* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Judgment pronounced on:
31. t October, 2014 % + I.A. No.12386/2011 in CS(OS) 1911/2011 BRIJ MOHAN BHATIA Through ..... Plaintiff Mr.Rajiv Singh Pilania, Adv. with Mr.Lalit Kumar, Adv. versus JAIN SALES CORPORATION & ORS ..... Defendants Through Mr.Sumant De, Adv. with Mr.A.K.Mehta, Adv. CORAM: HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE MANMOHAN SINGH MANMOHAN SINGH, J.
1. The present suit for permanent injunction restraining infringement of registered trademarks, copyrights, delivery up, rendition of accounts of profits, damages etc. has been filed by the plaintiff against the defendants in respect of trademark “Flexilam Nomex”. Alongwith the suit, plaintiff also filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC being I.A. 12386/2011.
2. Summons were issued in the suit and notices in the application to the defendants on 8th August, 2011. After hearing, detailed exparte order was passed against the defendants restraining them from using the name “Flexilam Nomex” similar to the trade name of the plaintiff, directly or indirectly advertising the similar name, copying, imitating or using description, colour, style and design similar to the mark of the plaintiff.
3. Upon service of interim order, defendants No.1 and 2 filed a written statement and reply to the said application. By this order, I propose to decide the said application i.e. I.A. No.12386/2011 filed by the plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC.
4. During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff expired on 9th December, 2011 leaving behind the legal representatives, details of whom have been recorded in the order dated 19th September, 2014. The said legal representatives filed an application being I.A. No.5553/2012 under Order XXII Rule 3 CPC as well as I.A. No.5554/2012 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Both the applications were allowed vide order dated 19th September, 2014 and the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff were taken on record.
5. Brief facts of the case as stated in the plaint are that plaintiff, the sole proprietor of Bhatia Insulation, is a leading supplier of insulation material and accessories, insulators, Industrial Safety products, Safety tape, Sleeves etc. under the trademark of “Flexilam Nomex”, a Class ‘F’ Insulation. The said trademark is registered in the name of plaintiff under Class 17.
6. The details of the turnover of plaintiff is provided in Para 6 of the plaint out of which the turnover for the financial year 2010-11 is stated to be Rs.67,96,135/-. Additionally, plaintiff has caused extensive publicity of its trademark Flexilam Nomex through various mediums, which includes placing signboards at various prominent locations in major cities of India and issuing advertisements in electronic and print media including leading newspapers and magazines. It has been averred that huge expenditure has been incurred by the plaintiff in this regard.
7. By virtue of continuous use, extensive sales and promotional activities, the trademark “Flexilam Nomex” is exclusively associated with the plaintiff by the members of the public as well as trade. The trademark Flexilam Nomex has become hallmark of excellence in the field of BOPP, Polyster, Laminated Paper Sheet etc and is more commonly known as Flexilam.
8. It is the case of the plaintiff against the defendants that the defendants have started using the mark Flexilam Nomex in respect of insulation material and laminated paper sheets. The defendants have copied the said mark as their trade name.
9. It has been averred by the plaintiff that in order to trade upon the goodwill and reputation of the plaintiff and in order to cheat the public at large by selling spurious goods in the market, the defendants have deliberately adopted the name Flexilam Nomex. The said mark has no meaning and has been adopted by the plaintiff who has developed the said mark as a brand name for itself.
10. The defendants have adopted the phonetically and visually the same mark as that of the plaintiff and even the spelling of the two are same. The said adoption is bound to cause confusion and deception amongst the public at large, more because the plaintiff and the defendants are engaged in the same areas of trade. Therefore, this would injure the business of the plaintiff inevitably.
11. It is alleged that even the material used by the defendants is similar to the material of the plaintiff although the quality of the defendants’ products are far inferior from that of the plaintiff’s. The defendants are passing off their goods as that of the plaintiff’s. In fact the plaintiff has also received complaints from various people asking whether the plaintiff has opened a new centre.
12. It has been alleged that the obvious imitation and piracy of the trade name, trade style, design and logo by the defendants is nothing but an attempt to trade upon the reputation acquired by the plaintiff in respect of the novel and distinctive name adopted by the plaintiff for its educational institution.
