Aided By The Following Delegates
1. This Parsi Matrimonial Suit is filed by the wife seeking divorce on the ground of cruelty under Section 32(dd) of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936 (âPMDAâ).
2. I have been aided by the delegates named above at the trial and the hearing of this suit. Their decision on facts is unanimous. Under Sections 19 and 46 the PMDA, the delegates are the sole judges of facts. Given their unanimous decision, it would not have been ordinarily necessary to set out the facts at any great length. I have done so for three reasons. The first is because there are very many issues framed, some of which lie within the remit of the delegates and others not, especially the question of alimony and residence; yet all are inter-dependent. The second is that although the delegates view is final and not appealable, there appears to be to this a narrow exception, i.e., one where an appeal is on the basis that the delegates âmisconducted themselves on questions of fact (Dina Dinshaw Merchant v Dinshaw Ardeshir Merchant, 1970 (72) Bom.L.R. 41).For myself, I have no hesitation in concluding that they did not, and that their decision is not only correct, but the only possible one on facts. But in at least one reported decision, it was argued that whether the facts proved amount to a matrimonial wrong or not is a question of law and, therefore, a wrong finding on that question can be interfered with in appeal (Kaikhushroo Tantra v Meherbai Tantra, 1945 (47) Bom.L.R. 819).In fairness to the delegates, I believe it is necessary to deal with the facts that were before them. The final reason is that it is only in this judgment that I can set out my summing up to the delegates on the law applicable to the facts at hand.
3. The Plaintiff-wife and the Defendant-husband were married on 1st May 1990 in Mumbai in accordance with Zoroastrian rites and customs. Both were divorcees. Both had children from their previous marriages. They have no children from the present marriage. This is not in dispute. Indeed, it seems that this is one of only two matters undisputed, the other being that the Plaintiff previously filed Parsi Suit No.30 of 2004 (âthe 2004 Suitâ) but which she later withdrew.
THE PLAINT
4. The Plaintiffs suit seeks a decree of divorce, an order for payment of alimony and a permanent residence. In her plaint, the Plaintiff contends that before the marriage in question, the Defendant stayed at Versova, Mumbai and continued staying there after the marriage too. Her case, briefly, is that before her marriage to the Defendant she was employed. The Defendant forced her to quit her job. She claims that he had âa closed mind and an inferiority complex. She also claims that her second marriage (to the Defendant) did not meet with her familys approval and she had to sever all ties with them. The Defendant, she says, took advantage of this. He is an aircraft engineer. At the time of the marriage, he had worked with British Airways for about 25 years. He left this airline and went to work for Malaysian Airways. He then joined Emirates Airlines. The Plaintiff claims that the Defendants salary, at the time of the suit, was Rs.1.5 lakhs per month or more. She alleges that the Defendant was hedonistic and spent lavishly on cars, bungalows and âanything that would give him status. Specifically, she alleges that he has a luxury car and has built a palatial bungalow at Lonavla on land of considerable acreage.
5. Although himself fond of luxuries, the Plaintiff says, the Defendant was miserly when it came to the running of the house. He demanded expensive meals and was finicky about his food. The Plaintiff claims she was forced to cook for him, his mother and his daughters from his first marriage even though they were married and lived separately. Being unable to make ends meet, the Plaintiff says she was compelled to take up a job.
6. The Plaintiff also says that she felt insecure in her marriage, especially since the Defendant continued to maintain relations with his previous spouse and his two daughters, all of whom lived with the Defendants mother at Wadia Baug, Parel, Mumbai. The Defendants daughters were the âbeneficiaries of his largesse, the Plaintiff says, but she herself was not given the same benefits. As an aircraft engineer he was entitled to free passage for foreign trips. These, the Plaintiff says, the Defendant took himself or gave to his daughters.
