R IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH DATED THIS10T H THE DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2018 PRESENT THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE B.VEERAPPA AND THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE H.T. NARENDRA PRASAD WRIT APPEAL No.100295 OF2018[LA-RES]. BETWEEN SRI. BIMAL S/O. KANTILAL MEHATA, AGE.54 YEARS, OCC: BUSINESS, R/O GOKUL ROAD, TQ. HUBLI DIST. DHARWAD. ... APPELLANT (BY SRI. A. S. PATIL, ADVOCATE) AND1 THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER AND LAND ACQUISTION OFFICER, DAHRWAD. THE UNION OF INDIA REPRESENTED BY ITS SENIOR DIVISIONAL ENGINEER, SOUTH-WESTERN RAILWAYS, KESHWARPUR, HUBALI. THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY THE GOVT. OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE M.S. BUILDING, BANGALORE.
2.
3. (BY SRI. RAVI V. HOSAMANI, AGA., FOR R1 & R3; ... RESPONDENTS :
2. : SRI. CHETAN T LIMBIKAI, ADV., FOR SRI AJAY U. PATIL, ADV., FOR R2) THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION4OF KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING THIS HON'BLE COURT TO SET ASIDE THE
ORDERDATED:20.03.2018, PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN W.P.NO.101731/2018 (LA-RES) BY ALLOWING THE WRIT APPEAL AS PRAYED FOR, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY. THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING THIS DAY, B. VEERAPPA J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:-
JUDGMENTThe appellant, who is the unfortunate land loser, has preferred the present appeal against the order dated 20.05.2018 made in W.P.No.101731/2018 by the learned Single Judge of this Court, dismissing the writ petition holding that the petitioner has not made out any good ground to continue to grant chances, when he has chosen to remain absent on various dates. I. FACTS OF THE CASE:
2. It is the case of the appellant/petitioner that he is the absolute owner of the land bearing Survey No.21/1 measuring 2 acre 25 guntas situated at :
3. : Bengeri village, Hubli Taluk, Dharwad District. On 28.10.2010, the Land Acquisition Officer acquired the said land invoking urgency clause under the provisions of Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act” for short) for the purpose of Hubli-Hospete and Hubli- Londa bypass line. The appellant has not challenged the acquisition proceedings. The possession of the land of the appellant was taken even prior to passing of the award i.e. on 21.07.2011. Subsequently, the Land Acquisition Officer passed award on 29.01.2013 made in LAQ-SR/H/06/2010-11 awarding compensation of Rs.13,384/- per gunta, in total Rs.22,35,175/- for 2 acres 25 guntas. II. LAND ACQUISITION PROCEEDINGS BEFORE LEARNED CIVIL JUDGE:- 3. The appellant, being dissatisfied with the meager amount of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer, filed an application before the :
4. : Assistant Commissioner under Section 18(1) of the Act seeking enhancement. On the reference made by the Land Acquisition Officer, the learned Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Hubballi has numbered it as LAC No.132/2014. The 2nd respondent/Union of India, represented by the Senior Divisional Engineer, South- Western Railways, filed objections on 10.01.2017 before the reference Court denying all the contentions and sought for rejection. The matter was posted for petitioner’s evidence. Unfortunately, the counsel for the petitioner/appellant therein has not proceeded with the matter to lead evidence. When the matter was posted finally on 28.11.2017, the case was called out, the claimant and his advocate remained absent before the Court and the learned Senior Civil Judge passed an order confirming the order passed by the learned SLAO for the reason that the matter is very old, no reason to grant time and petition came to be closed. Virtually, the petition came to be closed for default. :
5. : III. WRIT PROCEEDINGS:- 4. Being aggrieved by the said order, writ petition under Section 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India came to be filed before the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.101731/2018 seeking to quash the order dated 28.11.2017, passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Hubballi. The learned Single Judge of this Court has dismissed the petition mainly on the ground that the order sheet maintained by the learned Senior Civil Judge clearly indicates that the petitioner was not interested to prosecute the case and remained absent on various dates and no good ground to continue to grant chances, when he was chosen to remain absent on various dates. Against the said order dated 20.03.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.101731/2018, the present appeal is filed. IV. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES:- 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties to the lis. :
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6. Sri. A.S. Patil, the learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing the writ petition mainly on the ground that the petitioner/appellant has not shown any interest to proceed with the case is erroneous and contrary to the law. He further contended that the learned Single Judge ought to have allowed the writ petition and ought to have provided an opportunity to the appellant/ petitioner, who is a land loser, whose lands have been acquired by the State for the purpose of formation of Hubli-Hospete and Hubli-Londa bypass line, for the public purpose. He would further contend that the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition at the stage of admission itself on technical ground of delay in proceeding with the matter, on the ground that the petitioner/appellant has not shown interest in proceeding with the case. Therefore, he sought to allow the appeal. :
