Judgment:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED :
25. 04-2014 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE B. RAJENDRAN C.R.P. (NPD) No.1003 of 2006 Thuluva Vellalar Sangam, a registered Society, having its office at Door No.29/310, Vysyal Street Coimbatore Represented by its President .. Petitioner Versus 1. R. Manthrasalam 2. R. Manoharan 3. R. Rajendran 4. R. Santhanalakshmi 5. R. Premavathi 6. R. Jayakumar .. Respondents Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 115 of CPC against the fair and decreetal order dated 02.12.2005 passed in E.A. No.556 of 2003 in E.P. No.405 of 1984 in O.S. No.497 of 1970 on the file of the Principal District Munsif at Coimbatore. For Petitioner : Mr. S.V. Jayaraman, Senior Advocate for Mr. S. Raghu For Respondents : Mr. T.R. Rajaraman
ORDERThe petitioner/Sangam has filed this Civil Revision Petition questioning the correctness of the order dated 02.12.2005 passed in E.A. No.556 of 2003 in E.P. No.405 of 1984 in O.S. No.497 of 1970 on the file of the learned Principal District Munsif at Coimbatore. By the order dated 02.12.2005, the court below dismissed the E.A. No.556 of 2003 filed by the petitioner for restoration of E.P. No.405 of 1985, which was dismissed on 17.09.2003.
2. The learned Senior counsel for the revision petitioner would contend that the revision petitioner is the decree holder in the suit in O.S. No.497 of 1970 which was filed for recovery of possession. The suit was decreed on 19.01.1972 against which appeal was preferred by the defendants/judgment debtors which culminated in Second appeal before this Court and it was dismissed on 25.01.1980. Thereafter, to execute the decree, the revision petitioner has filed E.P. No.405 of 1984. During the pendency of the Execution Petition, some of the defendants died and therefore their legal heirs were brought on record. Ultimately, delivery was ordered by the trial court on 12.03.1986 and delivery was directed to be taken on or before 24.04.1986. As against this order, there was no appeal preferred by the judgment debtors. However, the revision petitioner/decree holder could not take delivery of possession as ordered by the court below. Since possession was not taken for a long time, as per the advise of the subsequent counsel for the revision petitioner/sangam, E.A. No.306 of 2002 was filed on 10.07.2002 on the ground that the President of the Sangam died. In fact, there was no necessity to file such a petition on the ground that the President of the Sangam died. In any event, this application in E.A. No.306 of 2002 was dismissed for default on 22.07.2002. Thereafter, another application in E.A. No.80 of 2003 was filed on 06.02.2003 to restore E.A. No.306 of 2002. Even this application was also dismissed for default on 17.09.2003. Consequent to this, the E.P. No.405 of 1984 itself was dismissed on the same day i.e., 17.09.2003, which according to the learned senior counsel for the petitioner was without notice. Therefore, the present application in E.A. No.556 of 2003 was filed by the petitioner. In the meanwhile, CRP No.569 of 2003 was filed before this Court against the order dated 25.06.2002 made in E.A. No.23 of 1999 only to be dismissed on 06.11.2003 as infructuous since the Execution Petition No.405 of 1984 itself was dismissed.
3. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner would contend that the petitioner has blamed his counsel on record for having committed breach of trust. The petitioner also sent a notice to his counsel for which the counsel has issued a reply on 07.11.2003 denying the averments contained in the notice. It is his further contention that E.A. Nos. 345 and 346 of 1986 were filed by him for police aid and break open of the premises in question during March 1986 pursuant to the order passed for delivery of possession. Both the applications were however closed on 07th March 1996 on technical grounds without giving any reasons. Therefore, according to the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, the applications in E.A. Nos. 345 and 346 of 1986 are still pending and they cannot be construed to have been closed. It is further contended by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that E.A. No.306 of 2002 was unnecessarily filed at the advise of his counsel on record inasmuch as the death of the President of Sangam will not be a bar for continuing the suit proceedings. In any event, the petitioner has given reasons for allowing the present application, but without considering the same, the court below dismissed the application and it warrants interference by this Court.
4. In support of his contention, the learned senior counsel for the petitoiner relied on the decision of this Court reported in (Munikrishna Achari vs. Kanniappa @ Raja Gounder) 1998 III CTC645to contend that when the execution petition was dismissed on technical grounds, it will not be a ground of depriving the benefits of the decree in favour of the decree holder.