13. On the other hand, in the written statement filed by the defendants No.1 and 2, the said defendants have taken preliminary objections that the suit is not maintainable for want of jurisdiction as well as cause of action. The suit is bad for misjoinder of cause of action as well as misjoinder of parties.
14. It has been averred that the said trademark Flexilam Nomex is generic in nature, common to trade and has a dictionary meaning. The registrar without applying its judicious mind has simply registered the same. The defendants in Para 5 of the written statement have given instances of third party use of the words FLEXILAM and NOMEX.
15. It has been further averred that plaintiff is importing goods under the different firm i.e. BIC International which starting importing only since June, 2009 in the name of Electrical Insulation Composite Paper but not in the name of NOMEX and selling it under different firm.
16. Further though the plaintiff averred that it has been using the trademark FLEXILAM NOMEX for more than a decade, the application for registration states that the mark is proposed to be used.
17. The defendants have a market base of their own and both the goods of the parties can be honestly and concurrently sold to the public without deception/confusion or misrepresentation to each other. The extent of goodwill and reputation claimed by the plaintiff in the plaint has been categorically denied by the defendants. It has also been averred that the BOPP and Polyster Laminated Paper Sheet; Laminated Paper Sheets of the defendants are different from that of the plaintiff.
18. The other contentions made in the plaint are denied in the written statement filed by the defendants. While in the replication filed by the plaintiff, the averments made in the written statement are denied.
19. I have heard learned counsel for both the parties who have made their submissions at bar. It is not denied by the defendant that the plaintiff is prior user of the mark and it is registered in favour of the plaintiff. The only plea raised by the learned counsel for the defendant is that there are other parties who got the registration of the same trademark prior to the plaintiff and it is common to trade and generic word.
20. There is no cogent evidence has been produced by the defendant in order to establish that third parties are using the trademark prior to the plaintiff except the search report. Actual products of these parties are also not filed. The defendant has failed to produce cogent and clear evidence to show that it is generic mark and is common to trade.
21. Before I proceed to decide these applications, it is imperative to discuss Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 that envisages the law relating to infringement of a registered trademark and Section 28 of the Act that provides for exclusive rights granted by virtue of registration. The said provisions read as under:
“29. Infringement of Registered Trademark (1) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being a registered proprietor or a person using by way of permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a mark which is identical with, or deceptively similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services respect of which the trade mark is registered and in such manner as to render the use of the mark likely to be taken as being used as a trade mark. (2) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being a registered proprietor or a person using by way of permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a mark which because of- (a) its identity with the registered trade mark and the similarity of the goods or services covered by such registered trade mark; or (b) its similarity to the registered trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by such registered trade mark; or (c) its identity with the registered trade mark and the identity of the goods or services covered by such registered trade mark, is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public, or which is likely to have an association with the registered trade mark. (3) In any case falling under clause (c) of sub-section (2), the court shall presume that it is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public. (4) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being a registered proprietor or a person using by way of permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a mark which(a) is identical with or similar to the registered trade mark; and (b) is used in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered; and (c) the registered trade mark has a reputation in India and the use of the mark without due cause takes unfair advantage of or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the registered trade mark. (5) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person if he uses such registered trade mark, as his trade name or part of his trade name, or name of his business concern or part of the name, of his business concern dealing in goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered. (6) For the purposes of this section, a person uses a registered mark, if, in particular, he(a) affixes it to goods or the packaging thereof; (b) offers or exposes goods for sale, puts them on the market, or stocks them for those purposes under the registered trade mark, or offers or supplies services under the registered trade mark; (c) imports or exports goods under the mark; or (d) uses the registered trademark on business papers or in advertising. (7) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who applies such registered trade mark to a material intended to be used for labelling or packaging goods, as a business paper, or for advertising goods or services, provided such person, when he applied the mark, knew or had reason to believe that the application of the mark was not duly authorised by the proprietor or a licensee. (8) A registered trade mark is infringed by any advertising of that trade mark if such advertising(a) takes unfair advantage of and is contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters; or (b) is detrimental to its distinctive character; or (c) is against the reputation of the trade mark. (9) Where the distinctive elements of a registered trade mark consist of or include words, the trade mark may be infringed by the spoken use of those words as well as by their visual representation and reference in this section to the use of a mark shall be construed accordingly.”
