(Prayer: Appeal filed under Clause 15 of Letters Patent, against the order made in W.P(MD)No.9688 of 2015 dated 22.06.2015)
S. Manikumar, J.
1. Challenge in this appeal, is to an order, made in W.P(MD)No.9688 of 2015, dated 22.06.2015, by which, the Writ Court has declined to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, to quash the proceedings in Na.Ka.No.36267/O.Na.3/2014-1, dated 07.05.2015, of the Director of Local Fund Audit Department, Chennai, 2nd respondent herein. The Writ Court has declined to grant any direction to the respondents, to sanction pensionary benefits to the appellant, in the post of Assistant Inspector and Deputy Inspector, in Local Fund Audit Department, for the period from 05.10.2001 to 21.01.2013, along with arrears of pension and other terminal benefits.
2. Facts leading to the writ appeal, are that the appellant resigned from service on 21.01.2013 due to family circumstances. It was accepted by the Director of Local Fund Audit Department, Chennai, 2nd respondent, vide order dated 03.04.2013. After resignation, the appellant has sought for terminal benefits and pension, by invoking Section 23(1) of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, which reads as follows:-
''23. Forfeiture of service on resignation - (1) Resignation from a service or post entails forfeiture of past service;
Provided that a resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service, if it has been submitted to take up with proper permission, another appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under the Government where service qualifies.''
3. By considering the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as to when pension can be granted and as to how statute has to be interpreted, at paragraphs 3 and 4, the Writ Court declined to grant the relief sought for, which reads as follows:-
3. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others vs. Braj Nandan Singh, reported in (2005) 8 SCC 325, has held as follows:
5. In order to appreciate rival submissions Rule 26 which is the pivotal provision needs to be quoted. The same reads as under:
"26. Forfeiture of service on resignation (1) Resignation from a service or post, unless it is allowed to be withdrawn in the public interest by the Appointing Authority, entails forfeiture of past service.
(2) A resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service if it has been submitted to take up, with proper permission, another appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under the Government where service qualifies."
Rule 26 as the heading itself shows relates to forfeiture of service on resignation. In clear terms it provides that resignation from a service or a post, unless it is allowed to be withdrawn in the public interest by the Appointing Authority, entails forfeiture of past service. The language is couched in mandatory terms. However, sub- rule (2) is in the nature of an exception. It provides that resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service if it has been submitted to take up, with proper permission, another appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under the Government where service qualifies. Admittedly this is not the case in the present appeal. Rule 5 on which great emphasis was laid down by the learned counsel for the respondent deals with regulation of claims to pension or family pension. Qualifying service is dealt with in Chapter III. The conditions subject to which service qualifies are provided in Rule 14. Chapter V deals with classes of pensions and conditions governing their grant. The effect of Rule 26 sub-rules (1) and (2) cannot be lost sight of while deciding the question of entitlement of pension. The High Court was not justified in its conclusion that the rule was being torn out of context. After the past service is forfeited the same has to be excluded from the period of qualifying service. The language of Rule 26 sub-rules (1) and (2) is very clear and unambiguous. It is trite law that all the provisions of a statute have to be read together and no particular provision should be treated as superfluous. That being the position after the acceptance of resignation, in terms of Rule 26 sub-rule (1) the past service stands forfeited. That being so, it has to be held that for the purpose of deciding question of entitlement to pension the respondent did not have the qualifying period of service. There is no substance in the plea of the leaned counsel for the respondent that Rule 26 sub-rules (1) and (2) has limited operation and does not wipe out entitlement to pension as quantified in Rule 49. Said Rule deals with amount of pension and not with entitlement.
6. It is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent.
7. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. M/s Price Waterhouse and Anr. (AIR 1998 SC 74)) The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner (1846 (6) Moore PC 1), Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures' defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (See The State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and Anr. (JT 1998 (2) SC 253)). It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. (See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tiptan) Ltd. (1978 1 All ER 948 (HL). Rules of interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans (1910) AC 445 (HL), quoted in Jamma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah and Ors.(AIR 1962 SC 847).
8. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. "Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid". Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage 218 FR 547). The view was re-iterated in Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama (AIR 1990 SC 981).