5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents repudiated the contentions of the revision petitioner on the ground that the entire proceedings are barred by limitation. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, the Execution Petition itself was dismissed long back and merely because the petitioner blames the advocate engaged by them, without any other reason, it will not entitle them to get the relief sought for in the present application. It is further contended that the petitioner society is a defunct society. Further, the present petitioner Ilangovan is not the elected President of the Sangam with effect from 23.08.2002 and he was not the authorised representative to represent the Sangam. Even the registration of the society as such is deemed to be cancelled, in such event, the petitioner has no locus standi to represent the Sangam before the Court. The petitioner has not come forward with any acceptable reason as to why they could not take delivery before 24.04.1986, as has been ordered by the Court below. Even as per the averments of the petitioner, the Execution Petition reached a finality by the order dated 12.03.1986, while so, the present application is barred by limitation. Therefore, the learned counsel for the respondents prayed for dismissal of the application.
6. The learned counsel for the respondents relied on the following decisions viz., (i) (Bala Tripura Sundramma vs. Abdul Khader) AIR1933Madraw 418 (Full Bench) (II) (Dunna Venkata Rao vs. Sree Rajah Saheb Meharban) AIR (37) 1950 Madras 2 (C.N.2) (1) (iii) (Hameed Joharan (dead) and others vs. Abdul Salam (dead) by LRs and others) (2001) 7 Supreme Court Cases 573 and (iv) (Shiv Kumar Sharma vs. Santosh Kumari) 2007 SAR (Civil) 819 (Supreme Court) to contend that the present application is barred by limitation and that exercise of equity juridiction cannot be exercised only when no law operates in the field.
7. I heard the learned senior counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents. An interesting question of law arises for consideration in this revision petition as to when the order passed for delivery of possession comes to an end in the event of default committed by the revision petitioner to take delivery. For determining such question, the facts of the case has to be stated in brief.
8. The suit in O.S. No.497 of 1970 was filed for recovery of possession and it was decreed on 19.01.1972. The decree passed in the suit was subjected to challenge before the Appellate Forum and it culminated in dismissal of the second appeal by this Court on 25.01.1980. The judgment debtor died on 25.04.1983 and therefore, the petitioner/decree holder filed E.P. No.405 of 1984 to bring on record the legal heirs of the deceased Judgment debtor. On 12.03.1986, the Execution Petition for delivery of possession was ordered and the respondents 2 to 9 were added as parties to the suit. The delivery was ordered to be effected on or before 24.04.1986. Subsequently, applications were filed for police aid and to break open but those applications were kept pending till 1991 and ultimately they were closed on technical grounds. In the meanwhile, the President of the Sangam died during 1991 and therefore, an application in E.A. No.306 of 2002 came to be filed to amend the Execution Petition in view of the death of the President of the Sangam. That application was dismissed for default, therefore, E.A. No.80 of 2003 was filed for restoration of E.A. No.306 of 2002. This E.A. No.80 of 2003 was also dismissed for default on 17.09.2003. Thereafter, the present application in E.A. No.556 of 2003 was filed for restoration of E.A. No.80 of 2003. In the meantime, a Civil Revision Petition No.859 of 2003 was filed before this Court against an order passed in E.A. No.23 of 1999 and that was also dismissed on 06.11.2003 as infructuous.
9. According to the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, the counsel who appeared before the Court below has to be blamed as he has not taken care of the case properly which led to the dismissal of the Execution Petition and the dismissal of the applications which were filed subsequently. For the mistake committed by the counsel on record, the petitioner need not be penalised especially when the petitioner could not enjoy the fruits of the decree passed in the suit. The learned senior counsel further submitted that once delivery was ordered, it is only a formality to be followed and failure to take possession will not disentitle the petitioner from enjoying the fruits of the decree. This is more so that the order dated 12.03.1986 for delivery of possession was not challenged by the judgment debtor. Merely because the subsequent applications filed by the petitioner were dismissed on technical grounds, the order passed in the Execution Petition will not go and it remains. The right of the revision petitioner by virtue of the decree passed in the suit cannot be taken away on technical grounds. There is nothing further to argue in this case and therefore the subsequent conduct of the case by the counsel for the petitioner or by the petitioner need not be taken into consideration by this Court. Further, the Execution Petition was summarily closed without hearing the petitioner. The learned senior counsel for the petiitoner relied on the decision of this Court reported in (Munikrishna Achari vs. Kanniappa @ Raja Gounder) 1998 III CTC645wherein in Para Nos. 2 to 4, it was held as follows:- 2. With respect to the objection that has been raised by the lower court regarding maintainability of the petition, it is already settled by this Court in the judgment reported in Veera Boyan vs. Ponnusamy Gounder and 3 others, 1998 (3) L.W.
