(Prayer: This WA filed under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act read with Article 215 of the Constitution of India praying that the order of learned single Judge dated 11.02.2015 passed in W.P.No.68108 of 2010 may Kindly be set aside and the writ appeal may be allowed.)
H.G. Ramesh J. (Oral):
1. Whether an Arbitral Tribunal having authority to receive evidence, has the power under Section 33 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 ( the Act ), to impound any instrument (document) as defined under Section 2 (j) of the Act, if it is not duly stamped?
This is the question that requires determination in this appeal. The question is answered in the affirmative.
2. This intra court appeal is directed against an order of a learned Single Judge dated 11.02.2015 made in Writ Petition No.68108 of 2010. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge has dismissed the appellant s writ petition as devoid of merit. In the writ petition, the appellant had challenged the order dated 19.05.2010 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal whereby it impounded the agreement of sale dated 14.04.2002 on the ground that it was not duly stamped. The appellant had also challenged the order dated 16.07.2010 passed by the District Registrar whereby the appellant was directed to pay the deficit stamp duty of Rs.8,55,000/- on the aforesaid agreement of sale and also a penalty of Rs.5,000/-.
3. We have heard Sri. F.V. Patil, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and perused the impugned order. The sole contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the Arbitral Tribunal which impounded the document had no power under Section 33 of the Act to impound the document, and hence, the order of the Arbitral Tribunal dated 19.05.2010 is liable to be set aside.
4. To examine the contention raised, it is relevant to extract Section 33(1) of the Act which relates to examination and impounding of instruments:
33. Examination and impounding of instruments:- (1) Every person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, and every person in-charge of a public office, except an officer of police, before whom any instrument, chargeable in his opinion, with duty, is produced or comes in the performance of his functions, shall, if it appears to him that such instrument is not duly stamped, impound the same.
(2) .
5. Learned counsel for the appellant rightly submitted that the Arbitral Tribunal has the authority to receive evidence. The learned counsel contended that the word and occurring in Section 33(1) of the Act should be understood in a conjunctive sense, and hence, mere authority to receive evidence is not sufficient but the said person should also be in-charge of a public office to get the power to impound any document. He submitted that an Arbitral Tribunal can t be said to be a person in-charge of a public office, and therefore, it has no power to impound any document under Section 33 of the Act.
6. We are unable to accept the aforesaid contention. In the context of Section 33(1) of the Act, the use of comma before the word and occurring therein indicates that the word and should be understood in a disjunctive sense. Therefore, every person having authority to receive evidence has the power under Section 33 of the Act to impound any instrument or document, if it is not duly stamped. It is not necessary in law that the said person should also be in-charge of a public office. Person referred to in Section 33(1) of the Act includes an Arbitral Tribunal. In view of the above, we find no error in the order of the learned Single Judge to warrant interference. The appeal is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. In view of dismissal of the appeal, I.A.2/2015 filed for interim stay also stands dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.