9. In Dr. R. Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. v. Dy. Transport Commissioner and Ors. etc. (AIR 1977 SC 842), it was observed that Courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own pre-conceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation.
10. The above position was highlighted by this Court in Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat and Another (AIR 2004 SC 3946).
11. The High Court's judgment affirming the order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained and deserves to be set aside which we direct. The appeal is allowed but without any order as to costs.
4. This Court, in the case of D.R.Premkumari vs. The Director, The Directorate of Forensic Science, Chennai and another (W.P.(MD) No.618 of 2012) decided on 03.10.2012 and also in the case of K.Ramasamy vs. The Principal Secretary to Government, Chennai and others (W.P.(MD) No.15959 of 2012) decided on 23.12.2014, has categorically held that an employee, who has resigned from service, is not entitled to any terminal benefits or pension.''
4. Placing reliance on paragraph 7 of the order made in D.Vijayarangan vs. Secretary, Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, reported in 2009 Writ L.R 12, Mr.N.Dilip Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner, assailed the correctness of the order impugned in the instant appeal. Paragraph 7 of the order made in D.Vijayarangan's case is reproduced hereunder:-
''7. In such a situation, a question arise whether the service of an employee can be forfeited if person asks for resignation on the ground of ill-health, which is allowed by the State.
Under Rule 23, a person is entitled for all benefits if he is allowed to resign for appointment in some other post under the Government. The rule is silent with regard to resignation, if given on the grounds of illness or ill-health for which permission is granted by the competent authority. In case, if it is held that the person, who has resigned because of illness or ill-health, as at par with the class of employees, who resign for misconduct or any adverse record, and the class of employees, who resign to join other government organisation are kept in a separate class for grant of pensionary benefits, in such case one may doubt Rule 23 violative of Article 14 vis-a-vis those who resign for illness or ill-helath and is accepted by the competent authority. Therefore, we hold that those who resign because of illness or ill-health and not because of any misconduct or adverse record and are allowed to do so by the State are entitled for the same benefit which is allowed to those who resigns to join another service under the State. Comparing the employees who are allowed to resign because of illness or ill-health at par with those employees who resign because of misconduct or adverse record will be otherwise violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.''
5. The Translated version of the Letter dated 21.01.2013 of the appellant requesting permission to accept resignation, is as follows:-
''Presently I am working as Deputy Inspector in the office of the Assistant Director, Local Fund Audit Department, Ariyalur. Due to my family circumstances, I am not in a position to continue in Government service. Therefore, due to my family circumstances, I resign my Government service from 21.01.2013 Forenoon. I have taken this decision on my own in Lucid mind. Hence, I humbly request to disburse my monetary benefits.''
6. Vide proceedings dated 03.04.2013, resignation of the appellant has been accepted. D.Vijayarangan's case arose out of resignation, on the ground of ill-health. Whereas, the case of the appellant is not so. Resignation of the appellant is due to family circumstances. Therefore, reliance placed on D.Vijayarangan's case is inapposite to the case on hand.
7. Proviso to rule 23, makes it abundantly clear that there shall not be any forfeiture of past services, if the resignation is submitted to take up, with proper permission, another appointment whether temporary or permanent under the Government, where service qualifies. Exclusion is only to the specific instance of taking up another employment, whether temporary or permanent, with the permission of the competent authority.
8. As rightly observed by the Writ Court, when the provision is plain and unambiguous, there cannot be any addition or substitution of words. Resignation could be due to misconduct or adverse record or ill-health or family problems or for any other justifiable cause. When the statute has excluded all the above, with the only specific inclusion, for consideration of the past services, for pension, in the event of taking up another appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under the Government, with proper permission, benefit of the said proviso, cannot be extended to a case of resignation due to ill-health. The Writ Court has adverted to the abovesaid aspect, placing reliance on the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court. We wish to add few more judgments, on the aspect as to how a section and proviso has to be interpreted.
(1) In the words of Tindal, C.J., in Sussex Peerage case [(1844) 11 Cl and F 85], wherein, he said thus, If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves so alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver.