405. While referring to the judgments of various High Courts and also the judgment of this Court reported in Ganapathy vs. Murugesan Chetty, 1989 (2) L.W. 38, the learned Judge held as follows:- Ds already noticed by me, the hearing was over on 18.12.1991 itself on which date the court passed an order for executing the sale deed. Therefore, on and from that date there was no hearing in that case and the right of the parties in the execution petition was decided on that date itself. Therefore, on 10.03.1992, the E.P. Was not called for any hearing. If that is the factual situation the order under challenge in this revision holding that the limitation prescribed under Order 21, Rule 106 of the CPC will apply cannotbe sustained. Accordingly, the order under challenge is set aside and the revision is allowed. 3. In view of the above, after setting the respondent ex parte in the execution petition, question of hearing further in execution will not arise. So, the order passed by the executing Court on 02.12.1993 cannot be said to be passed under Order 21 Rule 10 CPC so as to enable the lower court to direct the petitioner to file application under Order 21 Rule 106 CPC. In view of the above, the petitioner is correct in filing an application under Section 151 of CPC.
4. As stated by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, execution petition is a last one and if it is not restored so as to enable the petitioner to file sale papers, he will lose the benefits got under the valid decree. The dismissal of execution petition is only on technical ground. Hence, the lower Court is not correct in rejecting the petitioner's application on the ground that the petitioner cannot maintain the petition. Hence, the order of the lower Court is set aside and E.A. No.71 of 1994 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Gudiyatham is ordered and the executing court is directed to proceed with the execution petition in accordance with the law. 10. A reading of the decision of this Court relied on by the senior counsel for the petitioner would indicate that it was a case where the judegment debtor remained exparte and consequently some orders were passed. Therefore, it was concluded by this Court that the technical grounds need not be taken into consideration and the executing Court will not deprive the right of the parties in deriving the fruits of the decree. Whereas, in this case, it is not so. There were lot of default committed by the petitioner. First of all, it is not known as to why the petitioner did not take any steps to take delivery of possession between 1986 and 2002 and there is absolutely no explanation offered by the petitioner. No doubt, in the interregnum, the petitioner has filed applications seeking police aid and to break open and they were closed in the year 1996. For the first time, the petitioner has again approached the Court only in the year 2002 by filing an Execution Application, being E.A. No.306 of 2002 filed on 10.07.2002 on the ground that the President of the Sangam died. Such a long delay on the part of the petitioner remain unexplained. It is also to be taken note of that due to such a long delay attributable on the part of the petitioner, the respondents might have derived certain rights over the property and such right cannot be simply brushed aside by this Court. Even though the petitioner obtained an order for delivery of possession, the petitioner has not chosen to utilise it in time with the result, allowing the respondents to derive certain. In any event, there is no plausible explanation offered by the petitioner for the inordinate delay in taking steps to take delivery of possession of the property.
