rs.300/- each in all the cases. Office to draw award accordingly.” - 6 - 3. Aggrieved by said order the claimants preferred Miscellaneous First Appeal before this court in MFA Nos.10536/2012, 10537/2012 and 10538/2012.
4. Three appeals were taken up together and by common order dated 19.03.2015 the following order is passed: “The appeals are accepted in part. The impugned awards are modified. Compensation of Rs.30,000/- awarded in MVC No.1312/2008 is enhanced Rs.3,64,500/-. Compensation to of Rs.2,16,500/- awarded in MVC No.1313/2008 is enhanced to Rs.8,70,000/-. Compensation of Rs.2,31,855/- awarded in MVC No.1314/2008 is enhanced to Rs.4,40,000/-. The rest of the impugned awards as it relates to rate of interest, period of accrual of interest and the ratio of apportionment is confirmed. The compensation enhanced in terms of this judgment shall be invested in the names of respective claimants, in fixed deposits in any nationalized banks for a period of five years, - 7 - authorizing them to withdraw periodical interest. The interest accrued on compensation enhanced in terms of this judgment shall be paid to claimants.” 5. Appellants filed an application under section 151 of CPC in all three appeals seeking clarification of order dated 19.03.2015. The reason for such clarification is contained in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the affidavit. They contend that respondent-insurer by misinterpreting the order has deposited a portion of the amount stating that the ratio of apportionment is confirmed. They are liable only to the tune of 50% of the compensation awarded. The ratio of apportionment which is relating to the distribution of compensation among claimants is confirmed in the order passed in appeals. But when the appellants pointed out the finding recorded in paragraph 13 of Judgment, the insurer pointed out the same is not forthcoming in the operative portion and they are bound by operative - 8 - portion of Judgment passed by High Court and therefore they declined to comply. Therefore it became necessary for the petitioners to file application for clarification. When the application was listed before learned Single Judge, both the learned counsel for the parties appeared and made submissions and learned Single Judge passed the order dated 19.03.2015.
6. The learned counsel for the Insurance Company contended that the stand of the Insurance Company is correct and therefore, the judgment of the High Court requires clarification.
7. After hearing both of them, the learned Judge passed an order on 06.10.2015 which reads as under: “3. On going through the same, it is clearly seen that there is absolutely no ambiguity of any kind with reference to liability of insurer of lorry bearing registration No.MKO9310to satisfy the compensation awarded to claimants/appellants in the aforesaid three - 9 - appeals. The interpretation sought to be made by insurance company is frivolous and motivated to deny the benefit of judgment rendered in favour of appellants. In the bargain, there is an attempt on the part of insurance company in describing the judgment rendered by this Court as inoperative, which amounts to contempt of this Court. Since the officers of insurance company are deliberately creating problem to appellants/claimants, this Court feel that while clarifying the said judgment by allowing this application that insurance company is liable to pay compensation, the said officers will have to be shown their place by initiating appropriate proceedings for unnecessarily misinterpreting the judgment and trying to blame that the judgment itself is erroneous.
4. In that view of the matter, this Court feel that it is just and necessary that the Registrar General of this Court to initiate contempt proceedings against the Regional Manager of Oriental Insurance Company Limited, Bengaluru, for misinterpreting the - 10 - judgment and denying benefit of the same to claimants/appellants with ulterior motice.
5. Accordingly, with the aforesaid observations the application in I.A.1/2015 is allowed with a direction to Registrar General to initiate contempt proceedings against Regional Manager of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., Bengaluru.” 8. After the said order, the matter was placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice, who directed the Registry to present this suo moto petition.
9. When the matter came up for admission, on going through the averments in the petition, we were not satisfied, about any prima facie case of contempt made out to issue notice to the assessee. Hence, we directed the learned Government Advocate to take notice on behalf of this High Court and to satisfy us about the maintainability of this petition. Accordingly, today, she has made her submissions and also - 11 - produced before us three judgments of the Apex Court, on which reliance is placed.
10. In the light of what is stated above, the question that arises for our consideration is: “If after an order is passed by a Court and if one of the party understands the said order in a particular manner, which is not acceptable to the decree holder and complies with the order to the extent according to them, they are answerable, does it amount to a contempt of Court which calls for initiation of suo moto contempt proceedings by the High Court on the basis of the order of a learned Single Judge?.” 11. The contempt complained of in this proceeding is a civil contempt. A civil contempt means wilful disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a Court.-. 12 - 12. Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act confers power on the High Court to punish contempts of subordinate Courts. It reads as under: “10. Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate courts.– Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself: Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code.” 13. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, while passing the award held that the respondents 1 and 2 are only liable to pay 50% of the above determined compensation amount i.e., Rs.30,000/- in MVC No.1312/2008. Similarly in MVC No.1313/2008 also it - 13 - held that petitioners are only entitled for compensation of Rs.2,16,500/- from respondents 1 and 2 (50% of the above determined amount). In MVC13142008 at para 28 it was held that the respondents are liable to pay Rs.2,31,855/- as compensation to the petitioners along with 6% interest p.a. from the date of petition till realization, though the compensation determined as set out in these awards are double the sum. When this order was challenged before this Court, as is clear from the order set out above, the award is modified, the compensation of Rs.30,000/- awarded in MVC No.1312/2008 is enhanced to Rs.3,64,500/- compensation of Rs.2,16,500/- awarded in MVC No.1313/2013 is enhanced to Rs.8,70,000/- and a compensation of Rs.2,31,855/- awarded in MVC No.1314/2008 is enhanced to Rs.4,40,000/-. It was further observed that the rest of the impugned awards as it relates to rate of interest, period of accrual of interest and the ratio of apportionment is confirmed.-. 14 - 14. As set out above, in the first two appeals, it was clearly mentioned as 50% of the above due amount. However, in the body of the judgment, the learned Single Judge of the High Court held this apportionment is not correct. The Insurance Company is liable to pay the entire amount. It is not reflected in the final portion of the order. On the contrary, what is stated in the final portion order runs counter to this observation. It is in this context, the Insurance Company paid 50% of the compensation as enhanced. When the claimant pointed out the observations of the learned Single Judge in the body of the judgment, the Insurance company took a stand that it is the final operative portion of the order which prevails. That was their understanding. Therefore, the claimant filed an application for clarification.