(2) In Nairin v. University of St. Andrews reported in 1909 AC 147, the Apex Court held, Unless there is any ambiguity it would not be open to the Court to depart from the normal rule of construction which is that the intention of the Legislature should be primarily gathered from the words which are used. It is only when the words used are ambiguous that they would stand to be examined and construed in the light of surrounding circumstances and constitutional principle and practice.
(3) In Ram Rattan v. Parma Nand reported in AIR 1946 PC 51, the Hon'ble Mr.S.R.Das, held as follows:
The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is, by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In the present case, the literal construction leads to no apparent absurdity and therefore, there can be no compelling reason for departing from that golden rule of construction.
(4) In Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras reported in AIR 1953 SC 274, the Supreme Court held, It is settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase and sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself.
(5) In Rao Shive Bahadur Singh v. State, reported in AIR 1953 SC 394, the Supreme Court held, While, no doubt, it is not permissible to supply a clear and obvious lacuna in a statute, and imply a right of appeal, it is incumbent on the Court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which would render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application.
(6) What is the spirit of law, Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.R.Das in Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh reported in AIR 1954 SC 749, said that, The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly not be given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the Sections of the Act.
(7) In Hari Prasad Shivashanker Shukla v. A.D.Divelkar reported in AIR 1957 SC 121, the Apex Court held, It is true that an artificial definition may include a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary acceptation of the word which is the subject of definition; but there must then be compelling words to show that such a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary meaning is intended, Where, within the framework of the ordinary acceptation of the word, every single requirement of the definition clause is fulfilled, it would be wrong to take the definition as destroying the essential meaning of the word defined.
(8) In Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan reported in AIR 1957 SC 907, the Supreme Court held, it must always be borne in mind that the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act.
The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction.
It is only in such cases that it becomes relevant to consider the mischief and defect which the, Act purports to remedy and correct.
(9) In State of W.B., v. Union of India reported in AIR 1963 SC 1241, the Apex Court held that in considering the expression used by the Legislature, the Court should have regard to the aim, object and scope of the statute to be read in its entirety.
(10) In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Dr.Vijay Anand Maharaj reported in AIR 1963 SC 946, the Supreme Court held as follows:
But it is said, relying upon certain passages in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, at p, 68, and in Crawford on "Statutory Construction' at p. 492, that it is the duty of the Judge "to make such construction of a statute as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy," and for that purpose the more extended meaning could be attributed to the words so as to bring all matters fairly within the scope of such a statute even though outside the letter, if within its spirit or reason. But both Maxwell and Crawford administered a caution in resorting to such a construction. Maxwell says at p.68 of his book:
"The construction must not, of course, be strained to include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the words."
Crawford says that a liberal construction does not justify an extension of the statute's scope beyond the contemplation of the Legislature.
The fundamental and elementary rule of construction is that the words and phrases used by the Legislature shall be given their ordinary meaning and shall be constructed according to the rules of grammar. When the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. It is a well recognized rule of construction that the meaning must be collected from the expressed intention of the Legislature.
(11) In Inland Revenue Commissioner v. Joiner reported in (1975) 3 All. ER 1050, it has been held that normally a statutory provision consists of a general description of some factual situation and the legal consequences ensuing from it. Whether the general description is wide or narrow, it will have some limits. The question before a court of law in dealing with a statute is whether the factual situation proved before it falls within the general description given in the statute. A real difficulty in determining the right answer can be said to arise from an ambiguity in the statute. It is in this sense that the words, ambiguity and ambiguous are widely used in judgments.
(12) In Commissioner of Sales Tax v. M/s.Mangal Sen Shyamlal reported in 1975 (4) SCC 35 = AIR 1975 SC 1106, the Hon'ble Apex Court held, "A statute is supposed to be an authentic repository of the legislative will and the function of a court is to interpret it "according to the intent of them that made it". From that function the court is. not to resile. It has to abide by the maxim, ut res magis valiat quam pereat , lest the intention of the legislature may go in vain or be left to evaporate into thin air."
(13) In C.I.T., Madras v. T.Sundram Iyengar (P) Ltd., reported in 1976 (1) SCC 77, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held, if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and if two interpretations are not reasonably possible, it would be wrong to discard the plain meaning of the words used, in order to meet a possible injustice.
