Judgment:
1 R IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE02D DAY OF JULY, 2018 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE G.NARENDAR WRIT PETITION No.26098/2018 (LR SEC-77) BETWEEN: SRI B HANUMANTHAPPA, S/O. LATE. GIRIYAPPA, AGED ABOUT65YEARS, R/AT. MALLENAHALLI VILLAGE, TALAGUNDA HOBLI, SHIKARIPURA TALUK, SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT-577428. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI. GIRISH.M.K, ADV.) AND:
1.
2.
3. THE AUTHORIZED OFFICER AND ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, LAND TRIBUNAL, SHIKARIPURA, SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT-577427. THE THASILDAR, SHIKARIPURA TALUK, SHIKARIPURA, SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT-577427. SRI.KRISHNAPPA NAIKA, S/O. VENKANNA NAIKA, AGE: MAJOR, CHIKKERUR VILLAGE, HIREKERUR TALUK, HAVERI DISTRICT-581 111. (BY SMT. VAHEEDA, HCGP) ... RESPONDENTS2THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES226& 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER
PASSED BY THE FIRST RESPONDENT IN PROCEEDINGS DATED0510.2016 VIDE ANNEXURE-J AND FURTHER QUASH THE ORDER
PASSED BY THE HON'BLE KARNATAKA APPELLATE TRIBUNAL IN APPEAL NO.98/2017 (REVENUE) DATED2202.2018 VIDE ANNEXURE-K ETC. THIS WP COMING ON FOR ‘ORDER
S’ THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING: ORDER
Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned HCGP for the respondents.
2. Petitioner is before this Court being aggrieved by the order of the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal rendered in (Revenue) Appeal No.98/2017 dated 22.02.2018 whereby, the Appellate Tribunal has been pleased to confirm the order of the Authorized Officer and consequently was pleased to dismiss the appeal.
3. The facts in brief are that, the petitioner is the tenant/occupant of the land comprised in Sy.No.146/6 measuring 2 acres 5 guntas and situated in Mallenahalli Village, Talagunda Hobli, Shikaripura Taluk, Shivamogga District. That the land is in possession and cultivation of 3 the petitioner since the time of his father and that the father of the petitioner omitted to file an application in Form No.7 seeking for confirmation of occupancy rights and that pursuant to the amendment of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’ for short) inserting Section 77-A (1) the petitioner has preferred an application in Form No.7A on 17.12.1998 seeking for grant of occupancy rights.
4. That the Authorized Officer in proceedings No.L.R.T.7A.CR.01/99-2000 dated 05.10.2016 after considering the fact that there are no records demonstrating the vesting of the land or the possession and cultivation of the land by the petitioner or his predecessors and also taking into account the fact that the family of the petitioner i.e., the son of the petitioner is holding land in excess of the ceiling limit stipulated under the provisions of Section 77-A (1) of the Act has been pleased to reject the application. Upon an appeal, the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal vide order dated 22.02.2018 4 in (Revenue) Appeal No.98/2017 has been pleased to observes as follows in para Nos.21 and 22: “21. In this case there are no explanation on behalf of the Appellant even though in the partition taken place father and uncles of the Appellant 3.31 acres land in Sy.No.165/2, 1.39 acres land in Sy.No.173/1, 2.03 acres land in Sy.No.121/2 and 1.37 acres land in Sy.No.8 fell to the share of Giriyappa, father of the Appellant, for what reason on the death of Giriyappa on 28.10.2002 name of Pradeep Kumar S/o Appellant is mentioned/mutated in the records pertaining to lands measuring 1.37 acres bearing Sy.No.8, 2.03 acres, bearing Sy.No.121/2, 3.35 acres bearing Sy.No.165/2, 0.23 acres bearing Sy.No.244 of Mallenahalli Village noting reason as Giriyappa expired leaving Pradeep Kumar S/o Hanumnathappa, grandson as sole heir.