7. In paragraph 14 of the plaint, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant beat her severely, and this caused her immeasurable pain and trauma, even impairing her walk. She claims to have lodged N.C. Complaints at the D.N. Nagar Police Station in Andheri and later at the Byculla Police Station. The Plaintiff claims she had a photograph of her face showing it to be swollen and with a black eye but this, she claims, the Defendant filched from her cupboard. The Defendants behaviour towards the Plaintiff not only left her feeling vulnerable, but has also caused a great deal of friction between her and her relatives. The Plaintiff admits to having filed an earlier Parsi Suit No.30 of 2004 and having withdrawn it but this, she says, was on the Defendants assurance that he would mend his ways and make the Plaintiff more comfortable socially and financially. The Defendant does not, she says, allow her to meet her own relatives and insists she meet only his own mother and his daughters from his first marriage. Financial constraints, the Plaintiff says, continue: she has to take part-time jobs or be bailed out by her own children from her first marriage, against her wishes. She claims she has no financial or social support from the Defendant and feels she exists only to satisfy his needs, a puppet in the hands of a puppeteer.
8. The Plaintiff also claims that their matrimonial flat is in fact her aunts flat, adjacent to her maiden home. She further submits that the sole reason the Defendants name was added to an eviction suit filed by the Parsi Punchayets trustees was because the Plaintiff sought to seek help from the Defendant. However, she alleges that he took advantage of the situation by portraying himself to be the legal heir of the original tenement. The Plaintiff thus believes that he is trying to usurp the flat.
9. On these averments, the Plaintiff seeks a divorce. As to alimony and residence, the Plaintiff alleges that since the Defendant earns a salary of Rs. 1.5 Lakhs per month and has a palatial bungalow, she is entitled to alimony of Rs. 35,000/- per month or, in the alternative a decree for a lump sum of Rs.40 Lakhs. She has also sought an order that the Defendant provide her with accommodation or in the alternative quit Flat No.11/7 at Rustom Baug where the parties presently stay.
THE WRITTEN STATEMENT
10. In his written statement, the Defendant first contends that the present suit is not maintainable, as the Plaintiff had filed and subsequently withdrawn the 2004 Suit for the same reliefs. He denies all allegations of cruelty and physical violence. These, he says, have been repeated from the 2004 suit. He has, he says, looked after the Plaintiff in every respect, often at considerable financial cost to himself. He has frequently provided the Plaintiff and even her children from her first marriage with free return air tickets.
11. As to the residence, the Defendant says that the Versova flat was purchased in the name of the Plaintiffs employer at that time, M/s. NRK Garment Exporting Company Limited, where she continued to work for about a year and a half after their marriage. It is not true, he says, that he did not allow the Plaintiff to work. There is material in the form of performance appraisal reports till as recently as 2008 and 2010 by her employer Haymarket SAC Publishing (India) Private Limited to show to the contrary.
12. The Defendant claims that he is retired, has no income and lives off his savings. He denies being fond of luxuries. To the contrary, he says, it is the Plaintiff who is materialistic: she bought herself a brand new Tata Indica vehicle for Rs. 6.5 lakhs, and she has engaged a wholly unnecessary full time cook at a salary of Rs. 3,500/- per month. The Plaintiff cares not a whit for the Defendants health or the special diet he now needs. She makes no attempt to provide this and leaves him to the daily leftovers.
13. The Defendant claims to give the Plaintiff Rs. 20,000/- per month for household expenses. In addition, he also pays the electricity bills, telephone bills and other miscellaneous household expenses. He has always kept the Plaintiff in comfort and security, both socially and financially. The Plaintiff is a jealous and ungrateful wife who has failed to appreciate his goodness and generosity. After providing for the household and other expenses, the Defendant has only Rs.5,000 for his own needs. On the other hand, the Plaintiff has substantial funds and assets of her own. Thus, the Plaintiff is not entitled to any alimony.
14. The Defendant alleges that it is the Plaintiff who is wayward. She continues to be unacceptably intimate with her former husband. She often leaves the house at 8:30 am and returns at 8:30 pm, on some occasions not returning home for the night.
15. The Defendant denies all allegations of cruelty, physical and mental. The N.C. complaints are false as well, he says.
16. As to the flat at Rustom Baug, the Defendant denies that its tenant or occupant, one Mrs. Alamai Chinoy, was the Plaintiffs aunt or that she did, or could have, âbequeathed that flat to the Plaintiff. Mrs. Alamai Chinoy was not the Plaintiffs aunt, but his own.