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7. Per contra, Sri. Ravi V. Hosamani, learned Additional Government Advocate, appearing for respondents No.1 and 3 and Sri. Chetan T Limbikai, learned counsel for Sri Ajay U. Patil, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 sought to justify the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge and contended that from 2014 to 2017, the petitioner/appellant has not shown proper interest in conducting the case. Therefore, the learned Senior Civil Judge has passed orders closing the petition on 28.11.2017. The same is rightly confirmed by the leaned Single Judge of this Court exercising the powers vested under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. They would further contend that the petitioner, who approached the Court for enhancement, ought to have diligent in conducting the proceedings. When he was not diligent, closing the petition by the learned Senior Civil Judge is right and confirming the same by the learned Single Judge is also in accordance with law. Therefore, they sought for dismissal of the appeal. :
8. : V. POINT FOR DETERMINATION:- 8. In view of the rival contentions urged by the learned counsel for the parties, the only point that arises for our consideration, in the present appeal is:- “Whether the petitioner/appellant has made out a case to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition and confirming the order passed by the Senior Civil Judge dated 28.11.2017, closing the case in the facts and circumstances of the present case?.” VI. CONSIDERATION:- 9. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire material on record, carefully.
10. It is an undisputed fact that the appellant is the absolute owner of the land bearing Survey No.21/1, measuring 2 acres 25 guntas, situated at Bengeri village :
9. : of Hubli Taluk, Dharwad District and it was acquired by the State Government on behalf of the 2nd respondent for the purpose of Hubli-Hospete and Hubli-Londa bypass line, invoking urgency clause under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) of the Act. Admittedly, the said acquisition proceedings was not challenged by the present appellant, who is the land loser. It is also not in dispute that the Land Acquisition Officer proceeded to pass the award on 29.01.2013 fixing Rs.13,384/- per gunta as compensation and has awarded total compensation amount of Rs.22,35,175/- in respect of 2 acres 25 guntas of land.
11. Being dissatisfied with the award passed by the learned SLAO, the appellant/claimant filed an application under Section 18(1) of the Act before the Assistant Commissioner and on being referred the same to the learned Senior Civil Judge, it was numbered as LAC No.132/2014 by the learned Civil Judge. Though the appellant, who is a villager, had engaged the learned :
10. : counsel for representing his case, subsequently, objections came to be filed by the respondents only on 18.03.2015 and thereafter, matter was posted for evidence, the evidence was not commenced by the petitioner and it was adjourned on several dates. Therefore, the learned Senior Civil Judge, by his order dated 28.11.2017, closed the matter mainly on the ground that the matter is very old and no reasons to grant time and has confirmed the award passed by the learned SLAO. Against the said order, a writ petition came to be filed and the learned Single Judge dismissed the said writ petition on the ground ‘no case is made out to grant further chance’.
12. It is the specific contention of the appellant that if an opportunity is granted in favour of the appellant to lead evidence, no prejudice or hardship would be caused to the other side and he will proceed with the matter without seeking any further adjournment. :
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13. The material on record clearly depicts that the petitioner is a land loser to the extent of 2 acres 25 guntas, which is admittedly acquired by the respondent-state for public purpose and admittedly he has filed an application under Section 18(1) of the Act seeking enhancement of compensation. The learned Senior Civil Judge has closed the case mainly on the ground that the matter is old and claimant was absent, he ought to have provided one more opportunity by imposing some costs. Unfortunately, the learned Single Judge has also dismissed the writ petition mainly on the ground that the petitioner/appellant was absent on various dates and no good ground to continue to grant chances to the petitioner/appellant herein. The learned Senior Civil Judge as well as the learned Single Judge of this Court have failed to notice the very object of the legislation while enacting the provisions of Section 18 of the Act and a reference is a judicial proceeding commences before the Court and the petitioner/appellant is a land loser and the rights of the :
12. : parties in respect of immovable property cannot be deprived on technicality. Mere granting of an opportunity to the appellant to lead evidence to make out a case for enhancement would not cause any prejudice either to the respondent-state or the beneficiary. Admittedly, the respondent-state has acquired the land of the petitioner/appellant, which is not in dispute.
