(Prayer: Civil Revision Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, to set aside the fair and decretal order, dated 04.01.2016, passed in I.A.No.973 of 2015 in M.C.O.P.No.2275 of 2015, by the learned VI Additional District Judge, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Madurai.)
1. This Civil Revision Petition has been filed to set aside the fair and decretal order, dated 04.01.2016, passed in I.A.No.973 of 2015 in M.C.O.P.No.2275 of 2015, by the learned VI Additional District Judge, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Madurai.
2. The petitioner/Insurance Company is the second respondent in the M.C.O.P. The respondents are the claimants. They filed a claim petition claiming a sum of Rs.50 lakhs as compensation for the death of one Chandran @ Ramachandran, due to the accident occurred on 12.06.2014. The petitioner filed I.A.No.973 of 2015 to accept the affidavit filed by them and pass orders on the jurisdiction issue.
3. According to the petitioner, the accident occurred within the jurisdiction of Ramanathapuram District and the respondents have not impleaded the Branch Office, which issued the Insurance Policy in respect of the vehicle involved in the accident. The respondents have filed claim petition against the Administrative Office of the Insurance Company only. The respondents have given their residential address in the claim petition as No.A1G3, Tennis Garden, K.Pudur, Madurai-625 007. They are not residing in the address given and they have come out with the false case. Therefore, they filed I.A. to accept the affidavit and decide the jurisdiction issue as a preliminary issue.
4. The respondents filed counter affidavit denying the allegations made by the petitioner. The respondents denied that the accident took place in Ramanathapuram District. The respondents stated that they are residing at No.A1G3, Tennis Garden, K.Pudur, Madurai-625 007 and their permanent address is at No.33/5, Anna Nagar, NGO Colony, Velipattinam, Ramnad.
5. Both the petitioner and the respondents relied on various Judgments on this point. No oral and documentary evidence was let in before the Tribunal. Considering the F.I.R., the Tribunal concluded that the accident did not take place in Ramanathapuram District, but within Sivagangai District. The learned Judge rejected the contentions of the petitioner with regard to lack of jurisdiction, on the ground that the petitioner has not produced any material to substantiate their claim that the respondents are not residing in Madurai address, as given in the claim petition. Against the said order, the present civil revision petition is filed.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that against the Administrative Officer of Insurance Company, claim petition is not maintainable and Branch Office, which issued the Insurance Policy, was not impleaded as party respondent. On verification by the Investigator attached to the petitioner Insurance Company, the respondents are not residing at Madurai. The petitioner has filed an affidavit, wherein at paragraph No.5, it has been stated as follows:
5. It is respectfully submitted that insofar Madurai District, the petitioner company is concerned, the claim petitions relating to accident pending before the Tribunal is more than 1487 cases whereas in the nearby Sivagangai and Ramnad District, the claim petitions are 26 and 57 cases pending respectively. The staff available to attend to the above claim petitions pending before the learned Tribunals at Madurai is very less and static over a long period of time and as a result claim petitions are pending for years together prejudicing the claimants as well as defeating the purpose of the beneficial statute which was passed only to ensure immediate succour and sustenance to the family of the victims. .....
7. According to the petitioner, the claims Tribunal at Madurai has no territorial jurisdiction as the respondents/claimants are not residing at Madurai and claim against Administrative Office of the petitioner, does not confer the jurisdiction and the claim petition is not maintainable at Madurai. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the following Judgments:
(i) Ambica Industries Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise [2007 STPL (LE) 38574 SC = 2007 (6) SCC 769].