22. This circumstances confirms that to avoid the ceiling limit with extra ordinary effort/object the name of Pradeep Kumar is mutated in the records pertaining to lands measuring 1.37 acres bearing, 2.03 acres, bearing Sy.No.121/2, 3.35 acres bearing Sy.No.165/2, 0.23 acres bearing Sy.No.244 of Mallenahalli Village.” 5 5. With regard to the fact that the family of the petitioner is holding land in excess of ceiling limit, specified under the provisions to Section 77-A (1) of the Act is not disputed. Further, the Tribunal has also upheld the findings in the light of the fact that the appellant and his family members are in possession of land in excess of ceiling limit. Hence, the appellant is not entitled for confirmation of occupancy rights over the disputed property.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would vehemently contended that the reasoning by the Authorized Officer and the Appellate Tribunal, holding that the applicant is disentitled for confirmation of the occupancy rights on account of holding land in excess of ceiling limit is contrary to the law laid down by this Court in the ruling of Smt.Awamma vs. The Assistant Commissioner, Bijapur Sub-Division and others reported in 2015 (4) KCCR3113 He would contend that this Court has held that as the application is made prior to the insertion of provisions on 15.02.1999, the same is 6 inapplicable. This Court respectfully disagrees with the observations made by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court. It is no more res integra that the consideration of any application would be in the light of the law as prevailing as on the date of consideration of the said application. This Court holds so in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Hind Stone and others reported in (1981) 2 SCC742 The Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to hold in paragraph No.13 as follows: “13. Another submission of the learned counsel in connection with the consideration of applications for renewal was that applications made sixty days or more before the date of G.O.Ms. No.1312 (December 2, 1977) should be dealt with as if Rule 8-C had not come into force. It was also contended that even applications for grant of leases made long before the date of G.O.Ms. No.1312 should be dealt with as if Rule 8-C had not come into force. The submission was that it was not open to the Government to keep applications for the grant of leases and applications for renewal pending for a long time and then to reject them on the basis of Rule 8-C7notwithstanding the fact that the applications had been made long prior to the date on which Rule 8- C came into force. While it is true that such applications should be dealt with within a reasonable time, it cannot on that account be said that the right to have an application disposed of in a reasonable tune clothes an applicant for a lease with a right to have the application disposed of on the basis of the rules in force at the time of the making of the application. No one has a vested right to the grant or renewal of a lease and none can claim a vested right to have an application for the grant or renewal of a lease dealt with in a particular way, by applying particular provisions. In the absence of any vested rights in anyone, an application for a lease has necessarily to be dealt with according to the rules in force on the date of the disposal of the application despite the fact that there is a long delay since the making of the application. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel that applications for the grant of renewal of leases made long prior to the date of G.O.Ms. No.1312 should be dealt with as if Rule 8-C did not exist.” 7. It is not in dispute that the objective of the agrarian reform was to benefit small farmers and thereby 8 deliver them from the strangle hold of the big land lords and thereby ensure a dignified livelihood to the small and poor farmer. Further, the amendment is in furtherance of the objective of the Act, that is, to ensure a fair distribution of the State’s wealth. It is not in dispute that “Land” is a precocious resource, more so agricultural lands. With a burgeoning population and with the extent of land remaining static, the petitioner cannot be heard complaining that the amendment is inapplicable. The restriction imposed is a reasonable restriction and with a nexus to the objective to be achieved. A useful reference can be made to the observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph No.6 in the ruling reported supra. “6. Rivers, Forests, Minerals and such other resources constitute a nation's natural wealth. These resources are not to be frittered away and exhausted by any one generation. Every generation owes a duty to all succeeding generations to develop and conserve the natural resources of the nation in the best possible way. It is in the interest of mankind. It is in the interest of the Nation. It is recognised by Parliament….” 9 8. In the facts and circumstances, it is not in dispute that the said proviso has come into effect as on 15.02.1999 and the order passed on 09.04.2015. Hence, this Court respectfully disagrees with the opinion expressed in the aforesaid order. It is also further opined by the Co-ordinate Bench in paragraph No.3 as under: “3. ……. The said proviso was inserted by Act 34 of 1998, with effect from 15.02.199. As on the date the application was made, the proviso was not part of the Act. It has been inserted subsequently. Hence, the same would not apply so far as the present case is concerned. Therefore, the maximum limit as prescribed by the proviso would not be applicable to the petitioner.” 9. From a bare reading of the above, it is apparent that the Court has not laid down the law and in fact has made the observation in the facts and circumstances of that case, and the findings are restricted to that case.
10. In the case on hand, the fact that the petitioner was holding land in excess of ceiling limit has been demonstrated by the respondents. 10 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner would fairly admit the holding of the land by the family members of the petitioner but he would submit that the land is held by the son of the petitioner. On a further enquiry, learned counsel would fairly submit that the land is ancestral land.
12. If that be the position, it is inconceivable that the lands could have been transferred to the name of the grand son without acquiescence of the father i.e., petitioner herein. That apart, it is stated that fact is corroborated by the Official documents for example, the entries in the revenue records.
13. It is the admitted case of the petitioner that no records pertaining to Sy.No.146/6 are available. That being so, even on this ground, the application of the petitioner is liable to be rejected.
14. It is seen that apart from the above legal grounds, the conduct of the petitioner is also relevant. The petitioner has not approached the Authorities with clean hands. The Appellate Tribunal was right in observing that 11 the petitioner has resorted to devious methods to suppress the fact of holding of the land by the family members of the petitioner who is none other than his son. In that view of the matter also, this Court does not find any ground to warrant interference with the order impugned in this petition. Accordingly, the petition stands rejected. Sd/- JUDGE VM CT-HR