Ramachandra Menon, J.
1. The course pursued by the Tribunal in granting a total compensation of 5,14,250/- in respect of the demise of a minor boy aged 13 years is sought to be challenged by the insurance company, contending that the multiplier taken by the Tribunal is on the higher side and that deduction towards the probable personal expenses has been made only to an extent of 1/3rd, which, according to the company, should have been 50%, as it is claimed by the parents and the sibling.
2. The sequence of events narrated in the appeal reveals that the accident was on 26.8.2004. The minor boy was proceeding along the road when he was knocked down by an auto rickshaw bearing No.KL.04.G.3423 owned, driven and insured by respondents 1 to 3 before the Tribunal, causing fatal injuries. Despite the treatment availed for several days, his life could not be saved and he succumbed to the injuries on 2.9.2004 bidding farewell to this world. This was sought to be compensated by filing the claim petition by the parents and the minor sister.
3. The claim was contested by the insurance company with reference to the quantum of compensation payable and negligence. No violation of any statutory/policy condition was pointed out or established. The evidence adduced before the Tribunal consists of the oral testimony of PW.1 (mother of the deceased) and the documents produced and marked as Exts.A1 to A8, besides a copy of the policy produced as Ext.B1 on the part of the respondents. After considering the facts and figures, the Tribunal fixed negligence solely on the part of the driver of the auto rickshaw and proceeded to work out the compensation. Awarding amounts under different heads, total compensation payable was fixed as 5,14,250/-, which was directed to be satisfied with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of petiton, till realisation. This is sought to be intercepted by the insurance company, by way of the present appeal.
4. The learned counsel for the insurance company/appellant submits that the grievance is mainly 2 fold, in so far as the Tribunal has reckoned '20' as the multiplier in the case of a boy aged 13 years, which according to them should have been 15. Similarly, it is stated that only 1/3rd has been deducted from the notional monthly income towards the personal expenses, which should have been 50% as mentioned hereinbefore.
5. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the claimant as well as the learned counsel appearing for the Insurer.
6. On going through the pleadings and proceedings, it is seen that the Tribunal has awarded amounts mainly in respect of loss of life by reckoning the notional income as 3,000/- and adopting the multiplier of '20', of course after deducting 1/3rd towards the personal expeneses, thus arriving the figure as 4.8 lakhs. It is also seen from the detailed discussion made by the Tribunal in paragraph 9 of the award that the course pursued by the Tribunal is sought to be justified with reference to the law declared by the Apex Court in Master Mallikarjun Vs. Divisional Manager, The National Insurance Company Limited (2013 (3) KLJ 815: 2014 SCC 396) and celebrated decision in Sarla Verma (Smt) and Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr. (2010 (2) KLT 802).
7. The contention raised by the appellant/company is that Mallikarjun's case is not liable to be applied in the instant case in so far as it was a case involving injuries and not a question of death. Similarly, it is stated with reference to the multiplier, that nowhere in Sarla Verma's case, has the Supreme Court mentioned that the multiplier to be followed shall be '20'. We have gone through these decisions as well. In Mallikarjun's case, it was made clear by the Apex Court, that in respect of persons having disability above 10% upto 30%, a sum of 3 lakhs; up to 60% 4 lakhs; up to 90% 5 lakhs and above 90% it should be 6 lakhs shall be paid. For permanent disability upto 10%, it should be 1 lakh, unless there are exceptional circumstances to take a different yardstick.
8. It is true that the said extent of compensation has been prescribed in the case of 'injuries'. But here, it is a case of 'death', which should stand on a higher pedestal than the injuries. There is a contention put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant, that living with serious injuries is extremely difficult and hence a higher extent of compensation may be justified in such cases. To some extent we agree with the said proposition in so far as in the case of a person who is having serious injuries and is supposed to live long, there may be various instances, such as added pain and sufferings, loss of amenities and enjoyment in life, necessity to engage a permanent attendant if at all, and such circumstances warranted, future treatment expenses and such other heads. But coming to the extent of compensation payable for death in relation to the compensation payable for injuries, compensation for death definitely stands on a higher pedestal than the injuries, though a case involving injuries may attract compensation under some other relevant heads.