(ii) Mantoo Sarkar Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and another [I (2009) ACC 40 (SC) = 2009 (2) SCC 244], wherein in paragraph 18, it has been held as under:
"18. We, however, while taking that factor into consideration must place on record that we are not oblivious of the fact that a decision rendered without jurisdiction would be coram non juris. Objection in regard to jurisdiction may be taken at any stage. [See Chief Engineer, Hydel Project and Ors. v. Ravinder Nath and Ors., II (2008) SLT 135 = (2008) 2 SCC 350, wherein inter alia the decision of this Court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan AIR 1954 SC 340, was followed, stating:
26. The Court also relied upon the decision in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 and quoted in Harshad Chiman Lal case (2005) 7 SCC 791, SCC pp. 804-805, para 33, therefrom: (Kiran Singh case (supra), AIR p. 342, para 6
6. It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties.
Though in the aforementioned decision these observations were made since the defendants before raising the objection to the territorial jurisdiction had admitted that the Court had the jurisdiction, the force of this decision cannot be ignored and it has to be held that such a decree would continue to be a nullity."
(iii) Sonic Surgical Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd. [2009 (13) JT 406 : 2010 (1) SCC 135], wherein in paragraph 9, it has been held as under:
"9. Moreover, even if it had application, in our opinion, that will not help the case of the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondent Insurance Company has a branch office at Chandigarh and hence under the amended Section 17(2) the complaint could have been filed in Chandigarh. We regret, we cannot agree with the learned counsel for the appellant. In our opinion, an interpretation has to be given to the amended Section 17(2)(b) of the Act, which does not lead to an absurd consequence. If the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, it will mean that even if a cause of action has arisen in Ambala, then too the complainant can file a claim petition even in Tamil Nadu or Gauhati or anywhere in India where a branch office of the Insurance Company is situated. We cannot agree with this contention. It will lead to absurd consequences and lead to bench-hunting. In our opinion, the expression branch office in the amended Section 17(2) would mean the branch office where the cause of action has arisen. No doubt this would be departing from the plain and literal words of Section 17(2)(b) of the Act but such departure is sometimes necessary (as it is in this case) to avoid absurdity. (Vide G.P. Singh s Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 9th Edn., 2004, p. 79.)"
(iv) Muthuraj @ Satyamurthy Vs. V.M.Kandasamy and another [II (2007) ACC 597], wherein in paragraphs 14 and 15, it has been held as under:
"14. The appellant after the decision of the Tribunal on the aspect of territorial jurisdiction, should have chosen to file the claim petition before the appropriate Court within the territorial jurisdiction. Instead, he has challenged the order of the Tribunal contending that the claim petition ought not to have been dismissed on a technical ground. This contention of the appellant cannot be sustained as the question of territorial jurisdiction is more important in deciding the quantum of compensation and a claimant cannot be allowed to choose the Court according to his whims and fancies as it would amount to "forum shopping".
15. Further, since the appellant/claimant has failed to prove that his place of residence is within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Court and the Tribunal and has resorted to approach these two forums for the reasons best known to him and since this appeal is liable to be dismissed on that ground itself, I am of the considered view that no further adjudication is warranted as regards the aspects of negligence and the quantum of compensation. Thus, I hold that the impugned judgment of the Tribunal is infirmed in no way and the same is upheld."
(v) Nirmala Devi Agarwal and others Vs. ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd. and another [2013 (2) CHN 264 = 2013 (3) WBLR 132]
(iv) Ravendra Singh Vs. Sonu Rajak and others [2015 ACJ 2512]
(vii) Sita Devi and another Vs. Munne and others [MACA Nos.424 and 425 of 2012, dated 15.04.2013]
8. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the respondents permanent address is No.33/5, Anna Nagar, N.G.O. Colony, Velipattinam, Ramnad, but they are now residing at No.A1G3, Tennis Garden, K.Pudur, Madurai. Therefore, the claim petition filed against the Administrative Office, is maintainable. It is an internal arrangement of the petitioner/Insurance Company, which cannot be put against the claim of the respondents.
9. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the respondents relied on the following Judgments:
(i) Malati Sardar Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and others [2016 (1) TN MAC 1 (SC)], wherein in paragraph 14, it has been held as under:
"14. The provision in question in the present case, is a benevolent provision for the victims of accidents of negligent driving. The provision for Territorial jurisdiction has to be interpreted consistent with the object of facilitating remedies for the victims of accidents. Hyper-technical approach in such matters can hardly be appreciated. There is no bar to a Claim Petition being filed at a place where the Insurance Company, which is the main contesting parties in such cases, has its business. In such cases, there is no prejudice to any party. There is no failure of justice. Moreover, in view of categorical decision of this Court in Mantoo Sarkar (supra), contrary view taken by the High Court cannot be sustained. The High Court failed to notice the provision of Section 21, C.P.C."
