1. Heard Sri Rahul Sahai, learned counsel for the petitioner.
2. The present writ petition arises out of an order of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.
3. Before dealing with the merits of the case, the question arose as to whether the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be maintainable against the order passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal keeping in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 2548 of 2009 Radhey Shyam and another v. Chhabi Nath and others wherein it has been held that the judicial orders of Civil Court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
4. Sri Rahul Sahai, learned counsel for the petitioner referring to judgment of the Apex Court in Radhey Shyam (supra) submits that a distinction has been carved out between the Civil Court and a Tribunal. Mere reading of paragraph 10, 11 and 21 of the said pronouncement makes it clear that the orders of Civil Court stand on a different footing from the orders of a Tribunal.
5. With reference to the provision of Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is a statutory Tribunal established by the State Government. By notification of the State Government the area of jurisdiction is specified for the purpose of adjudication of claims under the Act. Section 168 provides the manner in which the Claim Tribunal has to proceed to decide the application for compensation filed under Section 166 of the Act. The procedure prescribed therein is a summary procedure.
6. Section 169 deals with the powers and procedures of the Claim Tribunal, a reading of which shows that the powers of a Civil Court are available to the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to a limited extent. The Claim Tribunals shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for the purpose of Section 195 of the Act i.e. for the purpose of an enquiry, to impose a fine upon a person convicted for an offence under this Act. Otherwise, it has powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of:-
(1) Taking the evidence of
(2) Enforcing attendance of witnesses
(3) Compelling to produce documents
(4) Material object and for such other purposes as may be prescribed.
7. Rule 221 of the Motor Vehicles Rules provides that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 will apply only in certain cases. Rule 9 to 13 and 15 to 30 of Order V; Order 9, Rules 3 to 10 of Order 13, Rule 2 to 21 of Order 16, Order XVII; and Rules 1 to 3 of Order 23 of the CPC would be applicable in a Civil proceeding before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.
8. A Full bench of this Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Janki Devi and others reported in, AIR 1982 Allahabad 296 has held that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not a Court but is a Statutory Tribunal, the incidents of which are governed entirely by the provisions of the Act.
9. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and a careful reading of judgment of Apex Court in "Radhey Shyam" would show that the referred question in "Radhey Shyam" before the Apex Court was as to whether the view taken in Surya Devi Rai v. Ram Chandra reported in 2003 (6) SCC 625 that the writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India lies against the order of Civil Court is the correct view or not. The question before the Apex Court in Radhey Shyam arose out of a proceeding in an Original Suit pending before the Civil Court. Assailing the interim injunction of the Civil Court in the pending suit, the writ petition was filed before the High Court and the interim injunction granted by the Civil Court was vacated. Hence the aggrieved party moved to the Apex Court by filing a Special Leave Petition. The contention was that the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was not maintainable against the order of Civil Court.
10. Considering the earlier nine judges bench in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and others v. State of Maharashtra reported in, AIR 1967 SC 1, the referring Bench observed in paragraph 27 as follows:-
"It is clear from the law laid down in Mirajkar in Para 63 that a distinction has been made between judicial orders of inferior Courts of Civil Jurisdiction and orders of inferior tribunals or Court which are not Civil courts and which cannot pass judicial orders. Therefore, judicial orders passed by Civil courts of plenary jurisdiction stand on a different footing in view of the law pronounced in para 63 in Mirajkar. The passage in the subsequent edition of Halsbury (4th Edn.) which has been quoted in Surya Dev Rai does not show at all that there has been any change in law on the points in issue pointed out above. "
11. Dealing with the question about the scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the law laid down in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and another reported in, AIR (1954) SC 440 was cited with approval by the Apex Court. The question before the Supreme Court in T.C. Basappa (supra) was of the scope of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in dealing with a writ of certiorari against the order of the Election Tribunal. It was held that certiorari was meant to supervise "judicial acts" which includes quasi judicial function of the administrative bodies. Relevant portion in paragraph 7 of the T.C. Basappa are as follows :-
"7. One of the fundamental principles in regard to the issuing of a writ of certiorari is, that the writ can be (I) [1953] S.C.R. 1114 at 1150, 257 of judicial acts. The expression "judicial acts" includes the exercise of quasi-judicial functions by administrative bodies or other authorities or persons obliged to exercise such functions and is used in contrast with what are purely ministerial acts. Atkin L.J. thus summed up the law on this point in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners:
"Whenever any body or persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling Jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs."
The second essential feature of a writ of certiorari is that the control which is exercised through it over judicial or quasi-judicial Tribunals or bodies is not in an appellate but supervisory capacity. In granting a writ of certiorari the superior Court does not exercise the powers of an appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior Tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior Tribunal. The offending order or proceeding so to say is put out of the way as one which should not be used to the detriment of any person.(Vide Per Lord Cairns in Walshall's Overseers v. London and North Western Railway Co. 4 AC 30, 39).