“28. Rights conferred by registration – (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the registration of a trade mark shall, if valid, give to the registered proprietor of the trade mark the exclusive right to the use of the trade mark in relation to the goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered and to obtain relief in respect of infringement of the trade mark in the manner provided by this Act. (2) The exclusive right to the use of a trade mark given under sub-section (1) shall be subject to any conditions and limitations to which the registration is subject. (3) Where two or more persons are registered proprietors of trade marks, which are identical with or nearly resemble each other, the exclusive right to the use of any of those trade marks shall not (except so far as their respective rights are subject to any conditions or limitations entered on the register) be deemed to have been acquired by any one of those person as against any other of those persons merely by registration of the trade marks but each of those persons has otherwise the same rights as against other persons (not being registered users using by way of permitted use) as he would have if he were the sole registered proprietor.”
22. By mere reading of these provisions, it is clear that a registered trademark is infringed by a person who not being a registered proprietor, uses in the course of trade a mark which is identical or deceptively similar in relation to the goods or services which are identical or similar to that in respect of which the trademark is registered without the permission of the trademark owner.
23. In order to establish infringement, the main ingredients of Section 29 of the Act are that the plaintiff's mark must be registered under the Act; the defendant's mark is identical with or deceptively similar to the registered trade mark; and the defendant's use of the mark is in the course of trade in respect of the goods covered by the registered trade mark. The rival marks are to be compared as a whole. Where two rival marks are identical, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove further that the use of defendant's trademark is likely to deceive and cause confusion as the registration shows the title of the registered proprietor and the things speak for themselves. In an infringement action, once a mark is used as indicating commercial origin by the defendant, no amount of added matter intended to show the true origin of the goods can effect the question. If Court finds that the defendant's mark is closely, visually and phonetically similar, even then no further proof is necessary.
24. The following are the judgments which are relevant to be referred for the purpose of infringement of the trade mark: i. In the case of Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories AIR1965SC980 – at 989990 page wherein it was held that:
“The action for infringement is a statutory remedy conferred on the registered proprietor of a registered trade mark for the vindication of the exclusive right to the use of the trade mark in relation to those goods” “if the essential features of the trade mark of the plaintiff have been adopted by the defendant, the fact that the get-up, packing and other writing or marks on the goods or on the packets in which he offers his goods for sale show marked differences, or indicate clearly a trade origin different from that of the registered proprietor of the make would be immaterial” ii. In the case of American Home Products v. Mac Laboratories AIR1986SC137in Para 36 it was held as under:
“When a person gets his trade mark registered, he acquires valuable rights by reason of such registration. Registration of his trade mark give him the exclusive right to the use of the trade mark in connection with the goods in respect of which it is registered and if there is any invasion of this right by any other person using a mark which is the same or deceptively similar to his trade mark, he can protect his trade mark by an action for infringement in which he can obtain injunction....”
iii. In the case of National Bell Co. v. Metal Goods Mfg. Co. AIR1971SC898at page 903 it was held as under:
“On registration of a trade mark the registered proprietor gets under Section 28 the exclusive right to the use of such trade marks in relation to the goods in respect of which the trade mark is registered and to obtain relief in respect of any infringement of such trade mark.”
iv. In the case of M/s Avis International Ltd. vs. M/s Avi Footwear Industries and another, reported in AIR1991Delhi 22, the relevant paras of which read as under:
“14. At this stage of the case, we have no affidavit against another affidavit, and in view of the statutory provisions of Ss. 28 and 31 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, it would be appropriate to rely upon contentions of the plaintiffs.
15. It is apparent that the word AEVI is not a commonly used word. The word is not in a dictionary. Its adoption by the defendants, therefore, needed to be explained, which the defendants have not explained in the pleadings before the Court.
16. Phonetically the word AVIS, which is registered mark for footwear, and the word AEVI'S have to be pronounced identically. The business name of the defendants is known as AVI Footwear Industries. Prima facie, if it was the intention of the defendants by affixing the label AEVI'S on the footwear made by them was to indicate that the footwear carrying that label is made by the AVI Footwear Industries, then the mark they would have adopted would have been AVI, but that they have not done. They have tried to bring their mark/ label as close as possible phonetically to the registered mark AVIS.
