(Prayer: Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, against the order dated 18.06.2014 made in W.P.No.3409 of 2014.)
Huluvadi G. Ramesh, J.
1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
2. This appeal by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission is against the order of the learned single Judge in accepting the case of the respondent/writ petitioner to consider her for appointment by extending the benefit of reservation for having studied in the Tamil medium. It appears that in the Combined Subordinate Services Examination-I, the respondent/writ petitioner, having applied for the post, also made a mention in the application that she had studied in Tamil medium, but did produce the said certificate, however, sought to produce the said certificate at the time of certificate verification and thus, relying upon the Division Bench judgments of this Court in the case of K.Arun Sabhapathy v. Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission rep.by its Secretary, Chennai and others reported in (2009) 3 MLJ 197 and also in the case of Dr.M.Vennila v. Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission rep.by Deputy Secretary, Chennai reported in 2006 (3) CTC 449, it was sought to be contended that at the time of submission of the application, all the required documents ought to have been furnished, failing which the candidature would be rejected. It appears that the learned single Judge has allowed the case of the respondent/writ petitioner on the ground that though she was not able to produce the certificate at the time of application, as the requirement has been satisfied at the time of certificate verification, her candidature has to be considered. As against the said order, the appellant/TNPSC is before this Court with this appeal.
3. The learned counsel for the respondent/writ petitioner, relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Charles K.Skaria v. Dr.C.Mathew reported in AIR 1980 SC 1230, has submitted that the order of the learned single Judge requires no interference, since the Apex Court, in paragraph-20 of the said judgment, has succinctly held as follows:-
This composite statement cannot be read formalistic fashion. Mode of proof is geared to the goal of the qualification in question. It is subversive of sound interpretation and realistic decoding of the prescription to telescope the two and make both mandatory in point of time. What is essential in the possession of a diploma before the given date; what is ancillary is the safe mode of proof of the qualification. To confuse between fact and its proof is blurred perspicacity. To make mandatory the date of acquiring the additional qualification before the last date for application makes sense. But if it is unshakeably shown that the qualification has been acquired before the relevant date, as is the case here, to invalidate this merit factor because proof, though indubitable, was adduced a few days later but before the selection or in a manner not mentioned in the prospectus, but still above board, is to make procedure not the hand made but the mistress and form not as subservient to substance but as superior to the essence.
4. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant/TNPSC is that the above observation was made in a different context and it does not apply to the case on hand.
5. Having heard the learned counsel on either side, in the case on hand, we could see that while extending the benefit of 20% reservation for the candidates who have studied in the Tamil medium, it appears that the respondent/writ petitioner, having acquired the qualification way back in the year 2001, has not produced the certificate at the relevant point of time, however, she was able to produce the certificate at the time of certificate verification. Hence the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the said certificate cannot be taken into consideration, since the same was not produced at the relevant point of time, that is at the time of submission of the application, deserves to be rejected. Though the Division Bench of this Court in Dr.Vennila's case cited supra, especially on the point of qualification etc., has held that no leniency or indulgence can be shown who have not signed the application even though they were permitted to write the examination and were found to be successful in the written examination and the Court has no power to modify or relax terms and conditions in instruction to candidates or in brochure, the Apex Court has laid down the ratio with regard to the extent of substantial justice to be done in Charles K.Skaria's case cited supra, emphasising the fact that mode of proof is geared to the goal of the qualification in question. Applying the said ratio to the case on hand, the respondent/writ petitioner has acquired the qualification way back in the year 2001, but she was unable to produce the certificate and also it is substantiated by the learned counsel for the respondent that in any degree certificate, normally the medium of instruction will not be mentioned. So also in the case of the respondent/writ petitioner, no such mention is made in the degree certificate, but she has successfully produced the certificate as to the Tamil medium at the time of certificate verification, which is found to be genuine and accordingly, taking support from the ratio of the Apex Court, sought to advance substantial justice and not to have a pedantic approach.
6. A further reading of the judgment of the Apex Court in Charles K.Skaria's case even on facts would show that if it is unshakeably shown that the qualification has been acquired before the relevant date, to invalidate this merit factor because of proof, though indubitable, was adduced a few days later but before the selection or in a manner not mentioned in the prospectus, but still above board, is to make procedure not the hand made but the mistress and form not as subservient to substance but as superior to the essence. Since the very ratio laid down by the Apex Court is to advance substantial justice and not to have a pedantic approach and the learned single Judge, rightly considering the case, has passed an order in favour of the respondent/writ petitioner, which cannot be faulted, the writ appeal is dismissed. However, this order, having been passed on consideration of peculiar facts and circumstances, cannot be quoted as a precedent. No costs.