9. Coming to the appropriate multiplier, it is true that Sarla Verma's case does not say that a multiplier '20' has to be adopted in the case of children up to 15 years. The question of appropriate multiplier was considered in detail and a comparison was made in a table as given in paragraph 40 of the said decision, i.e., Sarla Verma (Smt) and Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr. (2010 (2) KLT 802) with reference to different age groups and the multiplier as envisaged in Susamma's case (given in column No.2); multiplier as adopted in Trilok Chandra's case (Column No.3); multiplier in Trilok Chandra's case as clarified in Charlie's case (Column No.4); multiplier given in the 2nd schedule (Column No.5) and the multiplier actually used in the 2nd scheduled of the M.V.Act with reference to the quantum of compensation mentioned therein (in Column No.6).
10. After discussion with reference to the above figures observed in paragraph 41, the Apex Court mentioned in paragraph 42, as to the appropriate multiplier to be adopted shall be as mentioned in Column No.4. The said paragraph reads as follows:-
"42. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in column (4) of the Table above (prepared by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie), which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years), reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years."
11. It is true that, by virtue of the above declaration, 20 cannot be a multiplier in the case of anybody and the multiplier starts from 18 with a study declared by advancement of age group and it starts from the age group 15 to 20 years. The multiplier in the case of children up to 15 years is left blank. This does not mean that, upto 15 years the multiplier to be adopted is 'zero' or something less and since nothing is mentioned by the Apex Court in Sarla Verma's case, particularly in paragraph 42 as to the appropriate multiplier.
12. The vacuum resulted in respect of the multiplier, which could be reckoned in the case of children upto 15 years, was however filled up by a three member Judge bench of the Supreme Court while considering the correctness and sustainability of the verdict passed by the Apex Court in Sarla Verma's case on reference. The said verdict in Reshma Kumari's case has been reported in Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan [2013 (2) KLT 304(SC)]. The observation made by the 3 member bench in paragraph 40 is reproduced below:-
"40. In what we have discussed above, we sum up our conclusions as follows:
(i) In the applications for compensation made under S.166 of the 1988 Act in death cases where the age of the deceased is 15 years and above, the Claims Tribunals shall select the multiplier as indicated in Column (4) of the table prepared in Sarla Verma (2010 (2) KLT 802 (SC) = (2009) 6 SCC 121) read with para 42 of that judgment.
(ii) In cases where the age of the deceased is upto 15 years, irrespective of the S.166 or S.163A under which the claim for compensation has been made, multiplier of 15 and the assessment as indicated in the Second Schedule subject to correction as pointed out in Column (6) of the table in Sarla Verma (2010 (2) KLT 802 (SC) = (2009) 6 SCC 121) should be followed.
(iii) As a result of the above, while considering the claim applications made under S.166 in death cases where the age of the deceased is above 15 years, there is no necessity for the Claims Tribunals to seek guidance or for placing reliance on the Second Schedule in the 1988 Act.
(iv) The Claims Tribunals shall follow the steps and guidelines stated in para 19 of Sarla Verma (2010 (2) KLT 802 (SC) = (2009) 6 SCC 121) for determination of compensation in cases of death.
(v) While making addition to income for future prospects, the Tribunals shall follow paragraph 24 of the Judgment in Sarla Verma (2010 (2) KLT 802 (SC) = (2009) 6 SCC 121).
(vi) Insofar as deduction for personal and living expenses is concerned, it is directed that the Tribunals shall ordinarily follow the standards prescribed in paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 of the judgment in Sarla Verma (2010 (2) KLT 802 (SC) = (2009) 6 SCC 121) subject to the observations made by us in para 38 above.
(vii) The above propositions mutatis mutandis shall apply to all pending matters where above aspects are under consideration."
13. It is evident from the above discussion made by the bench that the verdict passed by the Apex Court in Sarla Verma's case was upheld in all other aspects, but for the modification made therein as proposed to be pursued, particularly with reference to the multiplier to be adopted in the case of children upto 15 years. The Apex Court made it clear that the appropriate multiplier to be adopted in the case of children upto 15 years is
`15'. As such, we find that the proper multiplier to be adopted in the present case is `15'. The question is, on reworking the compensation whether any deduction is to be made as contended by the appellant/insurance company.