17. In my view, the statutory monopoly which has been conferred upon the plaintiffs in connection with use of the mark AVIS for any other consideration in relation to grant or non-grant of an injunction, especially when the matter is at an interlocutory state, and is yet to be tried, and it cannot be foreseen as to whether the defendants who seek rectification of the plaintiffs mark, on account of nonuser would be able to prove their case. The statutory registration establishes prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs.
18. In this view of the matter, I think that the balance of convenience would be in fav0uor of the plaintiffs, to ensure that by concurrent user, during the period of the trial, no other rights come into existence. In my view, it is very convenient, if the defendants are so minded, to adopt any other label that establishes a connection in the course of trade with respect to the footwear manufactured by them.”
25. The issue with regard to plea of third party registrations has been discussed and decided by the Division Bench of this Court when similar plea was raised by the defendant in the case of Jagan Nath Prem Nath Vs. Bhartiya Dhoop Karyalaya, AIR1975Delhi 149, wherein it was observed as under:
“12. There is another significant fact relevant for purposes of the present appeal. The respondent is admittedly a manufacturer of 'agarbatis'. By trade marks Nos. 180044 and 157462 he got the same registered in respect of these goods. Under the former trade mark he got the name of 'RAJKAMAL' per se registered in respect 'dhoopagarbatis' and 'havan samagaris' etc., for the territories mentioned in the certificate. By the latter registration he got the device mark registered. In none of these trade marks, numerals 555 appear. These numerals have now been added by the respondents to his registered trade mark. This prima facie lends support to the claim of the appellant that he has done so deliberately as these numerals have come to be associated in the mind of the public with a particular quality of 'agarbati' made by the manufacturer of trade marks with these numerals.
13. The learned single Judge felt disinclined to continue the injunction mainly because he found that two other manufacturers, whose names we have set out earlier in this order, had already been selling 'agarbatis' manufactured by them under their registered trade mark containing the numerals 555. To our mind, at the present stage, this alone, without anything more, docs not furnish a sufficient ground to discharge the injunction because of the provisions in subsection (3) of Section 28 of the Act. Sub-section (3) of this Section provides that where two or more persons arc registered proprietors of trade marks, which are identical with or nearly resemble each other, the exclusive right to the use of any of those trade marks shall not be deemed to have been acquired by any one of those persons but regarding the right of such registered proprietors against third parties, it says that:
“......each of those persons has otherwise the same rights as against other persons (not being registered users using by way of permitted use) as he would have if he were the sole registered proprietor.”
14. The result, Therefore, in law is that even though the appellant may not be in a position to enforce any right against the other two registered holders of the trade mark using the numerals of 555 but against every third person (including the respondent) who is no a registered holder of the trade mark, he is entitled to enforce all his rights as registered holder of the trade mark. In our view, Therefore, as the respondent itself has applied for rectification of the appellant's trade mark in respect of the numerals '555' and has specifically pleaded therein that the appellant's goods are not known in the market by these numerals (vide para 3 of the application referred to above) there was a prima fade case for the appellant for the confirmation of the injunction till such time as the respondent is able to prove his contention before the Registrar.
15. Shri P.C. Khanna, learned counsel for the respondent argued that where a distinct label is registered as a whole such a registration does not confer any exclusive statutory right on the proprietor to use any particular word or name contained therein, apart from the mark as a whole. Reliance in support of this proposition was placed on the observations in the Registrar of Trade Marks v. Ashok Chandra Rakhit Ltd. (1955) 2 S-CR. These observations in the cited case were made in the context of exercise of powers conferred on the Registrar by Section 13 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940. This aspect is not at all relevant for the present controversy because the plaintiff can succeed in an action for 'infringement' if he proves that an essential particular of his trade mark has been copied: See Taw Manufacturer Coy. Ltd. v. Notek Engineering Coy. Ltd. and another'. (1951) 68 RPC2712).”