(14) If the words are precise and unambiguous, then it should be accepted, as declaring the express intention of the legislature. In Ku.Sonia Bhatia v. State of U.P., and others reported in 1981 (2) SCC 585 = AIR 1981 SC 1274, the Supreme Court held that a legislature does not waste words, without any intention and every word that is used by the legislature must be given its due import and significance.
(15) It is a well settled law of interpretation that when the words of the statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, ie., they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. Reference can be made to the decision of the Apex Court in Nelson Motis v. Union of India reported in AIR 1992 SC 1981.
(16) In M/s.Oswal Agro Mills Ltd., v. Collector of Central Excise and others reported in 1993 Supp (3) SCC 716 = AIR 1993 SC 2288, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that, where the words of the statute are plain and clear, there is no room for applying any of the principles of interpretation, which are merely presumption in cases of ambiguity in the statute. The Court would interpret them as they stand.
(17) In Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal reported in (2003) 2 SCC 577, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
35. In a case where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of harsh consequences arising therefrom....
37. The court s jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case the court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language used. ......But the intention of the legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act.
(18) In Indian Dental Association, Kerala v. Union of India reported in 2004 (1) Kant. LJ 282, the Court held, The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, "but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used", for it is well-accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. Where the laguage of an Act is clear and explicit, the Court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature. Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. The decision in a case calls for a full and fair application of particular statutory language to particular facts as found. It is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the Legislature intended something which it omitted to express. A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected.
(19) In State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh reported in (2005) 10 SCC 437, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held,
12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature.
13. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. The task is not easy as the language is often misunderstood even in ordinary conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that although in the matter of correspondence or conversation the person who has spoken the words or used the language can be approached for clarification, the legislature cannot be approached as the legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. No doubt, the legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the law so made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done only by making another law or statute after undertaking the whole process of law-making.
14. Statute being an edict of the legislature, it is necessary that it is expressed in clear and unambiguous language.....
15. Where, however, the words were clear, there is no obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. In that situation the judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of a lawmaker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased. This can be vouchsafed by an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained reluctance to do so . (See Frankfurter: Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes In Essays on Jurisprudence, Columbia Law Review, p. 51.)
(20) In Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy v. State of A.P., reported in (2006) 2 SCC 670, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that,
12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. It is well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous.
(21) In A.N.Roy Commissioner of Police v. Suresh Sham Singh reported in AIR 2006 SC 2677, the Hon'ble Apex Court held,
It is now well settled principle of law that, the Court cannot change the scope of legislation or intention, when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. Narrow and pedantic construction may not always be given effect to. Courts should avoid a construction, which would reduce the legislation to futility. It is also well settled that every statute is to be interpreted without any violence to its language. It is also trite that when an expression is capable of more than one meaning, the Court would attempt to resolve the ambiguity in a manner consistent with the purpose of the provision, having regard to the great consequences of the alternative constructions.
(22) In Adamji Lookmanji and Co. v. State of Maharastra reported in AIR 2007 Bom. 56, the Bombay High Court held that, when the words of statutes are clear, plain or unambiguous, and reasonably susceptible to only meaning, Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences. The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used. Attention should be paid to what has been said in the statute, as also to what has not been said.
(23) In State of Haryana v. Suresh reported in 2007 (3) KLT 213, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held, One of the basic principles of Interpretation of Statutes is to construe them according to plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words. If that is contrary, to or inconsistent with any express intention or declared purpose of the Statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. The onus of showing that the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges it must advance something which clearly shows that the grammatical construction would be repugnant to the intention of the Act or lead to some manifest absurdity.
(24) In Visitor Amu v. K.S.Misra reported in 2007 (8) SCC 594, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, It is well settled principle of interpretation of the statute that it is incumbent upon the Court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which will render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application. The Courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intent is that every of the statute should have effect. The legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. It is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being in apposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute.