14. While disposing of a reference, four factors must be etched on the mental screen by the Court as under:- 1. A reference under Section 18 is not an appeal against the award and the Court cannot take into account the material relied upon by the Land Acquisition Officer in his Award unless the same material is produced and proved before the Court.
2. So also the Award of the Land Acquisition Officer is not to be treated as a judgment of the Trial Court open or exposed to challenge before the Court hearing the Reference. It is merely an offer made by :
13. : the Land Acquisition Officer and the material utilised by him for making his valuation cannot be utilised by the Court unless produced and proved before it. It is not the function of the Court to sit in appeal against the Award, approve or disapprove its reasoning or correct its error or affirm, modify or reverse the conclusion reached by the Land Acquisition Officer, as if it were an appellate Court.
3. The Court has to treat the reference as an original proceeding before it and determine the market value afresh on the basis of the material produced before it.
4. The claimant is in the position of a plaintiff who has to show that the price offered for his land in the award is inadequate on the basis of the materials produced in the Court. Of course the materials placed and proved by the other side can also be taken into account for this purpose.
15. When the rights of the parties are involved in respect of the immovable property, the party who come to the Court, treating as temple of justice, with great :
14. : expectations and he should not be deprived of his rights in respect of immovable property on the ground of technicality. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. VII:
JUDGMENTS OF THE HON’BLE APEX COURT RELIED UPON:- 16. Admittedly, in the present case, the appellant being a villager has engaged his counsel. It was the duty of learned counsel to appear before the :
15. : learned Senior Civil Judge to take possible steps to proceed with the case to lead evidence and the appellant may not be aware of the Court procedure. Because of the mistake committed by the learned counsel, party should not be deprived of his right in respect of his immovable property. Our view is fortified by the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rafiq and another v. Munshilal and another, reported in AIR1981SC1400 at para No.3, held as under:- “3. The disturbing feature of the case is that under our present adversary legal system where the parties generally appear through their advocates, the obligation of the parties is to select his advocate, brief him, pay the fees demanded by him and then trust the learned advocate to do the rest of the things. The party may be a villager or may belong to a rural area and may have no knowledge of the court's procedure. After engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident that the lawyer will look after his interest. At the time of the hearing of the appeal, the personal appearance of the party is not only not required but hardly useful. Therefore, the party having done everything in his power to :
16. : effectively participate in the proceedings can rest assured that he has neither to go to the High Court to inquire as to what is happening in the High Court with regard to his appeal nor is he to act as a watchdog of the advocate that the latter appears in the matter when it is listed. It is no part of his job. Mr. A.K. Sanghi stated that a practice has grown up in the High Court of Allahabad amongst the lawyers that they remain absent when they do not like a particular Bench. May be we do not know, he is better informed in this matter. Ignorance in this behalf is our bliss. Even if we do not put our seal of imprimatur on the alleged practice by dismissing this matter which may discourage such a tendency, would it not bring justice delivery system into disrepute. What is the fault of the party who having done everything in his power and expected of him would suffer because of the default of his advocate. If we reject this appeal, as Mr. A.K. Sanghi invited us to do, the only one who would suffer would not be the lawyer who did not appear but the party whose interest he represented. The problem that agitates us is whether it is proper that the party should suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission, or misdemeanour of his agent. The answer obviously is in the negative. May be that the learned advocate absented himself deliberately or :
17. : intentionally. We have no material for ascertaining that aspect of the matter. We say nothing more on that aspect of the matter. However, we cannot be a party to an innocent party suffering injustice merely because his chosen advocate defaulted. Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court both dismissing the appeal and refusing to recall that order. We direct that the appeal be restored to its original number in the High Court and be disposed of according to law. If there is a stay of dispossession it will continue till the disposal of the matter by the High Court. There remains the question as to who shall pay the costs of the respondent here. As we feel that the party is not responsible because he has done whatever was possible and was in his power to do, the costs amounting to Rs.200/- should be recovered from the advocate who absented himself. The right to execute that order is reserved with the party represented by Mr. A.K.Sanghi.” 17. It is well settled that the power of superintendence so conferred on the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is administrative as well as judicial, and is capable of being invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved or :
18. : may even be exercised suo motu. The paramount consideration behind vesting such wide power of superintendence in the High Court is paving the path of justice and removing any obstacles therein. Our view is fortified by the dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, reported in (2003) 6 Supreme Court Cases 675, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court, at para No.22, 23 and 24, held as under:- “Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 22. Article 227 of the Constitution confers on every High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction excepting any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the armed forces. Without prejudice to the generality of such power the High Court has been conferred with certain specific powers by clauses (2) and (3) of Article 227 with which we are not concerned hereat. It is well-settled that the power of superintendence so conferred on the High Court is administrative as well as judicial, and is capable of being invoked at the instance of any :
19. : person aggrieved or may even be exercised suo motu. The paramount consideration behind vesting such wide power of superintendence in the High Court is paving the path of justice and removing any obstacles therein. The power under Article 227 is wider than the one conferred on the High Court by Article 226 in the sense that the power of superintendence is not subject to those technicalities of procedure or traditional fetters which are to be found in certiorari jurisdiction. Else the parameters invoking the exercise of power are almost similar.
