Judgment:
1. Two registered trade unions i.e. petitioner and respondent No.2 are in loggerhead on the question of status of representative union as per M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 ( MPIR Act). The petitioner is already enjoying the status of representative union under the MPIR Act since 1995. The respondent No.2 union preferred an application for recognition of union dated 26th October, 2013. The present petitioner was noticed on this application by Registrar Trade Union by communication dated 22.4.2014 (Annexure P/4). In turn, the petitioner submitted his reply / objection (Annexure P/5) dated 21.05.2014. The respondent No.1 / Registrar passed the order dated 23rd May, 2014 whereby in place of petitioner union the respondent No.2 union is declared as representative union under the Act. Petitioner feeling aggrieved by this order dated 23rd May, 2014 challenged the same by preferring an appeal under Section 22 of the Act before the Industrial Court. Industrial Court after hearing both the parties, passed the order dated 22.08.2014 (Annexure P/1). The appeal of the petitioner is allowed and impugned order of Registrar was set aside. Up to para 6 and to the extent impugned order of Registrar is set aside by the Industrial Court, the petitioners have no objection. They have assailed the ultimate direction of the Industrial Court whereby the Registrar was directed to obtain appropriate application under Section 17 Rule 17 with relevant form from the respondent No.2 and after hearing both the unions, make physical verification of members by fixing a date. The Industrial Court further ordered that appropriate order be passed according to the merits of the matter.
2. Assailing this order, Shri Alok Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that Section 13 of the Act deals with application which is preferred for the first time seeking representative status. For this purpose, there is a statutory form namely FORM (B). Under the Act, rules are made which are known as M.P. Industrial Relations Rules, 1961. By taking this Court to Rule 11, it is contended that for a fresh application preferred under Section 13 the requisite fees is Rs. 5/- which needs to be paid in cash. He submits that admittedly the respondent No.2 has paid Rs. 5/- in cash. By taking this Court to the application dated 26th October, 2013, it is submitted that it is not in consonance with the statutory requirement of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. It is submitted that it is not a case of fresh application for the purpose of getting status of representative union rather it was a case where respondent No.2 was seeking his replacement in place of the petitioner. Thus, application was required to be filed in consonance with the requirement of Section 17 read with relevant rules namely Rule 16 and 17.
3. Shri Alok Sharma heavily relied on the statutory FORM-E and the annexure appended to the said form. It is submitted that unless the information needs to be furnished are supplied, the application cannot be entertained. Putting it differently, it is submitted that whenever a union desires the representative status in lieu of existing representative union, it needs to furnish following information:-
1. Date of application.
2. Name of the Union applying for the recognition in place of an already recognized representative Union.
3. Address of Head Office.
4. Address of Local Office.
5. Name and addresses of the office bearers.
6. Whether the Union had applied for recognition to the Registrar at any time if so, the result of the application.
7. Name of the representative union in whose place the recognition is applied for ......
8. The address of the Head Office or local office of the representative union .....
9.The total number of members of the Union applying for recognition on the date shown in clause I above.
It is further contended that there must be an Annexure to Form-E which should contain following information:-
ANNEXURE OF FORM E
(1). S. No.
(2). Name of the undertaking.
(3) Shift.
(4) Department or occupation.
(5) Name of the member
(6) Father's name
(7) Age of the member.
(8) Whether membership subscription paid for the preceding months.
(9) Whether membership subscription paid for the month next to the preceding month.
(10) Receipt No. for membership subscription mentioned in column Nos. (8) and (9)
(11) The date of subscription
(12) Remarks.
4. He submits that it is necessary so that the other union gets information about the status of the applicant union and put forth his defence. It is submitted that the application dated 26th October, 2013 is not pregnant with minimum necessary details and therefore, it could not have been processed. He submits that when application was not containing minimum details, the Registrar has erred in treating it to be an application preferred under Section 17 of the Act. Criticizing his order, it is submitted that Registrar has acted in undue haste while passing the order dated 23rd May, 2014. He gave exparte hearing to respondent No.2 without fixing any date and without putting other party to the notice passed the order dated 23.05.2014. He submits that the Industrial Court has rightly set aside the order to that extent. He submits that once it is held by the Industrial Court that the said application preferred by the respondent No.2 was not in consonance with Section 17 and Rule 17 of the Act and it was infact an application as per Section 13 of the Act, it should have set aside the order in toto and at best liberty could have been reserved to the respondent No.2 to prefer appropriate application under relevant provision of the Act. He submits that Industrial Court was under no obligation to direct the Registrar to undertake the exercise as mentioned in para 7 of the order.
