(Prayer: This Criminal Petition Is Filed U/S 482 Of Cr.P.C. Seeking To Quash The Proceedings In Crl.Misc.No.(Dvpc) No.340/2013 On The File Of The Ii-Addl. Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.) and Jmfc Court, Gadag, As Against The Petitioners.)
1. The petitioners, who are arraigned as respondents in Crl.Misc.No.340/2013 on the file of the II Addl. Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.) and JMFC, Gadag, which was filed under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', for short), approached this Court seeking quashing of the entire proceedings against them on several grounds.
2. At the time of submitting the arguments, the learned Counsel for the petitioners strenuously contends that, the petition is only maintainable against the husband of respondent No.1 before the learned Magistrate and the petition is not maintainable against other family members, in view of the definition under Section 2(q) of the Act. Secondly he contends that, even considering the averments made in the petition filed under Section 12 of the Act, it does not disclose any specific allegation against the other petitioners, except petitioner No.1. Therefore, he contends that the petition filed before the trial Court against these petitioners is not maintainable and the same is liable to be quashed.
3. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the respondents herein submits that, though Section 2(q) defines 'respondent' to mean an adult male person, but the Apex Court has enlarged the definition providing authority to the wife even to include the relatives of her husband, if she is really aggrieved by the illegal acts of those relatives of the husband. Secondly, he countered the arguments of the learned Counsel by submitting that there are sufficient pleadings in the petition as to how the petitioners herein have ill-treated, harassed and caused domestic violence against the 1st respondent herein and in fact the relief is claimed against all the petitioners. Therefore he contended that, at the threshold, the petition cannot be quashed and the petitioners in fact have to approach the trial Court and file appropriate application showing that there was no act of domestic violence committed by them against the petitioner therein. Hence he pleads for dismissal of this petition.
4. The order sheet of the trial Court produced by the petitioners discloses that, after filing of the petition under Section 12 of the Act, the Court has issued notice and the petitioners have also appeared before the trial Court and they have to file their counter to the petition filed by the respondents herein.
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has drawn my attention to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2007 SC 1118 in the case of S. R. Batra and Anr. Vs. Smt. Taruna Batar, wherein the Apex Court, referring to Sections 17 and 19 of the Act, has held that, 'There is no law on matrimonial homes in India, but as per available law right to wife can only be as against husband, not against father-in-law, or other relatives or mother-in-law. Section 17 of the Act refers to 'shared house-hold'. The accommodation i.e., the mother-in-law's house does not become a 'shared house-hold' only because applicant-wife had shared that house with her husband earlier. For that it has to be a house owned or taken on rent by husband or a house which belongs to joint family of which husband is a member.'
This decision, in fact, does not say anything about the definition of Section 2( q) of the Act. It only refers to the 'shared house'. In this decision also it is clear that, if the husband and the other members are in the joint family house, then that can be called as 'shared house' and other relatives of husband, in fact, can also be made as parties to restrain them from committing any domestic violence by throwing out the wife from the shared house. Therefore, the above decision is not in a straight jacket manner applicable to the present case.
6. The learned Counsel for the respondents has cited a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2011 AIR SCW 1327 in the case of Sou.Sandhya Manoj Wankhade Vs. Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade and Ors., wherein the Apex Court has extended the definition of Section 2(q) and gave an authority to the wife, even to include the female members of the family. At paragraph 12 to 14 the Apex Court observed that, the legislature in fact intended to include female relatives of the husband or male partner from the ambit of the complaint that can be made under the Act. All that Section 2(q) defines; a 'respondent' to mean any adult male person, who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person, the proviso widens the scope of the said definition by including a relative of the husband or male partner within the scope of a complaint, which may be filed by an aggrieved wife or a female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage. If the Legislature intended to exclude females from the ambit of the complaint, which can be filed by an aggrieved wife, females would have been specifically excluded, instead of it being provided in the proviso that a complaint could also be filed against a relative of the husband or male partner. No restrictive meaning has been given to the expression 'relative', nor has the said expression been specifically defined in the Act, to make it specific to males only.
7. In view of the above said decision, if the case is made out under any of the provisions of the Act against any other relatives of the husband, there is no legal bar to make them also as party to the proceedings.
8. Now coming to the second limb of arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioners, that there are no allegations against other petitioners, except the petitioner No.1 herein, who is the husband of respondent No.1. On careful perusal of the petition, it discloses that at paragraph 1 to 3, the respondent No.1 has stated before the trial Court about the marriage being taken place between herself and the 1st petitioner herein and thereafter, she lived along with her husband and other members of the family of her husband in her matrimonial home. Paragraph 4 specifically described that, though the sisters of 1st petitioner were married, they have been residing with the 1st petitioner since long in the said house; and at the time of alleged domestic violence, they were physically residing in the said house. At paragraph 5 to 13, though in omnibus manner, it is stated that all the accused persons have demanded for more dowry and gold articles, but it is also specifically stated that they have ill-treated and harassed her with a sole intention to drive her out from the matrimonial house. At paragraph 7, it is stated that the petitioners have assaulted her and abused her; and they have not given any food and shelter to her; and also medicines whenever she fell ill etc.; and they in fact throw her away from the matrimonial home and refused to take her back. At the prayer column also, she claimed before the trial Court that the Court has to pass a protection order preventing the respondents therein from committing domestic violence against her and also for residence and maintenance to her and her child.
9. The Court has got ample power after the evidence being recorded and after hearing on merits, to order that the petitioners herein have to allow the 1st respondent to reside in the matrimonial home itself and the Court has also got power to restrain the petitioners from causing any domestic violence against the wife.
10. Therefore, looking to the overall materials on record, though the allegations are omnibus in nature, nevertheless, there are allegations against the petitioners with regard to commission of the domestic violence. Whether such specific allegations are required or not has to be considered by the Court after hearing the other side and after petitioners herein put their version in writing before the trial Court.
11. In the above said circumstances, I do not find any strong reasons to interfere with the orders passed by the trial Court and issuing notice to the petitioners. Therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed and accordingly the same is dismissed.