26. In the case of Century Traders Vs. Roshan Lal Duggar Co., AIR1978Delhi 250 the Division Bench of this Court did not accept the view of the Single Judge that the plaintiff would not be entitled to the discretionary relief of injunction inasmuch as the words "RAJARANI" were common to the trade and observed as under:
“(14) Thus, the law is pretty well-settled that in order to succeed at this stage the appellant had to establish user of the aforesaid mark prior in point of time than the impugned user by the respondents. The registration of the said mark or similar mark prior in point of time to user by the appellant is irrelevant in an action passing off and the mere presence of the mark in the register maintained by the trade mark registry did not prove its user by the persons in whose names the mark was registered and was irrelevant for the purposes of deciding the application for interim injunction unless evidence had been led or was available of user of the registered trade marks. In our opinion, these clear rules of law were not kept in view by the learned Single Judge and led him to commit an error. (15) It has been urged on behalf of the respondents that inasmuch as the appellant had failed to show exclusive user, no prima facie case had been made out by it for issue of an interim injunction. The gist of the law relating to a passing off action was said to be as enunciated in T. Oertli A.G. v. E.J.
Bowman (London), Ld., Page, W. & Cov. (Turmix Sales) Ltd., H.G.H. Farnsworth S.S. Parness and F.A. Marlow, 1957 R.P.C. 388 and T. Oertli A.G. v. E.J.
Bowman (London) Ld. and others, 1959 R.P.C.I. 5.”
27. Law of publici juris has been discussed in various cases and the Courts have given their respective findings to the effect that a party who has taken the defence of publici juris has to prove his case. The same has been dealt with by the Courts in the following cases: (i) In Express Bottlers Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Pepsico Inc. and Ors., 1989 (9) PTC14 it has been observed as under :
“50.....To establish the plea of common use, the use by other persons should be shown to be substantial. In the present case, there is no evidence regarding the extent of the trade carried on by the alleged infringers or their respective position in the trade. If the proprietor of the mark is expected to pursue each and every insignificant infringer to save his mark, the business will come to a standstill. Because there may be occasion when the malicious persons, just to harass the proprietor may use his mark by way of pinpricks.... The mere use of the name is irrelevant because a registered proprietor is not expected to go on filing suits or proceedings against infringers who are of no consequence....”
(ii) In the case of Century Traders vs. Roshan Lal Duggar & Co., AIR1978Delhi 250 it was observed as under:
“14. Thus, the law is pretty well settled that in order to succeed at this stage the appellant had to establish user of the aforesaid mark prior in point of time than the impugned user by the respondents. The registration of the said mark or similar mark prior in point of time to user by the appellant is irrelevant in an action for passing off and the mere presence of the mark in the register maintained by the trade mark registry did not prove its user by the persons in whose names the mark was registered and was irrelevant for the purposes of deciding the application for interim injunction unless evidence had been led or was available of user of the registered trade marks. In our opinion, these clear rules of law were not kept in view by the learned single Judge and led him to commit an error.”
(iii) Reference may also be had to the judgment of this Court in the case of P.M. Diesels v. S.M. Diesels, AIR1994Del 264, where in para 8, this Court held as follows:
“(8) Next contention raised by learned counsel for the defendant is that the word Marshal has become common to the trade of diesel engines in Rajkot and various other persons are using the trade mark in one form or other as inasmuch as some are using Airmarshal, Perfect Marshal, Powermarshal etc. and the defendant is not the only person who is using the trade mark Sonamarshal only. The plaintiff, therefore, cannot claim its trade mark to be distinctive of its goods or business and no customer is likely to be confused or deceived on account of this trade mark. This contention of the learned counsel for the defendant is also without force. In this connection it is sufficient to say that under the law it is the right of two parties before the court which has to be determined and the court has not to examine the right of other parties. If some other manufacturers are using or suffixing the word Marshal on their diesel engines, it is of no consequence. Furthermore, if the plaintiff has not taken any action against several other infringements, this does not mean that the plaintiff has abandoned its trade mark and cannot challenge the action of the defendant.”