17. On these pleadings, issues were struck on 18th March 2010. In the following tabulation, I have indicated the findings as well. The findings marked with an asterisk were determined by the delegates on facts.
| Sr. No. | Issue | Finding |
| 1 | Does the Plaintiff prove that the marriage between her and the Defendant was solemnized on 1st May 1990 at Mumbai according to Parsi Zoroastrian rites and customs? | Yes.* |
| 2 | Does the Plaintiff prove that the Defendant is guilty of the acts mentioned in the plaint? | No* |
| 3 | If answer to issue no. 2 is in the affirmative, whether the acts amount to cruelty? | Does notsurvive |
| 4 | Does the Plaintiff prove that she is entitled to any maintenance? | No |
| 5 | If answer to issue no. 3 is in the affirmative, what should be the maintenance amount? | Does notsurvive |
| 5A | Whether the Plaintiff proves that she is entitled to a separate accommodation to be provided by the Defendant, or in the alternative, whether the Plaintiff is entitled to a order directing the Defendant to quit flat No. 11/7, Rustom Baug, Mumbai 400 027, and to surrender his interest in that flat to the Plaintiff? (Framed on 1st August 2014) | No |
| 6 | Does the Defendant prove that the Plaintiff is not entitled to a decree as she has withdrawn unconditionally the previous suit filed on the same allegations? | No |
| 7 | Whether there is any condonation, collusion or connivance between the parties in filing of the suit? | No* |
| 8 | Whether there is any improper delay in filing the suit? | No* |
| 9 | Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of divorce? | No |
| 10 | What order and decree? | Suitdismissed. |
20. There is one other peculiarity in this case. After the Plaintiffs cross-examination was complete and the Plaintiff had closed her case, the Defendant was allowed to amend his written statement by an order dated 13th February 2013. Conceivably, this put the Plaintiff to disadvantage. Rather than start the trial de novo, or permit the Plaintiff to reopen her case, and having considered the amendments made, I passed an order on 16th June 2014 (by which time the Defendants documents had been marked and his evidence affidavit filed) that after the Defendant closed his case, and on sufficient cause being made out, the Plaintiff would be entitled to lead rebuttal evidence since the amendment was permitted at a very late stage. The Defendant carried this order in appeal. By its order dated 31st July 2014, the Appeal Court held the order of 16th June 2014 to be a procedural order and hence not maintainable. The Defendant was permitted to raise the ground at the hearing of the Appeal. Before me, at the trial, Ms. Contractor with her usual fairness declined to lead any additional evidence in rebuttal, and made no application in that behalf although asked if the Plaintiff wanted to do so. The trial and hearing of the suit proceeded, therefore, that the evidence before the court and the delegates was complete in all respects.
ANALYSIS OF ISSUES
21. I am unable to understand how the first issue could ever have been framed. It simply does not and cannot arise. The marriage itself is undisputed; indeed that is the reason for this entire litigation in the first place. I must straightaway state that though I directed the delegates not to address themselves to this issue at all, they have indicated their finding, and it is in the affirmative as indeed it must be.
22. Issues Nos. 2 and 3, too, ought not to have been split up. In any case, since they could be dealt with together, I did not recast them. On facts, the delegates found against the Plaintiff on Issue No.2, i.e., that the Defendant was not guilty of the acts complained of in the plaint. In consequence, Issue No.2, whether these acts constituted cruelty, did not survive. With that, issues Nos. 4, 5 and 5A had necessarily to be answered in the negative, and I have so held. Issue No.6 arose on account of the previous suit filed in 2004 by the Plaintiff and its unconditional withdrawal. Neither Ms. Irani nor Ms. Contractor directed much attention to this issue. Technically, it ought to have been in the nature of a preliminary issue perhaps, for a finding on that would have rendered the rest otiose. All concerned proceeded on the footing that the present suit contained not only material in the 2004 suit but additional material as well, and hence this issue was answered in the negative. Issues Nos. 7 and 8 were answered by the delegates in the negative. In consequence, I held against the Plaintiff on Issue No. 9 and have dismissed the suit.
23. I have, in the paragraphs that follow, summarised the rival submissions on facts presented by Ms. Irani and Ms. Contractor to the delegates. These were almost entirely in relation to Issues Nos. 2 and 3, whether the Plaintiff proved that the Defendant was guilty of the acts complained of in the plaint and whether these amounted to cruelty. I have then set out my summing up to the delegates, their responses and dealt with the learned Advocates respective submissions addressed to me on the remaining issues.