(ii) Kalaivani and others Vs. R.Sharmila Rangaraj and others [2011 ACJ 2382], wherein in paragraph 11, it has been held as under:
"11. Learned counsel for the petitioners in order to buttress and fortify his contention would also additionally submit that the Branch Office of the insurance company concerned in this case is situated in Erode only and so they could effectively contest the M.C.O.P. and no prejudice would be caused to them."
(iii) Mantoo Sarkar Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and another [2009 (1) TN MAC 68 (SC)], wherein in paragraphs 10 and 19, it has been held as under:
"10. The said Act is a special statute. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal having regard to the terminologies used therein must be held to be wider than the Civil Court.
A claimant has a wide option. Residence of the claimant also determines jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
19. A distinction, however, must be made between a jurisdiction with regard to the subject-matter of the suit and that of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas in the case falling within the former category the judgment would be a nullity, in the latter it would not be. It is not a case where the Tribunal had no jurisdiction in relation to the subject-matter of claim. As a matter of fact the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. If the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to entertain a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, in our opinion, the court should not have, in the absence of any finding of sufferance of any prejudice on the part of the first respondent, entertained the Appeal.
In Bikash Bhushan Ghosh v. Novartis India Ltd., 2007 (5) SCC 591, this Court has held:
17. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. If the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure are given effect to, even if the Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal had no jurisdiction, in view of the provisions contained in Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless the respondent suffered any prejudice, they could not have questioned the jurisdiction of the court. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan this Court held: (AIR p. 342, paras 6-7)
6. If the question now under consideration fell to be determined only on the application of general principles governing the matter, there can be no doubt that the District Court of Monghyr was coram non judice , and that its judgment and decree would be nullities. The question is what is the effect of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act on this position.
7. Section 11 enacts that notwithstanding anything in Section 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure an objection that a court which had no jurisdiction over a suit or appeal had exercised it by reason of overvaluation or undervaluation, should not be entertained by an appellate court, except as provided in the section. Then follow provisions as to when the objections could be entertained, and how they are to be dealt with. The drafting of the section has come in and deservedly for considerable criticism; but amidst much that is obscure and confused, there is one principle which stands out clear and conspicuous. It is that a decree passed by a court, which would have had no jurisdiction to hear a suit or appeal but for overvaluation or undervaluation, is not to be treated as, what it would be but for the section, null and void, and that an objection to jurisdiction based on overvaluation or undervaluation, should be dealt with under that section and not otherwise.
The reference to Section 578, now Section 99 CPC, in the opening words of the section is significant. That section, while providing that no decree shall be reversed or varied in appeal on account of the defects mentioned therein when they do not affect the merits of the case, excepts from its operation defects of jurisdiction. Section 99 therefore gives no protection to decrees passed on merits, when the courts which passed them lacked jurisdiction as a result of overvaluation or undervaluation. It is with a view to avoid this result that Section 11 was enacted. It provides that objections to the jurisdiction of a court based on overvaluation or undervaluation shall not be entertained by an appellate court except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in the section. It is a self-contained provision complete in itself, and no objection to jurisdiction based on overvaluation or undervaluation can be raised otherwise than in accordance with it.
With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or revisional court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 CPC and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits. The contention of the appellants, therefore, that the decree and judgment of the District Court, Monghyr, should be treated as a nullity cannot be sustained under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act.
