Oral Judgment:
Vijay Manohar Sahai, J.
1. The appellants have preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent challenging the common judgment and order dated 16.02.2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.4259 of 2007 and other allied matters.
2. The short facts are that the respondent herein executed a Memorandum of Entry (hereinafter referred to as âthe instrument for short) dated 18th March 1993 by way of mortgage in favour of Financial Institutions/Banks. Before the execution of the instrument, the respondent made an application to appellant No.2 under Section 31 of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as âthe Act for short) for adjudication of proper stamp duty leviable under the provisions of the Act. The appellant No.2 herein determined the stamp duty leviable at Rs.10,000/. On adjudication of stamp duty by appellant No.2, the respondent herein paid the said amount to appellant No.2. Hence, the appellant No.2 issued the certificate dated 18.03.1993 regarding full payment of the stamp duty leviable. However, after a lapse of more than 6 years, appellant No.1 issued a notice dated 30.07.1999 for taking the matter under suo motu revision.
2.1. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid notice, the respondent preferred a writ petition before this Court. The learned Single Judge, vide common judgment and order dated 16.02.2010, allowed the writ petition. Hence, present appeal.
3. We have heard Mr. Kamal B. Trivedi, learned Advocate General assisted by Mr. Kashyap Pujara, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the appellants and Mr. B. H. Chatrapati, learned counsel for Singhi and Co. for the respondent.
4. It is not necessary for us to go into the merit of the case in view of the fact that the notice dated 30.07.1999 for taking the matter under suo motu revision was issued beyond the prescribed period of six years and there is no other provision by which the statutory period of limitation prescribed under Section 53(A) or under Section 53(1) of the Act can be enhanced.
5. The notice dated 30.07.1999, which is annexed with the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the State Government is stated to have been issued under Section 53(A) of the Act. However, Mr. Pujara, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the appellant has fairly stated that the original notice was issued under Section 53(1) of the Act. Even in the impugned judgment also it is mentioned that the notices were issued under Section 53(1) of the Act. In the case of issuance of notice under section 53(A) of the Act, for invoking the powers of taking the matter under suo motu revision, the limitation prescribed is six years from the date of issuance of certificate of the Collector u/ss. 32, 32A, 39 or 41, as the case may be, whereas in a notice under Section 53(1) of the Act the period of limitation prescribed is 90 days. In either case the notice was issued beyond the maximum prescribed period of six years. Therefore, it will make no difference whether the notice was issued under Section 53(1) of the Act or under Section 53(A) of the Act. However, since in the impugned order it has been mentioned that the notice has been issued u/s. 53(1) of the Act and as the learned counsel for the respondent also placed before us the photo copy of the original notice, we treat all the notices issued by the appellants under Section 53(1) of the Act.
6. Since the notice dated 30.07.1999 has been issued beyond the maximum prescribed period of six years from the date of certificate dated 18.03.1993 certifying the full payment of the stamp duty leviable issued by appellant No.2 herein, no further action of taking the matter under revision can be taken by the appellant No.1 herein as the period for taking action has become time barred. As stated above, there is no other provision by which the statutory period of limitation prescribed under Section 53(A) or under Section 53(1) of the Act can be enhanced.
7. In view of the above reasons, we do not find any merit in this Letters Patent Appeal and the Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed on this short ground alone.
8. In view of the dismissal of the main appeal today, the civil application does not survive and it is, accordingly, dismissed.