23. The history of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, and how the jurisdiction has culminated into its present shape under Article 227 of the Constitution, was traced in Waryam Singh Vs. Amarnath. The jurisdiction can be traced back to Section 15 of High Courts Act, 1861 which gave a power of judicial superintendence to the High Court apart from and independently of the provisions of other laws conferring revisionsal jurisdiction on the High Court. Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 and then Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935, were similarly worded and reproduced the predecessor provision. However, sub-section (2) was added in Section 224 which confined the jurisdiction of the High Court to such :
20. : judgments of the inferior courts which were not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. That restriction has not been carried forward in Article 227 of the Constitution. In that sense Article 227 of the Constitution has width and vigour unprecedented. Difference between a writ of certiorari under Article 226 and supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227.
24. The difference between Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was well brought out in Umaji Keshao Meshram Vs. Smt. Radhikabai (1986) Supp. SCC401 Proceedings under Article 226 are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervisory. Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended by this Article to tribunals as well. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be :
21. : exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction.
18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kishore Kumar Khaitan and another v. Praveen Kumar Singh, reported in (2006) 3 Supreme Court Cases 312, at para No.12, 13 and 15, held as under: “12. The High Court, we must say, has also not properly exercised its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. In fact, it has failed to exercise its jurisdiction. Though the High Court rightly noticed that the burden was on the plaintiff to show that he was in possession on the date of the order directing the parties to maintain status quo and that he was dispossessed in violation of the subsisting interim order, it did not scrutinize the order to find out whether the requisite findings had been entered by the Additional District Judge on both those aspects. It :
22. : did not even consider whether there was a clear finding that the plaintiff was forcibly dispossessed on 20.6.1998 as alleged by him. It did not also consider whether the finding on possession was rendered based on a discussion of the available evidence and whether the directions in the order of remand had been complied with. In short, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, it behoved the High Court to consider whether the order of interim mandatory injunction was supported by the necessary findings. That is certainly a question of jurisdiction, since the jurisdiction to pass an interim mandatory order can only be based on such clear findings and the grant of an interim order without such findings would be acting without jurisdiction. We may incidentally notice that there is no prima facie material to indicate that on 20.6.1998 the plaintiff was, in fact, dispossessed by the defendants. We may in this context notice that the plaintiff could not show that he had either become a member of the tenants association of the building or had entered into an arrangement with it for the consumption of electricity in terms of the alleged rental arrangement. We have already noticed that none of the occupants of the building was examined to prima facie show dispossession. :
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13. The jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be restrictive in the sense that it is to be invoked only to correct errors of jurisdiction. But when a court asks itself a wrong question or approaches the question in an improper manner, even if it comes to a finding of fact, the said finding of fact cannot be said to be one rendered with jurisdiction and it will still be amenable to correction at the hands of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The failure to render the necessary findings to support its order would also be a jurisdictional error liable to correction. Here the jurisdiction to grant an interim mandatory injunction could be exercised on entering a finding that on the day the order for maintaining the status quo was passed, the plaintiff was in possession and a day after the interim order was passed, he was in fact dispossessed. The interim direction to maintain status quo was an ex parte order. From the order of the Additional District court it is not possible to come to the conclusion that on a proper advertence to the relevant materials, prima facie clear findings had been rendered by that court on these aspects. The prima facie infirmities attached to the letter said to create the tenancy cannot also be ignored, since that transaction is the foundation of the plaintiff's claim of possession. :
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15. Before parting, it is necessary to notice the argument that after the order of the High Court and after the filing of this petition for special leave to appeal to this Court, the plaintiff was put in possession pursuant to the order under challenge through the process of court. Now that we have set aside the order of the High Court and that of the Additional District court and rejected the prayer of the plaintiff for mandatory injunction, the defendants would be entitled to re- delivery of possession by way of restitution. The possession will be restored to them through court. But considering the questions to be decided in the suit, we direct the defendants, once they are put in possession of the premises in restitution, not to create any third party interest in respect of the plaint schedule building (being a part of the whole building) pending disposal of the suit. Considering the nature of the suit and the question involved, we would request the trial court, in which the suit has been filed, to try and dispose of the suit expeditiously. We clarify that it would not be necessary to consider the interim application for prohibitory injunction separately and the same would also be disposed of along with the suit by the trial court. The suit will be disposed of after trial untrammeled by any of the observations contained in these interim orders.” :
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19. It is well settled that against the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, the aggrieved party has to file an application under Section 18(1) of the Act for reference and ultimately it is for the reference Court to pass an award in answer to the reference. Non-participation by any party would not confer jurisdiction on the Civil Court to dismiss the reference for default. Admittedly, in the present appeal, the appellant is an aggrieved party against the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer. On reference being made under Section 18(1) of the Act, the learned Senior Civil Judge ultimately numbered it as LAC No.132/2014. if the appellant/claimant did not participate in the proceedings, the only remedy to the reference Court was to proceed to pass an award in answer to the reference.
