Oral Judgment:
1. The School Tribunal partly allowed the Appeal No. 67 of 1999 filed by the petitioner under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Condition of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 and Rules 1981 (hereinafter referred to as "the M.E.P.S Act" and "the said Rules"), challenging his termination from service with effect from 03.07.1999. The School Tribunal has declared the termination to be illegal and void and it is set aside. The appellant is held entitled to compensation of the salary of six month including pay and allowances, if any, against loss of employment and the Management was directed to pay six months full salary at the rate prevailing on the date of decision of the appeal on the post of Physical Education Teacher within a period of 60 days.
2. The employee is before this Court and claims modification of the order passed by the School Tribunal, seeking reinstatement in service with full backwages. None of the respondents have preferred any appeal challenging the decision given by the School Tribunal.
3. The undisputed factual position is that, in response to the advertisement dated 19.05.1998, the petitioner applied for one post of Physical Education Teacher and was interviewed on 03.05.1998 by the competent Selection Committee. Accordingly, he was appointed by an order dated 22.06.1998. The petitioner possessed the requisite qualification of B.A. B.P.Ed for appointment to the post of Physical Education Teacher. The Management did not forward the proposal for grant of approval to the appointment of the petitioner to the Education Officer for the reason that the School was on "no grant basis". There is no dispute that the petitioner was continued in service upto 30.04.1999.
4. However, the case of the petitioner is that, he was continued in service thereafter also upto 03.07.1999, though the case of the Management was that the services of the petitioner automatically came to an end on 30.04.1999 i.e. upto the end of academic session 1998-99. There is no dispute that no written notice or order of termination was issued and the School Tribunal has accepted the case of the petitioner that he was continued in service upto 30.07.1999. The appeal was filed within a period of limitation of 30 days before the School Tribunal. There is no perversity in recording such findings which are based on evidence on record.
5. Before the School Tribunal, the petitioner produced photostat copy of the order of appointment dated 22.06.1998, indicating specifically that he was appointed on probation for a period of two years from 22.06.1998 to 21.06.2000 in the scale of Rs.1400-2600. The order bears signature of the President/Secretary of the Society. The Management disputed the said order of appointment and produced another order of appointment of the same date, which indicates that the appointment of the petitioner was made from 22.06.1998 till the end of 1998-99 academic session, purely on temporary basis. It also contains a recital that at the end of this period, his services shall come to an end automatically.
6. The School Tribunal has relied upon sub-rule (5) of Rule 9 of the said Rules, which runs as under.
"9. Appointment of staff.
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(5) A letter of appointment order in the Form in Schedule "D" shall be issued to a candidate appointed to the post. A receipt in token of having receiving the appointment order shall be obtained from the candidate appointed.
The School Tribunal recorded the finding that in terms of aforesaid Rule, the order of appointment produced by the Management ought to contain the signature of the petitioner in token of having received the appointment order in terms of the aforesaid Rule. It recorded the finding that the order of appointment produced by the Management does not contain any such signature of the petitioner of having received the order of appointment. These findings are not challenged. It cannot, therefore, be presumed that it is the same order which was given to the petitioner.
7. The School Tribunal relied upon the Photostat copy of the order of appointment produced by the petitioner showing that he was on probation for a period of two years. The order bears signature of the President/Secretary of the Society which is not denied. The School Tribunal recorded the finding that the appointment of the petitioner was in a clear and permanent vacancy and in the manner prescribed, as contemplated by Section 5 (1) of the M.E.P.S Act and hence, the petitioner should be deemed to have been appointed on probation for a period of two years. Such findings are also not challenged.
8. The School Tribunal though set aside the order of termination on the ground that the same was illegal and in contravention of sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the M.E.P.S. Act, read with Rule 28(1) of the said Rules. It, however, refuses to grant reinstatement with backwages to the petitioner on the ground that the respondent No. 4 in this petition was appointed on 16.06.1999 in response to the advertisement issued on 06.06.1999, in the post which fell vacant on account of the petitioner being out of employment. The School Tribunal also relied upon the fact that the appointment of the respondent No. 4 was approved by the Education Officer and he is in continuous service for a period of 8 years and grant of reinstatement to the petitioner would cause prejudice to the legal rights accrued in favour of respondent No.4.
9. The only question which needs consideration by this Court is whether the School Tribunal has committed an error in refusing to grant reinstatement to the petitioner in service along with backwages. The consequence of grant of such order would be to terminate the services of respondent No. 4 who rendered 8 years service.