11. I had perused the records which would indicate that barring one sentence stating that the counsel engaged by the petitioner before the court below did not take care of the case properly, there is no other reason given in the affidavit for the inordinate delay in taking steps to take delivery of possession of the property. In this context, it is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Full Bench of this Court reported in (Bala Tripura Sundramma vs. Abdul Khader) AIR1933Madraw 418 (Full Bench) wherein, the Full Bench of this Court had determined the test to be applied with respect to the principle of revival. It was held by the Full Bench of this Court as under:- But that seems rather to beg the quesiton. If the application is one which must be made in order to save the bar of limitation it is neither futile nor unnecessary. As observed by Seshagiri Ayyar, J., in the same case on p.211 the Judicial Committee have held that exceptions not covered by the Sections of the Limitation Act should not be imported by Courts to relive a party from the bar of limitation, and this principle is not overlooked in the six Privy Council cases which he cites including Nrityamoni Dossai vs. Lakhan Chandra (11)..... In Satyanarayana Brahman vs. Seethayya it is also held that whatever view be taken of Nrityamoni Dossai vs. Lakhan Chandra (11) no equitable ground for suspension of a cause of action can be added to the provisions of the Limitation Act. Ammathayi Ammal vs. Sivarama Pillai (14) is to the same effect. A recent Privy Council case, Nagendra Nath Dey vs. Suresh Chandra Dey (15), lays down that though in theory some rule in regard to collateral litigation may be intelligible, when however there is no such rule in the Act, the only practical course is to interpret and follow the Act's provisions. We agree and hold that if the appellant cannot bring herself within the exemptions provided for in the Act, she cannot escape the bar of limitation by pleading in equity an implied order, or a collateral litigation which would render her proceedings futile. .....If this statement is correct, it may very well be contended that the present execution application may be deemed to be one for the revival of the former one which was wrongly dismissed by reason of an obstacle which was subsequently removed and for no fault or neglect of the decree-holder. But as I have set forth above, the dismissal of E.P. No.57 of 1922, as would appear from the orders thereon, was due to the non-payment of batta for fresh sale notice as ordered by the Court. There is nothing to show that by reason of the above adverse decision in O.S. No.14 of1920 the executing Court dismissed that petition on the ground that the properties could not be put up for sale. In the absence of any sort of proof in support of the assertion made in ground No.13 of the appeal memo and in the face of the express order of the Court passed on 16th January 1923, the only possible conclusion in this case is that petition was dismissed on that date on account of the failure of decree-holder to pay batta for fresh sale notice as ordered by the Court. Though O.9 and O.17, Civil P.C. do not apply to execution proceedings, still the Court has, doubtless, inherent power to dismiss an application for execution when the applicant makes default in the payment of batta which is necessary to put the Court in a position to proceed with the application. That being so, the dismissal of the execution petition on 16th January 1923 on account of the default of the decree-holder due to her own laches was a proper and final disposal of that petition. The principle of law deducible from a long course of decisions seems to be, that an application for execution which has been finally and properly dismissed cannot be revived......
12. The learned counsel for the respondents has further relied on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of (Dunna Venkata Rao vs. Sree Rajah Saheb Meharban) reported in AIR (37) 1950 Madras 2 (C.N.2) (1) wherein the Division Bench of this Court held that it is not every dismissal that would terminate the attachment but only a dismissal for a decree-holder's default. The 'default' contemplated is not merely one of default in appearance or in payment of process fee or production of documents, but includes also the failure to do what a decree-holder is bound to do, in order to enable the Court to proceed further with the application for execution. When once the Court dismisses the application for default of the decree-holder the Court has no power to continue the attachment as it would be opposed to the mandatory provision in the rule that on the dismissal of each application, the attachment shall cease. In Para No.7, it was held as follows:- 7. In the Civil Procedure Code of 1882 (Act IV of 1882) there was no provision similar to Order 21, Rule 57. Considerable difficulty was experienced in interpreting orders of Courts passed on execution petitions ".striking off execution proceedings "., or ". removing proceedings from the file ". or ". lodging ". them. There was considerable doubt whether such orders had the effect of putting an end to the attachment. There was no justification, it was felt, for such orders under any of the provisions of the Code. In order to put a stop to the practice of making such orders the Code of 1908 for the first time introduced the new rule, Order 21, Rule 57 which is in these terms: When any property has been attached in execution of the decree but by reason of the decree-holder's default the Court is unable to proceed further with the application in execution, it shall either dismiss the application or for any sufficient reason adjourn the proceedings to a future date. Upon the dismissal of such application the attachment shall cease. The rule gave an option to the Court, when by reason of the decree-holder's default it was unable to proceed with the further execution either to adjourn the proceedings or dismiss. If there was a dismissal of the application the attachment automatically ceased. Though in terms the rule does not apply to cases where there was an attachment before judgment, as such attachment is not strictly in execution of a decree, a Full Bench of this Court in Meyyappa Chettiar v. Chidambaram Chettiar (1923) 46 M.L.J.