Furthermore in determining as to whether a part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the court vis- -vis an Appellate Court a large number of factors may have to be taken into consideration. [See Ambica Industries v. CCE, 2007 (6) SCC 769]
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the appellant herein was a labourer. The justness or otherwise of the amount of compensation has not been disputed before us. If the High Court s judgment is to be complied with, the appellant would again have to initiate another proceeding either at Bareilly or Gurgaon or at Delhi or at Jabalpur. The same evidence would have to be rendered once again. The question of fact which was required to be determined in the proceeding before the Tribunal, namely, whether the driver of the truck or the driver of the bus had been driving their respective vehicles rashly and negligently would have to be determined afresh. The factual finding recorded in this case is that the driver of the truck was driving the truck rashly and negligently. In our opinion, in a case of this nature, we may even exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. In New India Insurance Co. v. Darshana Devi and others [2008 (1) TN MAC 322 (SC) : 2008 (7) SCC 416, this Court held:
20. Having said so, we must take notice of the fact that the deceased Baldev Singh was a labourer. The Tribunal has found that besides being a labourer, he also used to deal in safeda wood. He was the owner of the safeda wood which was being transported to the market for its sale. The first respondent, Darshana Devi, in her deposition, stated that the deceased used to purchase wood from the State of Himachal Pradesh on contract basis. Only Gurdial Singh and Ravinder Singh were accompanying him as labourers. His income was assessed only at Rs 2400 per month.
21. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case where this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Even in Brij Mohan, 2007 (2) TN MAC 66 (SC), this Court held: (SCC p. 64, paras 13- 14)
13. However, Respondent 1 is a poor labourer. He had suffered grievous injuries. He had become disabled to a great extent. The amount of compensation awarded in his favour appears to be on a lower side. In the aforementioned situation, although we reject the other contentions of Ms Indu Malhotra, we are inclined to exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India so as to direct that the award may be satisfied by the appellant but it would be entitled to realise the same from the owner of the tractor and the trolley wherefor it would not be necessary for it to initiate any separate proceedings for recovery of the amount as provided for under the Motor Vehicles Act.
14. It is well settled that in a situation of this nature this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India read with Article 136 thereof can issue suit directions for doing complete justice to the parties. 10. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and carefully perused the materials on record.
11. The point for consideration is whether the claims Tribunal at Madurai has territorial jurisdiction to entertain claim petition filed by the petitioner.
12. From the records, it is seen that the respondents are admitted that their permanent address is at No.33/5, Anna Nagar, N.G.O. Colony, Velipattinam, Ramanad District. Now, they are residing at Madurai. On the other hand, the petitioner is denying the said contention and has stated in the grounds of revision that on verification by the Investigator attached to the petitioner s Insurance Company, the respondents are not residing at Madurai and the Investigator was not examined before the Tribunal.
13. Both the learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondents relied on the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2009 (1) TN MAC 68 (SC) [cited supra], apart from other Judgments. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on paragraph 18, while the learned counsel for the respondents relied on paragraphs 10 and 19.
14. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Tribunal has territorial jurisdiction based on residence of the claimants. The residence of a person would depend upon facts of given case. When the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain a claim petition, the claim cannot be rejected on the question of lack of territorial jurisdiction unless it is shown that prejudice and hardship caused to the Insurance Company. The liability of Insurance Company is to reimbursement amount payable by the insured owner of vehicle. It is only in exceptional cases as provided under Section 170 of the M.V. Act, the Insurance Company can defend the claim.
15. In paragraph 14 of the Judgment reported 2016 (1) TN MAC (1) (SC) [cited supra], the Hon'ble Apex Court held that claim petition can be filed at the place where the Insurance Company is having its business. Paragraph 14 of the Judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case.
16. The petitioner is alleging that for lack of staff, they cannot properly contest the claim of the respondents and due to pendency of large number of claim petitions at Madurai and it will take long time to dispose the claim petition, which will prejudice to the respondents also, is not a reason for holding that the petitioner is put to hardship. The claim of the petitioner that the claim petition is not maintainable against the Administrative Office, is not acceptable. It is not the case of the petitioner that they are not having any Branch Office at Madurai. In view of residence of respondents at Madurai and Branch Office of the petitioner at Madurai, the Tribunal has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the claim petition filed by the respondents.
17. In the result, the civil revision petition is dismissed, confirming the order of the Tribunal. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. It is open to the respondents to implead the Branch Office of the petitioner, which issued the Insurance Policy in respect of the vehicle, which caused the accident.