10. It was not the case of the Management before the School Tribunal that the termination of the petitioner was as a probationer on the ground of unsatisfactory service in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Management under sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the M.E.P.S Act. Once the findings recorded by the School Tribunal that the petitioner was appointed on probation for a period of two years with effect from 22.06.1998 and that he was continued in service beyond 22.06.2000, the petitioner gets deemed confirmation in service by virtue of sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the M.E.P.S. Act. In the light of the undisputed factual position and the findings recorded, the School Tribunal could not have refused to grant reinstatement to the petitioner in service.
11. Though the respondent No. 4 was appointed subsequently on 16.06.1999, the approval to his appointment was made subject to the result of appeal filed by the petitioner. In view of this, the contention of Shri Deshpande, the learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 4 that upon completion of two years period of probation, the respondent No.4 has acquired deemed confirmation in service in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 5 cannot be accepted. In such situation, there was no question of conferring any legal right upon the respondent No. 4 to continue in service. Once it is held that the appointment of the petitioner was on probation and the finding recorded by the School Tribunal are accepted by the respondents, unless there is a case of terminating the services of the petitioner in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the M.E.P.S Act, there was no other option for the School Tribunal but to pass the order of reinstatement of the petitioner.
12. The decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Ramkrishna Chauhan vrs. Seth D.M.High School and others, reported in 2013 (2) Mh.L.J. 713 and also the decision of the Apex Court in case of Bharatiya Gramin Punarrachana Sanstha vrs. Vijay Kumar and others, reported in AIR 2002 SC 3092, relied upon by the respondents, have been considered by this Court in the decision in case of Shamim Azad Education Society, Giroli and others vrs. Presiding Office, School Tribunal, Amravati and others reported in 2014 (4) Mh.L.J. 723. The view which in the present case has been taken is in fact supported by the view of the Full Bench as has been held in the judgment in Shamim Azad Education Society's case.
13. Shri Mirza, the learned counsel for the Management submits that the petitioner has worked only for one year and therefore, he cannot be granted permanency in service unless he successfully completes the period of probation. The learned counsel has relied upon the decision of Bharatiya Gramin Punarrachana Sanstha cited supra. In the said decision, the appointment order produced on record and admitted in evidence indicate that appointment was only for a period of two academic sessions of 1996-97 and 1997-98 and it was not put on probation. The order of appointment stipulated that after expiry of said period of two years, the services of the first respondent would come to an end without any notice. There was also an undertaking given by the employee that he would be relieved on expiry of the period of academic session 1997-98 and he shall not claim any right to the said post. In such a situation, the Apex Court has held that the employee in the said decision was not entitled to remain in service after the end of academic session 1997-98. In the present case, once the finding of fact recorded by the School Tribunal is accepted that the appointment of the petitioner was on probation for a period of two years, then, unless the Management proves a case under Section 5(3) of the M.E.P.S Act, the employee would attain deemed confirmation in service after the expiry of two years period of probation. The decision is, therefore, not applicable to the facts of the present case.
14. So far as the question of backwages is concerned, the decision of this Court in case of Progressive Education Society, Hinganghat and others vrs. Nitin Krishnarao Nimbalkar and others, reported in 2006 (4) Mh.L.J 747, has been relied upon by Shri Shende, the learned counsel for the petitioner, to claim full backwages. The portion relevant relied upon by him is contained in para 9, which is reproduced below.
"9. The decision of the Apex Court, therefore, clearly lays down that the order regarding the payment of backwages would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and it should not be ordered mechanically without application of mind. In a case where the termination of services in exercise of powers under section 5(3) of the said Act is challenged before the competent authority, it would be the obligation of the Management to justify the action taken by it in that regard. Failure on the part of the Management in that regard would obviously disclose lack of bona fide in terminating the services of the probationer. It would evidently disclose that the employee was forbidden from performing and attending to his dues not on account of any mistake on the part of the Management. In such circumstances, when the employee is forbidden from performing his duties for no fault on his part and entirely on account of arbitrary action on the part of the Management, certainly the employee would be entitled for the entire backwages."
Similar view has been taken in the case of Deepali Surjuse vrs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahaviddyalaya (D.Ed.) and others reported in (2013) 10 SCC 324. However, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner is held entitled to the backwages to the extent of 30% of the total amount of backwages due and payable.
15. In the result, writ petition is allowed. The judgment and order dated 03.09.2007 passed by the School Tribunal is modified by directing reinstatement of the petitioner in service with continuity in service and all other consequential benefits as are available in law, within a period of 30 days from the date of this order, along with 30% backwages due and payable to the petitioner. Appeal No. 67 of 1999 filed by the petitioner before the School Tribunal is allowed. No order as to cost.