Re: ISSUE NO.2
Summary Of Arguments On Facts
24. In her address to the delegates, Ms. Irani stressed that the plaint was entirely without material particulars. No one could expect every minute detail in such a case; but there had to be something beyond poetically-worded and high-sounding phrases, something with sufficient detail to establish the course of conduct that can be said to amount to cruelty. This is something that only a plaintiff can do; such matters lie within the plaintiffs own knowledge. If this is not done, the case must be rejected. Here, other than the fact of two N.C. Complaints being filed, there was no evidence at all. The evidence affidavit merely reproduces the plaint. In it, the Plaintiff adduces no evidence at all. Even assuming that all that is stated in the evidence affidavit is true, it is still not âcruelty, i.e., a course of conduct so egregious as to make it impossible for the Plaintiff to reside with the Defendant. Ms. Irani also pointed to the cross-examination of the Plaintiff to show that the Plaintiff had continued working and therefore her allegations of not being allowed to do a job were false. In answer to Q.14 in cross-examination, the Plaintiff admitted that she had held a job since 2007.
25. She also addressed the delegates on the evidence to show that the allegation that the Defendant did not allow the Plaintiff to utilize his free passage air ticket allowance was incorrect. In paragraph 18 of her cross-examination, the Plaintiff admitted that she availed of the Defendants free air ticket allowances on account of his employment with British Airways, Malaysian Airlines and Gulf Airways (presumably Emirates), but says this was only till 2004 or 2005. This is, however, directly contrary to her assertion in paragraph 12 of her evidence affidavit that these allowances were used only by the Defendant or his daughters from his first marriage. The affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief of the Defendant showed, in fact, that there were frequent trips and that these tickets were used by the Plaintiff and her children from her first marriage. In paragraph 4 of his affidavit, the Defendant has said so and has also said that the Plaintiff visited Australia where her ex-husband and children by him lived, and that the Defendant provided her with tickets for these visits twice a year. Even when the Plaintiff took her children from her first marriage to America on a holiday, the tickets were provided by the Defendant. When the Plaintiffs children came to visit in India, the Defendant bore all their expenses. On none of this, Ms. Irani submitted, was there any cross-examination at all, and this must, therefore, be deemed to be established and the Plaintiffs case to the contrary disproved.
26. She also stressed the quite unusual intimacy in the Plaintiffs letters to her first husband. The Defendant, on the other hand, had been able to show from the documents and the cross-examination that the Plaintiff had a more than comfortable life-style: photographs of her collection of shoes, her jewellery, her bank accounts, her personal motor car and her frequent travels abroad.
27. Ms. Contractor, learned Advocate for the Plaintiff, placed her case on three grounds in her address to the delegates. Cruelty in this case, she submitted, was based on (1) the fact that the Defendant maintained relations with his first wife even after his marriage to the Plaintiff; (2) physical cruelty; and (3) depriving the Plaintiff of money and not letting her work. The Defendant was, at the very least, indifferent to the Plaintiff and this was sufficient to constitute cruelty, she submitted. There was no need for specifics and details. It was sufficient to see what averments were made, and these were general because they were continuing. The evidence was necessarily circumstantial, and the entirety of the Plaintiffs case was based on such evidence. The cross-examination of the Defendant showed that he was exceedingly well off. He had a Mercedes Benz motor car and a large house near Lonavla on a sizeable plot. He was admittedly earning more than Rs.1.3 lakhs per month at the time of his retirement.
Summing Up
28. In my summing up to the delegates, I asked that they each bear in mind while considering the facts what it is that is said to constitute âcruelty as a matrimonial wrong. This is a term that lends itself to no complete or exact definition. It lends itself to many interpretations, each fact-dependent (Ravi Kumar v Julmi Devi, (2010) 4 SCC 476).Where there is evidence of a course of conduct sufficiently grave, beyond the vicissitudes of daily life, as would make it unreasonable to expect the complaining spouse to live with the other, cruelty must be held to have been established (Samar Ghosh v Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511).There is no legal requirement of proof of apprehension of harm, injury or physical violence (Manisha Tyagi v Deepak Kumar, (2010) 4 SCC 339).It may, in a given case, be no more than a persistent attitude wholly inimical to the relationship (A. Jayachandra v Aneel Kaur, (2005) 2 SCC 22).The authorities under other personal laws regarding the interpretation of the expression must apply to cases under the PMDA as well. Further, Ms. Irani also commended an instruction to the delegates on the basis of N.G. Dastane v S. Dastane, (1975) 2 SCC 326)to the effect that where allegations of cruelty are made, it is for the complaining party to establish cruelty within the meaning of the law. In doing so, competing probabilities would have to be weighed and measured against the evidence on record. Also, while appreciating the evidence, regard must be had to the habits, ideas, worldviews and expectations of the social milieu of the parties. I instructed the delegates to bear these principles in mind as they approached the case. I also made it clear that it was not necessary that their decision be unanimous and that each would have to answer the issues according to his or her conscience of what was proved or not proved.