(25) In Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd., reported in (2008) 4 SCC 755, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 52, 54, 55 and 56, held as follows:
52. No doubt ordinarily the literal rule of interpretation should be followed, and hence the court should neither add nor delete words in a statute. However, in exceptional cases this can be done where not doing so would deprive certain existing words in a statute of all meaning, or some part of the statute may become absurd.
(26) In Phool Patti v. Ram Singh reported in (2009) 13 SCC 22, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held,
9. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that the court cannot add words to the statute or change its language, particularly when on a plain reading the meaning seems to be clear.
(27) In Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 653, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held,
179. Even otherwise, it is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is a determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute. Reference in this regard may be made to a recent decision of this Court in Ansal Properties and Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana [2009 (3) SCC 553] 180. Further, it is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature is specially precise and careful in its choice of language. Thus, if a statutory provision is enacted by the legislature, which prescribes a condition at one place but not at some other place in the same provision, the only reasonable interpretation which can be resorted to by the courts is that such was the intention of the legislature and that the provision was consciously enacted in that manner. In such cases, it will be wrong to presume that such omission was inadvertent or that by incorporating the condition at one place in the provision the legislature also intended the condition to be applied at some other place in that provision.
(28) In Satheedevi v. Prasanna reported in (2010) 5 SCC 622, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
12. Before proceeding further, we may notice two well-recognised rules of interpretation of statutes. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction, only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [AIR 1957 SC 907]
13. The other important rule of interpretation is that the court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation because it has no power to do so. The court cannot add words to a statute or read words which are not there in it. Even if there is a defect or an omission in the statute, the court cannot correct the defect or supply the omission - Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 323] and Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corpn. [AIR 1966 SC 1678]
(29) In Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust and Ors., v. A.G.Syed Mohideen and Ors. reported in 2010 CIJ 273 SC (1), it is held,
"6. It is now well settled that a provision of a statute should have to be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain and straight, without adding, substituting or omitting any words. While doing so, the words used in the provision should be assigned and ascribed their natural, ordinary or popular meaning. Only when such plain and straight reading, or ascribing the natural and normal meaning to the words on such reading, leads to ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which were not obviously intended by the Legislature or the Lawmaker, a court should open its interpretation tool kit containing the settled rules of construction and interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning of the provision. While using the tools of interpretation, the court should remember that it is not the author of the Statute who is empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so as to change the structure and contents. A court as an interpreter cannot alter or amend the law. It can only interpret the provision, to make it meaningful and workable so as to achieve the legislative object, when there is vagueness, ambiguity or absurdity. The purpose of interpretation is not to make a provision what the Judge thinks it should be, but to make it what the legislature intended it to be."
9. Let us consider few decisions, as to how, a Section has to be read and interpreted.
(i) It is well settled that a statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act, so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugancy either within the statute or between a Section or other parts of the statute. [Ref. Raj Krishna v. Bonod Kanungo reported in AIR 1954 SC 202].
(ii) In The State of Bihar v. Hira Lal Kejriwal reported in AIR 1960 SC 47, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at Paragraph 6, held,
To ascertain the meaning of a section it is not permissible to omit any part of it: the whole section should be read together and an attempt should be made to reconcile both the parts. ......The first part gives life to that Order, and, therefore, the acts authorised under that Order can be done subsequent to the coming into force of the Ordinance. ......The second part appears to have been enacted for the purpose of avoiding this difficulty or, at any rate, to dispel the ambiguity.
(iii) In S.Gurmej Singh v. S.Pratap Singh reported in AIR 1960 SC 122, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at Paragraph 9, held as follows:
It is an elementary rule that construction of a section is to be made of all the parts together and not of one part only by itself, and that phrases are to be construed according to the rules of grammar.
(iv) In A.R.Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak reported in 1984 (2) SCC 500, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held, It is a well established cannon of construction that the court should read the section as it is and cannot rewrite it to suit its convenience; nor does any cannon of construction permit the court to read the section in such manner as to render it to some extent otiose.