12. It was observed in Radhey Shyam (supra) that the said judgment in T.C. Basappa (supra) has been followed in all leading judgments and is a good law. Paragraph 11 of "Radhey Shyam and Another" reads as under:-
"11. It is necessary to clarify that expression "Judicial Acts" is not meant to refer to "Judicial orders of civil courts as the matter before this Court arose out of the order of Election Tribunal and no direct decision of this Court, except Surys Devi Rai, has been brought to our notice where writ of certiorari may have been issued against an order of a judicial court. In fact, when the question as to scope of jurisdiction arose in subsequent decisions, it was clarified that order of judicial courts stood on different footing from the quasi judicial orders of authorities or Tribunals."
13. While answering the reference, it was held in paragraph 18 as under:-
"18. Thus, it has been clearly laid down by this Court that an order of civil court could be challenged under Article 227 and not under Article 226."
14. Relying upon nine judges bench in Mirajkar it was held in paragraph 21 as under:-
"21. It is true that this Court has laid down that technicalities associated with the prerogative writs in England have no role to play under our constitutional scheme. There is no parallel system of King's Court in India and of all other courts having limited jurisdiction subject to supervision of King's Court. Courts are set up under the Constitution or the laws. All courts in the jurisdiction of a High Court are subordinate to it and subject to its control and supervision under Article 227. Writ jurisdiction is constitutionally conferred on all High Courts. Broad principles of writ jurisdiction followed in England are applicable to India and a writ of certiorari lies against patently erroneous or without jurisdiction orders of Tribunals or authorities or courts other than judicial courts. There are no precedents in India for High Courts to issue writs to subordinate courts. Control of working of subordinate courts in dealing with their judicial orders is exercised by way of appellate or revisional powers or power of superintendence under Article 227. Orders of Civil court stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or Tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil courts. While appellate or revisional jurisdiction is regulated by statutes, power of superintendence under Article 227 is constitutional. The expression "inferior court" is not referable to judicial courts, as rightly observed in the referring order in paras 26 and 27 quoted above."
15. Thus, in Radhey shyam, the Apex Court has held that the judicial orders of an inferior Court of plenary jurisdiction stand on a different footing from the orders of authorities or the tribunal and are not amenable to correctness in a writ of certiorari. It was held that the correctness of the judgment of a Civil Court can be examined under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in its supervisory jurisdiction by the High Court within its limited course.
16. Now, it is to be seen that as to whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal which are judicial tribunal can be termed as Civil Court. A Full bench of this Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation (supra) while dealing with the question of maintainability of cross objections as contemplated by Order 41, Rule 22 of the CPC in an appeal before the High Court has held that the Claim Tribunals are constituted by the State Government under the provisions of the Act. The decision of the Tribunal is called an award. The word "Award" in the ordinary dictionary means a judicial decision. The nature of the jurisdiction of claims tribunal is the same as that of the Civil Court though the tribunal is not a civil court and the award passed by it is not a decree of civil court. The Special tribunal constituted is governed exclusively by its own code.
17. In a recent judgment in Nahar Industrial Enterprises Limited v. Hong Cong and Shanghai Banking Corporation reported in, 2009 (8) SCC 646 the question for consideration was as to whether the High Court and Supreme Court has the power to transfer a suit from Civil Court to Debt Recovery Tribunal or not. While answering the said question, it was examined by the Apex Court as to whether the tribunal is a Civil Court. In paragraph 67 to 73 the observation are:-
67. The terms "Tribunal", "court" and the "civil court" have been used in the Code differently. All "courts" are "Tribunals" but all "Tribunals" are not "courts". Similarly all "civil courts" are "courts" but all "courts" are not "civil courts." It is not much in dispute that the broad distinction between a "court" and a "Tribunal" is whereas the decision of the "court" is final the decision of the "Tribunal" may not be. The "Tribunal", however, which is authorised to take evidence of witnesses would ordinarily be held to be a "court" within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It includes not only Judges and Magistrates but also persons, except Arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence. It is an inclusive definition. There may be other forums which would also come within the purview of the said definition."
"68. In State of M.P. v. Anshuman Shukla, (2008) 7 SCC 487, this Court while holding certain authorities to be a 'court' within the meaning of the Evidence Act, noted thus:-
"19. The definition of "courts" under the Evidence Act is not exhaustive (see Empress v. Ashootosh Chuckerbutty. Although the said definition is for the purpose of the said Act alone, all authorities must be held to be courts within the meaning of the said provision who are legally authorised to take evidence. [...]
21. In Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain it has been held that any tribunal or authority whose decision is final and binding between the parties is a court. In the said decision, the Supreme Court, while deciding a case under the Court of Enquiry Act held that a court of enquiry is not a court as its decision is neither final nor binding upon the parties."
The same, however, would not mean that only because a Tribunal has 'all the trappings of a court', it would be a court. (See Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd. [1950 SCR 459] Para 7 and 27}."
"69. Civil court is a body established by law for administration of justice. Different kinds of law, however exists, constituting different kinds of courts. Which courts would come within the definition of the civil court have been laid down under the Code of Civil Procedure itself. Civil Courts contemplated under Section 9 of Code of Civil Procedure find mentioned in Sections 4 and 5 thereof. Some suits may lie before the Revenue Court, some suits may lie before the Presidency Small Causes Courts. The Code of Civil Procedure itself lays down that the Revenue Courts would not be courts subordinate to the High Court.