15. The learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company reiterated the stand of the - 15 - Insurance Company and fairly submitted to the Court that the order requires clarification. Now the learned Single Judge has allowed the application for clarification. It means there is ambiguity and clarification is required. In the earlier portion of the order, it is said that there is absolutely no ambiguity of any kind with reference to liability of the insurer. If there is no ambiguity in the order, the application for clarification ought to have been dismissed. Again the operative portion of the order runs counter to the observations in the body of the order. It is because of these unintended mistakes, confusion arises. Public authorities when they have to pay public money, have to be careful and they should not make any payments, which are not warranted from the orders passed by the Court. It is in that context, they took a stand that, the operative portion of the order of the High Court apportioning is confirmed and they deposited 50% of the compensation as enhanced by the High Court and - 16 - declined to pay the balance. It is in that context, clarification application was filed by the claimant himself. If there was no ambiguity or no clarification was required, the application could not have been allowed. But still, it is allowed. Again, there is ambiguity and inconsistency. Therefore, we do not see any willful disobedience of any order passed by the Trial Court, which attracts the jurisdiction of this Court under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Now that the application is allowed, it is open to the claimant to file an execution petition and recover the amount.
16. In this context, the learned Government Advocate referred to three judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Welfare Association of Absorbed Central Government Employees in Public Enterprises and another Vs. Aravind Verma and others, reported in AIR1998SC2862where it was held that when there was some genuine doubt on the - 17 - part of the respondents in considering and giving effect to the judgment of this Court, there is no contempt.
17. Again, she referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dr(Capt.) Akhouri Ramesh Chandra Sinha Vs. State of Bihar and others reported in (1997)3 SCC25 where it was held as under: “If the respondents misunderstood the scope of the judgment and have given benefits which Dr.S.N.Upadhyay and eight others are not entitled to i.e., parity when the petitioner, it would be open to him to have his rights adjudicated in appropriate proceedings in the light of the judgment of this Court and the law. No attempt was made by the Government to misinterpret the order passed in the appeals. So, it cannot be said that it constitutes a deliberate and willful disobedience in implementation of the orders passed by this Court.” - 18 - 18. Again, the Apex Court in the case of Indian Airports Employees Union Vs. Ranjan Chatterjee and another reported in AIR1999SC880held as under: “These rival contentions involve an interpretation of the order of this Court, the notification and other relevant documents. We are not deciding in this contempt case whether the interpretation put forward by the respondents or the petitioners is correct. That question has to be decided in appropriate proceedings. For the purpose of this contempt case, it is sufficient to say that the non- absorption of these six sweepers was bonafide and was based on an interpretation of the above orders and notification etc. and cannot be said to amount to ‘wilful disobedience’ of the orders of this Court.” 19. Therefore, it is clear that after an order is passed by a Court, it is open to the parties to construe the order in the manner they deem fit. If such a consideration or interpretation of the order is not in - 19 - conformity with what the order per se says, it is open to the Court before whom such an interpretation is placed to ignore the said interpretation and enforce the order. Merely because one of the parties placed an interpretation, which is not acceptable to the Court, it does not amount to ‘wilful disobedience’.
20. In fact the Apex Court in the case of E.Bapanaiah V/s. K.S.Raju and others reported in (2015)1 SCC451held at para 28 as under: “The present case relates to a civil contempt wherein an undertaking given to the Company Law Board is breached. Normally, the general provisions made under the Contempt of Courts Act are not invoked by the High Courts for forcing a party to obey orders passed by its subordinate courts for the simple reason that there are provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to get executed its orders and decrees. It is settled principle of law that where there are special law and general law, the provisions of special law would prevail over general law.-. 20 - As such, in normal circumstances a decree- holder cannot take recourse of the Contempt of Courts Act else it is sure to throw open a floodgate of litigation under contempt jurisdiction. It is not the object of the Contempt of Courts Act to make decree- holders rush to the High Courts simply for the reason that the decree passed by the subordinate court is not obeyed.” 21. Here is a case where an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is set-aside by the High Court in its Appellate Jurisdiction and the compensation amount is enhanced. The Insurance Company has deposited 50% of the amount so awarded by this Court. They are refusing to pay the remaining 50% on the ground that the operative portion of the order has confirmed the apportionment made by the Tribunal, whereas in the body of the order of the High Court, the said apportionment is set-aside. It is because of the said inconsistency and ambiguity, they are declining to pay the balance amount and they also - 21 - submitted to the Court that this order requires clarification. If the order is clarified and if the Court were to direct them to make the payment, they would make the payment. Therefore, there is no intention on the part of the Insurance Company to disobey the order. All that they wanted is a clarification to cloth them with the duty to pay the said amount. It is not a case of mis- interpretation. It is a case of two portions of the order, which gave raise to an ambiguity and the public authority has to pay the public amount to the claimant. They were very cautious and they wanted the Court to clarify. In that view of the matter, there is no contempt and this contempt petition suo moto registered by the High Court is dismissed. JUDGE Sd/- Sd/- JUDGE SBN/SPS