28. It is settled law that once the trademark is registered, the other party is not entitled to infringe the same who is not the registered proprietor even if trademark is wrongly registered. This is not the practice to copy the registered trademark unless it is rectified by the Trademarks Registry or the Appellant Board on the petition filed by the aggrieved party. In case the said plea is allowed in the action of infringement and the defendant is allowed to infringe the work, there would be havoc in the trade. Malafide adoption by the party who is infringing trademark has to be curbed at any cost.
29. In the case of Automatic Electric Ltd. Vs. R.K. Dhawan, (1999) (19) PTC81it was held that the defendant therein having got the trademark "DIMMER DOT" registered in Australia, could not contend that the word "DIMMER" is a generic expression. Automatic Electric Ltd. (supra), was approved by the Division Bench of this Court in The Indian Hotels Company Ltd. Vs. Jiva Institute of Vedic Science & Culture, 2008 (37) PTC468 wherein it was held that:
“40. It was next argued by Mr. Rohtagi that the word 'JIVA' is a descriptive word which cannot be protected as a trade mark by a Civil Court. We do not think so, the appellant has itself applied for registration of the Jiva as a trade mark and cannot, Therefore, argue that the mark is descriptive. In Automatic Electric Limited. v. R.K. Dhawan and Anr. 1999 PTC (91) 81 this court has in similar circumstances repelled the contention and held that since the defendant had itself sought to claim a proprietary right and monopoly in "DIMMER DOT", the disputed trade mark it did not lie in its mouth to say that the said mark was a generic expression.”
Passing off 30. The test of confusion and deception in order to prove the case of passing off has been very well discussed in the case of Laxmikant V. Patel vs. Chetanbhat Shah and Another, reported in (2002) 3 SCC65 wherein the Supreme Court while considering a plea of passing off and grant of ad interim injunction held in no uncertain terms that a person may sell his goods or deliver his services under a trading name or style which, with the passage of time, may acquire a reputation or goodwill and may become a property to be protected by the Courts. It was held that a competitor initiating sale of goods or services in the same name or by imitating that name causes injury to the business of one who has the property in that name. It was held that honesty and fair play are and ought to be the basic policy in the world of business and when a person adopts or intends to adopt a name which already belongs to someone else, it results in confusion, has the propensity of diverting the customers and clients of someone else to himself and thereby resulting in injury. It was held that the principles which apply to trade mark are applicable to trade name also. In para 10 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:
“The law does not permit any one to carry on his business in such a way as would persuade the customers or clients in believing that his goods or services belonging to someone else are his or are associated therewith. It does not matter whether the latter person does so fraudulently or otherwise. The reasons are two. Firstly, honesty and fair play are, and ought to be, the basic policies in the world of business. Secondly, when a person adopts or intends to adopt a name in connection with his business or services which already belongs to someone else it results in confusion and has propensity of diverting the customers and clients of someone else to himself and thereby resulting in injury.”
In this case, the Apex Court further observed that:
“Where there is probability of confusion in business, an injunction will be granted even though the defendants adopted the name innocently.”
31. The likelihood of confusion or deception in such cases is not disproved by placing the two marks side by side and demonstrating how small is the chance of error in any customer who places his order for goods with both the marks clearly before him, for orders are not placed, or are often not placed, under such conditions. It is more useful to observe that in most persons the eye is not an accurate recorder of visual detail and that marks are remembered rather by general impressions or by some significant detail than by any photographic recollection of the whole.
32. In view of the above facts, circumstances and the evidence filed on record, the plaintiff has established a prima facie case for the confirmation of the ex-parte order of interim injunction. The balance of convenience also lies in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants, if the interim order is not continued, the plaintiff would suffer loss and irreparable injury. Accordingly, the application, i.e. I.A. No.12386/2011 filed by the plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC is allowed. Till the disposal of the suit, the defendants are restrained from using, directly or indirectly advertising, copying, imitating the mark “Flexilam Nomex” or any other mark similar to the trademark of the plaintiff, and/or using description, colour, style and design similar to thes trademark of the plaintiff, and/or directly or indirectly reproducing/storing/selling or distributing goods under the trademark of the plaintiff.
33. The application is disposed of. CS(OS) No.1911/2011 List the matter before Joint Registrar for admission/denial of documents on 6th February, 2015. (MANMOHAN SINGH) JUDGE OCTOBER31 2014