14. During the course of hearing the learned counsel appearing for the claimant pointed out with reference to the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Kishan Gopal and another Vs. Lala and others [2014(1) SCC 244] that the multiplicand fixed in the said case in respect of a child aged 10 years was 30,000 per annum and the multiplier adopted was `15' in respect of such child. The learned counsel submits that it was a case where the accident occurred on 26.8.2004 and as such, there is nothing wrong in having accepted a higher multiplicand in the instant case and also adopting a higher multiplier so as to fix the extent of compensation. On going through the said verdict it is seen that the notional income was fixed by the Apex Court in the said case applying the principle in Lata Wadhwa's case Lata Wadhwa and others Vs. State of Bihar [2001 (8) SCC 197]. It was found based on the evidence adduced in Lata Wadhwa's case, that the victim in the said case, though aged 10 years, was actually assisting the parents in the agricultural operations and was accordingly that appropriate extent was fixed as the proper multiplicand, thus fixing the same as 30,000 per annum. No such situation is available in the instant case and the victim was a student. However, considering the date of accident and such other adverse circumstances, the Tribunal has fixed 3,000/- as the notional monthly income and worked out the compensation accordingly, which can't be held as wrong.
15. Next question to be considered is whether the deduction towards the probable personal expenses should have been 1/3rd or 50% as contended by the appellant/insurance company. As mentioned already, after filling up the lacuna in Sarla Verma's case with regard to the multiplier for children upto 15 years, the three member Bench of the Apex Court held in Reshma Kumari's case that the multiplier shall be '15' in such cases and then the compensation should be worked out as given in the 2nd schedule. Coming to the 2nd schedule, only 1/3rd can be deducted in such cases and as such we approve the course pursued by the Tribunal in deducting only 1/3rd towards the personal expenses and treating the balance 2/3rd as the probable contribution. On re-working the compensation for the loss of death, it comes to 3000x12x15x2/3rd ordered=3.6 lakhs; whereas the Tribunal has awarded a sum of 4.8 lakhs.
16. Considering the question whether any interference is to be made by this Court on the compensation, it is to be seen that absolutely no amount has been awarded by the Tribunal towards loss of love and affection. The Tribunal has made a reference to the above head in column No.9 of the table given in paragraph 10. But the amount given is in respect of the loss of dependency because of the death calculated as 4.8 lakhs; split up figures of which have been given in paragraph 9 which reads as follows:
3000x12x20=7,20,000
7,20,000/3=2,40,000
7,20,000-2,40,000=4,80,000
This calculation shows that no amount has been awarded by the Tribunal towards loss of love and affection.
17. The amount payable towards loss of love and affection came to be considered by the Apex Court and as per decision reported in Rajesh Vs. Rajbir Singh [2013 (3) KLT 89(SC)] it has been held that a sum of 1,00,000/- is payable under this head. It is true that the scope of this decision came to be considered by another Division Bench of this Court as per decision reported in Valsamma Vs. Binu Jose (2014 (1) KLT 10), wherein it has been held that the compensation payable under this head and also the amount payable towards loss of consortium (wherever that is applicable) has to be made with reference to the age of the deceased as well as that of the claimant. In the instant case, the deceased was of 13 years of age and the loss of love and affection is very much on the higher side in so far as the age of the parents and also the siblings is concerned. As such, we find it appropriate to award a sum of 1,00,000/- under this head. Incidentally, it is also to be noted that no amount has been awarded by the Tribunal towards pain and suffering. Admittedly the accident occurred was on 26.8.2004, whereas the death took place much thereafter i.e., on 2.9.2004. The child was undergoing much pain and suffering and so was the position with regard to the mental agony and such other adverse circumstances of the parents concerned and sibling. The deficit amount, if at all any, after reckoning the above extent of compensation, i.e., 3.6 lakhs + 1 lakh=4.6 lakhs is 20,000 (4.8 lakhs awarded by the Tribunal- 4.6lakhs =20,000/-). The said amount can very well be set off or accommodated under the head pain and suffering and as such, the award passed by the Tribunal cannot be termed as excessive under any circumstance.
In the above circumstance, we find that none of the grounds raised by the appellant is tenable. No interference is warranted. The appeal fails. Interference is declined. The appeal stands dismissed accordingly.