29. On the question of whether or not the acts complained of in the plaint were proved, I directed the delegates attention to the rival evidence affidavits and the cross-examination. What was the case the Plaintiff had brought to court? Were her allegations sufficiently established? Did her cross-examination of the Defendant prove her allegations in relations to these acts? If, as Ms. Contractor said, the foundation of the case was this trifecta of (a) maintaining illicit relations with his ex-wife even after his marriage to the Plaintiff; (b) physical cruelty and violence; and (c) forcing the Plaintiff not to work and depriving her of money, the delegates would have to consider whether on the record any of these could be said to be proved. In particular, I suggested that the delegates look to the documents produced by the Defendant. These included photographs showing her extensive wardrobe, accessories and jewellery. There was, too, the unchallenged evidence of the Defendant that he had secured air passage for the Plaintiff and her children by her first marriage several times. As to the question of her intimacy with her first husband, the Defendant had produced documents at Exhibits D-10 and D-11, letters to her first husband and the Defendant respectively; as also photographs taken during her sons wedding. These photographs show the Plaintiff dancing with her ex-husband. I suggested that the delegates not take overly much stock of these photographs as the wedding was in Australia and a post-wedding dance might well be de rigeur in such situations.
30. Ms. Contractors cross-examination of the Defendant was not directed in the least to establishing the Plaintiffs case on physical cruelty. It focussed almost entirely on the first and third limbs of her case, i.e., that the Defendant had illicit relations with his ex-wife and that he was very wealthy in contrast to the Plaintiff (and, presumably, that he therefore did not maintain the Plaintiff as she was entitled). On the first part of this, the Defendant candidly admitted that his ex-wife, Ruby, lives with his mother in a flat at Wadia Baug (Paragraphs 1 and 5 of the Defendants cross-examination).He however denied that he continued to âmaintain relationsâ with his ex-wife or spent nights there (Paragraph 7 of the Defendants cross-examination).Other than this, there is no evidence at all.
31. The delegates heard both counsel at length. They concluded that the Plaintiff had not been able to prove Issue No.2, i.e., that she had not proved the facts complained of in the plaint. Their decision, read out by the foreman, was unanimous. I have accepted this decision as indeed I must. It also accords with my own view.
32. In that view of the matter, Issue No.2 being answered against the Plaintiff, Issue No. 3 would also have to be so answered against the Plaintiff. If the allegations themselves were held to be not proved, no question arose of those allegations constituting cruelty.
Re: ISSUES NOS. 4, 5 AND 5A
33. These are issues of law, relating to maintenance, the amount of maintenance and residence. In view of the findings on Issues Nos. 2 and 3, these do not survive. In any case, even otherwise, I do not believe Ms. Contractor has been able to make out any case that the Plaintiff was forced not to work or was denied anything she desired, let alone anything she needed. As I have noted, there is considerable evidence from the Defendant that the Plaintiff had a more than comfortable lifestyle. She was used to travelling abroad, and frequently; and much, if not all, of this was with the Defendants free air ticket allowance. Even in her cross-examination, the Plaintiff admits to at least one foreign holiday with her children, (Paragraph 17 of the Plaintiffs cross-examination)and this coincides with the Defendants assertion that he provided the air tickets for this for the Defendant and her children. The Defendant has not been cross-examined on this at all. Ms. Contractor labored long and hard on cross-examining the Defendant as to his financial status. He admits to having a 1991 Mercedes Benz diesel motor vehicle, one that he bought with a bank loan. It is a fourth-hand vehicle. He has denied having a second car, but admitted he had a 1986 model car while he was working in Tamil Nadu, one that he says is no longer roadworthy and is registered only in that state. He admits, however, to having constructed a bungalow in Karla, near Lonavla, in 2002 or 2003 with a built up area of 950 sq.ft. However, he has been able to show that he has gifted this bungalow to his daughters and that he acquired the land and built the bungalow with a bank loan of Rs. 35 lakhs that he repaid.