20. Admittedly, in the present case, by the impugned order dated 28.11.2017, the learned Senior Civil Judge proceeded to close the case for non- :
26. : appearance which amounts to dismiss the case for default by confirming the order passed by the learned SLAO. Non-participation of any party would not confer jurisdiction on the Civil Court to close the reference in view of the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Khazan Singh (Dead) by LRs v. Union of India, reported in (2002) 2 Supreme Court Cases 242, at para No.6 and 7, held as under:- “6. Section 18 of the Act empowers a person interested in the land to move by a written application to the Collector requiring that the matter be referred for determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of compensation, the person to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. If the application for reference is in order the Collector is bound to make a reference of it to the Court. Section 20 of the Act enjoins on the Court to "proceed to determine the objection". The Court shall after holding such inquiry as may be necessary pass an award. Section 26 of the Act reads thus: :
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"26. Form of Awards.-(1) Every award under this Part shall be in writing signed by the Judge, and shall specify the amount awarded under clause first of sub-section (1) of Section 23, and also the amounts (if any) respectively awarded under each of the other clauses of the same sub- section, together with the grounds of awarding each of the said amounts. (2) Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of Section 2, clause (2) and Section 2, clause (9), respectively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."
7. The provisions above subsumed would thus make it clear that the Civil Court has to pass an award in answer to the reference made by the Collector under Section 18 of the Act. If any party to whom notice has been served by the Civil Court did not participate in the inquiry it would only be at his risk because an award would be passed perhaps to the detriment of the party concerned. But non-participation of any party would not :
28. : confer jurisdiction on the Civil Court to dismiss the reference for default.” VIII: CONCLUSION:- 21. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the petition on the ground that the petitioner has not made out good ground to continue to grant chances, confirming the order passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Hubballi, dated 28.11.2017, closing the case, cannot be sustained.
22. For the reasons stated above, the issue raised in the appeal has to be answered in affirmative holding that the appellant has made out the case to interfere with the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge confirming the order passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Hubballi, closing the case. In order to do justice between both the parties. But the appellant is not entitled to the interest from 30.05.2015 till 10.10.2018, in case he succeeds in LAC No.132/2014. :
29. : IX. RESULT:- 23. In view of the above, we proceed to pass the following:-
ORDERa) The writ appeal filed by the appellant is allowed. b) The impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 20.03.2018 in W.P.No.101731/2018 and the order dated 28.11.2017, made in LAC No.l32/2014 by the learned Senior Civil Judge and JMFC., Hubballi, are hereby set aside and LAC No.132/2014 is restored to file. c) The matter is remanded to the learned Senior Civil Judge and JMFC., Hubballi, to proceed in accordance with law. d) The appellant is directed to appear before the learned Senior Civil Judge and JMFC., Hubballi on 10.10.2018 and he shall proceed with the evidence on the date to be fixed by the learned :
30. : Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Hubballi, without seeking any further adjournment. e) The appellant is not entitled to interest from 30.05.2015 till 10.10.2018, in case he succeeds in LAC No.132/2014 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Hubballi.
24. The service rendered by the learned counsel for the parties, especially, Sri. Ravi V. Hosamani, the learned Additional Government Advocate for the State, is appreciated and placed on record.
25. Registry is directed to circulate this order to the learned judges/presiding officers, who handle the LAC matters in the State. Sd/- JUDGE Sd/- JUDGE yan