415 : I.L.R. 47 Mad. 483 (F.B.) held that the expression ".property attached in execution". in Order 21, Rule 57, Civil Procedure Code included also property attached before judgment, when, there was a decree in the suit which was followed by an execution petition for bringing the property attached to sale, and that the dismissal of such application would carry with it the penal consequences provided in Order 21, Rule 57. This was also the view of Bombay and some other Courts, though the High Courts of Allahabad, Calcutta and Patna disagreed with that view. Under this rule it is not every dismissal that would terminate the attachment but only a dismissal for a decree-holder's default. The ".default". contemplated was not merely one of default in appearance or in payment of process fee or production of documents but included also the failure to do what a decree-holder was bound to do, in order to enable the Court to proceed further with the application for execution. When once the Court dismisses the application for default of the decree-holder the Court has no power to continue the attachment as it would be opposed to the mandatory provision in the rule that on the dismissal of such application the attachment shall cease. See Namunna Bibi v. Rosha Miah (1911) I.L.R. 38 Cal. 482 Dildar Husain v. Sheo Narain (1918) 41 All. 157 and Vijayadas Hanumantdas v. Shekharappa Anantappa I.L.R. 1941 Bom. 652 (AIR (28) 1941 Bom. 395). With a view to clarify the rule further this High Court and the other High Courts under the rule making power have altered the provisions of this rule in different ways. In 1936 this High Court substituted for the rule as contained in the Code of 1908, the following rule as Rule 57: (1) Where any property has been attached in execution of a decree and the Court hearing the execution application either dismisses it or adjourns the proceedings to a future date, it shall state whether the attachment continues or ceases : Provided that when the Court dismisses such an application by reason of the decreeholder's default the order shall state that the attachment do cease. There is also a Sub-clause (2) to the rule which has been added by this Court but as it is not relevant for the purpose of the present discussion it need not be set out here. Under the first clause the Court hearing an execution application may either dismiss the application or adjourn it to a future date. It is obligatory on the Court to state the fact whether the attachment continues or ceases. The dismissal of the application or the adjournment of it is not confined in this clause to the default of the decree-holder as under the old rule. An execution Court may dismiss the execution application for other reasons than the default of the decree-holder; as for example, where an execution was stayed by a superior Court or under Act IV of 1938, or execution could not be proceeded with for want of bidders on the date of the sale. Under the proviso, however, while the Court dismisses an application by reason of the decree-holder's default it is obligatory on the part of the Court to state that the attachment will cease. This is practically what was provided for in the rule which was replaced, as under that rule when an application was dismissed for default of the decree-holder the attachment immediately ceased. The interpretation placed upon the old rule with reference to the expression ".attached in execution of the decree ". by the Full Bench in Meyyappa Chettiar v. Chidambaram Chettiar (1923) 46 M.L.J.
415 : I.L.R.47 Mad. 483 (F.B.) and the meaning of the word ". default ". as interpreted by the decisions under the old rule would equally apply to the substituted rule.
13. In the decison of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of (Mahammad Gaffar Baig vs. Mahammad Abdul Khaleel Khan) reported in AIR1957Andhra Pradesh 991 (V44C316Dec.) (I) a learned single Judge held that non-prosecution of the petition such as by not pressing it amounts to a default of the decree-holder. The default envisaged in rule 57 is not confined to non-appearance or non-payment of batta or failure to produce necessary documents. It also includes failure to do things for the successful execution of the decree. In Para No.3, it was held as follows:- 3. In this appeal, the decision of the trial court is impugned as being unsustainable. It is urged for the appellant that since E.P. No.221 of 1951 was dismissed for default of the decree-holder the attachment should be deemed to have been raised and therefore the sale proceedings could not be continued. The argument of Mr. Ramarao is that though no specific order was passed by the executing Court raising the attachment it would have that effect since the petition was dismissed for the default of the decree-holder and this is founded on the provisi to O.21, R.57..... To this extent, the argument for the appellant seems to be sound. Though no specific order is made that the attachment ceased, if the application was dismissed by reason of the decree-holder's default, the result contemplated in the proviso would have followed as a necessary corollary. There is also force in the submission of Mr. Ramarao for the appellant that the non-prosecution of the petition such as by not pressing it amounts to a default of the decree-holder. There is abundant authority for the position that the default envisaged in that rule is not confined to non-appearance or non-payment of batta or failure to produce necessary documents. It also includes failure to do things for the successful execution of the decree.......
14. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of (Hameed Joharan (dead) and others vs. Abdul Salam (dead) by LRs and others) reported in (2001) 7 Supreme Court Cases 573 by the learned counsel for the respondents to drive home the point that limitation starts by reason of the statutory provisions as prescribed in the statute. Time does not stop running at the instance of any individual unless, of course, the same has a statutory sanction being conditional. In Para N9.39, the Honourable Supreme Court held as follows:- 39. Let us examine the matter from another perspective. Limitation Act has been engrafted in the Statute Book in the year 1963 and the Indian Stamp Act has been brought into existence by the British Parliament in 1899 though, however, the Government of India Adaptation of Indian Laws Order 1937, the Indian Independence Adaptation of Central Acts and Ordinance Order 1948 and the Adaptation of Laws Order 1950 allowed this fiscal statute to remain on the statute book. The legislature while engrafting 1963 Act, it is presumed and there being a golden canon of interpretation of statutes, that it had in its mind the existing Indian Stamp Act before engrafting the provisions under Article 136. A latter statute obviously will have the effect of nullifying an earlier statute in the event of there being any conflict provided however and in the even there is otherwise legislative competency in regard thereto. As regards the legislative competency, there cannot be any doubt which can stand focussed neither there is any difficulty in correlating the two statutes being operative in two different and specified spheres. Enforceability of the decree cannot be the subject matter of Section 35 neither the limitation can be said to be under suspension. The heading of the Section viz., ".Instrument not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence etc.". (emphasis supplied) itself denotes its sphere of applicability: it has no relation with the commencement of period of limitation. As noticed above 'executability' and 'enforceability' are two different concepts having two specific connotation in legal parlance. They cannot be termed as synonymous, as contended by Mr. Mani nor they can be attributed one and the same meaning. Significantly, the final partition decree, whenever it is drawn bears the date of the decree when the same was pronounced by Court and bit when it stands engrossed on a stamp paper and signed by the judge and this simple illustration takes out the main thrust of Mr. Mani's submission as regards the applicability of the Stamp Act viz-a-vis, the enforceability of the decree. The decree may not be received in evidence nor it can be acted upon but the period of limitation cannot be said to remain under suspension at the volition and mercy of the litigant. Limitation starts by reason of the statutory provisions as prescribed in the statute. time does not stop running at the instance of any individual unless, of course, the same has a statutory sanction being conditional as more fully noticed hereinbefore: the Special Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Bholanath Karmakarand others v. Madanmohan Karmakar , in our view has completely misread and misapplied the law for the reasons noted above and thus cannot but be said to be not correctly decided and thus stands overruled. Undoubtedly, the judgment of the Calcutta High Court has been a very learned judgment but appreciation of the legislative intent has not been effected in a manner apposite to the intent rather had a quick shift therefrom by reason where for, the Special Bench came to a manifest error in recording that the period of limitation for execution of a partition decree shall not begin to run until the decree is engrossed on requisite stamp paper.
15. Lastly, the learned counsel for the respondents relied on yet another decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of (Shiv Kumar Sharma vs. Santosh Kumari) reported in 2007 SAR (Civil) 819 (Supreme Court) to contend that equity must yield to law, however, such exercise of equity jurisdiction is subject to the provisions of law and it can be exercised only when no law operates in the field. In para No.21 of this decision, the Honourable Supreme Court held that The Courts in India exercise jurisdiction both in equity as well as law, but exercise of equity jurisdiction is always subject to the provisions of law. If exercise of equity, jurisdiction would violate the express provisions contained in law, the same cannot be done. Equity jurisdiction can be exercised only when no law operates in the field.
16. If the ratio laid down in the decisions relied on by the counsel for the respondents mentioned supra is applied to the facts of this case, the decree holder has exhibited lack of prudence in taking steps to take delivery of possession. Even though there is no appeal preferred against the order for delivery of possession, by the respondents/judgment debtors, it is not known as to why the revision petitioner failed to take steps to assert his right for delivery of possession for a long time, thereby the revision petitioner allowed the period of limitation to run to over ride his right. By such act on the part of the revision petitioner, the respondents have derived a right over the property for a long time and such right also cannot be simply brushed aside by this Court. There is no acceptable or convincing reason assigned by the revision petitioner for the inordinate delay in taking steps to take delivery of possession barring few sentences where he blamed the counsel before the trial court for breach of trust. The petitioner, at each and every stage, has left the applications to be dismissed for default without any acceptable reason. In those circumstances, I do not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the trial court. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs. 25-04-2014 rsh Index : Yes Internet : Yes To The Principal District Munsif Coimbatore B. RAJENDRAN, J rsh Pre-delivery Order in CRP (NPD) No.1003 of 2006 25.04.2014