34. There is a great deal of controversy about the flat at Rustom Baug where the parties presently stay. Each claims to be a legatee of this tenancy flat from one Aimai (Alamai) Chinoy. Each claims Aimai Chinoy as her/his aunt. The evidence is ambivalent. It does not reflect the title of either of the parties to this flat, though it is undisputed that they are in occupation. Ms. Contractors attempts to prove that the Defendant did not even know who Ms. Chinoy was have not succeeded enough to establish the Plaintiffs case. All that is undisputed is that both the Plaintiff and the Defendant are joined as fellow defendants in an eviction action filed by the landlords, the Trustees of the Parsi Punchayet. Aimai Chinoys heirs are also party defendants to that suit. The plaint proceeds on the basis that both the Plaintiff and the Defendant are âunlawful inductees of that flat (Exhibit D-8, Â aragraph 5).
35. In any case, once the delegates have found that the Plaintiffs case is not proved, and since this suit must, therefore, be dismissed there is no question of granting any alimony, maintenance or making provision for any residence. Certainly no question arises of ordering the Defendant to ârelinquish his interest in the Rustom Baug tenement in favour of the Plaintiff.
36. Issues Nos. 4, 5 and 5A are therefore answered in the negative.
Re: ISSUES NOS. 7 AND 8
37. The delegates have answered both issues in the negative. There is no collusion, connivance or condonation and there is no delay such as would defeat the suit. This is on the delegates assessment of the facts, and it is determinative. In any case, neither side has dealt with this in any way, nor even addressed either the delegates or the court on it.
Re: ISSUES NOS. 6, 9 AND 10
38. Does the previous suit filed in 2004 by the Plaintiff and withdrawn in 2007 bar the filing of the present suit in 2009? Ms. Contractor is, I believe, correct in her submission in saying that what is complained of is a continuing wrong. To establish this, certain facts earlier pleaded must necessarily be introduced again. But this cannot mean that the present suit is to stand defeated. The Plaintiff has not hidden the fact of the earlier suit. She has explained it in the plaint and in her evidence affidavit, and she has not been cross-examined on this effectively. A suggestion put to her that the present suit was a repetition of the earlier suit was denied (Paragraph 3 of the Plaintiffs cross-examination).This line of cross-examination was not further pursued. This issue is, therefore, decided in the negative.
39. Issue No. 9 is whether the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree for divorce. Technically, this ought to have been combined with Issues Nos. 2 and 3. Quite evidently, it must be answered in the negative. Consequently, in response to Issue No. 10, the suit must fail.
FINAL ORDER
40. The suit is dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.
41. The original documents are to be returned to the parties upon these being replaced with photocopies authenticated by the advocates for the respective parties.
42. I must thank the delegates, Mr. Mogrelia (Foreman), Mrs. Mithoo Wadia, Mr. Sam Patel, Dr. Jehangir Deboo and Ms. Goolu Karani for their assistance in this and other matters. Each of them served with exemplary diligence, care and understanding. A copy of this judgment is to be sent to each of the five delegates for information and record.
27th August 2014
43. At this stage, after judgment is pronounced today, Ms. Irani learned advocate for the Defendant, points out that by a previous order the Defendant was directed to pay the electricity bill and the wages of the full time cook. In addition, the Defendant was required to pay an amount of Rs.4000/- as maintenance pendente lite to the Plaintiff-Wife. In view of the disposal of the suit, no question arises of continuing the payment of maintenance. The Defendant is however agreeable to continue paying the electricity bills up to a maximum of Rs.5000/- p.m. and wages of the cook up to a maximum of Rs.5000/- p.m. The balance, if any, for the electricity bill and cook's wages will be paid by the Plaintiff.
44. The advocate for the Defendant have, I am informed, made an application for a certified copy of verdict of the delegates. A photocopy authenticated by the Parsi Registrar shall be made available to the advocate for the Defendant in fulfilment of her request.