(v) In Balasinor Nagrik Co-operative Bank Ltd., v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya reported in 1987 (1) SCC 606, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at Paragraph 4, held as follows:
It is an elementary rule that construction of a section is to be made of all parts together. It is not permissible to omit any part of it. For, the principle that the statute must be read as a whole is equally applicable to different parts of the same section. .......It also provides for the manner of the exercise of such power. .......... Sub-section (1) of Section 36 is made subject to the fulfilment of the conditions prerequisite,
(vi) In T.N.State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission reported in 2007 (7) SCC 636, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held, Resort can be had to the legislative intent for the purpose of interpreting a provision of law, when the language employed by the legislature is doubtful or susceptible of meanings more than one. However, when the language is plain and explicit and does not admit of any doubtful interpretation, the Supreme Court cannot, by reference to an assumed legislative intent expand the meaning of an expression employed by the legislature and therein include such category of persons as the legislature has not chosen to do.
(vii) In Ansal Properties and Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana, reported in (2009) 3 SCC 553, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, It is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is determinative factor of legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute.
40. In Ganga Prasad Verma (Dr.) v. State of Bihar [1995 Supp (1) SCC 192], it has been held that: (SCC p. 195, para 5)
5. Where the language of the Act is clear and explicit, the court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature.''
10. Let us also consider some of the decisions, as to how, a Section has to be read and interpreted in the context, in which, it is used.
(i) In the case of Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless G.F., and Co., Ltd., AIR 1987 SC 1023, the Hon'ble Apex Court held :
"Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place."
(ii) In Balram Kumawat v. Union of India reported in 2003 (7) SCC 628, the Supreme Court held that, Contextual reading is a well-known proposition of interpretation of statute. The classes of a statute should be construed with reference to the context vis-a-vis the other provisions so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute relating to the subject-matter. The rule of "ex visceribus actus" should be resorted to in a situation of this nature.
11. Let us consider few decisions, as to whether, the Courts can add or delete or substitute any word to a statute or section.
(i) In CIT v. Badhraja and Company reported in 1994 Supp (1) SCC 280, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that an object oriented approach, however, cannot be carried to the extent of doing violence to the plain meaning of the Section used by rewriting the Section or substituting the words in the place of actual words used by the legislature.
(ii) In Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu reported in (2001) 7 SCC 71, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that,
13. We have considered the submissions made by the parties. The settled principles of interpretation are that the court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do. The court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The court cannot aid the legislature s defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are there.
(iii) In Institute of C.A. of India v. Ajit Kumar Iddya reported in AIR 2003 Kant. 187, the Karnataka High Court held that, So far as the cardinal law of interpretation is concerned, it is settled that if the language is simple and unambiguous, it is to be read with the clear intention of the legislation. Otherwise also, any addition/subtraction of a word is not permissible. In other words, it is not proper to use a sense, which is different from what the word used ordinarily conveys. The duty of the Court is not to fill up the gap by stretching a word used. It is also settled that a provision is to be read as a whole and while interpreting, the intention and object of the legislation have to be looked upon. However, each case depends upon the facts of its own.
(iv) In Sanjay Singh v. U.P. Public Service Commission reported in (2007) 3 SCC 720, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, It is well settled that courts will not add words to a statute or read into the statute words not in it. Even if the courts come to the conclusion that there is any omission in the words used, it cannot make up the deficiency, where the wording as it exists is clear and unambiguous. While the courts can adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislative or the rule-making authority, it cannot set at naught the legislative intent clearly expressed in a statute or the rules.
12. On the principles of causus omissus, let us consider the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Unique Butyle Tube Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. U.P. Financial Corporation and Others reported in 2003 HKC 852: 2003 (2) SCC 455: 2003 (113) Comp Cas 374: 2003 All LJ 427: AIR 2003 SC 2103, wherein, it was argued that the Court cannot supply the omissions by the Legislature. While interpreting a provision, the Supreme Court held that the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it and it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it if it is deemed necessary. It is further held that by the principle of causus omissus, Court cannot supply the law.
13. In the light of the guiding principles of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as to how statutes and sections have to be interpreted, we are not inclined to accept the contentions of the appellant, both on law and on facts. Having regard to the above principles of law, we are also constrained to observe that the decision in D.Vijayarangan's case, cannot be taken as a precedent, to be applied in similar circumstances.
In view of the above discussion and decisions, the writ appeal is dismissed. No costs.