1. Heard learned counsels for both the parties.
2. The Petition is filed to challenge the Judgment and Order passed in Criminal Appeal No.73 of 2012, which was pending in the Court of 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad. In the proceedings filed under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short "Domestic Violence Act"), direction is given against the present Petitioner, husband to return Dahej (Jahez) articles to the Respondent or to pay Rs.2,00,000/- in lump sum towards the price of those articles to the present Respondent.
3. It is the case of the wife that the articles given in Jahez, which include ornaments, are in the custody of the husband and he has not returned those articles though the parties are living separate. In the proceedings filed under Domestic Violence Act, many reliefs were claimed but the aforesaid relief is granted by the Sessions Court in Criminal Appeal. This relief was refused by learned J.M.F.C. by making some observations on the basis of the record of compromise.
4. Both the sides showed relevant record to this Court and some argument was advanced on the basis of provisions of the Domestic Violence Act. It was mainly submitted by the learned counsel for the Petitioner that it is the contention of the husband that the parties have taken divorce by mutual consent and document of Khulanama has been executed and so the proceeding is not tenable under the provisions of Domestic Violence Act. To ascertain as to whether even after the dissolution of the marriage, proceeding can be filed, the Scheme of the Domestic Violence Act needs to be seen and particularly definitions of "domestic relationship" given in Section 2(f) and "shared household" given in Section 2(s) of the Act needs to be considered. These two definitions show that it is sufficient for the aggrieved person to show that at any stage she had lived in a domestic relationship with the respondent, husband. Then the definitions of "aggrieved person" and "domestic violence" need to be seen. They are given in Section 2(a) and 2(g) of the Act. Section 2(g) shows that the meaning given in Section 3 of the Domestic Violence Act needs to be considered. Section 3(iv) of the Act shows that economic abuse is included in the definition of "domestic violence". Further, in Chapter IV there are provisions made regarding Procedure for obtaining reliefs. Section 20 of the Act is with regard to monetary reliefs. This Court has no hesitation to hold that Section 20(1)(c) of the Domestic Violence Act can be used in a case like present one. It runs as under:
"20. Monetary reliefs.- (1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of section 12, the Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence and such relief may include, but is not limited to,-
(a)................ (b)................
(c) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage or removal of any property from the control of the aggrieved person."
5. Thus, in law there is nothing to prevent the Magistrate to grant the relief of return of Jahez articles. All these provisions are enabling provisions and that object always needs to be kept in mind by Court exercising the powers for the interpretation of the aforesaid provisions.
6. The learned counsel for the Petitioner, husband took this Court through the compromise document. This document dated 26th May, 2008 shows that the wife had agreed to return to the matrimonial house and on the same day she returned to the matrimonial house. There is a mention that the wife was to take with her the ornaments which were in her possession, to the matrimonial house. This mention in the compromise document dated 26th May, 2008 cannot lead to the inference that all the ornaments were with her right from beginning, and particularly ornaments given as Jahez articles were also with her.
7. The execution of document like Khulanama is also not disputed by the parties. The wife has challenged Khulanama also, but that challenge need not be considered for the purpose of present proceeding. This document of Khulanama dated 25th August 2008 shows that Jahez articles as per list were to be returned by the husband on 26th August, 2008. It is not the case of the husband that as per this promise he had returned Jahez articles. In view of the aforesaid circumstances the only point that remains is as to whether Jahez articles as claimed in the Petition were given at the time of marriage. A list of Jahez articles is produced by the wife and which is apparently signed by father of the husband. In the list, in addition to the household articles, there is a mention of gold and silver ornaments. The weights of the ornaments are also mentioned. As the order of return of these ornaments was made on 1st March, 2014, it can be said that the value of the ornaments was required to be ascertained as on 1st March, 2014. In March 2014, the value of gold was more than Rs.27,000/- per 10 gm. The value of silver was around Rs.40,000/- per kg. Even today the value of gold per 10 gm. is around Rs.27,000/-though the value of silver has come down upto Rs.35,000/- per kg. If the value of the gold and silver is calculated and the value of the household articles given in the list is calculated, then it can be said that amount of Rs.2,00,000/- is not on higher side. There is no other list with the husband to show that list available with the wife is not correct one. In view of these circumstances, this Court holds that there is no possibility of interference in the decision given by the Sessions Court.
8. Learned counsel for the Petitioner, husband placed reliance on the case reported in 2010(3) Mh.L.J. Page No.305 (Jayesh Uttamrao Khairnar and others vs. State of Maharashtra and others). In that matter, protection order was claimed when divorce was given by competent Court in favour of the husband and during the relevant period of one year or immediately before filing of the application under this Act, there was no conjugal relationship. The Court held that provisions of Section 12, 16, 20 and 22 of Domestic Violence Act were not available to the wife. The facts were different. This reported case is of no help to the present Petitioner, husband.
9. In the result, the Writ Petition stands dismissed.