5. Per Contra, Shri Ravi Jain, learned counsel for the respondent No.2, submits that although the respondent No.2 has not challenged the order dated 22.08.2014 passed by the Industrial Court, the ultimate direction given by the Industrial Court is not liable to be interfered with. He heavily relied on Section 22(3) of the Act. He submits that as per said provision, the Industrial Court is empowered to confirm, modify or rescind any order passed by the Registrar. In addition, the Industrial Court may pass such consequential order as it may deem fit. It is strenuously argued that if Industrial Court deemed it fit to direct the Registrar to obtain application from respondent No.2, no interference is warranted. He relied on unreported judgment passed by this Court in WP No. 3867/2010 ( Cadbury Workers Association Vs. State of M.P. and Ors.). By relying on para 14(ii) of the said order, he submits that this Court directed the Registrar to fix a fresh date for physical verification. It is therefore argued that no interference is warranted.
6. Shri Devendra Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent No.3, advanced singular contention. He submitted that as per Section 17 (2) of the Act, the information was required to be given to the Labour Officer which was not admittedly given and therefore, the order of Registrar was rightly interfered with by the Industrial Court.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
8. Since the order of Industrial Court to the extent Registrar's order is set aside, is not put to test by the other side, I find no reason to interfere or disturb the said finding. However order of the Industrial Court makes it crystal clear that decision making process adopted by the Registrar was grossly vitiated and therefore, interference was rightly made by the Industrial Court.
9. The argument of Shri Jain is based on Section 22(3) of the Act which employs the words " as it may deem fit". The question is whether this provision gives any unfettered power to the Industrial Court to pass any kind of order. In this regard, it is apt to remember that U.S. Supreme Court in its unique words opined that "Law has reached its finest moment when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion" United State vs. Wunderlich, 96 L Ed 113 (1951). The Apex court in various cases considered the words conveying discretion by implying the word "as he deems fit". Sakar J observed that "Section 29(3) only confers power to make the order in terms of the statute, order which would give effect to and read with the Act elsewhere conferred. The word " as he deems fit" do not bestow the power to make any order on consideration de hors the statute which the authorities consider best according to their notions of justice [See: AIR 1962 SC 753 (R.M. Paranjype Vs. A.M. Mali and Ors.)]. The Apex Court opined that wide discretion conferred by these words has to be exercised keeping in view the purpose for which it is conferred [ See 2004(8) SCC 524) (Chariant International Ltd. Vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India)]. Similarly, the words " Shall take such action thereon as it may think fit" do not give discretion to take action outside the statute [See: AIR 1961 SC 619 (Akshaibar Lal (Dr.) Vs. Vice Chancellor, BHU). In AIR 1961 SC 1191 ( A. St. Arunachalam Pillai Vs. Southern Roadways Ltd.) and AIR 1963 SC 64 (Abdul Mateen Vs. Ram Kailah Pandey) the Apex Court opined that when a power is conferred on Tribunal in similar words, the Tribunal cannot pass any and every order but can only pass such orders which the subordinate authorities could have not passed in that particular case.
10. If the aforesaid litmus test laid down by the Supreme Court is applied in the present case, it will be clear that Industrial Court in its ultimate direction travelled beyond the statute. Industrial Court was not obliged to direct the Registrar to take action of obtaining a fresh application from respondent No.2. As per Section 17 of the Act, it is voluntary act on the part of the union claiming representative capacity. Registrar is under no obligation to undertake the aforesaid exercise. In other words, Registrar being a statutory authority was not obliged to invite such application from respondent No.2. The Judgment in Cadbury (Supra) has no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case. This is trite that a judgment is precedent for a point which has been specifically decided and not on a logic which can be reduced from the same (See: AIR 1968 SC 647(State of Orissa Vs. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and others). In 2003 (2) SCC 111(Bhavnagar University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. And Ors.) the Apex Court opined that a decision is an authority for which it is decided and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. A little difference in facts or additional facts may make lot of difference in the precedential value of decision (Para 59). In the light of aforesaid, said judgment in Cadbury (Surpa) is of no assistance to Shri Jain.
11. Resultantly, the ultimate direction of Industrial Court mentioned in para 7 is set aside. Liberty is reserved to the respondent No.2 to prefer appropriate application in accordance with law. Since the act in no uncertain terms prescribes the methodology to decide the question of representative status, it is premature for the courts to direct the authorities to act in a particular manner. Act contains sufficient guidelines for the Registrar to deal with such application. Resultantly, the said portion of para 7 of Industrial Court is set aside.
12. Petition is allowed. It is made clear that this court has not expressed any opinion on the merits. No costs.