"70. We may notice that a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in State Bank of India (supra) and a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Cofex Exports Ltd. (supra) have held that the DRT is not a court and it exercises powers of a civil court only in respect of limited matters."
"71. Civil Courts are constituted under statutes, like Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887. Pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction of the civil courts are fixed in terms thereof. Jurisdiction to determine subject matter of suit, however, emanates from Section 9 of the Code. We would revert to the interpretation of the said provision vis- -vis the provisions of the Act a little later."
"72. In P. Sarathy v. State Bank of India [(2000) 5 SCC 355], this Court opined that although there exists a distinction between a court and a civil court, but held that a Tribunal which has not merely the trappings of a court but has also the power to give a decision or a judgment which has finality and authoritativeness will be court within the meaning of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the context of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 the term 'court' is considered to be of wide import. However, there again even for that purpose exists a distinction between a court and the civil court. In P. Sarathy v. State Bank of India, (Supra) this Court has held:-
"12. It will be noticed that Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not speak of a "civil court" but speaks only of a "court". It is not necessary that the court spoken of in Section 14 should be a "civil court". Any authority or tribunal having the trappings of a court would be a "court" within the meaning of this section.
13. ... In order to constitute a court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement."
18. Further in determining the question as to whether DRT would be a Civil Court, in paragraph 88, 89 and 92 it was held:-
"88. We have noticed hereinbefore that Civil Courts are created under different Acts. They have their own hierarchy. They necessarily are subordinate to the High Court. The appeals from their judgment will lie before a superior court. The High Court is entitled to exercise its power of revision as also superintendence over the said courts. For the aforementioned purpose, we must bear in mind the distinction between two types of courts, viz., civil courts and the courts trying disputes of civil nature. Only because a court or a tribunal is entitled to determine an issue involving civil nature, the same by itself would not lead to the conclusion that it is a civil court. For the said purpose, as noticed hereinbefore, a legal fiction is required to be created before it would have all attributes of a civil court."
"89. The Tribunal could have been treated to be a civil court provided it could pass a decree and it had all the attributes of a civil court including undertaking of a full-fledged trial in terms of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and/or the Evidence Act. It is now trite law that jurisdiction of a court must be determined having regard to the purpose and object of the Act. If the Parliament, keeping in view the purpose and object thereof thought it fit to create separate tribunal so as to enable the banks and the financial institutions to recover the debts expeditiously wherefore the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure as also the Evidence Act need not necessarily be resorted to, in our opinion, by taking recourse to the doctrine of purposive construction, another jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon it so as to enable this Court to transfer the case from the civil court to a tribunal."
"92. We have held that the Tribunals are neither civil courts nor courts subordinate to the High Court. The High Court ordinarily can be approached in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 or its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercises such jurisdiction not only over the courts but also over the Tribunals. Appellate tribunals have been constituted for determining the appeals from judgments and orders of the Tribunal."
19. Thus from the discussion made above, it can be concluded that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal are the statutory tribunal and have been created with the specific purpose and objective of the Motor Vehicles Act. Certain provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure though are applicable to limited extent, however, this does not mean that the tribunal would answer the description of the Civil Court. The High Court has power of an appeal against the award of the tribunal, under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act filed by a person aggrieved but that would not mean that against an order of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal which is not an award, the writ of certiorari would not lie.
20. It has been clearly laid down by the Apex Court that the statutory tribunal created under an Act is not a Civil Court of plenary jurisdiction and hence a writ of certiorari against the order of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, not being an award, would be maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
21. Now, dealing with the merits of the case, it would be seen that the writ petition has been filed against an order dated 9.10.2014 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in Misc. Case No. 24 of 2011 which arose out of a Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 897 of 2008. The Misc. Case No. 24 of 2011 was registered on an application 3 Ga filed by the Insurance Company for review of the award dated 29.1.2011. The review application was filed on the ground that a fraud was committed by the claimant and the alleged accident from the truck No. UP-25 T 7356 was planted in connivance with the owner, who chose not to contest the proceedings, in an effort to obtain insurance money illegally. No such accident had occurred and the survey report dated 1.5.2008 indicates that on the date of alleged accident i.e. 3.6.2008, the truck in question was lying in the garage of one Shamim Mistri. The review application was dismissed on the ground that there was no power with the tribunal to review.
22. There is no dispute about the fact that the against the award of Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Insurance company can file an appeal under section 173 of the Act. Moreover, there is no provision of review in the Motor Vehicles Act and the Tribunal has become functus officio after declaration of the award.
23. In this view of the matter, no infirmity is found in the order of rejection of the review application. The petitioner Insurance company had to challenge the award dated 29.1.2011 before the competent court of law. Thus, on the merits of the writ petition, no inference is required.
24. The writ petition is dismissed, accordingly.
Petition Dismissed.